Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Trade Gains in Chaotic Equilibria

It is shown by means of an overlapping-generations (OLG) example that free international trade may be both deterministically chaotic and gainful in the sense of Pareto to a participating country.     

Non-existence of Duopoly Equilibria: A Simple Numerical Example

We give a simple example to the non-existence of duopoly equilibrium in pure strategies in an economy with two goods and two types of consumers. This extends also the discussion on the incentive for trade in an oligopolistic framework initiated in Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998).     

Gains from Trade in a Differential Game Model of Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper revisits a classical topic of trade gains in a differential game model of oligopoly in which Home and Foreign firms differ in the number and cost. After deriving the feedback Nash equilibrium, we provide examples to consider how the difference in the number of firms or costs affects gainfulness of trade. We prove that feedback strategies can result in implications for trade gains which are sharply different from the open-loop case.     

Production Networks and Patterns of Trade: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper investigates the role of production networks in determining the pattern of international trade. Using Taiwan's trade data for 1991, production networks are found to have a discernible impact on the pattern of trade, aside from the variables typically envisaged by conventional and new trade theories, including factor proportions and technological difference. Taiwan's industries are shown to be relatively strong in horizontal networks, but weak in vertical ones. However, the strength in horizontal networks can be undermined by high wages, and the weakness in vertical networks can be strengthened by high R&D intensities. Both networks are conducive to intra-industry trade, which means that networks are useful devices for product differentiation.     

Evolving Patterns of International Trade

Theoretical models of growth and trade suggest that patterns of international specialization are dynamic and evolve endogenously over time. Initial comparative advantages are either reinforced or gradually unwound with the passage of time. This paper puts forward an empirical framework for modeling international trade dynamics that uses techniques widely employed in the cross-country literature on income convergence. On applying this framework to industry-level data, evidence is found for significant differences in international trade dynamics among the G-5 economies.     

An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria

A convincing interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria describes them as steady states in a large population in which players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. I study the conditions under which an evolutionary, stochastic learning process converges to the appropriate distribution over pure strategies in the population. I find that not all mixed equilibria can be justified as the result of an evolutionary process even if the equilibrium is unique. For symmetric 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 games I give necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence, which are related to the concept of an ESS, and forn × ngames I give a sufficient condition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73, D83.     

No-arbitrage Equilibria with Differential Information: An Existence Proof

On the example of a pure exchange financial economy with two periods incomplete nominal-asset markets and differential information of the adverse selection’s type, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (J Math Econ 38:393-410, 2002) introduced refined concepts of no-arbitrage prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information setting the classical concepts of the symmetric information literature. We now assess existence issues and extend a standard property of symmetric information models. Namely, we prove that a no-arbitrage equilibrium always exists, as long as financial markets preclude arbitrage, under the same standard conditions, whether agents have symmetric or asymmetric information.     

贸易自由化、外资并购与寡头市场的福利效应分析--对(Farrell,Shapiro 1990)模型在开放条件下的扩展

本文试用扩展的（Farrell,Shapiro1990）模型,在关税减让为特征的自由贸易化趋势下,对同质产品的横向外资并购带来的价格及福利效应进行边际分析。主要观点：在一定条件下,（1）对行业价格效应的判定,其符号取决于两个变量的权衡,即关税外生性下调导致外商均衡产量的变动和关税下调后外资并购行为引致的并购方整体产量的变动。（2）对一国社会福利效应的判定不存在单一化结论。关税下调后的外资并购行为,其引发的外部福利效应与关税下调前的情况相比,有利程度可能趋于下降,甚至走向反面——变为负效应。但是,关税下调带来的社会福利效应在很大层面上会带来正的福利效应。     

寡头垄断行为模型的统一：推测变量法

推测变量法是哈佛学派SCP范式的理论基础。本文利用推测变量法对一些典型寡头垄断模型进行了统一,本质地 揭示了这些模型的差异但是推测变量取值范围的不同,并指出在实际运用推测变量法中所应注意的问题。     

Foreign Trade Patterns Between Estonia and the EU

In this paper, we focus on the development of the foreign trade flows between Estonia and the EU. We observe rapid reorientation of the trade flows from the former Soviet Union towards Western markets because of economic reforms and foreign trade liberalization. Moreover, we determine the commodity groups with a comparative advantage in the EU market and analyze its dynamics. Further analysis of the intra-industry trade (ITT) shows that vertical IIT plays a dominant role in Estonian-EU IIT flows. Shares of total, vertical, and horizontal IIT have grown rapidly since 2004, the year of accession to the EU.     

Oligopoly and Merger: A Simple Classroom Game

Professor Miller describes a game which has been used in intermediate price theory courses as well as in introductory classes. Two versions are presented—a duopoly and a six-firm market, both with undifferentiated product and a known market demand schedule. Students are also asked to make a monopoly of the six firms by forming a trust or holding company. Miller contends that the game is more stimulating than lectures aud suspects that it will result in longer retention.     

边境贸易及人民币跨境结算问题研究——以广西壮族自治区为例

自2009年中国跨境贸易人民币结算试点开展以来,人民币结算额不断上升,但同时也面临一些问题。以广西为例,边境贸易发展推动了广西经济实力的上升,创新了银行业务,为跨境贸易人民币结算累积了丰富经验。但在货币监管、监测统计等方面还存在问题。因此,我国要扩大人民币区域影响力,创新结算业务,构建统一的货币兑换和清算体系以及完善人民币跨境收支监测管理体制等,从而推动人民币国际化发展路线。     

Dynamic Patterns of Trade Imbalances with Recursive Preference

Based on the recursive preference approach, the dynamic and global properties of the two‐country open economy are examined with one good and inputs of labor and capital, with capital being freely traded internationally. First, by showing that the world's consumption increases (decreases) with an increase (decrease) in the world's capital, the global stability of the economy is obtained. Secondly, the nonmonotonicity of consumption between impatient country 1 and patient country 2 is established. Thirdly, with the Cobb–Douglas‐type production function and country 1's technological superiority, the dynamic trade patterns and the asset–debt position are derived.     

Analysis of Bilateral Trade Patterns With Panel Data

Bilateral trade flows are examined to investigate whether trade patterns are consistent with a simple model of trade in differentiated products. In contrast to previous results in the literature, it is shown that the simple model of trade in differentiated products is often not appropriate for trade among the poor nations. Demand differences among the poor countries are shown to be at least a partial explanation for the deviations from the theoretical predictions.     

Mixed Oligopoly and Environmental Policy

We show in this paper that when there are both public and private firms in product markets (a mixed oligopoly) the decision whether to privatize a public firm interacts with the environmental policy of governments. Therefore, the outcome of the decision whether to privatize a public firm may be different if the government internalizes the environmental damage than if the government ignores it. When the government sets a tax to protect the environment, the tax is lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private one even though the environmental damage is greater. In the mixed oligopoly the marginal cost of the public firm is lower than the market price.     

Monopoly and Oligopoly Provision of Addictive Goods

This article investigates monopoly and oligopoly provision of an addictive good. Consumer preferences are modeled as in Becker and Murphy (1988). Addictive goods have characteristics that create interesting strategic issues when suppliers are noncompetitive. We characterize the perfect Markov equilibrium of a market with noncompetitive supply of an addictive good and compare it with the efficient solution. Depending on particular parameter values, we find a wide variety of possible steady-state outcomes, including ones with output above the efficient level and price below marginal cost. We also find that market power can be disadvantageous.