The timing ability and global performance of Tunisian mutual fund managers: A multivariate GARCH approach

It is well-established in the financial literature that the global performance of mutual fund managers is the result of two skills: selectivity and market timing. This paper examines whether the multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) approach improves our perception of the global performance of fund managers compared with the unconditional approach and the conditional approach based on instruments. We find strong evidence that the multivariate GARCH method makes mutual fund performance looks better relative to the existent approaches, but this improvement in the global performance does not mean necessarily that mutual funds outperform traditional benchmarks. Indeed, mixed mutual funds yield neutral performance relative to benchmarks, whereas bond mutual funds generate significant positive global coefficients. The strong performance of bond fund managers comes from their ability to pick profitable bonds, not from their ability to time the market. Also, the empirical tests highlight that the best (worst) bond funds in the past remain at the top (bottom) of the ranking in the following years. These findings suggest that the Tunisian bond market presents strong opportunities for sophisticated investors.     

International Real Estate Mutual Fund Performance: Diversification or Costly Information?

We investigate the net effect between diversification benefit and information cost of international real estate mutual funds from three dimensions: whether investors can benefit from investing in international real estate mutual funds, whether managers of international real estate mutual funds possess superior market knowledge and timing abilities, and whether investors are motivated by returns or diversification. Our findings are threefold. First, the results show that international real estate mutual funds perform better and are less risky than domestic real estate mutual funds before Jun 2007. That is, diversification benefits outweigh the information costs, and investors therefore gain from investing in international real estate mutual funds. However, the benefit is reduced because of the economic shock of sub-prime financial crisis. Second, on average, neither international mutual fund managers nor domestic mutual fund managers possess market timing abilities. Finally, we find that fund flows are driven by investors’ return-chasing behaviors and fund size, but not by diversification purpose.     

The performance of US bond mutual funds

We evaluate the performance of the US bond mutual fund industry using a comprehensive sample of bond funds over a long time period from January 1998 to February 2017. In this one study, we examine bond fund selectivity, market timing and performance persistence. We evaluate bond funds relative to their self-declared benchmarks and in terms of both gross-of-fee returns and net-of-fee returns. We document considerable abnormal performance among funds both to the fund (gross returns) and to the investor (net returns). Bond fund performance is found to be superior in the post financial crisis period. However, past strong performance cannot be relied upon to predict future performance. Finally, while some funds exhibit market timing ability; we find a predominance of negative market timing among US bond mutual funds.     

Pitfalls and perils of financial innovation: The use of CDS by corporate bond funds

We use the financial crisis of 2007–2009 as a laboratory to examine the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers in asset management. We find that when a fund uses complex trading strategies involving the use of CDS team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds. This may be due to the greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to single managers. During the financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams becomes negative, which may be because of the slower decision times of teams, which are especially costly during times of rapidly changing market conditions.     

Portfolio concentration and fund manager performance

This research examines the relationships among portfolio concentration, fund manager skills, and fund performance in Taiwan's equity mutual fund industry, yielding several empirical findings as follows. First, after controlling for other factors, concentrated equity funds tend to have smaller net asset values, larger fund flows, higher turnover rates, and a younger age and prevail in smaller fund families. Second, concentrated fund managers buy and sell stocks more smartly based on economic trends or market factors than do diversified fund managers, i.e., they have better market‐timing abilities. Third, only partial evidence supports the premise that concentrated equity funds have better next‐quarter risk‐adjusted performances than do diversified ones, as these fund managers' skills positively correlate to risk‐adjusted fund performance. Fourth, fund managers who have better stock‐picking abilities and intensively invest in certain industries generally exhibit better Carhart's alpha in the next quarter than do other fund managers. Fifth, fund managers' stock‐picking abilities more closely relate to long‐term performance than do their market‐timing abilities. Lastly, positive performance persistence is much stronger than negative performance persistence, but concentrated funds do not have stronger performance persistence than do diversified funds.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Performance Chasing,Fund Flows and Fund Size in Real Estate Mutual Funds

Real estate mutual funds have grown dramatically in number, size, scope and assets under management over the last 15 years, but little assessment is evident. The present study addresses this limitation. Better prior period performance is associated with greater shares of fund inflows for a period. Returns, however, are negatively associated with increased fund flows and fund size. Investors chase past performance limiting fund managers’ ability to optimize investments. Under normal market conditions, but departing from typical mutual fund performance, real estate mutual fund returns generally exceed relevant benchmarks on a before expenses basis and match benchmark returns after expenses. The ability to meet and exceed benchmark returns, however, does not hold during the financial crisis period. Overall, more established funds are shown to have higher returns while fund turnover is not a determinant of returns.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Should Asset Managers Hedge Their “Fees at Risk”?

Although the recent financial crisis afflicted all asset managers, the problem of general market exposure was in some respects worse for the long-only funds that rely almost completely on asset-based fees than for the “absolute return” and other kinds of hedge funds that also receive performance-based fees. While the revenue generated by performance-based fees is expected to be volatile, asset-based fees tend to be viewed as an “annuity” stream that involves little or no earnings risk. But, especially in the case of long-only funds, large shortfalls in asset fees were caused by the combination of significant redemptions and sharp reductions in assets under management that accompanied the plunge in asset prices. In this article, the author attempts to quantify the expected effect of market fluctuations on the asset fees and profitability of long-only asset managers. Having done so, he then argues that traditional long-only asset managers—managers whose only reason for being is their ability to generate above-market returns (or “alpha”) on a fairly consistent basis—routinely retain too much beta risk in their primarily asset-based fee structures. The author offers two main reasons for long-only asset managers to hedge beta risk: (1) it would reduce the need for fund management firms to hold liquid capital to ensure solvency and fund important projects during market downturns; (2) it would provide the firm's current and prospective clients with a clearer signal of whether its managers are succeeding in the firm's mission of generating alpha, as well as the possibility of more equity-like and cost-effective incentive compensation systems for those managers.     

The impact of the Arab Spring and the Ebola outbreak on African equity mutual fund investor decisions

Financial development and stock markets have been widely considered to be key factors in economic growth. Among institutional investors, mutual funds play a key role in providing financial resources to stock markets, particularly in developing countries. Different from other investments, mutual fund flows could be affected by retail investors’ behavior and their overreaction to specific events. We considered 78 equity mutual funds that are geographically specialized in African countries and observed monthly flows and performance for the period of 2006–2015. We find that two major events, Ebola and the Arab Spring, significantly affected the fund flows, controlling for fund performance, expenses and market returns. Retail investors over-reacted to these major events, withdrawing their savings from the African mutual funds. This result is particularly strong when connected to the media coverage of these events: the higher the number of articles about Arab Spring and Ebola, the higher the withdrawals. These irrational investors’ behavior damaged the funds’ managers market timing ability, and reduced the equity capital injection into African stock markets. Our results have several implications for both holders of frontier market mutual funds and the overall asset management industry.     

The Performance,Asset Allocation,and Investment Style of International Equity Managers

This paper evaluates the performance of 114 international equity managers over the January 1988–December 1997 period. Performance tests are conducted using Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) performance methodologies. The managers are divided into mutual fund (n=54) and separately managed fund (n=60) investment management categories. Each management category is further divided by foreign and world (global) investment objectives. Three major findings are reported. First, international equity managers, on average, were unable to outperform the MSCI World market proxy during the sample period. However, world managers did perform better than their foreign counterparts. Second, geographic asset allocation and equity style allocation decisions enhanced the performance of international managers during the sample period. Third, separately managed funds outperformed mutual funds during the period studied when mutual fund returns are measured net of management fees. The apparent managed performance advantage abates, however, when mutual fund returns are adjusted to include management fees. Thus, we find no significant difference in the performance of the management categories when returns are measured gross of fees.     

International mutual fund selectivity and market timing during up and down market conditions

This study examines the selectivity and market-timing ability of international mutual fund managers. Ninety-seven international mutual funds with a minimum of five-year return history selected from the Morningstar OnDisc database are analyzed. Our findings suggest that managers of international mutual funds possess good selectivity and overall performance. We also find weak evidence of poor market-timing ability. Consistent with prior findings from domestic mutual funds, there is a negative correlation between the international fund managers' selection ability and market-timing ability. Finally, managers for Europea funds show poorer performance than those managing the other three international fund groups.     

Coskewness timing ability in the mutual fund industry

The ability of mutual fund managers to time coskewness successfully can help them manage their portfolio’s exposure to potential losses and improve their fund’s performance. This study assesses whether mutual fund managers are able to manage the market exposure of their investment portfolios given a change in coskewness. We demonstrate that fund managers investing in Small Blend and Small Growth stocks possess the ability to time coskewness. On average, the fund managers of these two investment objectives increase the market exposures of their portfolios about 2.749 % and 1.340 %, respectively, based on their anticipations on future coskewness. Superiority is driven from the fact that the fund managers in small capitalization stocks are successfully able to manage the tail risk of their funds’ portfolios. The fund-by-fund results confirm that the number of individual funds succeeding in timing market skewness of the Small Blend and Small Growth investment objectives is larger than the remaining types. The main findings are robust when controlling for other types of timing ability, the periods of financial turbulence, and the construction of coskewness.     

我国开放式基金绩效及选股和择时能力研究

近年来,开放式基金逐渐成为我国基金市场的绝对主体。开放式基金能否取得较好的绩效受到市场的普遍关注。本文选取了资金管理规模前20位的公司,并从中随机挑选1只基金,运用詹森指数、特雷诺比率、夏普指数和信息比率等单因素模型和Fama-French三因素模型对开放式基金的绩效进行分析,并使用T-M模型、H-M模型、C-L模型对基金经理人股票选股与择时能力进行分析。结果发现:第一,我国开放式基金经理的选股能力存在时变性,在上升期具备选股能力,在下跌期不具备选股能力,而无论是在上升期还是下跌期,基金经理普遍不具备择时能力。第二,在市场上升期基金经理比较注意对风险的把控,系统性风险较小,而在下跌期基金投资组合的系统性风险明显上升,基金经理冒险意愿上升,当市场出现大幅度下跌时,其不理性行为会加剧市场的波动。本文的研究结论有利于提升投资者的风险意识和理性意识、促进外部监管部门的精准监管审查,并能够激励基金经理人提高自身风险管控的能力。     

Real Estate Fund Flows and the Flow-Performance Relationship

Convexity in the flow-performance relationship of traditional asset class mutual funds is widely documented, however it cannot be assumed to hold for alternative asset classes. This paper addresses this shortcoming in the literature by examining the flow-performance relationship for real estate funds, specifically open-end, direct-property funds. This investment vehicle is designed to provide the risk-return benefits of private market real estate and is available to retail investors in many countries across the globe. An understanding of fund flow dynamics associated with this investment vehicle is of particular interest due to the liquidity risk associated with holding an inherently illiquid asset in an open-end structure. Our analysis draws on the theoretical foundations provided in the literature on mutual fund flows, performance chasing, liquidity risk, participation costs and dynamics across market cycles. We focus on German real estate funds from 1990 to 2010 as this is the largest market globally and there is a high level of confidence in the data. The results show that real estate fund investors chase past performance at the aggregate level and the relationship between flows and relative performance is asymmetric (i.e., convex) at the individual fund level. Fund-level liquidity risk tends to weaken convexity, while sensitivity increases with higher participation costs. We find the flow-performance relationship varies across time, though our interpretation is asset and investment vehicle specific. The implications are applicable to investors and fund managers of open-end, direct-property funds and, more broadly, other alternative asset funds where the underlying asset may not be liquid.     

Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

The Asset Management Industry in Asia: Dynamics of Growth,Structure, and Performance

We examine the industrial organization and institutional development of the asset management industry in Asian developing economies—specifically in China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. We focus on the size and growth of the buy‐side of the respective financial markets, asset allocation, the regulatory environment, and the state of internationalization of the fund management industry in its key components—mutual funds, pension funds, and asset management for high net worth individuals. We link the evolution of professional asset management in these environments to the development of the respective capital markets and to the evolution of corporate governance. We find that the fund management industry occupies a very small niche in domestic financial systems that are dominated by banks. At the same time, we find that its growth has been very rapid in the early 2000s and we suggest that this is likely to persist as the demand for professional management of financial wealth in the region develops and as the pension fund sectors of the respective economies are liberalized to allow larger portions of assets to be invested in collective investment schemes.     

Pension fund manager skills over the economic cycle: the (non-)specialization cost

We study whether pension fund managers, as professionals of important social and financial products, are able to add value for their clients and adapt to economic changes. To this end, we analyze the performance and skills (market timing and stock picking) over the economic cycle from both pension fund and manager perspectives. This double analysis allows examining whether skills reside in managers and/or funds and control for manager substitutions. Despite the long-term nature of pension funds, we find that both fund and manager skills vary with market conditions, showing better evidence of stock-picking in booms, and of market timing in recessions. Nonetheless, top (bottom) funds and managers exhibit both (incorrect) skills in booms and in recessions. Some of the top (bottom) funds and managers are the best (worst) in both abilities in the same periods, but not in different periods, showing that not all managers have the ability to adapt to market conditions. Additionally, managers with limited skills tend to specialize because diversification requires multi-task skills and the non-specialization of these managers usually results in incorrect skills.     

Momentum investing and the asset allocation decision

This study examines the active asset allocation decisions of Australian multisector fund managers to determine whether active fund managers engage in momentum strategies. We find evidence supporting the existence of momentum investing in active asset allocation strategies. This evidence exists in the Australian Equities, Australian Fixed Interest and Listed Property asset classes. Interestingly, balanced funds adopt contrarian strategies in the International Equities asset class. We also examine whether there is any association between a fund's market timing skill and the execution of momentum strategies. Our results show that fund managers with no market timing skill are momentum investors.     

Time-varying fund manager skills of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds in developed and emerging markets

We examine stock selectivity and timing abilities in the market-wide return, volatility and liquidity of SRI fund managers. We find that multi-dimensional fund manager skills are time-varying and persistent in the short run, with developed market funds exhibiting longer persistence in all dimensions. Fund manager skills tend to be affected by fund characteristics (i.e., expense ratio, fund size, turnover and management tenure) and market characteristics (i.e., ESG market capitalization, mandatory ESG regulation and 10–2 yield spread). Fund managers of developed (emerging) market funds outperform (underperform) the market indices. For both fund types, fund managers possess exceptional volatility and liquidity timing despite poor return timing. Moreover, fund managers focus more (less) on timing the market’s return and less (more) on picking stocks when the prospect of recession keeps increasing (decreasing). Interestingly, if fund managers attempt to time the market-wide return or liquidity, stock selectivity will be worsened by their timing behavior.