The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement

Summary  The paper briefly reviews previous studies of the deterrent effect of competition enforcement. It then describes the key findings of a recent report commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading on the scale of the deterrent effect of merger control and competition law enforcement in the UK. The research, which was based on in-depth interviews and phone surveys with senior competition lawyers and large UK companies also indicated which sanctions may be more effective at deterring anti-competitive behaviour and provided suggestions for improving deterrence. The paper discusses a number of policy issues raised by the research’s findings. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the OFT or Deloitte. This paper was prepared for the October 2007 workshop on Measuring the Effects of Competition Law Enforcement, organized by the Netherlands Competition Authority.     

The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands

Summary  In this paper we try to bridge the gap between the outcome ambitions of competition policy in terms of welfare gains and consumer surplus and the longer term effects of competition policy on growth and employment. First of all, an overview is given of the different definitions of welfare. We explain why maximising the consumer surplus is an important part of the mission statement for most competition authorities. In the second part of the paper we estimate the impact of the introduction of the competition law on economic development. The effects of antitrust policies, merger control and energy regulation on the consumer surplus appear substantial. This increase in consumer surplus can be interpreted as a cut in the “market power wedge” which, from a modelling point of view, is comparable to a cut in the tax wedge. A model simulation for the Netherlands shows that the economy responded positively to this increase in the consumer surplus. We find that production has grown by an extra 0.5% and that employment has increased by 0.4% as a result of the enforcement of the Competition Law. The authors are respectively Chief Economist of the NMa and senior advisor at the Office of the Chief Economist of the NMa. This paper is the background paper for the presentation with the same title at the conference “Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement”, held in The Hague, 17 and 18 October 2007. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

论执法人员在执法活动中的失误及其补救

执法人员在执法过程中造成的失误 ,给公民、法人和社会组织的合法权益造成了损失。究其原因是多方面的 ,既有主观的 ,也有客观的。主观方面表现为执法人员素质低下 ,对法律、法规的理解不透 ;客观方面表现在法律不健全及各方面的干扰 ,造成了执法方面的失误。因此 ,就要求我们对执法人员造成的失误要及时补救 ,这样做才能体现社会主义法制的优越性 ,树立执法机关的形象 ,维护公民、法人和社会组织的合法权不受侵害     

Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

Summary  This article reviews empirical evidence informing an assessment of cartel and merger antitrust enforcement in the United States and makes some reasonable inferences from it. It also explains why an objective assessment based on hard evidence is not possible for the critical deterrence effects of enforcement, or for any of the effects of enforcement against single-competitor exclusionary conduct. Finally, this article describes the reporting by the U.S. Department of Justice of consumer savings from its antitrust enforcement actions, and details the construction of the savings estimates from cartel and horizontal merger enforcement. The views expressed herein are not purported to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement

Summary  This article surveys, discusses and classifies methods for ex-post evaluation of the efficiency of competition authorities: court appeals, peer reviews, case studies, event studies, (authorities’ own) bottom-up calculations of consumer gains, deadweight-loss estimates, cross-country panel studies etc. Based on empirical estimates from other types of studies and on a simple oligopoly model, one conclusion is that many bottom-up calculations are based on exaggerated estimates of gains from cartel enforcement, relative to those from merger enforcement. Another conclusion is that authorities’ ex-post self evaluations are of limited value, relative to external evaluations. “Who watches the guardians?”, by Juvenal, 2nd century Roman poet and critic.     

Stackelberg横向兼并博弈的分析

文章通过增加"蛇吞象"式兼并分析,扩展了Steffen-Kai-Wieland模型,研究结果表明:无论"大鱼吃小鱼","蛇吞象","强强联合",还是"弱者联合"的兼并,四种兼并对参与企业都是有利可图的.但这些兼并都会提高市场集中度,导致消费者福利下降.     

关于检察机关提升执法公信力的思考

检察机关公信力体现的是公众对检察制度的实施、检察权的运用过程和造成的结果的心理感受,是公众对检察机关办理各类案件的信服度,同时在一定程度上也是考核检察机关检察工作能否让人民群众满意的重要标准。尤其是对处于与人民群众打交道的第一战线的基层检察机关而言,执法公信力的提升不仅有助于推动全国检察事业的发展,而且对构建良好的党群、检群关系也有重要意义。     

反垄断与经济发展质量——基于《反垄断法》实施的经验证据

竞争是市场运行的核心,有效发挥市场职能是推动经济发展的关键。文章借助《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验,研究发现《反垄断法》实施后,企业的全要素生产率提高,但是与竞争企业相比,垄断企业增加的全要素生产率显著更少。机制检验表明,《反垄断法》促使垄断企业削弱要素投入影响全要素生产率,具体表现为垄断企业的研发投入和研发部门员工比例下降、员工薪酬和高学历员工比例下降、并购金额降低。上述影响仅在国有企业中显著。进一步分析发现,《反垄断法》也会影响垄断企业的产品市场表现和资本市场表现。文章研究表明《反垄断法》不仅能够提高企业经营效率、促进经济增长,更能够打破垄断企业的优势地位、助力经济均衡发展。文章为评价《反垄断法》实施效果补充了宏观层面的经验证据,也有助于认识政府在弥补市场失灵中的重要角色,为如何充分发挥市场的资源配置功能带来启示。     

论国土资源执法监察效能建设

基于国土执法形势更加严峻的现状,分析其原因,倡议从政府体制、法律机制和土地执法内部体系等方面进行改革建设,增强土地执法监察效能,以保护国土资源,减少滥用耕地,促进并稳定房地产市场。     

The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law

We extend the Bucci and Tenorio (1996) model of illegal immigration by constructing a two-country, one-good, two-factor model, and use a Cobb-Douglas production function to analyze political issues not considered in their work. We consider the case where capital is immobile between the two countries, as well as the case in which capital is mobile. Our main result is that the host country's government can, under some circumstances, optimally enforce employer sanctions in order to maximize the host country's welfare under both capital mobility and immobility.     

局部网络效应与企业标准竞争

传统理论观点认为,在网络效应的作用,标准竞争通常会导致一个赢者通吃的市场结果。然而在大多数情况下,网络效应对于用户而言并不是同质的,局部网络效应为我们提供了一个新的解释工具。局部网络效应的存在在很大程度上改变了标准竞争的结果,更容易带来多种技术共存的局面。     

Ex-Post Evaluation of Competition Law Enforcement Effects in the German Packaging Waste Compliance Scheme Market

We provide an ex-post evaluation of the impact of competition law enforcement activities in the German packaging waste compliance scheme market. Until 2003, the non-profit compliance scheme DSD enjoyed a monopoly in the market. Numerous antitrust cases, however, paved the way for competitive market structures. We show that these enforcement activities resulted in a series of market entries since 2004, a corresponding drop in DSD’s market share, increased innovation and substantial efficiencies. Furthermore, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to show that prices decreased by 63% and to estimate the aggregated consumer welfare gains achieved by 2011 at a total of €13 billion. In the given case imposing a non-profit obligation on the monopolist did not substitute for the efficiency-enhancing effects of competition.     

Coexistence of large firms and less efficient small firms under price competition with free entry

This study constructs a game of technology selection and Bertrand-like price competition in a market with free entry. It demonstrates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which a small number of firms adopting a large-scale technology coexist with, and charge a lower price than, a large number of firms adopting a small-scale technology. In this equilibrium, both available technologies and resources are allocated efficiently. This result provides a new economic rationale for antitrust law in general and, in particular, the US Sherman Act, wchich regards free entry and price competition as of foremost importance for maintaining market quality.     

Measuring the Economic Costs and Benefits of the EU

The EU has pursued protectionist policies not merely in food but also in manufacturing at the customs union level. In services it has not dismantled much of the existing national protectionism. The economic costs are calculated here at some 3% of GDP for the UK and some 2% for the rest of the EU. Added to its social interventionism, these costs suggest that the EU has put political integration before economic efficiency. This paper draws heavily on my book with Vidya Mahambare and Eric Nowell (Minford et al., 2005). I am grateful for helpful comments to Kim Huynh, Michele Fratianni and other participants at the IU 2006 conference in Fratianni’s honour. I contributed this paper in recognition of many pleasurable discussions with Michele over the years on this and many other topics. JEL Classification Numbers: F13, F14     

反不正当竞争法视域下平台算法的法律规制

如今智能算法这一技术工具逐渐成为平台新型不正当竞争滋生的温床,如过度的数据抓取、强制“二选一”及算法恶意比价行为等。但平台算法不正当竞争行为在《反不正当竞争法》中并无明确规定,面临一般条款与互联网专条难以直接适用、平台经营者竞争关系认定标准不一、平台损害赔偿责任的认定与豁免不明确的困境,需通过加强一般条款与互联网专条的规定、明确平台经营者竞争关系认定的标准、完善平台损害赔偿范围与豁免规则予以解决。     

基于种群竞争模型的中外资银行竞争均衡分析及实证检验

文章首次将组织生态学理论应用于银行市场竞争分析中,在分析了银行种群生态学特征的基础上,构建了中外资银行两银行种群及多银行种群的Lotka-Volterra竞争模型,研究技术示范效应及竞争效应对中外资银行竞争均衡状态的影响,最后利用非平衡面板数据对理论结果进行了实证检验,并给出政策建议。结果显示:适当控制中外资银行种群间的示范效应及竞争效应,鼓励各银行种群间的差异化经营,提高银行种群获取客户资源的能力,有利于形成多元化的银行市场结构。     

论经济法学课程教学的合作化问题

经济法学课程具有较强的综合性、实践性和国际性,其所涉及的资源比较分散,这一切使得合作化在该课程教学中显得很重要。这种合作化主要涉及校内合作、校外合作和与国外的合作。通过合作,不仅可以提高经济法学课程的教学质量,还可以实现人才培养模式的立体化、动态化和社会化。     

成本节约的不确定性、效率抗辩与并购评估审查

横向并购可能给参与并购的企业带来成本节约而产生效率效应,同时也可能产生反竞争效应。在横向并购反垄断审查的效率抗辩中,并购企业只要能够证实成本节约的效率效应能够抵消反竞争效应进而增进社会总福利水平,就可以获得反垄断当局的批准。然而,成本节约及其实现程度具有不确定性,成本节约的不确定性不仅会影响消费者剩余和社会总福利水平,而且将对效率抗辩和反垄断当局并购审查的判定规则产生影响。本文以Cournot模型为基础,系统分析了成本节约的不确定性对于横向并购反垄断评估审查中效率抗辩、判定规则和预期消费者福利的影响,为反垄断当局在并购评估审查中如何考虑效率因素提供决策参考。     

区域无序竞争的经济学分析及文化成因初探

区域无序竞争主要表现在重复建设、产业同质化、招商引资恶性竞争等方面。区域无序竞争有其必然的经济学原因：经济自由主义的理论支撑、区域划分标准不一、劳动地域分工理论的背离、区域政府的非理性竞争、区域保护主义严重、非均衡发展战略的必然趋势。区域无序竞争有深刻的文化根源,文化强国战略强调人的身心和谐、人与大自然的和谐、鼓励人追求心灵安详,舍弃追求物欲的你争我斗,这为探究区域无序竞争的文化成因提供了独特视角：达尔文进化论的误读、“更高、更快、更强”理念的误区、企业家与有限责任公司的不足、教育在区域经济伦理中的缺位、比经济危机更可怕的心灵危机。     

金融危机向社会危机传导的经济法与社会法组合防范

金融危机有向社会危机传导的风险。在此背景下,以增进社会整体福祉为宗旨、追求结果和实质公正,实现经济和社会可持续发展的经济法和社会法在防范危机传导中作用突出。经济法偏重于危机预防和经济增效功能,社会法偏重于修复保障和社会增效功能,二者需要功能配合。回应防范危机传导的需要,进一步在实践中沉淀智慧和过滤结晶,立基于理念共生耦合、着力于制度协调互动,加强二者的功能组合,有利于形成制度协力来达到双赢效果。