EBITDA and Managers' Investment and Leverage Choices

EBITDA is a commonly used performance measure for (i) valuation, (ii) debt contracting, and (iii) executive compensation. The widespread use of EBITDA by stakeholders may induce managers to focus their attention on EBITDA. Since EBITDA excludes various expenses, managers who fixate on EBITDA may underweight the excluded expenses when determining their firms' investments in capital and leverage levels. I find that managers who fixate on EBITDA overinvest in capital and overlever their firm relative to their industry peers. These results are robust to alternative proxies for managers' focus on EBITDA and alternative specifications. I also find that firms whose managers focus on EBITDA have weaker operating performance, which is attributed to higher depreciation expense. My primary proxy for managers' focus on EBITDA is whether they choose to disclose EBITDA in annual earnings announcements. I find that the use of EBITDA in setting executive compensation, the prevalence of EBITDA estimates by analysts, and the use of EBITDA‐based covenants in firms' debt contracts are all positively associated with the propensity to disclose EBITDA in earnings announcements. I find weaker evidence of opportunistic motives explaining EBITDA disclosure. These results are consistent with managers disclosing EBITDA to portray to investors that it is a metric they seek to maximize. Overall, this study suggests that while EBITDA is a widely used metric, there is a systematic cost to using this measure—it provides managers with incentives to overinvest in capital and to acquire excessive debt.     

Private Information Production,Public Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital: Theory and Implications*

Both private information production by market traders and public disclosure by firms contribute to dissemination of financial information in the capital market. However, the motives and economic consequences of the two are quite different. In general, private information production is intended by investors to increase their trading profit, which has the effect of widening the information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm's cost of capital. On the other hand, public disclosure can be used to narrow this information gap and to lower the cost of capital. This paper provides a theoretical model to examine the economic incentives behind these two forms of information dissemination and their consequences on the cost of capital. By simultaneously considering the firm's and the information traders' decisions, the paper derives an equilibrium in which the amount of private information production, the level of public disclosure, and the cost of capital are all linked to specific characteristics of the firm, of information traders, and of the market. In contrast to conventional beliefs, the paper predicts that, across firms, the cost of capital can be either positively or negatively related to the firm's disclosure level, depending on the specific factors that cause the variation within a particular sample. Similarly, the extent to which investors follow a firm and the firm's disclosure level can be either positively or negatively related to each other. Implications for empirical research are discussed.     

盈余管理的动机及手段

盈余管理的动机可以归纳为契约动机、资本市场动机和政治成本动机三类。出于不同的动机,上市公司会使用不同的盈余管理手段,但是过度的盈余管理不但严重扭曲上市公司的信息,误导投资者,而且使上市公司的利益受到损害。因此,对上市公司盈余管理应进行有效监管,例如完善现有会计准则,健全公司治理结构等。     

Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Voluntary Disclosure Quality: Is there Really an Effect on the Cost of Equity Capital?*

Research on the effects of voluntary disclosure quality on the cost of equity capital is often plagued by endogeneity concerns. In this paper, I use a dynamic panel system GMM estimator, which provides internal instruments from the firm's history that directly address endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. By using hand-collected voluntary disclosure scores for firms listed in the Swiss stock exchange, I examine the dynamic relation between voluntary disclosure quality and the cost of equity capital in a panel over a period of 10 years. The results suggest that the relation between voluntary disclosure quality and the cost of equity capital becomes insignificant after controlling adequately for potential dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved heterogeneity.     

Equity‐Based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality

We examine the relationship between a firm's disclosure quality and equity‐based compensation of independent members of the board of directors. The dimensions of disclosure quality we focus on are management's earnings guidance and information flowthrough financial analysts. Using both levels and changes specifications, we find the average ratio of equity‐based pay to total pay of independent board members to be positively related to a firm's disclosure quality. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of management's equity‐based compensation, other governance measures, and financial controls, and robust to instrumental variable tests of endogeneity. Furthermore, we find directors’ equity‐based compensation to be negatively associated with the firm's cost of equity capital. Our results are consistent with equity‐based compensation providing incentives to independent directors to push for better disclosure quality.     

Analysts’ Use of Nonfinancial Information Disclosures*

In this study I examine how analysts process nonfinancial information and how this is affected by the patterns of firms’ nonfinancial information disclosures. More specifically, I examine the association between analyst earnings forecast errors and the persistence of nonfinancial disclosures, both across information content and over time. The study focuses on firms in the wireless industry for the period 1997–2007. The results show that analysts tend to underreact to the information contained in customer acquisition cost, average revenue per user, and the number of subscribers. These are the performance measures that have significant predictive ability for future earnings of wireless firms. Distinguishing between firms on the basis of their nonfinancial disclosure patterns reveals that the above findings are driven primarily by firms with irregular disclosures. There is no evidence of analysts’ inefficiency in evaluating the content of nonfinancial metrics provided by persistently disclosing firms. This implies that the lack of systematic disclosures of performance measures restricts financial analysts’ ability to fully analyze the contributions of these metrics for future earnings.     

Mandatory Disclosure,Generation of Decision‐Relevant Information,and Market Entry

We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision‐relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?*

We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward‐looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering, and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months before the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to “hype the stock” and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that “hyped” their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been hype, and suggesting that the hype may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.     

信息披露质量与市场流动性

本文以深交所A股上市公司为样本．研究上市公司的信息披露整体质量是否影响公司股票在市场上的流动性。基于分笔高频交易数据．检验集中于流动性的两个关键方面：市场宽度和市场深度。采用稳健的非线性两阶段最小二乘法来克服信息披露的自选择特点所引起的内生性问题。实证结果显示，公司高质量的信息披露能有效提高其股票的市场流动性，这种影响主要是通过缩小市场宽度来达到．而对市场深度的影响不显著。利用市场微观结构的价差分解方法的研究发现．高质量的信息披露提高市场流动性的机制在于有效减轻市场上信息不对称程度。     

公司信息披露质量对投资者交易行为的影响——基于对深圳上市公司的经验分析

本文在控制样本自选择偏误的基础上.实证分析了我国上市公司的信息披露质量差异对投资者交易行为的影响.研究发现,投资者在关于股票价格和风险的交易决策时对不同信息披露质量的公司具有行为差异,高披露质量的公司有较低的信息成本和市场风险;但是,公司信息披露质量高低对投资者的股票交易数量、交易速率的影响尚不显著,且不知情者"跟随"交易现象明显,市场投机氛围重,表明我国证券市场的有效程度尚待提高.本研究为规范和引导我国上市公司的信息披露行为及健全证券市场制度提供了经验证据.     

盈余管理、CEO特征与碳信息披露——来自中国高碳排放行业上市公司的证据

在全球气候变化不断加剧的背景下,碳密集型行业正面临着日益增长的公众压力。此种情况下,推动绿色低碳经济已然成为实现可持续发展的必然选择。选取2012—2020年中国高碳排放行业上市公司为研究对象,探究盈余管理对碳信息披露的影响,以及CEO特征对碳信息披露和盈余管理的调节作用。结果显示,盈余管理程度越大,碳信息披露越少;CEO性别为女性、CEO教育背景越高、CEO任期越长、CEO财务背景越强,盈余管理对碳信息披露的反向促进作用会得到加强;CEO年龄越大,盈余管理对碳信息披露的反向促进作用会得到削弱。     

Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure*

This paper investigates whether firms benefit from expanded voluntary disclosure by examining changes in capital market factors associated with increases in analyst disclosure ratings for 97 firms. The disclosure rating increases are accompanied by increases in sample firms' stock returns, institutional ownership, analyst following, and stock liquidity. These findings persist after controlling for contemporaneous earnings performance and other potentially influential variables, such as risk, growth, and firm size. While it is difficult to draw unambiguous causal conclusions, these results are consistent with disclosure model predictions that expanded disclosure leads investors to revise upward valuations of the sample firms' stocks, increases stock liquidity, and creates additional institutional and analyst interest in the stocks.     

Market liquidity,private information,and the cost of capital: Market microstructure studies on family firms in Japan

We investigate cost of capital, information asymmetry, and market liquidity of listed family firms vs. non-family firms in Japan. First, we find that the cost of debt is lower and the cost of equity is higher for family firms than non-family firms, but the differences are not significant. The WACC of family firms becomes higher than that for non-family firms and the difference is significant probably because family firms in Japan use less leverage. Next, we find that the stocks of family firms are traded with higher information asymmetry than non-family firms. As for information asymmetry and illiquidity measures, we utilize the variables Adjusted PIN and Probability of Symmetric Order Flow Shocks (PSOS). Concomitantly we also estimate alternate conventional measures of market liquidity as a robustness check. Overall, the evidence on liquidity is somewhat mixed, while we find family firms show higher information asymmetry, which may affect cost of equity. As a final policy implication, we recommend family firms in Japan conduct more voluntary and timely disclosure, in particular, for the benefit of general stock investors, and may want to increase leverage to reduce the WACC.     

Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Earnings Announcements: A Cross‐Country Analysis

Using firm‐level data from 23 developed markets, we document a positive association between overall firm‐level governance quality and the informativeness of earnings announcements measured by abnormal stock return variance. This finding is robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of firm‐level corporate governance. Further analyses reveal that firms with strong governance show little evidence of earnings management, appoint Big 4 auditing firms, and attract analyst following, implying a positive link between strong corporate governance and the information quality of earnings announcements. Finally, there is some evidence that the relation between firm‐level governance and market reactions around the announcements exists only in countries characterized by a transparent information environment and strong legal investor protection.     

Does High‐Quality Auditing Mitigate or Encourage Private Information Collection?

The finance literature offers two competing possibilities on how investors respond to the quality of public financial statements in their pricing decisions. They could collect either (i) more private information to benefit from lower information collection cost, or (ii) less private information because of lower incremental benefits. In this paper, we use the audit setting to examine which possibility prevails. Using the idiosyncratic return volatility as a proxy for firm‐specific information, we show in a sample of 51,559 firm‐year observations for 8,261 U.S. firms spanning the period of 2000–2010 that firms audited by higher‐quality auditors exhibit lower average idiosyncratic return volatility but a higher concentration of it at the time of earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the argument that investors reduce private information collection in response to higher audit quality. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of audit quality and idiosyncratic return volatility.     

资本市场会计信息披露:问题与对策

资本市场的会计信息披露质量,直接关系到能否为各利益相关者提供决策有用的相关信息,是研究资本市场的核心内容之一。本文从会计信息披露的内涵入手,对我国资本市场会计信息披露中存在的问题进行了深入分析,并在此基础上提出了完善我国资本市场会计信息披露的策略选择。     

Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.     

The Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD&A Section of Annual Reports*

Abstract. In this study, we appeal to theories advanced by Darrough and Stoughton (1990) to enhance our understanding of why some firms may voluntarily include directional forecasts in their annual reports while others do not. The data are consistent with their predictions that a firm's disclosure policy reflects its concern for both financial market valuation and product market competition. We find that for “good news firms, the probability of forecasting is increasing in the financing requirements but decreasing in the threat of competitor entry. The converse holds for “bad news” firms. These results lend further empirical support to the observation that the familiar good news hypothesis tested in the management earnings forecast literature offers only a partial explanation for the decision to forecast. Interestingly, however, even after controlling for financial and product market considerations, an overall voluntary disclosure bias still exists in the data. The data also provide support for the OSC's concern about a voluntary disclosure bias. Only 17.5 percent of our sample forecasts represent revisions downward relative to the previous year's results. However, in contrast to the OSC's concern about a general lack of forward-looking disclosures in annual reports, 35.9 percent of our sample firms include directional forecasts in their MD&A or elsewhere in the annual report.     

Are Investors Misled by “Pro Forma” Earnings?*

This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators.     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.