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风险投资家报酬设计与风险投资组织形式密切相关。风险投资的组织形式不同,风险投资家的报酬设计会存在差别。文章通过分析有限合伙制、公司制和信托基金制三种组织形式,探索了与之对应的风险投资家报酬设计安排。 相似文献
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风险投资对我国高新技术产业发展起着越来越重要的推动作用。本文通过总结国内外学者对风险投资体系中的三个主体——投资者、风险投资家和风险企业之间的委托代理关系的研究,指出我国在风险投资中因信息不对称而引起的委托代理问题研究方面存在的不足。 相似文献
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风险投资中投资者与风险投资家之间的关系是一种委托与代理关系,投资者和风险投资家的目的都是实现收益最大化。融资契约收益的分配直接影响到风险投资家的努力水平,从而影响到最终的投资收益。因此,只有从投资者和风险投资家两个角度分析风险投资中的最优契约安排,才能给出最优契约安排的选择区间。 相似文献
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风险投资中存在着风险投资者、风险投资家和风险企业三者间双重委托-代理关系,即投资者与风险投资家构成的第一层委托代理关系和风险投资家与风险企业构成的第二层委托代理关系.本文在回顾国内外相关文献的基础上,从不同角度提出了一系列解决风险投资中出现的问题的各种对策,包括优化企业治理结构、筛选可靠的代理人,分批投资以及政府和中介机构行为. 相似文献
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王永菲 《安徽商贸职业技术学院学报(社会科学版)》2012,11(4):36-39
在信息不对称条件下,风险投资市场中的风险投资者与风险投资家会形成委托代理关系进而会导致逆向选择与道德风险问题的出现。从减少信息不对称和促使委托人与代理人双方收益趋向一致的角度出发,建立了一套分析风险投资者与风险投资家收益分配机制模型,根据模型分析得出收益分配的最佳方案,提出了更加完善的委托代理风险防范措施和激励机制,以解决风险投资者无法克服信息不对称所带来的逆向选择及道德风险等一系列实际问题,并在帮助风险投资者约束风险投资家的行为的基础上使自己的收益最大化,从而促进风险投资市场更加繁荣和健康发展。 相似文献
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财务治理在公司治理中处于核心地位,而激励约束机制是财务治理的内核.风险企业财务激励约束机制主要体现为风险投资家对风险企业家的激励约束,主要分为货币的激励约束和权力的激励约束.货币激励约束是指变动的收益分配机制和分阶段的资本供给机制,权力激励约束表现为财务管理权、控制权的相机性以及控制权的隐形激励. 相似文献
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在IT信息时代,信息的不对称是在所难免的,其中隐藏了许许多多的风险问题。在不对称信息下,本文从风险投资这一角度来研究其中隐藏的问题,论述中考虑了风险投资者、风险投资家、风险投资企业家这三个经济利益主体之间的不对称信息,针对其中几个问题提出了一些解决措施。 相似文献
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一、薪金与股权的关系
给予经营者的报酬结构是以薪金为主,还是以股权为主?薪金激励的特点是直观、可预见性强,经营者的风险相对较小,但短期行为严重,不利于企业长远发展;股权激励则能使经营者更加注重企业的长远发展,经营者通过股权激励可以取得较高的收入和报酬,但风险相对比薪金激励要高. 相似文献
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Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
This paper examines the entrepreneur's choice between bank finance and venture capital. With bank finance, the entrepreneur keeps full control of the firm and has efficient incentives to exert effort. With venture capital finance, there is a two-sided moral hazard problem as both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (VC) provide unverifiable effort. The entrepreneur benefits from the VC's managerial input but must surrender partial ownership of the venture, thus diluting the entrepreneur's incentive to provide effort. Venture capital tends to be preferred to bank finance when VC productivity is high and entrepreneurial productivity is low. 相似文献
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论美国、德国风险投资的退出机制 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
风险投资退出机制在风险投资中占有十分重要的地位。美国风险投资退出渠道主要以IPO和并购为主 ,而德国风险投资主要以股票回购退出为主。造成这种差异的原因主要有二板市场的发达度不同、投资主体的不同、投入创业阶段的不同和激励机制的差异等。 相似文献
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产权制度安排对创业资本的运作效率产生几乎决定性的影响.创业资本产权的合理配置应该是赋予创业资本组织相对独立而充分的产权、构建激励与约束相容的创业资本组织形式并在创业投资家和创业资本出资者之间分享剩余索取权.但我国的制度环境使高效率的产权安排难以形成,产权缺损是我国创业资本的制度特征,并由此造成了创业资本制度安排的停滞均衡.要打破这种低效率的制度均衡,就应该进行以确立创业资本完整私人产权为核心的制度创新. 相似文献
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《Journal of Business Venturing》1993,8(1):43-58
The Net Present Value (NPV) Rule provides the basic principle underlying the sharing of ownership in a new venture. The principle often fails because the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist cannot agree on the potential profitability value of the venture.First, the venture capitalist may simply have a less optimistic interpretation of the data related to the venture's profit potential. We refer to this discrepancy between the expectation of the entrepreneur and that of the venture capitalist as the expectation gap.Second, the venture capitalist knows that for the venture's potential to be realized, the entrepreneur/manager must devote his full effort to the success of the organization. This is not a problem if the entrepreneur owns the entire project. Once the ownership is shared, however, especially when the venture capitalists own the majority of the shares, the entrepreneur has a financial incentive to apply less than the diligence required to control costs and protect the interests of the outside equity holders. This financial incentive arises because any perk, including leisure or shirking, consumed by the entrepreneur does not have to be shared with the venture capitalist, while every dollar saved does. This is not solved by the venture capitalist acquiring a larger percentage of the company. That will only exacerbate the problem as it decreases the cost to the entrepreneur of each dollar of the company's funds spent for the perk. We refer to this as the motivation problem.In the article, we show how stock options can be used to deal effectively with both problems. First, stock options are always worth more to the optimist than to the pessimist. Thus, there will be a reverse valuation gap with respect to the stock options. We show that by issuing stock options to the entrepreneur, it is possible to close the expectation gap.To solve the motivation problem, the entrepreneur's stake must be increased to the extent where the cost to him of excessive consumption of perks will be as high as the benefit he derives. This can be accomplished by taking advantage of two valuation characteristics of stock options. First, stock options are worth only a fraction of the value of the underlying equity shares. Thus, it is easier for the venture capitalist to give up these, rather than the underlying equity shares. Second, the stock options will fluctuate with the venturing firm's value at a higher rate than the entrepreneur's percentage ownership. Thus, by issuing the entrepreneur a combination of equity shares and stock options, it is possible to increase significantly the entrepreneur's cost of “shirking” or “excessive consumption of perks.” Under idealized conditions, it is possible to design a financing arrangement that eliminates the motivation problem.The principles discussed here provide benchmarks that both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist may wish to bring to the negotiating table. In the end, there is no substitute for the building of trust between the two to give the venture the maximum chance of success. 相似文献