Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Implicit Mercantilism,Oligopoly, and Trade*

The authors propose a new model of trade between developing and advanced economies to capture the effects of important asymmetries in the organizations of their industries. This model demonstrates how the industrial structure of a developing economy can evolve to produce what the authors call “implicit mercantilism.” Free entry plus domestic oligopoly in a developing economy, when combined with competitive behavior in developed countries, generates several distinct stages of mercantilism hitherto unrecognized in the literature. Each stage has its own pattern of interaction with a competitive trading world. As the production costs and techniques of the mercantile society converge to world standards, its citizens will first lose from this progress, only later to gain. Both effects are due to certain relationships between home prices and world prices, newly identified in this paper. The analysis is particularly relevant to the structure of Asian economies, and to policy debates about their reform.     

International Trade Policy towards Monopoly and Oligopoly*

This paper highlights the importance of product differentiation and endogenous R&D in determining the optimal R&D policy, in a model where investment in cost‐reducing R&D is committed before firms compete in a differentiated‐goods third‐country export market. R&D is always taxed in oligopolies for high degrees of product differentiation. For lower degrees of product differentiation the duopoly is subsidized or the government remains inactive. In contrast, the monopoly is always subsidized. The government with a duopoly may be active or inactive depending on the degree of product differentiation. Thus, we may observe a reversal in the sign of the optimal R&D policy if the degree of product differentiation changes or, alternatively, if there is a change in the number of firms. Similar qualitative results hold if trade policy uses output subsidies, instead of R&D promotion.     

International Trade Without Autarkic Equilibria

It is possible that wealthy trading countries nevertheless have no autarkic equilibria. However, if a country has no autarkic equilibrium, the offer curve of that country may consist of disjoint segments, which implies that a worldwide trading equilibrium does not always exist, that international exchanges do not always take place in equilibrium, and therefore that econometric estimates of the structure of open economies must be viewed with scepticism. In the present paper, I provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a worldwide free-trade equilibrium and for the existence of gains from free trade for individual countries.     

Trade Gains in Chaotic Equilibria

It is shown by means of an overlapping-generations (OLG) example that free international trade may be both deterministically chaotic and gainful in the sense of Pareto to a participating country.     

Non-existence of Duopoly Equilibria: A Simple Numerical Example

We give a simple example to the non-existence of duopoly equilibrium in pure strategies in an economy with two goods and two types of consumers. This extends also the discussion on the incentive for trade in an oligopolistic framework initiated in Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998).     

Free Trade versus Autarky under Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

The paper compares free trade with autarky in an asymmetric multi‐country world under Cournot competition with constant returns to scale and linear demand. We derive respective conditions under which free trade will hurt a country's consumers, benefit its firms, induce it to export, increase its output and raise its welfare. We show that these conditions are linked in a clear order, with one implying the next. We further demonstrate that free trade can reduce world total output and total consumer surplus as well as world welfare. Along the way, we correct several oversights in the literature.     

Trade and Global Pollution in Dynamic Oligopoly with Corporate Environmentalism

This paper examines the effects of international trade in the presence of dynamic oligopolistic competition where the stock of global pollution has a negative welfare effect and the oligopolists' objectives may include society's pollution damage as well as private profits. In a symmetric case where the number of firms, emission coefficient, and firms' environmental consciousness are the same in two countries, an opening of trade unambiguously improves each country's welfare in the short run. In the long run, however, trade increases the stock of global pollution and hence, whether opening of trade is beneficial depends on the parameters of the economy. If there are asymmetries between countries, the short‐run gains from trade in both countries are not necessarily guaranteed, because trade liberalization may increase output in one country and reduce it in the other. Moreover, free trade may result in lower pollution stock than under autarky.     

On the Contemporary Commodity Structure of World Trade Patterns: An Empirical Assessment

For about 150 years, international trade theory has mostly highlighted trade in consumption goods. Such a modeling approach was likely supported by the then prevailing commodity structure of world trade. This paper shows that – at least since 1970 – only about 20 per cent of commodity trade has taken place in consumables, the remainder being intermediates and capital goods. Theoretically, this evidence suggests a move in the modelling strategy for traded goods: from utility functions to production functions. Sanyal and Jones' "new trade theory" (1982) does precisely that. In addition, some crucial research challenges emerge. These relate to dynamic changes in some general characteristics of production technologies throughout the world.     

Gains from Trade in a Differential Game Model of Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper revisits a classical topic of trade gains in a differential game model of oligopoly in which Home and Foreign firms differ in the number and cost. After deriving the feedback Nash equilibrium, we provide examples to consider how the difference in the number of firms or costs affects gainfulness of trade. We prove that feedback strategies can result in implications for trade gains which are sharply different from the open-loop case.     

The Loss from Trade under International Cournot Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry

This paper examines the efficiency and welfare effects of intra‐industry trade in the presence of imperfect competition and heterogeneous technologies. We show that when a Southern country has a relatively less concentrated industry and faces low demand, the output of the Northern country may contract after initiating trade. Production inefficiencies can outweigh the gain effected by trade‐induced competition and lower price in trade, resulting in a net loss in the global welfare. In some circumstances, voluntary technology transfer, managed trade through VERs, or the introduction of a tariff can improve both trading partners' welfare.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

Terms of Trade,Competitive Advantage,and Trade Patterns

This paper investigates the competitive determination of the pattern of trade, seen as a choice of technique problem within a two-country, two-commodity, circulating capital model. It seeks to re-examine the analytical premises of the principle of comparative advantage. The establishment of competitive advantage is addressed in a Sraffian framework that allows the integration of the choice of technique problem to issues of growth and distribution. The focus is on exploring the validity of this principle when capital is internationally immobile—the context in which the principle was first postulated. Capital immobility imparts a degree freedom to the model. Closing the model and establishing a trade outcome on the basis of the principle of comparative advantage depends on the specification of appropriate boundary conditions. These boundary conditions boil down to some specification of relative scales of the trading partners and the scope for complete specialization and mutually beneficial gains from trade is circumscribed.     

On Chamberlinian-Ricardian Trade Patterns

This study provides a simple, many‐industry model of trade which emphasizes the interaction between cross‐country technical heterogeneity (i.e., a Ricardian aspect) and monopolistic competition among producers of differentiated products (i.e., a Chamberlinian aspect) as determinants of trade patterns. It is shown that the emergence of intra‐industry trade is crucially dependent on the shape of the technology index schedule, which is obtained as a step‐function.     

Evolving Patterns of International Trade

Theoretical models of growth and trade suggest that patterns of international specialization are dynamic and evolve endogenously over time. Initial comparative advantages are either reinforced or gradually unwound with the passage of time. This paper puts forward an empirical framework for modeling international trade dynamics that uses techniques widely employed in the cross-country literature on income convergence. On applying this framework to industry-level data, evidence is found for significant differences in international trade dynamics among the G-5 economies.     

Production Networks and Patterns of Trade: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper investigates the role of production networks in determining the pattern of international trade. Using Taiwan's trade data for 1991, production networks are found to have a discernible impact on the pattern of trade, aside from the variables typically envisaged by conventional and new trade theories, including factor proportions and technological difference. Taiwan's industries are shown to be relatively strong in horizontal networks, but weak in vertical ones. However, the strength in horizontal networks can be undermined by high wages, and the weakness in vertical networks can be strengthened by high R&D intensities. Both networks are conducive to intra-industry trade, which means that networks are useful devices for product differentiation.