Krazy Kimmy's: A Case in Fraud Examination

This two‐part case allows for maximum student engagement through preparation, in‐class discussion, and through a Part B case that is part of the Teaching Note. Through this case, students work to identify possible fraud schemes, plan an investigation, and perform horizontal analysis calculations. Students will learn about the concept of ethical hacking, red flag identification, internal control weaknesses, and investigation considerations for fraud schemes. Further, in‐class planning for next steps and investigation can occur, providing an opportunity for group work and in‐depth learning. This case offers flexibility for instructors in that it can be covered over one class or multiple classes, or can be assigned as an independent or group assignment. This teaching note provides an overview of the case along with guidance for teaching this case.     

Thunder Bay Transportation: A Case of Business Valuation and Negotiation*

Thunder Bay Transportation (TBT) is a very versatile case that can be used in several milieus and at various levels of difficulty. The case describes the process involved in the purchase and sale of a private business. Mr. Getzko, owner/manager of TBT, is attempting to sell his business to pursue retirement. Sudbury Systems (SS) is pursuing an acquisition of TBT. Students are required to assume the role of either Mr. Getzko’s accountants (seller) or Sudbury Systems’ accountants (buyer) to: (1) develop a preliminary business value, (2) negotiate adjustments, and (3) arrive at an agreed‐upon business value to finalize the sale. Students will explore both business valuation approaches (earnings based and asset based) and various business valuation concepts (e.g., normalized earnings, sustaining capital reinvestment, earnings multiple, redundant assets, etc.).     

Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.