The ambidextrous CEO

Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously--when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.     

MarketBusting: strategies for exceptional business growth

If company leaders were granted a single wish, it would surely be for a reliable way to create new growth businesses. Business practitioners'overwhelming interest in this subject prompted the authors to conduct a three-year study of organizational growth--specifically, to find out which growth strategies were most successful. They discovered, somewhat to their surprise, that even companies in mature industries found rich new sources of growth when they reconfigured their unit of business (what they bill customers for) or their key metrics (how they measure success). In this article, the authors outline these and other moves companies can make to redefine their profit drivers and realize low-risk growth. They offer plenty of real-world examples. For instance: CHANGING YOUR UNIT OF BUSINESS: Once a conventional printing house, Madden Communications not only prints promotional materials for customers but also manages the distribution and installation of those materials on-site. Its revenues grew from dollars 1o million in 1990 to dollars 133 million in 2004, in an industry that many had come to regard as hopelessly mature. IMPROVING YOUR KEY METRICS-PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVITY: Lamons Gasket, with dollars 80 million in revenues, built a Web site that radically improved its customers' ability to find, order, and pay for goods. The firm's market share rose along with its customer retention rate. The authors also suggest ways to identify your unit of business and associated key metrics and recognize the obstacles to changing them; review the key customer segments you serve; assess the need for new capabilities and the potential for internal resistance to change; and communicate to internal and external constituencies the changes you wish to make in your unit of business or key metrics.     

The founder's dilemma

Why do people start businesses? For the money and the chance to control their own companies, certainly. But new research from Harvard Business School professor Wasserman shows that those goals are largely incompatible. The author's studies indicate that a founder who gives up more equity to attract cofounders, new hires, and investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less equity. More often than not, however, those superior returns come from replacing the founder with a professional CEO more experienced with the needs of a growing company. This fundamental tension requires founders to make "rich" versus "king" trade-offs to maximize either their wealth or their control over the company. Founders seeking to remain in control (as John Gabbert of the furniture retailer Room & Board has done) would do well to restrict themselves to businesses where large amounts of capital aren't required and where they already have the skills and contacts they need. They may also want to wait until late in their careers, after they have developed broader management skills, before setting up shop. Entrepreneurs who focus on wealth, such as Jim Triandiflou, who founded Ockham Technologies, can make the leap sooner because they won't mind taking money from investors or depending on executives to manage their ventures. Such founders will often bring in new CEOs themselves and be more likely to work with their boards to develop new, post-succession roles for themselves. Choosing between money and power allows entrepreneurs to come to grips with what success means to them. Founders who want to manage empires will not believe they are successes if they lose control, even if they end up rich. Conversely, founders who understand that their goal is to amass wealth will not view themselves as failures when they step down from the top job.     

The uncompromising leader

Managing the tension between performance and people is at the heart of the CEO's job. But CEOs under fierce pressure from capital markets often focus solely on the shareholder, which can lead to employee disenchantment. Others put so much stock in their firms' heritage that they don't notice as their organizations slide into complacency. Some leaders, though, manage to avoid those traps and create high-commitment, high-performance (HCHP) companies. The authors' in-depth research of HCHP CEOs reveals several shared traits: These CEOs earn the trust of their organizations through their openness to the unvarnished truth. They are deeply engaged with their people, and their exchanges are direct and personal. They mobilize employees around a focused agenda, concentrating on only one or two initiatives. And they work to build collective leadership capabilities. These leaders also forge an emotionally resonant shared purpose across their companies. That consists of a three-part promise: The company will help employees build a better world and deliver performance they can be proud of, and will provide an environment in which they can grow. HCHP CEOs approach finding a firm's moral and strategic center in a competitive market as a calling, not an engineering problem. They drive their firms to be strongly market focused while at the same time reinforcing their firms' core values. They are committed to short-term performance while also investing in long-term leadership and organizational capabilities. By refusing to compromise on any of these terms, they build great companies.     

An Unconventional Conglomerateur: Henry Singleton and Teledyne

Capital allocation involves decisions about raising and returning capital, and about acquiring and selling companies—all of which can have major effects on shareholder value. Rather than judging CEOs by growth in revenues or earnings, the author argues that they should be judged by increases in the per share value of the companies they manage and also in comparison with the returns generated by peer firms and the broader market. Successful CEOs have been able to overcome the “institutional imperative”—the tendency of managers to focus on the sheer size of their enterprises and to avoid doing things that might be seen as unconventional. In this chapter from his recent book, The Outsiders, which provides accounts of eight remarkably successful and long‐tenured CEOs, the author describes the successful management by Henry Singleton of the conglomerate Teledyne from 1963 to 1990, a period during which the company's shareholders enjoyed annualized returns of over 20%. During the 1960s, the company produced high returns mainly by making large acquisitions funded by new equity issues. During the 1970s and '80s, by contrast, Teledyne used massive share repurchases to return excess capital to shareholders. Thus, Singleton adjusted his capital allocation strategy in response to changes in product and financial markets—and to changes in the perceived difference between market and intrinsic values. When investors provided capital with relatively low required rates of return, as in the 1960s, Singleton was an aggressive buyer investor in a wide range of businesses. But when interest rates were high and equity valuations were low, as in the 1970s and early 1980s, Singleton used share repurchases to create value by reducing investment and limiting growth. The company's shareholders were well rewarded in both environments.     

Divestiture: strategy's missing link

Although most companies dedicate considerable time and attention to acquiring and creating businesses, few devote much effort to divestitures. But regularly divesting businesses--even good, healthy ones--ensures that remaining units reach their potential and that the overall company grows stronger. Drawing on extensive research into corporate performance over the last decade, McKinsey consultants Lee Dranikoff, Tim Koller, and Antoon Schneider show that an active divestiture strategy is essential to a corporation's long-term health and profitability. In particular, they say that companies that actively manage their businesses through acquisitions and divestitures create substantially more shareholder value than those that passively hold on to their businesses. Therefore, companies should avoid making divestitures only in response to pressure and instead make them part of a well-thought-out strategy. This article presents a five-step process for doing just that: prepare the organization, identify the best candidates for divestiture, execute the best deal, communicate the decision, and create new businesses. As the fifth step suggests, divestiture is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to a larger end: building a company that can grow and prosper over the long haul. Wise executives divest so that they can create new businesses and expand existing ones. All of the funds, management time, and support-function capacity that a divestiture frees up should therefore be reinvested in creating shareholder value. In some cases, this will mean returning money to shareholders. But more likely than not, it will mean investing in attractive growth opportunities. In companies as in the marketplace, creation and destruction go hand in hand; neither flourishes without the other.     

Manage customer-centric innovation--systematically

No matter how hard companies try, their approaches to innovation often don't grow the top line in the sustained, profitable way investors expect. For many companies, there's a huge difference between what's in their business plans and the market's expectations for growth (as reflected in firms' share prices, market capitalizations, and P/E ratios). This growth gap springs from the fact that companies are pouring money into their insular R&D labs instead of working to understand what the customer wants and using that understanding to drive innovation. As a result, even companies that spend the most on R&D remain starved for both customer innovation and market-capitalization growth. In this article, the authors spell out a systematic approach to innovation that continuously fuels sustained, profitable growth. They call this approach customer-centric innovation, or CCI. At the heart of CCI is a rigorous customer R&D process that helps companies to continually improve their understanding of who their customers are and what they need. By so doing, they consistently create or improve their customer value proposition. Customer R&D also focuses on better ways of communicating value propositions and delivering the complete experience to real customers. Since so much of the learning about customers and so much of the experimentation with different segmentations, value propositions, and delivery mechanisms involve the people who regularly deal with customers, it is absolutely essential for frontline employees to be at the center of the CCI process. Simply put, customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer. Using the example of the luggage manufacturer Tumi, the authors provide a step-by-step approach for achieving true customer-centric innovation.     

Value acceleration: lessons from private-equity masters

The most successful private-equity firms regularly spearhead dramatic business transformations, creating exceptional returns for their investors. To understand how those firms do it, the authors studied more than 2,000 PE transactions over the past ten years and discovered that the top performers' success stems from the rigor with which they manage their businesses. This article describes the four management disciplines vital to the success of the best PE firms. First, for each business, they define an investment thesis: a brief, clear statement of how to make the business more valuable within three to five years. The thesis, which guides all actions by the company, usually focuses on growth. PE firms know that the demonstration of a path to strong growth produces the big returns on investment. Second, they don't measure too much. They zero in on a few financial indicators that most clearly reveal the business's progress in increasing its value. They watch cash more closely than earnings and tailor performance measures to each business, rather than imposing one set of measures across their entire portfolio. Third, they work their balance sheets, mining undervalued assets, turning fixed assets into sources of financing, and aggressively managing their physical capital. Last, they make the center the shareholder. Corporate staffs in PE firms make unsentimental investment decisions, buying and selling businesses when the price is right and bringing in new management when performance falters. These firms also keep their corporate centers extremely lean. By adopting these four disciplines, executives at public companies should be able to reap significantly greater returns from their own business units.     

Funding growth in an age of austerity

Everyone knows that corporate growth--true growth, not just agglomeration--springs from innovation. And the common wisdom is that companies must spend lavishly on R&D if they are to innovate at all. But in these fiscally cautious times, where every line item of every budget in every company is under intense scrutiny, many organizations are doing just the opposite. They tighten their belts, subject nascent product-development programs to rigorous screening, and train R&D staffers to think in business terms so the researchers will be better able to decide whether an idea for a product or service is worth pursuing in the first place. Such efficiency measures are commendable, say authors Gary Hamel and Gary Getz. But frugality is not a growth strategy, they point out, and, in truth, there is very little correlation between corporate performance and the amount spent on innovation. Companies like Southwest, Cemex, and Shell Chemicals have shown that businesses don't have to spend a fortune on R&D to reap the benefits of innovation. To produce more growth per dollar invested, companies must produce more innovation per dollar invested. Hamel and Getz explain how businesses can dramatically improve their innovation yields. They offer these five imperatives: Increase the number of innovators among existing employees (whatever their job titles) by involving them in innovation processes and events. Focus on developing truly radical ideas--ones that change customers' expectations and behaviors and industry economics--not just incremental ideas. Look for innovation sources outside the organization, as well as inside. Increase the learning from small, low-risk experiments. And commit to long-term, consistent development efforts.     

CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions,Facts, and Challenges

This article brings a broad range of statistical studies and evidence to bear on three common perceptions about the CEO compensation and governance of U.S. public companies: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, it has declined since then— by more than 30%—from peak levels that were reached around 2000. Moreover, when viewed relative to corporate net income or profits, CEO pay levels at S&P 500 companies are the lowest they've been in the last 20 years. And the ratio of large‐company CEO pay to firm market value is roughly similar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than the levels that prevailed before the 1960s. What's more, in studies that begin with the late '70s, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. And when set against the compensation of other highly paid groups, today's levels of CEO pay, although somewhat above their long‐term historical average, are about the same as their average levels in the early 1990s. At the same time, the pay of U.S. CEOs appears to be reasonably highly correlated with corporate performance. As evidence, the author cites a 2010 study reporting that, over the period 1992 to 2005, companies with CEOs in the top quintile (top 20%) of realized pay in any given year had generated stock returns that were 60% higher than the average companies in their industries over the previous three years. Conversely, companies with CEOs in the bottom quintile of realized pay underperformed their industries by almost 20% in the previous three years. And along with lower pay, the CEOs of poorly performing companies in the 2000s faced a significant increase in the likelihood of dismissal by their own boards. When viewed together, these findings suggest that corporate boards have done a reasonably good job of overseeing CEO pay, and that factors such as technological advances and increased scale have played meaningful roles in driving the pay of both CEOs and others with top incomes—people who are assumed to have comparable skills, experience, and opportunities. If one wants to use increases in CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or “board capture,” one also has to explain why the other professional groups have experienced similar, or even higher, growth in pay. A more straightforward interpretation of the evidence reviewed in this article is that the market for talent has driven a meaningful portion of the increase in pay at the top. Consistent with this conclusion, top executive pay policies at roughly 97% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received majority shareholder support in the Dodd‐Frank mandated “Say‐on‐Pay” votes in 2011 and 2012, the first two years the measure was in force.     

Breaking out of the innovation box

In most companies, investments in innovation follow a boom-bust cycle. For a time, the cash flows. Then, as the economy sours or companies rethink their priorities, the taps go dry. But when research budgets are slashed, the strong projects are often abandoned along with the weak ones. Promising initiatives are cut off just when they are about to bear fruit. Expensive labs are closed; partnership agreements costing millions in legal fees are thrown away. When disruptive changes in the competitive landscape come, companies are caught flat-footed. Sustainable innovation requires a new approach: Instead of being largely isolated projects, innovation initiatives need to gain access to the insights and capabilities of other companies. To be protected from the ax of short-term cost reductions and the faddishness born of easy money, the initiatives must become part of the ongoing commerce that takes place among companies. But how can businesses traffic in such sensitive information without giving their competitors an advantage? The answer, the author contends, lies in a practice that's been common since the Middle Ages: the use of independent intermediaries to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information among companies without revealing the principals' identities or motives and without otherwise compromising their interests. Executive search firms, for example, allow job seekers to remain anonymous during the early stages of a search, and they protect businesses from disclosing their hiring plans to rivals. A network of innovation intermediaries would be in a unique position to visualize new opportunities synthesized from insights and technologies provided by several companies--ideas that might never occur to businesses working on their own.     

The growth crisis--and how to escape it

At a time when companies are poised to seize the growth opportunities of a rebounding economy, many of them, whether they know it or not, face a growth crisis. Even during the boom years of the past decade, only a small fraction of companies enjoyed consistent double-digit revenue growth. And those that did often achieved it through short-term measures--such as mergers and inflated price increases--that don't provide the foundation for growth over the long term. But there is a way out of this predicament. The authors claim that companies can achieve sustained growth by leveraging their "hidden assets," a wide array of underused, intangible capabilities and advantages that most established companies already hold. To date, much of the research on intangible assets has centered on intellectual property and brand recognition. But in this article, the authors uncover a host of other assets that can help spark growth. They identify four major categories of hidden assets: customer relationships, strategic real estate, networks, and information. And they illustrate each with an example of a company that has creatively used its hidden assets to produce new sources of revenue. Executives have spent years learning to create growth using products, facilities, and working capital. But they should really focus on mobilizing their hidden assets to serve their customers' higher-order needs--in other words, create offerings that make customers' lives easier, better, or less expensive. Making that shift in mind-set isn't easy, admit the authors, but companies that do it may not only create meaningful new value for their customers but also produce double-digit revenue and earnings growth for investors.     

Bureaucrats as managers and their roles in corporate diversification

We examine the diversification choices and financial performance of companies run by former bureaucrats in China. We find that the ex-bureaucrat led companies are involved in more diversified business lines than other firms managed by professionals without such government backgrounds. While former bureaucrats that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to operate in unattractive industries, those who manage private firms do businesses in more profitable, faster-growing, and more related industries. The diversification of private firms is helped by additional borrowing capacity brought in by ex-bureaucrat CEOs, while no such financing effect is found in SOEs. The overall diversification performance associated with bureaucrat CEOs is positive in private firms, but not in SOEs. As manifested by the different diversification strategies and outcomes between private firms and SOEs, the government-linked CEOs facilitate transfers of critical business resources that benefit either owners' or governments' goals.     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Growing talent as if your business depended on it

Traditionally, corporate boards have left leadership planning and development very much up to their CEOs and human resources departments-primarily because they don't perceive that a lack of leadership development in their companies poses the same kind of threat that accounting blunders or missed earnings do. That's a shortsighted view, the authors argue. Companies whose boards and senior executives fail to prioritize succession planning and leadership development end up experiencing a steady attrition in talent and becoming extremely vulnerable when they have to cope with inevitable upheavals- integrating an acquired company with a different operating style and culture, for instance, or reexamining basic operating assumptions when a competitor with a leaner cost structure emerges. Firms that haven't focused on their systems for building their bench strength will probably make wrong decisions in these situations. In this article, the authors explain what makes a successful leadership development program, based on their research over the past few years with companies in a range of industries. They describe how several forward-thinking companies (Tyson Foods, Starbucks, and Mellon Financial, in particular) are implementing smart, integrated, talent development initiatives. A leadership development program should not comprise stand-alone, ad hoc activities coordinated by the human resources department, the authors say. A company's leadership development processes should align with strategic priorities. From the board of directors on down, senior executives should be deeply involved in finding and growing talent, and line managers should be evaluated and promoted expressly for their contributions to the organization-wide effort. HR should be allowed to create development tools and facilitate their use, but the business units should take responsibility for development activities, and the board should ultimately oversee the whole system.     

Show me the money-cut: Shareholder dividend suspensions and voluntary CEO pay cuts during the COVID pandemic

Many US companies with December 31, 2019 as their fiscal year end had their Annual Shareholder Meeting scheduled (usually online) during the COVID pandemic. Unexpectedly faced with significant changes in operating environments, some companies decided to suspend shareholder dividend payments. In normal circumstances, this would be interpreted as a very negative event and shareholders could be expected to respond adversely at the annual meeting. However, we investigate whether CEOs were able to maintain shareholder support by offering a previously unheard of response of “sharing the pain”, committing to cut their own pay following a dividend suspension. At issue is whether investors acted as if they updated their inferences using the new voluntary pay-cut decision to infer the extent to which the CEOs underlying personality type was well matched to crisis management. We estimate an instrumental variables model in which the dividend suspension is used as an instrument for the endogenous pay cut variable.     

Attracting Long‐Term Shareholders

Corporate CEOs often say they don't hear enough from shareholders about strategic issues related to long‐term value creation. At the same time, they claim to hear with predictable regularity from short‐term investors about their success (or failure) in hitting consensus earnings targets. But as the authors of this article begin by noting, there is mounting evidence that companies get the shareholders they deserve—that companies that provide quarterly earnings guidance and otherwise focus investor attention on near‐term earnings targets tend to attract more transient investors. The authors go on to argue that companies with a compelling long‐term vision can expect to benefit not only from more farsighted managerial decision‐making, but also from building a base of longer‐term investors who share management's view of success, and how it can and ought to be achieved. Such a shift in strategic focus and disclosure toward longer‐run performance creates a virtuous cycle—one in which companies that gain the interest and backing of investors with longer horizons end up reinforcing management's confidence to undertake value‐adding investments in their company's future. Even if most companies can't pick their shareholders, they can develop an investor engagement strategy designed to attract long‐term investors. In this article, the chairman and president of FCLTGlobal outline the underlying strategy behind long‐term investor relations and the four key components of such an approach.     

Getting offshoring right

The prospect of offshoring and outsourcing business processes has captured the imagination of CEOs everywhere. In the past five years, a rising number of companies in North America and Europe have experimented with this strategy, hoping to reduce costs and gain strategic advantage. But many businesses have had mixed results. According to several studies, half the organizations that have shifted processes offshore have failed to generate the expected financial benefits. What's more, many of them have faced employee resistance and consumer dissatisfaction. Clearly, companies have to rethink how they formulate their offshoring strategies. A three-part methodology can help. First, companies need to prioritize their processes, ranking each based on two criteria: the value it creates for customers and the degree to which the company can capture some of that value. Companies will want to keep their core (highest-priority) processes in-house and consider outsourcing their commodity (low-priority) processes; critical (moderate-priority) processes are up for debate and must be considered carefully. Second, businesses should analyze all the risks that accompany offshoring and look systematically at their critical and commodity processes in terms of operational risk (the risk that processes won't operate smoothly after being offshored) and structural risk (the risk that relationships with service providers may not work as expected). Finally, companies should determine possible locations for their offshore efforts, as well as the organizational forms--such as captive centers and joint ventures--that those efforts might take. They can do so by examining each process's operational and structural risks side by side. This article outlines the tools that will help companies choose the right processes to offshore. It also describes a new organizational structure called the extended organization, in which companies specify the quality of services they want and work alongside providers to get that quality.     

How CEOs manage growth agendas

When does it make sense for companies to grow from within? When is it better to gain new capabilities or access to markets by merging with or acquiring other companies? When should you sacrifice the bottom line in order to nurture the top line? In a thought-provoking series of essays, five executives--Kenneth Freeman of Quest Diagnostics, George Nolen of Siemens USA, John Tyson of Tyson Foods, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, and Robert Creifeld of Nasdaq--describe how they have approached top-line growth in various leadership roles throughout their careers. They write candidly about their struggles and successes along the way, relaying growth strategies as diverse as the companies and industries they represent. The leaders' different tactics have almost everything to do with their companies' particular strengths, weaknesses, and needs. Freeman, for instance, emphasizes the importance of knowing when to put on the brakes. When he first became CEO of Quest, he froze acquisitions for a few years so the company could focus on internal processes and "earn the right to grow." But for Greifeld, it's all about innovation, which "shakes up competitive stasis and propels even mature businesses forward." The executives agree, though, that companies can grow (and can do so profitably) by distinguishing their offerings from those of other organizations. As Ranjay Gulati of Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management points out in his introduction to the essays, no matter what strategies are in play,"it's important to remember that growth comes in many forms and takes patience.... The key is to be ready to act on whatever types of opportunities arise."     

Hiring retirement-age CEOs

More than 10% of the S&P 1500 companies have hired a CEO who starts the job near or above the conventional retirement age of 65 years old. This phenomenon exists among all industries and persists over time. Firms are more likely to hire retiring CEOs when the CEO job risk is high and when the firm is in distress. Retiring CEOs receive lower total compensation, the compensation structure puts a higher weight on nonequity-based compensation, and have a shorter tenure. Retiring CEOs can be beneficial to shareholders when they are hired for the right purpose.