Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity

Innovation and the adoption of new ideas is fundamental to economic progress, and so is free trade of goods and services. Here we examine the underlying economics of the market for ideas and its implications for trade. From a positive perspective, we examine how such markets function and how international trade interact with them. From a normative perspective, we examine the pitfalls of current intellectual property regulations, and how might they be improved. We highlight recent research by ourselves and others challenging the notion that government awards of monopoly through patents and copyright are "the way" to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. JEL Classification: X15, X16 This article is based on the text of the SER Invited Lecture delivered by Michele Boldrin at the 2003 Simposio de Análisis Económico (Seville). We thank National Science Foundation Grants SES 01-14147 and 03-14713 for financial support. Corresponding author: Michele Boldrin     

中国各地区出口的信息传导机制研究

本文首次运用指向非循环图(DAG)方法排列出我国八个主要出口地区的出口同期因果关系,在此基础上进行结构VAR建模以及预测误差方差分解,进一步考察了各地区出口的信息传导过程.实证结果表明:北京、上海是我国出口的领导者;同处我国经济中心--\"长三角\"的上海、江苏和浙江的联系非常紧密;山东在我国的出口市场有着重要的连接作用;广东出口的辐射功能非常有限,这与它贸易大省的地位不相称.     

Walras and Darwin: an odd couple?

General equilibrium theory and the evolutionary branches of economics and game theory take rather opposite positions in the spectrum covered by the economic science. However, we reveal and explore analogies between Darwinian dynamics and Walrasian tatonnement processes for pure exchange economies, as well as further analogies implied by these.     

基于博弈论的企业品牌战略决策分析

博弈思维的全面导入,为企业品牌战略决策提供了重要的理论依据。由“非合作性博弈”向“合作性博弈”转换是当今国际市场主流发展趋势,市场主导企业与非主导企业结成品牌合作联盟,实施品牌合作战略,可以有效抵制外来企业的入侵,达到“双赢”的目的。     

Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces” Game

This paper examines the Dirty Faces problem as a Bayesian game. The equilibrium in the general form of the game requires the extreme assumption of common knowledge of rationality. However, for any finite number of players, the exact number of steps of iterated rationality necessary for the equilibrium to arise depends on the number of players of a particular type, allowing the game to be used to bound the number of steps satisfied by actual players. The game differs from other games used to study iterated rationality in that all players are better off when common knowledge of rationality is satisfied. While behavior in experiments is inconsistent with the game-theoretic prediction at the group level, individual level behavior shows a greater degree of consistency with theory and with previous results on iterated rationality. Finally, there is some evidence of learning in repeated play.     

An evolutionary theory of the convergence towards low inflation rates

This paper presents an evolutionary interpretation of Barro-Gordons monetary policy game. The model describes a multi-country setup where governments and private agents are boundedly rational players. The behavioral rule of players decisions leads to the imitation of the strategy giving the highest payoff. In this evolutionary monetary policy game, we show how a low inflation state is reached from an international context dominated by inflationary policies. The analysis explains the convergence towards low inflation rates observed during the past twenty years. Moreover, the low inflation state appears to be the long-run equilibrium of the game under some conditions featuring the observed macroeconomic context.JEL Classification: E5, C72, C73 Correspondence to: A. dArtigues     

植入"公平博弈"的委托-代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的"公平博弈"概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出"互惠性"非理性行为的新委托一代理模型.由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平.研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的.新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成.本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作.     

直入“公平博弈”的委托—代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin（1993）提出的“公平博弈”概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出“互惠性”非理性行为的新委托一代理模型：由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的。新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作。     

The brief history of game theory and the dissemination in China

After the year of 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstem published the book ＂Theory of Games and Economic Behavior＂, the game theory had gradually become an emerging discipline. At present, game theory has already penetrated to every industry and widespread application in economy, politics and military and so on. The paper introduces the history and the developed situation of game theory about the foreign and domestic state.     

On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making

International cooperation can be looked at in two ways: as a process and as an outcome. This paper shows how the process of treaty-making can affect treaty outcomes and how treaty design can change the rules of the game of international cooperation.     

What＇s Wrong with the Chinese Cyber Market？ -A Discussion on Trust

Given the booming of internet usage in its domain, Chinese on-line shopping business is not growing proportionately. The absence of a market mechanism based on trust among suppliers and customers is to blame, although other factors as well holding the responsibility. Beginning with an introduction to the theory of ＂lemons＂, this paper reviews the status quo of trust in the Chinese cyber market, from the perspective of legislation, regulation and institution. It also prescribes several possible micro-solutions.     

市场秩序的博弈论分析--兼论规范市场秩序的制度安排

我国目前市场秩序混乱的问题基本上是体制转型中产生的问题。由于现代博弈论涉及秩序和制度安排,因此可以依据博弈论的认识论和方法论,寻找市场秩序混乱的根源,由此找到规范市场秩序的有效制度。     

基于社会责任的企业环境信息披露博弈分析

企业的生产经营活动对人们赖以生存的环境产生着重大影响，所以企业应承担向社会公众披露有关环境信息的责任。目前,企业的环境信息披露情况不容乐观．为了促使经济健康发展．本文通过建立模型来分析企业与相关入之间的博弈关系，试图达到一种经济学上的“帕累托最优”状态。     

区域经济发展中不同利益体对环境政策的博弈分析

在经济发展过程中,不同利益主体为了各自区域经济的发展,仅追求自身利益,造成自然资源不合理地被开发利用、环境污染和生态破坏,这些制约了整个区域经济的可持续发展。本文运用博弈论分析了区域经济发展中,不同利益主体间利益关系以及各博弈主体可能的行为,为政策当局制订合理的区域经济发展政策提供一定参考性意见。     

自然保护区管理与周边社区农民经济活动的博弈分析

从博弈的角度出发,系统地阐述了保护区管理与周边社区的冲突关系,以及存在的主要问题.并通过理性的选择,利用纳什均衡的方法来分析双方的冲突,以达到双赢的目的.     

价格联盟博弈分析

随着市场竞争日益激烈，降价成为企业在竞争中常用的手段之一，竞相降价导致企业利润不断下滑，甚至引发整个行业亏损。为了避免恶性价格竞争，同行企业希望通过建立价格联盟，共同执行协议价格来阻止利润下滑。本文从博弈论的角度分析了价格联盟形成的动因、效用和解散等问题，并提出了政策建议。     

1953～1960年中央与地方经济关系的博弈分析

根据不断变化的情况和建设经验的积累,建国后我们一直在探索中央集权和地方分权的关系。所有这些都通过中 央与地方和地方之间的相互影响,深深地影响着中国经济的发展和进程。     

博弈论对正统经济学思维方式的冲击

自20世纪40年代博弈论被引入经济学之后,现代经济学在许多领域发生了很大的变化。与此同时,作为工具的博弈论与作为思想的博弈论却出现了一种分离的倾向。在作为工具的博弈论满足经济学家对形式主义模型沉溺的同时,作为思想的博弈论却对正统经济学形成了根基性的挑战。博弈论不仅是一种数学工具,更是一种方法论。它引导着人们彻底重新认识经济世界和人们的经济行为,在这一过程中,正统经济学的思维方式——确定性的经济社会观、理性经济人假设、个体主义原则受到了愈来愈强的冲击。