Inferring Accounting Information from Corporate Financing Choices: An Examination of Security Issuances in the Banking Industry*

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year.     

The Role of Narcissistic Hypocrisy in the Development of Accounting Estimates

In an experiment including experienced managers, we investigate how supervisor and subordinate narcissism influence a supervisor's review of a subordinate's accounting estimate. While narcissistic supervisors express greater liking for narcissistic subordinates (narcissistic tolerance), they nonetheless reject and revise the accounting estimates of narcissistic subordinates to a greater extent than they reject estimates of non-narcissistic subordinates (narcissistic hypocrisy), even when doing so inhibits the supervisor's ability to reach a profit target. Our findings contribute to extant research in accounting and psychology. We demonstrate that narcissistic hypocrisy extends beyond the evaluation of others and alters narcissists' willingness to rely on other narcissists in a meaningful financial reporting decision. We also find that narcissistic hypocrisy is robust across age, gender, and supervisory experience.     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

Performance Measure Aggregation in Multi‐Task Agencies

In multi‐task environments, the efficiency of aggregating managerial performance information and the degree of customization/standardization are closely related. Aggregation without information loss (i.e., statistically sufficient) requires at least as many measures as there are effective tasks (which arise through a task aggregation process analogous to that applied to homogeneous activities in activity‐based costing) and can be used uniformly for evaluation across similar jobs. Aggregation without economic loss (i.e., economically sufficient) can be achieved with a single performance measure but requires customization even across similar jobs. The main implication is that job complexity, the number of aggregate performance measures, and the degree of customization in performance measurement are interrelated. In particular, at the same level of performance measure aggregation, we predict highly customized performance evaluation in complex multi‐task jobs and standardized (uniform) performance evaluation only in simpler jobs with fewer tasks. We discuss additional empirical implications in the conclusion.     

The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

EPC工程项目联合体协调管理评价研究

为确保EPC（工程总承包）项目联合体的协调发展以及项目的顺利进行,以EPC工程项目联合体为协调管理绩效评价主体,结合联合体成员协调管理内容以及项目的实际特点,经过有关文献的检索与分析,从权责利分配合理性、目标协同程度、总承包部管理能力、总承包部协调能力、联合体成员间信任5个方面建立联合体协调管理绩效评价指标体系。运用模糊综合评价法,以杭州之江路输水管廊及道路提升EPC项目为实例,对EPC项目联合体协调管理绩效进行评价。     

The Role of Informal Controls and a Bargaining Opponent's Emotions on Transfer Pricing Judgments

While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others’ emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers’ perception of their opponents’ signals is the mechanism by which opponents’ emotions influence transfer‐price decisions. This study highlights the role of others’ emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents’ emotions under various control system structures.     

The World Has Changed—Have Analytical Procedure Practices?

Analytical Procedures (APs) provide a means for auditors to evaluate the “reasonableness” of financial disclosures by comparing a client’s reported performance to expectations gained through knowledge of the client based on past experience and developments within the company and its industry. Thus, APs are fundamentally different than other audit tests in taking a broader perspective of an entity’s performance vis‐à‐vis its environment. As such, APs have been found to be a cost‐effective means to detect misstatements, and many have argued that a number of prior financial frauds would have been detected had auditors employed effective APs. With several dramatic and far‐reaching developments over the past decade, the current study examines whether and how APs have changed during this period. In particular, we focus on the impact of significant “enablers” and “drivers” of change such as technological advancements and the enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act. We also compare our findings to an influential study of the practices of APs by Hirst and Koonce (1996) that was conducted over 10 years ago. We interview 36 auditors (11 seniors, 13 managers, and 12 partners) from all of the Big 4 firms using a structured questionnaire. The data reveal some similarities in findings when compared to prior research (e.g., auditors continue to use fairly simple analytical procedures). However, there are a number of significant differences reflecting changes in AP practices. For instance, as a result of technology auditors now rely more extensively on industry and analyst data than previously. Further, auditors report that they develop more precise quantitative expectations and use more non‐financial information. They also appear to rely more on lower level audit staff to perform APs, conduct greater inquiry of non‐accounting personnel, and are willing to reduce substantive testing to a greater extent as a result of APs conducted in the planning phase. Finally, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has had an impact in greater consideration and knowledge of internal controls, which is seen as the most important factor driving the use and reliance on APs.     

The Fair Value of Cash Flow Hedges,Future Profitability,and Stock Returns

The SEC and FASB recently expressed concerns that investors do not fully assimilate all of the information provided by complex and incomplete derivatives and other comprehensive income (OCI) disclosures. My evidence supports these concerns. Specifically, I examine the information content of unrealized cash flow hedge gains/losses for future profitability and stock returns. An unrealized gain on a cash flow hedge suggests that the price of the underlying hedged item (i.e., commodity price, foreign currency exchange rate, or interest rate) moved in a direction that will impair the firm's profits after the hedge expires. Consequently, I find that unrealized cash flow hedge gains/losses are negatively associated with future gross profit after the firm's existing hedges have expired. This association only holds after the firm has reclassified its hedges into earnings, and is weaker for firms that can pass input price changes on to their customers. Finally, investors do not immediately price the cash flow hedge information. Instead, investors appear surprised by future realizations of gross margin, consistent with the view that complex and incomplete disclosures delay pricing. These results are relevant to policymakers involved in the current FASB and IASB project designed to simplify the accounting and disclosure for derivatives and, in particular, cash flow hedges.     

Accounting Recognition,Moral Hazard,and Communication*

Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source that partially but credibly conveys the agent's private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self‐report). In a simple setting with no communication, alternative labor market frictions lead to alternative optimal recognition policies. When the agent is allowed to communicate his or her private information, accounting signals serve as a veracity check on the agent's self‐report. Finally, such communication sometimes makes delaying the recognition optimal. We see contracting and confirmatory roles of accounting as its comparative advantage. As a source of information, accounting is valuable because accounting reports are credible, comprehensive, and subject to careful and professional judgement. While other information sources may be more timely in providing valuation information about an entity, audited accounting information, when used in explicit or implicit contracts, ensures the accuracy of the reports from nonaccounting sources.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

我国商业银行管理会计应用浅析

商业银行管理会计涵盖财务预算、成本核算、盈利分析、业绩评价和资产负债管理等内部管理的核心内容,提供银行发展战略、盈利能力、风险预警和业绩衡量等重要信息。为了充分发挥管理会计在我国商业银行经营管理中的作用,以提高商业银行的经营效益、管理水平和市场竞争力,本文具体阐述了当前我国商业银行管理会计应用与革新的主要内容,并提出了在商业银行推行管理会计的对策建议。     

Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases*

Prior research indicates that individuals acting as jurors experience outcome effects in audit negligence litigation. That is, jurors evaluate auditors more harshly in light of negative outcomes, even when audit quality is constant. I posit that outcome effects in this setting are caused by jurors using their negative affect (i.e., feelings) resulting from learning about negative audit outcomes as information relevant to auditor blameworthiness. I tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which I manipulated audit quality, outcome information, and provision of an attribution instruction. The attribution instruction was designed to discredit negative affect as a cue to auditor blameworthiness. Consistent with expectations, attribution participants' evaluations of auditors exhibited less reliance on outcome information and more reliance on audit quality information than did evaluations made by control participants. In fact, outcome effects were eliminated for attribution participants. Courts may be able to improve the quality of jurors' decisions in such cases by employing an attribution instruction.     

环境信息披露质量与财务绩效互动效应研究

通过选取480家上市公司2015—2019年的数据，并进行标准化处理，运用综合评价指数、耦合协调度模型，构建环境信息披露质量和环境绩效指标体系。在对环境信息披露质量和财务绩效耦合协调关系研究的基础上，运用PVAR模型、格兰杰因果检验、脉冲响应函数等方法，选取三大行业为代表，分别为采矿业、电力/热力/燃气及水生产和供应业、制造业，研究环境信息披露质量与财务绩效两者之间的相互作用关系，以此说明环境会计信息披露的重要性。实证结果表明，环境信息披露质量和财务绩效之间存在显著的促进作用，但在不同的行业有所区别。     

How Disclosure Features of Corporate Social Responsibility Reports Interact with Investor Numeracy to Influence Investor Judgments

Firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports typically frame their strategies in terms of either community or global efforts (i.e., “strategy frame”). Further, the style used to depict CSR performance in reports often highlights either pictures or words (i.e., “presentation style”). These two prominent disclosure features of CSR reports promote a natural fit or misfit in the focus (relatively low‐level or high‐level focus) investors adopt when thinking about the firm and its CSR efforts. Further, these disclosure features likely have different effects on investors depending on their numeracy or, in other words, the way that they naturally process numerical information. In this study, we predict and find that a fit between the strategy frame and the presentation style of a firm's CSR report causes less numerate investors to be more willing to invest than when a fit is not present. Specifically, we find that a fit leads less numerate investors to experience subjective feelings of processing fluency and, in turn, positive affect that serves as a cue that the positive CSR performance information can be relied upon, which positively influences willingness to invest. Our results have implications for both CSR reports as well as other types of firm disclosures that increasingly vary along similar disclosure characteristics. Our results also contribute to both the growing literature on presentation effects in accounting, as well as the broader business literature on CSR reporting.     

The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation and Role on External Auditors' Planning Judgments and Decisions*

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.     

Cumulative Prospect Theory and Managerial Incentives for Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Using samples of restating and nonrestating U.S. firms, the study empirically investigates the relationship between the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting and accounting‐based performance outcomes. The outcomes are framed as gains and losses relative to a reference point, defined as the mean performance of industry peers. Consistent with cumulative prospect theory (CPT), the findings show that fraud incidence is positively (negatively) related to the probability of a loss (gain); more (less) sensitive to the probability of a loss (gain) (i.e., loss‐aversion); and more (less) sensitive to an extra unit of the probability at a high‐ or low‐ (medium‐) probability level (i.e., nonlinear probability weighting function). The study extends the fraudulent financial reporting literature by formulating fraud incidence as a function of performance outcomes using peer performance as a reference point. By testing CPT's individual‐level behavioral implications on firm‐level archival data, the study reconceptualizes the investigation of fraudulent financial reporting in terms of risk attitude and extends prior investigations of CPT from laboratory experiments to a real‐world setting of fraudulent financial reporting.     

Do ‘Boss Effects’ Exist in Japanese Companies? Evidence from Subordinate–Supervisor Matched Panel Data*

This article investigates whether supervisors can significantly enhance their subordinates' performance using a five‐waves panel dataset from a medium‐sized Japanese firm comprising around 400 employees. The dataset includes all regular non‐managerial employees working in one manufacturing company. About 40 supervisors were matched to their subordinates, and the evaluation outcomes were used to evaluate the worker performance. The results showed that supervisor effects were heterogeneous, displayed a one‐year lag, and lasted for two years. We proved the existence of the supervisor effect on current performance, by using current supervisor dummies or past supervisor dummies. Irrespective of the supervisor being switched, the effect of the past supervisor on workers’ current performance continues to exist. It was also found that these effects remained significant, even when workers were assigned new/different supervisors.