浅析工程量清单计价下的投标策略及技巧

投标报价是工程投标的核心,报价过高,会失去中标机会;过低,即便中标,也会带来亏损的风险。本文就投标策略及技巧加以论述。     

从工程项目投标报价分析看报价中的风险规避

在我国现行的合理最低价中标的原则下,如何加强投标中的风险分析和规避,既低价中标,又保证项目的盈利,将直接关系到投标方的生存和发展.通过对工程项目投标决策的步骤及影响因素进行分析,从而提出工程项目投标报价的两种方法,并探索出工程项目投标中的风险规避技巧,以求认真负责,最经济合理、最有成效做好投标报价工作.     

投标报价决策理论与实践

在国际工程投标报价工作中,如何进行正确的投标决策,确定合理而又有竞争力的管理费和利润取费率及标价,对投标成败至关重要。国外常用的报价决策方法是通过用统计方法计算本公司不同报价的中标概率。很显然,计算利润越高,中标概率越低;计算利润越低,中标概率越高。根据概率论的理论,计算利润与中标概率的乘积为期望利润,表示在其他条件不变的情况下,公司以相同的取费标准投标承接大量类似工程的平均利润水平。由于每个企业都是以长期平均利润最大为经营目标,因此从理论上和长远角度讲,期望利润最大时的取费率和标价是最佳的。一…     

建筑业招投标中“平均价中标”的实验研究

本文通过实验室实验研究私人独立价值（IPV）假定和共同价值（CV）假定下平均价中标的拍卖。无投标限价时,IPV拍卖的报价迅速收敛至前期平均价,而CV拍卖的报价并未有明显的收敛趋势。有投标限价时,CV拍卖的报价均收敛于投标限价,报价的波动几乎与投标限价的起伏重合,而IPV拍卖的报价却没有随投标限价的起伏而有大幅的波动,仍收敛至前期的平均价格。IPV拍卖的平均报价或中标价格和中标企业的成本没有很大的联系,平均价中标几乎不能配置资源至成本最低的企业。无投标限价CV拍卖虽然避免了“赢家诅咒”问题,但报价普遍偏高;而设立较低的投标限价虽可能降低价格,但和最低价中标拍卖一样,不可避免遭遇“赢家诅咒”问题,同时投标限价很容易成为竞拍者协调报价的共同信息。     

浅析投标报价技巧及低价竞标的应用

投标报价的方式及方法、低价中标在我国的应用情况及投标报价编制技巧;本文通过参加徐州市建筑工程定额站组织的培训学习并结合我单位低价中标的橙黄时代F2楼的投标经验发表一下自己的理解和看法,为以后类似工程的投标报价提供参考.     

复杂经济条件下的工程建设项目投标报价

作者通过对工程建设项目投标报价的研究与探索,系统总结了影响工程投标报价决策的因素以及投标报价的方法与技巧,并对当今复杂经济条件下如何提高中标率,确保在中标后的经济效益提出了相应的对策。     

电力工程清单投标报价编制的探讨

近年来.随着招投标工作的不断完善,招标文件的编制已成为招投标工作正常运作和工程成本控制的重要环节.如何才能提高投标报价的竞争力及投标单位的中标机会,做好投标报价的编制是重点工作之一.为此,本文作者主要就投标报价编制进行了分析.     

市政工程施工投标的程序和报价策略

建设工程施工投标最终报价是投标单位以标书编制的预算价（标价）为基础,综合考虑各种因素后对预算标介进一步修订的报价,对是否中标将产生直接影响。本文论述了如何根据招标工程报价的不同类型,确定工程施工投标最终报价的技巧。     

关于市政工程施工中投标的程序和报价技巧

市政工程施工投标最终报价是投标单位以标书编制的预算价（标价）为基础,综合考虑各种因素后对预算标介进一步修订的报价,对是否中标将产生直接影响。本文论述了如何根据招标工程报价的不同类型,确定工程施工投标最终报价的技巧。     

浅谈工程投标管理

投标工作是关系到施工企业生存发展的工作,"中标是第一要务"这是放之任何一个施工企业都皆准的指导方针。投标管理工作是个系统工程,投标工作做得好坏,标书质量编制的优劣,将直接影响是否能中标,也影响到中标后的履约。     

施工企业投标与报价策略研究

在当今招投标市场竞争异常激烈的情况下,为使企业获得良好的经济效益和社会效益,任何施工企业都必须重视投标与报价策略的研究。对投标与报价两个方面的策略进行系统研究,望能使招投标市场竞争更加公平,施工企业能更好提高自身质量。     

Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition

Negotiations about a merger or acquisition are often sequential and only partially disclose to bidders information about each otherʼs bids. This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders. Each bidder can inspect the item at a nonprohibitive cost. If a revenue-maximizing seller cannot charge bidders for the information about the otherʼs bid, then the seller optimally runs a sequential second-price auction with a reserve price and a buy-now price. The seller prefers to keep the bids confidential and, sometimes, to hide the order in which he approaches the bidders.     

建设项目多目标评标的决策分析

建设项目的招标投标在我国应用已经非常广泛,评标的方法也越来越完善,但评标指标的权重不明确仍然是限制评标过程公平公正、科学合理的关键因素。本文通过研究在评价指标的权重不确定的条件下,提出了先优化每个投标方案的综合属性值,确定评标指标权重,再进行组合赋权并对投标方案进行排序的评标多目标决策方法。该方法避免了获取偏好信息的困难,有利于科学、公平、公正地进行评标,确定中标人,且易于计算机上实现。     

Cost overrun and auction format in small size public works

We study the effect on cost overruns of two different auction formats, the first price sealed bid and the average bid, conditional on whether entry is open or restricted. The first price format awards the contract to the lowest bid, while the average bid format awards the contract to the bid closest to the average of all the bids. This latter format is supposed to prevent an unreliable low bidder from winning the auction; as a consequence cost overruns should be lower under the average bid than under the first price format. We test this hypothesis with a panel data set of auctions held in the Italian Veneto region between 2004 and 2006, including small size public projects in sectors such as road works and building maintenance. We find that cost overruns are lower under the average bid format, but only when the entry is restricted. We then speculate on possible explanations for this result.     

西方竞租理论发展过程与最新拓展

竞租理论源于农业竞租理论,其中做出突出贡献和影响的是屠能。随着城市的发展,城市竞租理论得以快速发展,在阿隆索之前,新古典经济学、土地经济学、生态经济学等学派均形成了自己的主要观点。阿隆索继承新古典经济学的思想建立了经典的城市竞租模型,成为了城市经济学重要的基础理论之一。随着新的城市问题的出现,城市竞租理论在城市特征、交通成本、效用等模型方面以及在经验检验方法方面均有拓展。我国的城市问题与西方国家有所不同,文章也指出了竞租理论在我国应用的拓展展望。     

电力物资评价方法研究

评标是招投标工作中最关键的环节,目前常用的评价方法是最低评标价法、综合评分法、价值系数法等。电力物资招标评价方法应从评审因素这个特定的评标方法、评审因素系数的合理赋值、规定废标标准、报价要求和投标价格修正方法等完善策略。     

All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction

This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price.     

Bid Design Effects in Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice Contingent Valuation

A potential concern in multiple bounded discrete choice contingent valuation surveys – where the respondent is asked to express voting certainty, rather than a simple yes or no, on a large number of payment amounts (bids) – is whether responses are influenced by the particular position of bids in the bid-voting panel rather than solely on the respondents willingness to pay (WTP). For instance, respondents may systematically state they would pay the first few bid amounts and not pay all subsequent bids – regardless of the actual dollar values. Such systematic bid design effects would suggest that this method does not provide a valid measure of WTP. Using a split-sample survey, we compare responses to three different bid arrays that have an identical minimum bid, maximum bid, and number of bids. Using nonparametric estimation techniques, we find that estimated WTP distributions and corresponding welfare measures are not statistically different across survey samples.     

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations.     

评标准则对建筑业利润率的影响研究——基于多智能体仿真

目前关于低价中标对建筑业的影响存在积极与负面两方面的看法,一方认为建筑企业为了生存不得不作出＂最低价抢标＂的抉择,因而产生质量纠纷、影响企业发展的后果。一方认为发达国家多在实践中采用低价中标方式,所有采用过的评标办法在实施中总会出现一些自身无法解决的弊端,实施最低价中标评标办法较之其它办法更有利于实现真正的竞标。理论各持一词。因而研究从个体企业行为角度出发,根据多智能体理论,使用Netlogo建模平台,建立中国建筑业的交易行为互动流程,模拟运行建筑产业创新行为,通过建筑业的虚拟仿真竞争互动,观察并分析论证了建筑业不同评标准则对产业收益存在不同的影响,低价中标方法损害产业收益,而偏好创新中标方法有利于产业收益提高。