CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.     

周慕冰会见法国Natixis环球资产管理公司CEO一行

1月13日,副市长周慕冰在希尔顿酒店会见了法国Natixis环球资产管理公司CEO约翰先生一行。双方就金融管理等方面进行了深入交流。周慕冰表示,重庆是中国最年轻的直辖市,经济发展迅速。     

CEO心腹揭秘CEO

CEO是一个充满神秘感的职位,它是管理层的核心,就像企业的芯片,驱动着企业发展。吉利收购沃尔沃、Google转跳香港、丰田全球召回……     

CEO析

CEO的盛行始于20世纪80年代的美国，在中国，以信息技术为代表的网络热潮的兴起。令企业界的第一批CEO破土而出，国内诸多企业群起仿效，传统企业的老总纷纷改称CEO。     

Corporate Governance and CEO Innovation

A fundamental concern emerging from the corporate literature is the agency problem of innovation. While innovation is considered as a major driver of corporate growth and profitability, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has an intrinsic reluctance to pursue innovation projects. The thrust of this paper is to identify the mechanisms of corporate governance which help attenuate this problem, thereby encouraging the CEO to have the propensity to innovate. The empirical results suggest that firms with a widespread dispersion of shares among shareholders are less likely to encourage the CEO to innovate. The likelihood of innovation appears to increase, however, in the presence of a large shareholder. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, there appears to be no association between innovation and board independence. The same result holds for board size. Also, a diverse board appears to negate CEO predisposition to innovate. On the other hand, innovation increases when the CEO is not the Board Chair but has equity ownership, although the incentive effect is economically small. The paper uses a sample of domestically-owned, publicly-listed Australian firms over the period 1994–2003.     

CEO的圣经

"这是一个幸运儿的故事".全球第一CEO杰克·韦尔奇这样定义他的《自传》. 因"没有计划"、"与众不同"而为人所诟病的韦尔奇,从1981年入主通用电气起,在短短20年时间里,使通用电气市值增长30多倍,排名从全球第十位提升到第二位.他本人也成为世界上年薪最高的首席执行官、最令人羡慕的商界领袖、CEO们争相效仿的偶像人物.韦尔奇退休前的最后一个大动作,便是写传记将自己的成长岁月、成功经历及经营理念和盘托出.《杰克·韦尔奇自传》700万美元的预付稿酬和120万册的首印数字都在叙说着韦尔奇曾经的辉煌.     

CEO Compensation and Stakeholders' Claims*

The traditional view that a corporation exists solely to serve the interests of the firm's shareholders has given way to a changing view that recognizes the importance of corporate constituents in addition to shareholders. Prior studies demonstrate a significant association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and a firm's stock prices. However, the association between CEO compensation and the claim of other primary stakeholders (customers, employees, suppliers) has not been examined. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the adoption of long‐term incentive plans aligns the interest of the CEO with the interest of the primary stakeholders in the firm. Using the fixed‐effect regression, our results indicate a significant association between the change in CEO compensation and the claims of the customers, shareholders, and employees. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the managers are accountable not only to the shareholders but also to primary stakeholders.     

跨国公司首脑建议“投资亚洲首选中国”

出席 2001《财富》全球论坛的跨国公司首脑们,对繁荣的中国市场表现出强烈的兴趣。他们认为,中国经济一直保持强劲增长,未来的发展前景仍十分乐观,必将为海外投资者提供广阔天地。 　　外国投资者关注的焦点之一是中国飞速发展的信息科技市场。统计资料显示,中国电讯市场已位列世界第二。截至去年底,中国的互联网用户达 2250万户,是 1999年的 1． 53倍;电话普及率为 21％,固定电话和移动电话用户达到 2． 3亿户。 　　与会的大企业家们对中国科技产业的发展充满信心。他们认为,中国国内市场庞大,经济发展强劲,而欧美经济的放缓…     

Discretionary Accounting Choices and CEO Compensation*

This paper makes four contributions to the literature relating accounting choices to CEO compensation. First, it shows that discretionary accruals are associated with CEO cash compensation, a result that holds after controlling for both the nondiscretionary components of income and increases in shareholder wealth. Although significant, the coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly lower than that on nondiscretionary accruals, which in turn is significantly lower than the coefficient on operating cash flows. Second, the paper shows a differential reaction to positive and negative discretionary accruals —- the association between positive discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation is significantly greater than the association between negative discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. Third, the paper shows the association between discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. In particular, when positive discretionary accruals allow the firm to reduce or avoid a loss, the association between CEO cash compensation and discretionary accruals is significantly greater. Finally, this paper shows that the association of CEO cash compensation with reported income generally increases with the level of discretionary accruals, consistent with management responding to the incentives provided.     

Projects of Development of Interaction of FEC and HCS: Problems of Forecasting and Management

The paper has presented the problems of forecasting and managing projects on the development of fuel and energy complex and housing and communal services, the identification of priority areas, and the planning of innovative technologies in the current conflict of interests in their economic relations.     

管理者过度自信对企业投资行为及绩效影响探讨

文章从理论和实践上分析管理者过度自信对企业投资行为与投资绩效的影响。研究发现,在法律机制与监督机制不健全的情况下,管理者以往的成功经验往往会导致管理者过度投资,而过度投资对企业绩效存在着负面的影响。     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。     

Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega (delta) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB?) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta. Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.