The cost of firms’ debt financing and the global financial crisis

We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premium paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5500 issues over the period 2005–2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005–2007 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010–2012 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms received a discount of 40 basis points.     

Who said large banks don’t experience scale economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function

The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale economies is made more complex by risk-taking. Better diversification resulting from larger scale generates scale economies but also incentives to take more risk. When this additional risk-taking adds to cost, it can obscure the underlying scale economies and engender misleading econometric estimates of them. Using data pre- and post-crisis, we estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard model ignores endogenous risk-taking and finds little evidence of scale economies. The model accounting for managerial risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking finds large scale economies, which are not driven by too-big-to-fail considerations. We evaluate the costs and competitive implications of breaking up the largest banks into smaller banks.     

Too big to fail in banking: What does it mean?

Interest in too big to fail (TBTF) resolutions of insolvent large complex financial firms has intensified in recent years. TBTF resolutions protect some in-the-money counterparties of a targeted insolvent firm from losses that they would suffer if the usual bankruptcy resolution regimes used in resolving other firms in the industry were applied. Although special TBTF resolution regimes may reduce the collateral spill-over costs of the failure, the combined direct and indirect costs from such “bailouts” may be large and often financed in part or in total by taxpayers. Thus, TBTF has become a major public policy issue that has not been resolved in part because of disagreements about definitions and thereby the estimates of the benefits and costs. This paper explores these differences and develops a framework for standardizing the definitions and evaluating the desirability of TBTF resolutions more accurately.     

美国银行破产若干法律问题探究及启示

近些年来,我国有关部门正在加紧对银行破产进行立法的制定工作,中国人民银行已将《金融机构破产条例》正式纳入行政立法规划。美国是世界上银行业最发达的国家之一,银行业的不断发展也促使了美国银行法制的完善。它山之石,可以攻玉,本文通过对美国银行破产法律制度的介绍和分析,希望能够对我国的银行破产立法有所启示。     

国有企业负债与预算软约束

本文分析了作为所有者的政府、最大债权人的国有银行对国有企业预算软约束的状况。试图从这个角度 ,为国有企业高负债型的资本结构提供一个解释。     

“大而不能倒”的法律困境

由于各国政府未能就大型金融机构跨境破产清算达成协议,包括美国在内的世界各国都未形成处理大型金融机构破产的有效方法。这就要求进一步提高系统重要性金融机构的资本金,以为其提供缓冲。而最好的方法是控制金融机构的规模。     

Measuring Potential GSE Funding Advantages

As the size of government sponsored enterprises (GSE) has grown, attention has focused on the relationship between the federal government and the GSEs, with particular attention focused on estimating the impact of this relationship on GSE debt costs. Quantifying the GSEs cost advantage is a controversial exercise with several competing methodologies providing divergent values. Thus, this paper reviews the methods that have been utilized in previous studies and recommends an alternative approach that overcomes many of the criticisms of previous work. By using offering yields on GSE debt, we find that the three housing GSEs enjoyed an average advantage of between 25 and 29 basis points over AA banking sector bonds, between 43 and 47 basis points over A rated bonds, and between 76 and 80 basis points over BBB rated banking issues. We find that our results are robust to both the basic approach taken as well as to model specification.     

Dwarf banks

This study examines the business model and the viability of very small commercial banks in emerging market context. Using a unique sample of 141 Russian banks with less than a $10 million in assets, I trace performance, survival, recapitalization and growth patterns of these dwarf banks in response to the sharp increase in the minimum capital requirements. I find that dwarf banks are, on average, low-risk financial intermediaries that perform simple operations and have significantly higher survival rates in local markets with poor economic and banking services outreach characteristics. I also find that the average dwarf banks withstand the regulatory capital shock surprisingly well by securing fresh capital injection followed by a twofold asset size increase. The results of this study contribute to the literature on the relationship between the small bank business model, local banking markets characteristics and long-term viability. They also provide new evidence on the expected and unexpected outcomes of the “too small to survive” regulatory intervention into the banking market size structures.     

系统重要性金融机构的国际监管趋势浅析

系统重要性金融机构的监管已经成为当前国际金融改革的一个重要组成部分。国际金融组织和各国金融监管机构正致力于降低其道德风险,终结大型金融机构“过大而不能倒”的局面。我国的监管需要从中国的国情和实际出发,不断完善宏观审慎管理框架,建立健全金融基础设施,积极参与国际游戏规则的制定,为防范系统性风险和维护金融稳定做出不懈努力。     

Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks

We examine whether “too‐big‐to‐fail” (TBTF) factors affect estimates of scale economies for large banks. From a standard model of bank production that does not control for any TBTF factors, we find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. We then control for TBTF factors by using a measure of the “implicit subsidy” that emerges from a reduction in TBTF banks’ funding costs due to investor expectations of government support. We do this in two ways: first, we estimate scale economies from an augmented model of bank production that employs a proxy for the counterfactual price of debt that banks would face in the absence of any TBTF funding cost advantage; second, we estimate scale economies from a model of bank production that is estimated only for a sample of banks considered unlikely to be TBTF. After controlling for TBTF factors using either method, we no longer find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. These results suggest that estimated scale economies for large banks are affected by TBTF factors.     

Federal Home Loan Bank Lending to Community Banks: Are Targeted Subsidies Desirable?

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 amended the lending authority of the Federal Home Loan Banks to include advances secured by small enterprise loans of community financial institutions. Three reasons for the extension of this selective credit subsidy to community banks and thrifts are examined, including the possible need to: subsidize community depository institutions, stabilize the Federal Home Loan Banks, and address a market failure in rural markets for small enterprise loans. We empirically investigate whether funding constraints impact the small-business lending decision by rural community banks. We estimate static and dynamic models of small-business lending by community banks. The data reject the hypothesis that access to increased funds will increase the amount of small-business loans made by community banks.     

The impact of changes in bank ownership structure on the allocation of capital: International evidence

A new wave of bank privatizations in the past decade has significantly changed the ownership structure of banking systems around the world. This paper explores how these changes affect the allocation of capital within countries. Increases in domestic blockholder ownership of banks adversely affect the allocation of capital through increased lending activity to less productive industries and to those with less dependence on external finance. This result is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of corruption. I find some evidence that foreign presence improves capital allocation efficiency by increasing lending to more productive industries, primarily in common law countries.     

Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment System Following Wide‐Scale Disruptions

We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide‐scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions—operational problems and changes in participants’ behavior. If the disruption is large enough, hits a key geographic area, or hits a “too‐big‐to‐fail” participant, then the smooth processing of payments can break down, and central bank intervention might be required to reestablish the socially efficient equilibrium. The paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of events such as the September 11 attack. In addition, the model can be reinterpreted to analyze shocks to fundamentals that affect the parameters of the intraday liquidity management game. We demonstrate this by showing how processing behavior changed in response to heightened credit risk at the time of the Lehman Brothers failure.     

Taming Systemically Important Financial Institutions

We model a systemically important financial institution that is too big (or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision, the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a systemic risk authority endowed with special resolution powers, including the control of bankers’ compensation packages during crisis periods.     

地方政府财政压力与银行信贷资源配置效率——基于我国城市商业银行的研究证据

基于2005—2015年我国城市商业银行的样本,本文研究省级地方政府财政压力是否对商业银行信贷资金投向和信贷资源配置效率产生影响。研究发现,地方政府财政压力是影响城市商业银行信贷资源配置的重要因素。具体而言,省级地方政府的财政压力越大,省内城市商业银行投向地方国有经济部门的贷款比率越高。然而,信贷资源更多投向地方国有经济部门的银行有更高的不良贷款率和更差的会计业绩。进一步研究发现,在财政压力大的省份,城市商业银行投向地方国有经济部门的贷款比率越高,则贷款拨备率越低,这表明城市商业银行会通过盈余管理行为来应对监管压力。本文研究结论对商业银行监管以及防范化解金融风险有重要启示。     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.