Indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in incomplete market structures with financial assets as an extreme form of market coordination breakdown

Market coordination breakdowns can be formulated in terms of Incomplete Market Structures, whatever is the assumption made about market power (monopoly or competition). When the assumption of competition is made, and financial assets generate an incomplete market structure, there are, generically, an infinite number of equilibria. It is shown that after embedding the model of incomplete markets in a more general model based on the absence of double coincidence of wants, a game theoretic concept of equilibrium, like the Core, allows us to prove an equivalence theorem, i.e. to show that indeterminacy is caused by the fact that the returns of financial assets have no direct utility.     

Information and Liquidity

We study how recognizability affects assets’ acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock certificates, bonds or foreign currency, say. This idea is common in monetary economics, but previous models deliver equilibria where less recognizable assets are always accepted with positive probability, never probability 0. This is inconvenient when prices are determined through bargaining, which is difficult with private information. We construct models where agents reject outright assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Thus, information frictions generate liquidity differences without overly complicating the analysis.     

What’s wrong with Pittsburgh? Delegated investors and liquidity concentration

What makes an asset institutional quality? This paper proposes that one reason is the existing concentration of delegated investors in a market through a liquidity channel. Consistent with this intuition, it documents differences in investor composition across US cities and shows that delegated investors concentrate their investments in cities with higher turnover. It then estimates a search model showing how heterogeneity in liquidity preferences makes some markets more liquid, even when assets have identical cash flows. The paper provides evidence for clientele equilibria arising in frictional asset markets and suggests that a liquidity channel may explain divergent paths in city development.     

Debt-overhang banking crises: Detecting and preventing systemic risk

This paper shows how the debt-overhang distortion on bank lending can generate a self-fulfilling-expectations banking crisis accompanied by a plunge in the value of banks’ assets and a contraction of bank lending and economic activity. Moral hazard in banking adds an additional channel that can generate multiple equilibria, worsen the debt-overhang distortion, and deepen the crisis. Some signals of systemic risk include: high volatility and the presence of two modes in the probability distribution functions of the returns on bank-issued bonds and on portfolios of bank-issued bonds and equities; and high correlation between the returns on bank-issued bonds. Macroprudential regulation should discourage the exposure of banks to the economic and financial cycle by raising the capital requirements for banks with more cyclical assets.     

Patterns in cross market liquidity

Academic research on liquidity has generally focused on explaining what can be called within market liquidity. That is it seeks to explain things like why one stock is more liquid than another. But there has been considerably less attention to cross market liquidity: the issue of why some securities are more liquid than others. For example, stocks are apparently far more liquid than high yield bonds. Why? Why do some markets exist (orange juice for example) while others do not (potatoes for example)? This article lays out the current academic evidence regarding liquidity across assets and explains why current theories have trouble with one item or another. The challenge then is to produce an overarching theory that offers predictions that are closer to what the data seems to imply about cross market liquidity.     

Non-implementability of Arrow–Debreu equilibria by continuous trading under volatility uncertainty

In diffusion models, a few suitably chosen financial securities allow to complete the market. As a consequence, the efficient allocations of static Arrow–Debreu equilibria can be attained in Radner equilibria by dynamic trading. We show that this celebrated result generically fails if there is Knightian uncertainty about volatility. A Radner equilibrium with the same efficient allocation as in an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists if and only if the discounted net trades of the equilibrium allocation display no ambiguity in the mean. This property is violated generically in endowments, and thus Arrow–Debreu equilibrium allocations are generically unattainable by dynamically trading a few long-lived assets.     

Money,Asset Prices,and the Liquidity Premium

This paper examines the effect of monetary policy on the market value of the liquidity services that financial assets provide, known as the liquidity premium. The theory predicts that money supply and nominal interest rates have positive effects on the liquidity premium, but asset supply has a negative effect. The empirical analysis with U.S. data confirms the theoretical predictions. The theory also proposes that the liquidity properties of assets can cause negative nominal yields when the money holding cost is low and liquid assets are scarce. The suggestive empirical findings in Switzerland to support this theoretical result are presented.     

Monetary Policy,Asset Prices,and Liquidity in Over‐the‐Counter Markets

We develop a model where agents can allocate their wealth between a liquid asset, which can be used to purchase consumption goods, and an illiquid asset, which represents a better store of value. Should a consumption opportunity arise, agents may visit a frictional “over‐the‐counter” secondary asset market where they can exchange illiquid for liquid assets. We characterize how monetary policy affects both the issue price and the secondary market price of the asset. We also show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, search and bargaining frictions in the secondary asset market can improve welfare if inflation is low.     

Managing markets for toxic assets

A model in which banks trade toxic assets to raise funds for investment is analyzed. Toxic assets generate an adverse selection problem and, consequently, the interbank asset market provides insufficient liquidity. Investment is inefficiently low because acquiring funding requires banks to sell high-quality assets for less than their “fair” value. Equity injections reduce liquidity and may be counterproductive as a policy for increasing investment. Paradoxically, if it is directed to firms with the greatest liquidity needs, an equity injection will reduce investment further. Asset purchase programs, like the Public–Private Investment Program, often have favorable impacts on liquidity, investment and welfare.     

The Downside of Asset Screening for Market Liquidity

This paper explores the tension between asset quality and market liquidity. I model an originator who screens assets whose cash flows are later sold in secondary markets. Screening improves asset quality but gives rise to asymmetric information, hindering trade of the asset cash flows. In the optimal mechanism (second‐best), costly retention of cash flows is essential to implement asset screening. Market allocations can feature too much or too little screening relative to second‐best, where too much screening generates inefficiently illiquid markets. Furthermore, the economy is prone to multiple equilibria. The optimal mechanism is decentralized with two tools: retention rules and transfers.     

Informational asymmetries and a multiplier effect on price correlation and trading

Summary In this paper we show how rational expectations equilibrium models with asymmetric information, without market frictions, can generate extreme comovements in asset prices. Information asymmetries generate a multiplier effect on price correlation - a World Bank definition of financial contagion. This is shown in two frameworks: perfect and imperfect competition. In the first framework, we also model a version of home-bias, showing why information sharing explains crosscountry capital flows. In the second framework, we provide closed form solutions for a model with multiple insiders and assets that generalize the ideas in [10].     

The financial reporting of fair value based on managerial inputs versus market inputs: evidence from mortgage servicing rights

This research examines whether the fair value of mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the cash flow and risk characteristics of the underlying assets than the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). Using mortgage servicing fees as a proxy for the underlying cash flows, we find that the valuation multiples for MSRs based on Level 3 inputs are more positively associated with the persistence of future servicing fees compared with the fair value of MSRs based on Level 2 inputs. We also document that only the valuation multiples based on Level 3 fair values are negatively associated with proxies for risk factors. Our results suggest that, although unobservable inputs are subject to managerial discretions, managers can generate higher quality fair value estimates than market inputs due to their information advantage, especially when the market for the underlying asset is inactive.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

The Impact of Large Portfolio Insurers on Asset Prices

We develop a simple model in which the presence of portfolio insurers in a market of risk-averse traders leads to multiple equilibria for the pricing of financial assets and can cause an increase in volatility, including insurance-induced price drops. We demonstrate, however, that centralized portfolio insurance firms may actually reduce, not increase, volatility, even if the existence of these firms increases the total amount of funds under insurance.     

Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows

The paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets. Analyzing mutual fund data, we find that, consistent with a theoretical model, funds with illiquid assets (where complementarities are stronger) exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets. We also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors. We present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects. We analyze the implications for funds’ performance and policies.     

Reputation and interdealer trading: a microstructure analysis of the Treasury Bond market

Trading generates not only information about the payoff of the assets traded, but also information about the traders themselves. Over time this information creates reputation. By using a unique dataset on the Treasury bond market, we derive a measure of reputation. This is then used to group dealers on the basis of their reputation and to analyze how they react to the reputation of other dealers. We show that the same type of trade, on the same asset, in the same market can generate different volume and volatility patterns depending on the type of dealers originating it. We also identify the “salient traders”. These traders, even if they do not originate the biggest volume of trade, have the highest impact on the market. These results have strong implications in terms of forecastability of future returns, volatility and overall trading volume because they show that most of the explanatory power of trades is due to salient traders.     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

A Note on the Determinants of the Outcomes of Bankruptcy Petitions: Evidence From Korea

This study provides evidence on the determinants of the outcomes of bankruptcy petitions using Korean firms for the period from 1977 to 1994. We hypothesize that a firm with more free assets, less liquid assets, longer existing period, larger size, lower operating risk, and more goodwill would have higher survival prospects from the bankruptcy petition. The results from logit estimation confirm this hypothesis. The free assets, existing period, firm size, and goodwill have positive influence on the probability of reorganization, while the liquid assets, and operating risk are negatively related to the probability of reorganization. Among these variables, the free assets percentage is the most significant at the one percent level in determining the outcomes of bankruptcy petitions. This reveals that a bankrupt firm with more free assets tends to be reorganized because it would be easy to obtain additional financing needed for the successful reorganization. The liquid assets and existing period are also significant at the five percent level. We conclude that a firm with more free assets, less liquid assets, and longer existing period would have higher survival prospects in Korea.     

Dynamic Spanning in the Consumption-Based Capital Asset Pricing Model

Under the assumptions of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM), Pareto optimal consumption allocations are characterized by each agent's consumption process being adapted to the filtration generated by the aggregate consumption process of the economy. The wealth processes of the agents, however, are adapted to the finer filtration generated by aggregate consumption and the conditional distribution of future aggregate consumption. Therefore, in order to achieve Pareto optimal consumption allocations, a sufficiently varied set of assets must exist such that any wealth process adapted to this finer filtration can be implemented by dynamically trading in that set of assets. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of such a set of assets based on dynamically trading contingent claims on aggregate consumption. In addition, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in a dynamically effectively complete market in which agents are only able to trade in contingent claims on aggregate consumption, the market portfolio of firms, and a (numeraire) zero-coupon bond. We demonstrate the role of short- and long-term contingent claims on aggregate consumption for the implementation of Pareto optimal allocations in the presence of short- andlong-term risks. In addition, in the presence of personal risks, we demonstrate the role of insurance contracts.     

Growth Opportunities and Investment Decisions: A New Perspective on the Cost of Capital

This paper shows that it is not always correct to make an upward adjustment to the stock beta in calculating the hurdle rate for capital budgeting even when the project under consideration is riskier than existing assets. The paper also shows that the correct hurdle rate is smaller than the market capitalization rate calculated from the firm's stock beta when the project under consideration has the same risk as existing assets. In addition, it is shown that the market capitalization rate will be an underestimate (overestimate) of the correct hurdle rate when the risk of future assets is greater (smaller) than both the risk of assets in place and that of future capital expenditures. These new results are direct consequences of the insight that the firm's investment opportunities are in fact real call options written on underlying assets.