不同竞争态势下的公司股权结构与价值的实证研究

股权结构与企业绩效之间存在着区间效应，合理的股权结构能为企业带来更高的价值，但不同竞争态势下的上市公司，其股权结构对公司价值的影响也不相同。为了使股权结构发挥所期望的作用，首先应说量提高行业的竞争性。     

我国上市公司信用风险度量及影响因素分析

首先利用KMV模型度量了样本公司的信用风险,接着以资产规模、股权结构、成长能力、流动性、行业前景、公司经营状况作为解释变量、公司违约距离作为被解释变量,建立了多元线性回归模型。实证分析表明,资产规模、股权集中度、成长能力与信用风险正相关;国有股比重、流动性与信用风险负相关;行业前景和公司经营状况对信用风险也有显著影响。     

双层股权结构与公司价值——基于赴美上市中概股公司的经验证据

双层股权结构有助于创始人及管理团队稳定公司控制权、激发其潜能和积极性,但也带来了诸如其他投资者保护不足、管理层谋取控制私利等潜在风险。考虑到我国采用双层股权结构的公司主要集中于赴美上市的中概股公司,本文以2005-2020年在美上市的中概股公司为样本,探究双层股权结构对公司价值的影响及作用机制,以及这种影响在企业不同生命周期阶段的差异性。结果表明：第一,双层股权结构显著提高了公司价值;第二,双层股权结构的价值增值效力是通过降低代理成本、缓解公司短视来发挥作用的;第三,从企业生命周期动态视角来看,在成长期和成熟期的企业采用双层股权结构能够提高公司价值,且对成长期企业的促进作用更强,而衰退期企业采用双层股权结构不具有价值增值作用。充分发挥双层股权结构的价值增值效力、抑制其可能带来的不利影响,要引导企业合理选择双层股权结构,同时做好退出机制的前瞻性设计,加强公司内部治理和外部监督,强化对创始人及管理团队的激励约束。     

两个乳业集团的治理与业绩

近年来,关于股权结构与公司治理、股权结构与公司业绩的讨论沸沸扬扬,在不同行业不同持股结构对应不同的公司治理、不同的公司治理又成为公司业绩的基本影响因素这一点上达成了共识.但是对于公司治理如何影响公司业绩的机制却鲜有研究,也缺乏有说服力的解释和论证.公司业绩与公司治理到到底是什么关系?公司治理的内在价值到底是什么?如何计量分析?     

股权结构与内部控制质量的相关性研究

本文选取2011年A股上市公司为样本,以深圳迪博内部控制指数量化企业内部控制质量,将股权集中度、股权性质、机构持股比例、高管持股比例作为股权结构的表征变量.通过理论与实证分析相结合,研究股权结构与内部控制质量的相关关系.研究结果表明,不同的股权结构会影响内部控制有效性.     

股权结构与股利政策——对我国上市公司股利政策的理论分析

一、文献回顾与理论介绍 影响股利政策的因素有很多。吕长江、王克敏（1999）采用了38个变量来解释上市公司的股利政策，在剔除了解释变量之间的自相关性后，得到了11个主成分因子。实证分析表明这11个变量与现金股利都是显著相关的。魏刚（2001）也采用了9个自变量来解释我国上市公司的现金股利，用7个变量来解释股票股利，并得出显著的相关系数。在二者所采取的解释变量中都包含了表示股权结构的变量——国家股比例、法人股比例、流通股比例。由于中国上市公司股权结构的特殊性以及对股利政策的尤为重要的影响，本文想抽出股权结构这一个因素来分析股利政策，并且研究的重点在于理论而不是实证。     

碳减排、企业价值与企业广告投资 ——来自中国高污染行业的经验证据

以碳减排信息披露与企业价值间关系为研究主体,在媒体关注、碳信息披露和企业价值的中介模型基础上,引入广告投入这一新调节变量,检验该中介模型的显著性是否会受到广告投入的影响.并采用北京市高污染行业的上市企业为样本,运用逐步回归以及Bootstrap方法验证变量间的中介调节关系,证明广告投入能够显著增强媒体关注对碳减排披露和企业价值的中介作用,降低企业获得绿色投资的成本.最后,根据研究结果提出相关建议.     

上市公司ESG评级对企业价值的影响研究

本文对国内外与ESG相关的研究进行了梳理，根据相应的理论基础提出研究假设，选取了A股沪深两市343家上市公司在2016年-2020年的数据为样本，以商道融绿公司发布的上市公司ESG评级为解释变量，以企业托宾Q值为被解释变量，用双向固定效应模型对面板数据进行了回归，并进行了异质性分析，得出以下结论：ESG评级对企业价值有积极的影响，并且这种积极影响会受到行业、区域和公司属性的调节，对于重污染行业企业、经济发达地区企业和非国有企业，这种积极影响会更加明显。     

家族企业股权制衡度与企业价值的门槛效应分析

本文以2010~2014年全部A股上市的家族企业平衡面板数据为样本,通过多元回归分析和固定效应面板门槛回归模型研究了基于不同企业特征下,股权制衡度与企业价值之间的关系。研究发现:企业规模、家族控制程度及两权分离度对股权制衡具有门槛效应,股权制衡度对企业价值的影响效果会随着门槛变量的改变而改变,家族企业股权制衡度与企业价值之间的关系并非严格意义上的"倒U型"关系,而是非平滑对称的曲线,不同的门槛变量,两者之间呈现不同的影响方向和影响程度。本文为股权制衡影响家族企业的路径和作用机制提供经验证据,而且门槛回归结果更能反映真实情况,能够更好地解释股权制衡度与企业价值之间的关系。     

股权结构与公司价值——对房地产行业上市公司的实证分析

本文以价值创造指标EVA作为公司绩效的度量,以竞争激烈的房地产行业上市公司为样本,讨论了股权结构与公司绩效的关系。结果表明：在竞争激烈的房地产行业上市公司中,股权构成对公司绩效有显著的影响,但股权集中度对公司绩效没有显著影响。说明股权结构对公司经营绩效是很重要的,同时外部市场的激烈竞争,也能够促使经理人更好地进行企业的经营管理。     

资本结构与企业绩效的互动关系研究——基于创业板上市公司的实证检验

中小企业在我国经济中具有重要地位,随着我国创业板市场的推出,中小企业的融资问题将会得到有效缓解。本文通过建立资本结构与企业绩效的联立方程模型,应用广义矩估计法(GMM)对联立方程进行估计研究,考察创业板上市企业资本结构与企业绩效之间的互动关系。研究结果表明,资本结构与企业绩效确实存在互动关系,在企业绩效中资本结构、成长能力、股权集中度、董事会兼任经理人和企业规模都对其有显著影响,而在资本结构中盈利性、成长能力、偿债能力、资产担保价值和企业规模五个因素对企业资本结构选择具有显著影响。     

Ownership structure and corporate performance

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected.     

信息不对称、公司治理与现金持有价值——基于知情交易概率的非平稳面板数据

本文为了研究中国上市公司信息不对称、公司治理和现金持有价值之间的关系,以沪深上市公司2004-2009年数据为基础,利用知情交易概率作为管理者和投资者之间的信息不对称代理变量,以高管持股比例作为公司治理代理变量,利用公司各种财务指标作为控制变量,发现信息不对称与中国上市公司现金持有价值呈显著负相关,高管持股比例和现金持有价值显著正相关,支持自由现金流理论和委托代理理论,信息不对称程度越高,管理者越可能滥用现金,导致现金持有价值下降,而提高公司治理,加强投资者保护可以提高现金持有价值。     

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.     

THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

The distinctive ownership and governance structure of the large American corporation-with its distant shareholders, a board of directors that defers to the CEO, and a powerful, centralized management-is usually seen as a natural economic outcome of technological requirements for large-scale enterprises and substantial amounts of outside capital, most of which had to come from well-diversified shareholders. Roe argues that current U.S. corporate structures are the result not only of such economic factors, but of political forces that restricted the size and activities of U.S. commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. Populist fears of concentrated economic power, interest group maneuvering, and a federalist American political structure all had a role in pressuring Congress to fragment U.S. financial institutions and limit their ability to own stock and participate in corporate governance.
Had U.S. politics been different, the present ownership structure of some American public companies might have been different. Truly national U.S. financial institutions might have been able to participate as substantial owners in the wave of end-of-the-century mergers and then use their large blocks of stock to sit on the boards of the merged enterprises (much as Warren Buffett, venture capitalists, and LBO firms like KKR do today). Such a concentrated ownership and governance structure might have helped to address monitoring, information, and coordination problems that continue to reduce the value of some U.S. companies.
The recent increase in the activism of U.S. institutional investors also casts doubt on the standard explanation of American corporate ownership structure. The new activism of U.S. financial institutions-primarily pension funds and mutual funds-can be interpreted as the delayed outbreak of an impulse to participate in corporate ownership and governance that was historically suppressed by American politics.     

Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

The paper develops a simple model of corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analyzed. The model compares the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the benefits from efficient management control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. The paper reexamines the free-rider problem in corporate control in the presence of liquidity trading, derives predictions for the trade and pricing of blocks, and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure.     

第一大股东持股对资本结构选择的影响研究

本文调查了上海证券交易所A股非金融业上市公司（2003—2005数据）,从风险分散化的角度考察了股权结构（第一大股东持股）对资本结构（公司负债）的制度影响。作者发现,第一大股东持股对公司资产负债率均具有显示的负向影响;即使在控制了公司其他主要特征（资产规模、资产结构、盈利能力和市场价值）的影响之后,第一大股东持股对公司负债的负向效应仍然显著。这意味着,第一大股东持股越高,他们减少公司财务杠杆的动机就越强。该经验结果支持了本文风险分散化的理论预期：第一大股东具有显著的通过降低公司负债回避风险的融资倾向和管理动机。作者还观察到。作为法人（或非国有股东）的第一大股东比作为国有股东的第一大股东具有更强烈的动机降低公司债务。这一发现为风险分散化的理论解释提供了进一步的经验证据。本文的研究表明,股权集中化的公司可能会偏离最优财务决策的轨道。     

最终控制人利益侵占的条件分析——对LLSV模型的扩展

本文以少数所有权控制结构(controlling minority structure)形成的最终控制人所有权与控制权分离为研究对象,通过对LLSV模型的扩展,分析最终控制人在什么条件下会实施侵占少数股东利益的经济行为。模型分析结果显示,投资者法律保护程度、相对所有权和相对投资收益率是最终控制人实施利益侵占与否以及利益侵占程度的重要影响因素。本文模型的分析结论与已有公司治理经验研究的发现一致。     

优化股权结构:完善上市公司治理结构的突破口

从公司治理结构产生的历史和逻辑来看 ,股权结构和公司治理结构有渊源关系。股权结构是公司治理结构的基础 ,它决定了公司治理的形式和模式。本文对 94 4家上市公司的股权结构进行全面的统计分析 ,并结合各类持股主体的行为特征 ,得出我国公司内、外部治理机制都不能有效发挥作用的结论 ,作者提出了优化我国股权结构进而完善上市公司治理结构的政策建议。     

CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE U.K., GERMANY, AND FRANCE

Like its U.S. counterpart, the U.K. corporate ownership and governance system can be characterized as an outsider system with a large number of public corporations, widely dispersed ownership (though with growing concentrations of institutional shareholdings), and well-developed takeover markets. By contrast, the much smaller number and proportion of publicly traded German and French corporations are governed by insider systems--those in which the founding families, banks, or other companies have controlling interests and in which outside shareholders are not able to exert much control.
The different patterns of ownership in the U.K. and in France and Germany give rise to different incentives and corporate control mechanisms. Concentrated ownership would seem to encourage longer-term relationships between the company and its investors. But, while perhaps better suited to some corporate activities with longer-term payoffs, concentrated ownership could also lead to costly delays in undertaking necessary corrective action, particularly if the owners receive "private" benefits from owning and running a business. And, although widely dispersed ownership may increase the likelihood that corrective action will be sought prematurely (as outsiders rush to sell their shares in response to a temporary downturn), the presence of well-diversified public owners may also be more appropriate for riskier ventures requiring large amounts of new capital investment.
Thus, concentrated ownership, while having the potential to reduce information costs and to strengthen incentives to maximize value, can also impose costs in two ways: (1) by forcing managers and other insiders to bear excessive company-specific risks that could be transferred to well-diversified outsiders; and (2) by allowing insiders to capture private benefits at the expense of outsiders.