Why was the euro weak? Markets and policies

Against all odds, the euro turned out to be a weak currency. We argue that this outcome can readily be explained by the policy-mix that was chosen at the onset of the period: tight fiscal policies following the convergence mechanism that was imposed by the Maastricht treaty and loose monetary policy that resulted from the convergence of interest rates to the lower point of the spectrum. We investigate this outcome empirically and show that the euro's weakness can be understood as the result of an excess supply in the zone, which is channelled abroad in the usual beggar my neighbor way.     

Coping with ignorance: unforeseen contingencies and non-additive uncertainty

Summary. In real-life decision problems, decision makers are never provided with the necessary background structure: the set of states of the world, the outcome space, the set of actions. They have to devise all these by themselves. I model the (static) choice problem of a decision maker (DM) who is aware that her perception of the decision problem is too coarse, as for instance when there might be unforeseen contingencies. I make a “bounded rationality' assumption on the way the DM deals with this difficulty, and then I show that imposing standard subjective expected utility axioms on her preferences only implies that they can be represented by a (generalized) expectation with respect to a non-additive measure, called a belief function. However, the axioms do have strong implications for how the DM copes with the type of ignorance described above. Finally, I show that some decision rules that have been studied in the literature can be obtained as a special case of the model presented here (though they have to be interpreted differently). Received: December 16, 1999; revised version: March 22, 2000     

The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

A quasi-linear social choice problem is defined as selecting one (among finitely many) indivisible public decision and a vector of monetary transfers among agents to cover the cost of this decision. This decision is based upon individual preferences, which are assumed to be additively separable and linear in money. The Separability axiom is a consistency property for choice methods on societies with variable size: the decision is not affected if we remove an arbitrary agent under the condition that he be guaranteed his original utility level and the cost to the remaining agents is modified accordingly. Thus the utility level assigned by the social choice function to agent i is the price at which the other agents are unanimously willing to buy agent is share of the decision power. A general characterization of choice methods satisfying this axiom is provided. Three subclasses of particular interest are characterized by additional milder axioms. Those are: (i) equal sharing of the surplus left over some reference utility (e.g., the utility at a status quo decision), (ii) utilitarian methods that merely select the efficient public decision and perform no monetary transfers, and (iii) equal allocation of nonseparable costs, which divides equally the surplus left over from the utility derived from the pivotal mechanism (also known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism).     

Politically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: When the social-insurance budget is too small in a democracy

The essay analyzes in an overlapping-generations model, to which extent a pay-as-you-go pension system will be the outcome of majority voting, given specific institutional set-ups. Clearly, the vote of an active person depends on his expectations about how the present decision (i.e., his contribution) is linked to the future (i.e., his benefits), when he will be retired. In the paper we employ the assumption of a basic social contract where each active voter's future benefits are positively related to his contributions. It is shown that in this framework a steady-state with a positive (though lower than optimal) level of the pension system exists, even if a new majority decision about the system takes place every period.     

Hedging and flexing : Two ways of choosing under ignorance

Two strategies for making decisions under severe uncertainty—called here ignorance—are contrasted. A popular strategy under such conditions is to forego the best outcome in order to avoid the worst which might happen; this is hedging, and is shown to lead to a number of problems: once made, a hedge can rarely be revised if the worst does not occur; hedging often brings about the worst outcome which is being hedged against; the worst outcome is often undefined; and hedging can lead to a vicious circle, disregarding the benefits which an option might bring. Each problem is illustrated by a decision about technological change, which typically are decisions under ignorance. Flexing has none of these problems. Flexing aims at achieving the very best outcome. This too risks achieving the worst outcome, but the strategy insures against this. The decision maker should ensure that if the worst outcome arises, the original decision can be reserved quickly and without great cost. Ways in which this can be done are discussed through the examples.     

Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation

The canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent's participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract, typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type. Upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents' outside options, we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification. We develop a multi-dimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems, providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing. First, with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar "no-distortion-at-the-top" result persists, but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching. Second, in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that, generally, the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome. However, when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense, distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form: efficient quality allocations with cost-plus-fee pricing.     

Polarization,Political Instability and Active Learning*

In a multiperiod setting, decision‐makers can learn about the consequences of their decisions through experimentation. We examine how polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. We distinguish two cases: (i) the decision to be made is not salient and does not affect the outcome of subsequent elections (exogenous elections) and (ii) the decision is salient and the election outcome depends on it (endogenous elections). It is shown that while the possibility of learning increases activism, the existence of political instability distorts learning. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, when elections are exogenous, polarization between political parties does not always decrease active learning.     

Housing price,talent movement,and innovation output: Evidence from Chinese cities

How housing costs would influence the job‐housing choice of talent and associated city‐level innovation performance is a question of interest for urban development policies. Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the influence of rising housing prices on the attraction of talent and the associated innovation output in major Chinese cities. In this paper, we use the housing price data of 51 cities from the China Real Estate Index System database and the corresponding macro data of China City Statistical Yearbooks from 2005 to 2014 to analyze this focal research question. The empirical analysis shows that the increase in city housing prices generally correlates positively with city innovation outcome and talent attraction, suggesting no crowding‐out effect on the innovative performance of the city. However, the positive association between housing prices and innovation outcome and talent attraction has started to disappear in first‐tier cities in recent years, suggesting potential crowding‐out effect if the increasing housing prices transform to bubbles. This research thus provides considerable policy implications concerning the impacts of housing prices on talent movement and innovation output.     

Economic integration and regional convergence: effects of NAFTA on local convergence in Mexico, 1980–2008

Continental integration processes can alter traditional development axes. Paelinck and Polèse´s work in 1999 explains that in the case of Mexico there is a tension between the U.S. border and the rest of the country: Mexico´s integration in the NAFTA should have reduced the U.S. border attraction, extending the growth to territories located between this border and Mexico City. To test this hypothesis, we propose a spatial conditional β-convergence model that uses as regressors both the distances to the U.S. border and to Mexico City, together with other control variables. This model is applied to the period from 1980 to 2008 using GVA at the municipality level. Working with municipal-level data allows to observe convergence patterns across space and identify the effects of location. The time-span studied distinguishes between before and after NAFTA. Estimates based on Mundlak´s approach were obtained for time-invariant regressors. Results show that during the pre-NAFTA period there was a general process of convergence, but it is mainly explained by the faster growth of municipalities located near to the U.S. border. However, post-NAFTA, convergence in municipalities disappeared and the effect of distance to the U.S. border reversed its sign, as predicted in Paelinck and Polèse´s model.     

Implementing just and efficient decision-making

In an economy with one public good, one private good and quasi-linear utilities we explore decision-making mechanisms to non-cooperatively implement an efficient outcome. By auctioning the leadership role among agents, one implements egalitarianism, namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo. A refinement of this mechanism (so-called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds) allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome: it achieves egalitarianism above the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision.     

On the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions

This article examines the impact of input prices on an entrant’s make-or-buy decision and on the subsequent social welfare level for three alternative models of downstream competition. For each particular model, it derives the range of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake: (a) the productively efficient make-or-buy decision; and (b) the socially optimal make-or-buy decision. The main conclusion of this article is that the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal in the case of the Hotelling model, is socially optimal for the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the efficient decision in the case of Cournot competition and is not necessarily socially optimal in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model. Last, this article examines the conditions under which the efficient and/or socially optimal make-or-buy decision undertaken by an entrant fulfills the regulatory two-fold goal of promoting service-based competition and encouraging facilities-based competition. Therefore, this article also provides the optimal access pricing policy that results in the best feasible outcome in terms of social welfare, productive efficiency, competition level and investment level for a given downstream competition model.     

Game Outcome Uncertainty and Television Audience Demand: New Evidence from German Football

Despite its prominence in the economic literature, our knowledge regarding the role of game outcome uncertainty (GOU) in spectator decision‐making is fairly limited. Even worse, studies testing the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH) by exploring TV demand for European football have further intensified the original ambiguity. In this paper, we revisit the role of GOU in spectator decision‐making by testing the UOH with regard to two different sporting products: (1) domestic league and (2) knockout tournament games. Analyzing TV demand for almost 1,500 German football games, we find support for the UOH in league, though not in knockout tournament games.     

Asymmetric Demand Information and Foreign Direct Investment*

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic (quantity‐setting) market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. Compared to a firm that chooses to export, a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand. In addition to the well‐known tension between the fixed set‐up costs of investment, the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes, the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect. FDI may be observed even if trade costs are zero. The analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both FDI and exports.     

The Effects of Attraction on Investment Decisions

The attraction effect occurs when an inferior item changes a decision-maker's perception of the relationship between other available alternatives, contrary to the expectations of rational decision-making. This study presents the first evidence that this effect, which has appeared persistently in consumer research, can influence investment decisions. The study also finds two distinct patterns of reaction to the inferior item as a sign of "cluster attraction"-a way of spreading investment risk. Evidence of attraction means that the values of important facets of corporate reporting may not be stable across an investor's decisions, but may depend on the items presently available for investment. Results of an experiment conducted with approximately 100 graduate students with investing experience or interest show that the investor's perceived values of reported financial or non-financial performance, quality of earnings, and information source reliability are subject to trade-offs and can be altered by the composition of the decision set, rather than by any intrinsic change in the investment candidate itself. The discussion highlights the implications of these findings for an understanding of how investors regard the qualities of financial reporting.     

Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach

Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest share that induces efficient investment, even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment, and (ii) half of the pie. The result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold-ups. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, L14.     

Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot reject the simple hypothesis described above either.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Learning by replicator and best-response: the importance of being indifferent

This paper compares two learning processes, namely those generated by replicator and best-response dynamics, from the point of view of the asymptotics of play. We base our study on the intersection of the basins of attraction of locally stable pure Nash equilibria for replicator and best-response dynamics. Local stability implies that the basin of attraction has positive measure but there are examples where the intersection of the basin of attraction for replicator and best-response dynamics is arbitrarily small. We provide conditions, involving the existence of an unstable interior Nash equilibrium, for the basins of attraction of any locally stable pure Nash equilibrium under replicator and best-response dynamics to intersect in a set of positive measure. Hence, for any choice of initial conditions in sets of positive measure, if a pure Nash equilibrium is locally stable, the outcome of learning under either procedure coincides. We provide examples illustrating the above, including some for which the basins of attraction exactly coincide for both learning dynamics. We explore the role that indifference sets play in the coincidence of the basins of attraction of the stable Nash equilibria.     

Modeling stochastic innovation races

We consider a firm moving towards a stochastic final destination to be chosen from a discrete set after a decision period. The decision period itself may be deterministic or stochastic. We assume the firm can move at variable innovation (R&D) speed associated with a monotone nondecreasing variable cost, and it can also stop and move anywhere. There is a fixed cost per time unit “carried” by the firm as well, associated with keeping at the knowledge (technology) frontier. We investigate various types of the firm's optimal trajectory in the R&D race during the decision period. The model is adapted and applied to racing behaviour in the Japanese telecommunication industry.     

Export market participation with sunk costs and firm heterogeneity

In this article we investigate the importance of sunk costs, firm characteristics and spillovers from nearby exporters on a firm's decision to participate in exporting. The empirical analysis involves the estimation of a nonstructural, discrete choice, dynamic model with firm heterogeneity. By using panel data for Estonian companies from 1994 to 1999 we find that: (i) both sunk costs and observable firm characteristics are important determinants of export market participation; (ii) previous history matters, in that, if a firm has been exporting the previous period or the period before, it significantly increases the likelihood of the firm exporting in the current period; (iii) larger firms with high capital intensity and foreign ownership are more likely to be exporters; (iv) operating in an export-oriented industry increases a firm's likelihood of exporting.     

English auctions with resale: An experimental study

I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market. I employ different models like QRE and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants, that is, as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors. When the outcome of the resale market is not certain, there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the Nash prediction.