Optimal auction design in two‐sided markets

A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depend on the searchers' expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers. This article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run, where clicking rates are mechanism dependent. In line with the practice of the major search engines, the revenue‐maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers. By trading off rent extraction and clicking volume, this mechanism works as a cross‐subsidization device between searchers and advertisers.     

Real estate auctions: A survey of theory and practice

Recent downturns in real estate markets combined with a general acceptance of auctions have resulted in an unprecedented number of auction sales. A need therefore exists for the further development of real estate auction models that can provide insights into this emerging market institution. To facilitate this task a survey of auction theory as pertaining to its application in real estate markets is provided in this paper. Topics addressed includes bidding equilibria, the role of reserve prices, information disclosure, the decision to use auctions, bidder participation, and multiple-object sales. An overview of empirical studies in this area is also provided.     

Investigating individual privacy within CBDC: A privacy calculus perspective

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) are a digital innovation based upon distributed ledger and smart contract technology. In this paper we examine how potential users of CBDC technology willingly disclose their personal information. The researchers conducted an online quantitative survey which investigates the privacy perceptions of consumers. Using the privacy calculus theory lens, this study looks at the potential benefits of CBDC and how these influence user perceptions towards privacy disclosure. While this research suggests that participants in the study had negative perceptions in relation to the disclosure of personal information, many were willing to offset these concerns if there are significant benefits in the usage of CBDC. Factors such as ease of use, convenience, availability, and credibility were viewed as key benefits in this scenario. Thus, future banking strategies and marketing approaches need to consider these components to foster CBDC adoption.     

Do Unexpected Land Auction Outcomes Bring New Information to the Real Estate Market?

Land and real estate are intrinsically related but generally traded in two different markets. Vacant land, being a major “raw material” for development of real estate, is traded by developers who actively manage development risk for profit. Real estate, being a long lived final product, is traded by end-users or investors for use or investment in the secondary market. This study examines price discovery between the two markets. The key question is whether land transactions, in the form of public auctions, convey any new information to the secondary real estate market. Our results suggest unexpected land auction outcomes have both market-wide and local effects on real estate prices. However, the impacts are asymmetric. We found that lower than expected land auction prices have a significant negative market-wide and local impact on real estate prices while higher than expect land auction prices have little or no impact.     

How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection

This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products. Our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers, even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice. When customers are wary of the adviser's incentives, contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers. If, instead, customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice, high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation. Policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare. However, prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser's incentive to acquire information. More vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation, but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers.     

Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition

We develop a multi-period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long-lived information. We show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. In the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero, market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately. These results are in contrast to those of Kyle (1985) in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually, and, when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, market depth is constant over time.     

Screening incentives and privacy protection in financial markets: a theoretical and empirical analysis

We study a model in which firms offer financial products to individuals, post prices for their products, and screen consumers who apply to purchase them. Any information obtained in the screening process may be traded to another firm selling related products. We show that firms' ability to sell consumer information can lead to lower prices, higher screening intensities, and increased social welfare. By exploiting variations in the adoption of local financial‐privacy ordinances in five California Bay Area counties, we are able to provide simple estimates of the effects of stricter financial‐privacy laws on mortgage denial rates during 2001–2006. Consistent with the model's predictions, denial rates for home‐purchase loans and refinancing loans decreased in counties where opt‐in privacy ordinances were adopted. Moreover, estimated foreclosure start rates during the financial crisis of 2007–2008 were higher in counties where the privacy ordinance was adopted.     

基于内容提供商视角的传统媒体定价策略研究

随着移动互联网的发展,新媒体平台的出现和传统媒体的经营模式转型正在改变媒体市场结构。考虑传统媒体转型和新媒体内容外包,引入新媒体平台建立三方双边市场结构模型,考察竞争型市场结构中传统媒体平台的定价策略。研究发现：针对消费者和广告商进行差异性定价可以给传统媒体平台带来最佳收益,因此对消费者的低收费和补贴是合理的,并不构成非正当竞争;平台间差异化程度直接影响到其议价能力和利润水平;此外,消费者对广告的容忍程度也会影响媒体平台对广告商的定价,容忍程度越低,广告费用越高。     

Adverse Information and Dealer Spreads: Evidence from Dutch Auction Repurchases

The Dutch auction repurchase has become an increasingly popular alternative to open market repurchases and self-tender offers for the distribution of earnings to shareholders. In a Dutch auction, the repurchase price is not determined by a managerial decision, but by shareholders. The extent to which a Dutch auction signals private information is tested by examining stock returns and bid-ask spreads. Stock prices increase and bid-ask spreads widen during the announcement of a Dutch auction; prices decrease and spreads narrow at expiration. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the final repurchase price, Dutch auctions initially increase the risk to which security dealers are exposed. As information asymmetry among managers, investors, and dealers is reduced at expiration, security dealers no longer need to protect themselves from information trades.     

Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels

A prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it, fearing it will attract new rivals. In this paper, we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements, wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers, can notably alter disclosure incentives. As under prevailing views, a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors. However, entry shifts the incumbent supplier–retailer relationship: the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner, translating into lower wholesale prices. This, in turn, can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news, since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions. Our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence, firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products.     

Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses

We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.     

Market transparency: who wins and who loses?

This study uses laboratory experiments to determine the effectsof trade and quote disclosure on market efficiency, bid-askspreads, and trader welfare. We show that trade disclosure increasesthe informational efficiency of transaction prices, but alsoincreases opening bid-ask spreads, apparently by reducing market-makers'incentives to compete for order flow. As a result, trade disclosurebenefits market makers at the expense of liquidity traders andinformed traders. We find that quote disclosure has no discernibleeffects on market performance. Overall our results demonstratethat the degree of market transparency has important effectsof market equilibria and on trader and market-maker welfare.     

Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions

This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. Individual sellers benefit mostly from access to a large set of buyers, but the magnitude depends on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.     

Sufficient Conditions for Public Information to Have Social Value in a Production and Exchange Economy

Conditions are derived under which all consumers in a production and exchange economy will prefer (at least weakly) disclosure of public information to no such disclosure. The conditions involve consumer endowments, the allocative efficiency of the financial market, and value maximizing behavior by firms. Cases exist where consumers will prefer disclosure of public information in a production and exchange economy, although they would be indifferent to such disclosure in an otherwise similar pure exchange economy. The difference in results is due purely to the fact that in production and exchange economies, information may be used to reallocate resources across time and firms, thus highlighting the fundamental difference between the role of information in pure exchange and in production and exchange economies.     

Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure of Quality Information in HMO Markets

This study examines incentives for voluntary disclosure of quality information by health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Economic theory predicts complete voluntary disclosure without mandatory rules. This article introduces plans' selection motives to avoid high-risk consumers as a deterrent of full unraveling; if disclosure is expected to attract high-risk members, plans have incentives to withhold information. The empirical analysis shows that while market unraveling was an important mechanism to bring disclosure, it was not complete, and plans in markets with high-risk consumers were less likely to disclose. This study suggests that market unraveling may not arise if risk selection incentives are prevalent.     

The Formation of Inflation Expectations: Microdata Evidence from Japan

We propose a novel approach for measuring inflation expectations, which can alleviate the rounding number problem. Furthermore, we examine how consumers form inflation expectations. We find that consumers heterogeneously update their information sets on prices; 46% of the consumers collect information about the consumer price index at least once a quarter, while the remaining consumers less frequently or never obtain this information. We also find that forecast revisions are sensitive to a change in food prices. More than half of consumers are attentive only to a change in food prices and may form their inflation expectations using food price changes as a signal of fluctuations in the overall inflation rates. The existence of consumers who are inattentive to aggregate inflation casts doubt on the transmission of monetary policy through the management of expectations.     

Privacy in E-Commerce: Development of Reporting Standards, Disclosure, and Assurance Services in an Unregulated Market

Government regulation of financial reporting by publicly listed firms, coupled with a punitive regime for violation of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), has been in place in the United States for seven decades. Whether this regime is effective or useful is an open question, especially in the absence of data on the behavior of unregulated economies. Privacy disclosure in e‐commerce is essentially an unregulated environment with some parallels to financial disclosure. A study of privacy standards, disclosures practices, and demand for audits can help accountants and security regulators project the consequences of a competitive regime sans regulation for accounting standards, disclosure and audit practices. In this article we set up a framework for such a study, gather data from the field, and analyze privacy standards, privacy disclosure practices, and the effectiveness of opt‐out practices of 100 high‐traffic e‐commerce Web sites. We observe four diverse sets of privacy standards (TRUSTe, BBB Online, WebTrust, and PWC Privacy) competing in this market, attracting clienteles of their own as reflected in privacy policies and the disclosure of such policies. With a few exceptions, actual disclosure and opt‐out practices correspond reasonably well to stated policies in e‐commerce. There is little evidence that the prevailing competitive regime induces a race to the bottom with respect to privacy standards and disclosures. We explore the implications of these results for the consequences of a competitive regime for regulation of financial reporting.     

Market Efficiency, Bounded Rationality, and Supplemental Business Reporting Disclosures

The AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting has urged disclosure of relevant forward-looking information on risks and opportunities to supplement conventional financial statements. We conduct a laboratory market experiment to assess the effects of such disclosures on capital allocation decisions. We develop two sets of competing hypotheses regarding how capital markets react to supplemental disclosures. One set is based on the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency, while the other posits that the bounded rationality of individual traders leads to inefficient market prices. We find that explicit disclosure of management's best estimate of an uncertain quantity improves market efficiency, even though this disclosure is redundant with information in financial statements. Second, we find disclosure of an upper bound of management's estimate has the potential to bias security prices upward, while informationally equivalent disclosure of both upper and lower bounds removes this bias. These results suggest that experimental market reactions to these supplemental disclosures are inconsistent with market efficiency. Supplemental analyses of individuals' price predictions and trading behavior support our conclusion that inefficiencies are at least partially attributable to individual information processing biases.     

公开竞标的贷款定价方式对P2P借贷平台的优化作用

P2P借贷是一种金融创新模式,将互联网技术与民间借贷相结合。互联网信贷的巨大需求推动P2P借贷平台的爆发式发展,而P2P借贷发展核心的两个问题是信用评级和风险定价。由于我国未完全实现利率市场化,P2P平台采用的是量化借款人信息的方式计算贷款利率。信息不对称导致P2P平台的贷款利率不能充分反映借款人风险,同时造成信誉良好的借款人不能获得低成本的贷款。文章利用拍卖机制模型对公开竞标的贷款定价方式进行探究,认为公开竞标方式可以改善信息披露,降低借款人的成本,借款人和投资人在公开竞标的贷款定价方式下都可以获得灵活的选择空间,从而提高借贷成功的比例。     

Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency

This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.