CEO optimism and incentive compensation

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.     

Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating

We study whether outside directors are held accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties to directors of firms involved in the option backdating (BD) scandal of 2006–2007. We find that, at firms involved in BD, significant penalties accrued to compensation committee members (particularly those who served during the BD period) both in terms of votes withheld when up for election and in terms of turnover, especially in more severe cases of BD. However, directors of BD firms did not suffer similar penalties at non-BD firms, raising the question of whether reputation penalties for poor oversight of executive pay are large enough to affect the ex ante incentives of directors.     

Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased [Jensen, M.C., 2005a, Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.     

Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations

I investigate the determinants and consequences of granting equity to the target's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during deal negotiations. These negotiation grants likely reflect information about the acquisition, benefit from the deal premium, and provide more timely bargaining incentives. I find that CEOs are more likely to receive equity during negotiations when they negotiate for the target, particularly when the target has more bargaining power. This suggests that boards use equity to enhance bargaining incentives for CEOs with the most influence over deal price. I find limited evidence that negotiation grants are used as compensation and no evidence that they have a material adverse effect on shareholders.     

Nonlinear incentives and mortgage officers’ decisions

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, banks should ensure that their incentive compensation policies appropriately balance long-term risk with short-term rewards. Using daily output data from mortgage officers in a US commercial bank, we test the notion that nonlinear contracts create time-varying incentives for the employees and impose costs on the firm. We provide empirical evidence that mortgage officers greatly increase their output toward the end of each month, when the minimum monthly quota is assessed. This occurs through a combination of reducing the processing time and approving some marginal applications. We also find that mortgages originated on the last working day of the month have a higher likelihood of delinquency.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

The power of the pen and executive compensation

We examine the press’ role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated approach by the media in selecting CEOs to cover. However, negative coverage is also greater for CEOs with more option exercises, suggesting the press engages in some degree of “sensationalism.” We find little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover.