论我国的法院调解制度

我国法院调解制度在法律实践、政治设计、文化引导、经济效益、社会效果等方面都有独到的作用,在化解社会冲突,促进义务的履行方面一直也在发挥积极作用.但随着市场经济活跃与发展,我国的诉讼调解制度逐渐暴露出自身的矛盾和弱点,完善的方向和思路也应针对这些问题进行.     

论我国的法院调解制度

我国法院调解制度在法律实践、政治设计、文化引导、经济效益、社会效果等方面都有独到的作用,在化解社会冲突,促进义务的履行方面一直也在发挥积极作用。但随着市场经济活跃与发展,我国的诉讼调解制度逐渐暴露出自身的矛盾和弱点,完善的方向和思路也应针对这些问题进行。     

法院调解兴衰的经济学分析

调解作为一种有效解决民事纠纷的方式,在我国司法实践中曾几度兴衰,究其原因,学界有着不同的看法。本文从经济学角度,运用法经济学的研究方法,通过对社会、当事人及法院各自的价值判断标准进行经济学分析,试图找出法院调解兴衰的原因并对法院调解的未来做出理论上的预测。     

论法院调解的定义及其原则

法院调解是我国民事诉讼法规定的一项重要制度,是解决民事纠纷的一条重要途径.本文在相关理论文献的基础上,结合审判工作实际,分析了法院调解的定义和原则,为进一步探讨法院调解的其他问题奠定了基础.     

我国法院附设ADR制度的建立与完善

起源于美国的法院附设ADR制度,作为一种司法调解制度在世界各国得到广泛运用。近年来,我国在司法实践中为完善法院附设ADR制度积累了许多成功经验。《最高人民法院关于人民法院民事调解工作若干问题的规定》对我国的法院调解制度进行了全面规范,确立了协助调解人制度、独立调解人制度、和解协议确认制度以及和解协调人制度。但是,这些制度尚存在许多程序方面的缺陷,还不是严格意义上的司法ADR制度,需要通过立法来进一步完善。     

论我国法院审级制度的改革

实现司法公正是当前司法体制改革的核心问题,也是社会转型时期制度建设的首要任务。本文运用比较的方法,重新植理了两大法系关于法院审级制度构建的基本理论,检讨了我国现行法院审级制度的弊端,从司法审判内部机制改革、资源重新合理配置这一独特视角,对中国法院在审级制度上应进行的改革提出了一些有针对性的建议,试图解决地方保护主义等体制性问题,并逐渐实现司法公正。     

试论新时期的法院调解

随着政治、经济、文化的发展，审判的地位提高，审判方式不断改革。法院开始注重当庭宣判率，实行一步到庭的审判方式。而作为最能体现法律效果和社会效果的调解却受到了冷落。然而一味地注重判决却导致了上诉率不断上升，信访案件日益增多，法院执行难，诉讼成本增大等一系列问题的突显，从而导致法院服务于社会的价值，在一定程度上受到了削弱。不利于和谐社会的构建。这就在客观上，使法院对调解制度予以重新的重视。     

论我国农地制度非市场化取向的合理性

农地制度是各相关方的正式博弈规则,它的合理与否对尚处于工业化进程中的中国而言,从根本上影响着广大农村社会的稳定、和谐。因而,要辨别农地制度的合理,性自然不能简单的从微观效率出发。同时,这一正式制度的制定也必然有其现实依据,笔者则以粮食安全为基点,以中央、地方和农民三方博弈的视角辨析了目前我国的农地制度的合理性。     

替代性纠纷解决机制浅析——以中国法院调解制度为例

随着社会经济的发展,纷繁复杂的社会纠纷也日益突显,司法不可能解决所有的问题。因此,建立多元化的替代性纠纷解决机制更符合社会和法治可持续发展的需要。中国的法院调解兼具司法与替代性解纷机制两种特征,从ADR的角度来看,法院调解与其他非诉解纷机制一样具有相同的制度补充机能。从替代性纠纷解决机制概述入手,针对中国法院调解制度在实践中存在的问题,提出了完善中国替代性纠纷解决机制的构想。     

浅议行政诉讼中的调解制度

调解制度是我国司法制度的重要部分,对于行政诉讼法中是否应当加入法院调解制度,长久以来都是学界争论的焦点,笔者试图从行政法调解制度的历史原因、现状、未来展望进行分析,以其对我国行政诉讼调解制度的立法做出一些参考和建议.     

Financial intermediation and entry-deterrence

Summary. In this paper, we analyze the interaction between an incumbent's financial contract with a bank and its product market decisions in the face of a threat of entry, in a dynamic model with asymmetric information. The main results of the paper are: there exists a separating equilibrium with no limit pricing; the low-cost incumbent repays more to the bank in the first period due to the threat of entry; and there are parameter values for which the bank makes more profits with the threat of entry than without. Received: July 19, 2002; revised version: December 4, 2002 Correspondence to: N. Jain     

Financial intermediation with credit constrained agents

This paper studies the effects of financial intermediation on aggregate levels and the distribution of resources in an economy with credit-constrained heterogeneous agents and occupational choice. Whether an agent becomes an entrepreneur depends on a realized entrepreneurial ability and accumulated assets needed to finance a business project with uncertain returns. I compare a steady state of an economy with financial intermediation to an economy in which entrepreneurs must finance their projects only from their savings. The simulated economy with financial intermediation matches well the US data on the distribution of occupations and resources. The steady state welfare and efficiency gains from financial intermediation are large.     

从经济理性到有限理性:经济学研究理性假设的演变

"经济理性"是经济学的传统研究假设,却因背离现实而受到质疑.基于行为人稀缺的心理资源和系统固有的不确定性而产生的"有限理性"正逐步取代"经济理性"成为经济学研究的理性假设.不同的理性观点可以从决策的视角得到系统地解释和比较.并且,随着理性假设的演变,经济行为的决策标准也相应从单一静态最优向多元动态平衡转变.     

A theory of trust based systems of intermediation

Recent studies have analysed the economic benefits of belongingto high-trust networks and the biological foundations of individualtrust, but much scepticism remains regarding the precise roleof trust in economic transactions, as well as gaps between microand macro concepts of trust. This paper links individual andinstitutional trust by modelling the costs associated with accessingmarket, law and trust-based intermediation systems, and identifiesthe conditions under which one of the three systems may be moreadvantageous for rational actors, and thus more likely to emerge.The discussion concentrates on examples drawn from developmentpolicy to illustrate how the three systems operate together,and how the failing of the trust system affects the legal andmarket systems.     

The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen

Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall.     

Costly financial intermediation and excess consumption volatility

This paper documents the cyclical properties of financial intermediation costs and uses their dynamics to explain excess consumption volatility (ECV) differences across countries in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with housing market. I find that financial development levels have a limited role in explaining ECVs. Instead, the volatility of financial sectors plays the determinative role. Consistent with the data, the model finds higher ECVs in emerging countries. The paper also shows that if the US had the same intermediation cost structure as Turkey, deteriorations in the production and consumption following a financial shock would increase threefold.     

Theories of coalitional rationality

This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability.     

Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation

In a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model, the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 12 (1988) 3)), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.     

Platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one. The monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market, except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform, in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform. The market allocation is constraint-efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers. An increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition. As a result, the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges. In contrast, an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition. In this case, the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms.