Tariffs,Quality Choice,and Cost Functions: a Foreign Monopoly Case*

It has been shown that trade restrictions such as tariffs, import quotas, and voluntary export restrictions, lead to quality upgrading of imports. In this paper, however, we reconsider this proposition by focusing on the nature of cost functions. Based on a standard vertical differentiation model, we analyze the effects of tariffs on quality and quantity of imports. We show that if a fixed cost is an increasing function of quality, tariffs lead to quality downgrading of imports. Moreover, we discuss minimum quality requirements (MQR) for such a trade policy. We show that MQR increases the amount of imports and an importing country's welfare in the presence of the fixed cost function. These issues will be addressed in the context of a foreign monopoly.     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

LEGAL CORRUPTION

We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the elite does not face any binding incentives to limit corruption; one centered around legal corruption, where the elite must incur a cost to legally protect corruption; and finally a no‐corruption outcome, where the population is able to effectively react to corruption. Testable implications from the model are derived based on country‐wide parameters. Crucially, we use a rich corporate survey, including 8,279 firms in 104 countries, tailored for this research, and featuring measures of legal corruption that are novel to the literature. The microdimension of the database enables improving on familiar shortcomings associated with the use of endogeneity‐prone, country‐wide indices of perceived corruption. The empirical results, making use of a broad range of proxies and sources, generally validate the model's explanations.     

Distorted Trade Barriers: A Dissection of Trade Costs in a “Distorted Gravity” Model

It is common in the trade literature to use iceberg transport costs to represent both tariffs and shipping costs alike. However, in models with monopolistic competition these are not identical trade restrictions. This difference is driven by how the two costs affect the extensive margin. We illustrate these differences in a gravity model. We show theoretically that trade flows are more elastic with respect to tariffs than transport costs and find a linear relationship between the elasticities with respect to tariffs, iceberg transport costs, and fixed market costs. We empirically validate these results using data on US product‐level imports.     

NAFTA and the Realignment of Textile and Apparel Trade: Trade Creation or Trade Diversion?*

A modified version of the partial‐equilibrium gravity model, originally proposed by Fukao et al. (2003 ), is employed to investigate the changing pattern of US textile trade. We use US Bilateral Manufacturing Imports and Exports data for 1989–2001 to assess the impact of labor wages, tariffs, and exchange rates on the composition of US textile imports before and after the creation of NAFTA. The analysis is performed at the SIC two‐digit industry level and the more disaggregated four‐digit sector level. We find little evidence of trade diversion in textiles frequently attributed to NAFTA, while trade creation is clearly present. Furthermore, lower wages in some textile‐exporting countries (e.g. countries in Asia) do not appear to significantly increase these countries' shares of US textile imports at the expense of other trading partners. However, variations in currency exchange rates and tariffs have substantial effects on the composition of US imports.     

How much do tariffs matter? Evidence from the customs union of Belarus,Kazakhstan and Russia

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the early impact of the formation of the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and associated changes in import schedules on the structure of imports. Relying on an original data-set of statutory tariffs we find that trade creation effects were significant only in trade between Russia and third countries, but that there was some trade destruction, with a significant negative impact on imports from China to Kazakhstan and Russia, and on imports from the EU to Belarus. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively small, suggesting that the benefits of the new tariff policy per se are limited at best.     

Free-Trade Areas and Welfare: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper examines the welfare effects of the formation of a free-trade area. When a country is constrained to charge lower tariffs on imports from some countries, it is in its interest to reduce external tariffs as well. In alinear-quadratic model of intraindustry trade, the reduction in external tariffs induced by free-trade agreements is sufficiently large to make nonmember countries better off. Since only privately beneficial free-trade agreements are signed voluntarily, the formation of a free-trade area is a Pareto improvement. Owing to free-riding problems, however, the global free-trade area may not be a stable outcome.     

Liberalizing U.S. Trade with the Eastern Bloc: What are the consequences?

This paper provides estimates of the trade and welfare consequences of removing the high discriminatory tariffs that the United States imposes against imports from the Soviet Union and its allies. These imports are now taxed at Smoot-Hawley rates. The estimates of the trade effects exceed those of previous studies, in part because the recent “Tokyo Round” of multilateral trade concessions has increased the tariff discrimination against the non-MFN (Most Favored Nation) suppliers. The study is the first to assess the welfare consequences of eliminating this discrimination. It is estimated that the overall annual gain to the United States would be about $1.8 billion and that the annual gain to the communist suppliers would be between $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries

This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the "concertina rule" for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs but not moves towards uniformity and particularly not increases in low tariffs. I show that the basic principles of tariff reform are the same in unilateral, multilateral and customs union contexts. Finally, I suggest that the theory of strategic trade policy does not justify subsidies to high-technology industries.     

Tariff (De‐) Escalation with Successive Oligopoly

This paper explores the issue of a simultaneous reduction in tariffs at different stages of a vertically related market where each stage is oligopolistic. When vertically related markets are characterized as a successive oligopoly, reducing tariffs by an equivalent amount on upstream and downstream imports will have a differential effect on market access and hence profits at each stage as a result of a combination of horizontal and vertical effects. These differential effects have implications for the tariff structure post‐trade reform.     

Trade liberalization and markups: Micro evidence from China

This paper presents evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese firm-product data that, given productivity, input tariff reductions induce an incumbent importer/exporter to increase product markups. We further investigate empirically the mechanisms underlying this trade liberalization effect, and find that input tariff reductions decrease marginal costs, and their effects on markup adjustments are more profound among firms with higher import dependence. Moreover, we exploit unique features of Chinese data by comparing results for two trade regimes: ordinary trade (wherein firms pay import tariffs to import) and processing trade (wherein firms are not subject to import tariffs). While the aforementioned trade liberalization effects and mechanisms only apply to ordinary trade, processing trade samples are used in a placebo test. The paper also shows that more productive firms charge higher markups for products. All these findings are robust to alternative markup measures including one estimate using physical-quantity output data, different production function specifications, a subsample consisting only of pure exporters, and estimations based on our theoretical derivations.     

Effects of a Free Trade Agreement on the Exchange Rate Pass‐through to Import Prices

This paper investigates the effect of trade liberalization on the exchange rate passthrough (ERPT) to import prices. To do so, it employs an empirical estimation of the effects of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the Mexican ERPT, and uses a Ricardian general equilibrium model. The model identifies two channels that explain how the trade liberalization alters the ERPT. The first channel is the direct relationship between the tariffs and the pass‐through by good. The second channel is the effect that tariffs have on the composition of imports, altering indirectly the aggregate pass‐through.     

Protection with many sellers: An Application to Legislatures with Malapportionment

What effect, if any, does legislative malapportionment have on international trade protection? This paper argues that in malapportioned legislatures, such as the U.S. Senate, industries become over‐represented in a legislature if they are disproportionately located in small constituencies. As a result, industries that are disproportionately located in smaller constituencies are likely to receive greater protection from international trade. To argue this point theoretically, this paper develops a new model, combining legislative bargaining and a model of lobbying to study trade protection while allowing for a legislature with multiple legislators and differently sized constituencies. We then test the predictions of this new model using tariff votes from the U.S. Senate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a panel of tariffs and non‐tariff barriers to trade in the U.S. in the 1990s. Considerable support is found for the model's predictions. Industries concentrated in states where the population is low receive greater protection from imports.     

Illegal Immigration and Second-best Import Tariffs

A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows.     

The CBI Industrial Trends Survey — A Statistical Note

As the high tariff barriers of the inter-war period have been gradually reduced over the past twenty years, non-tariff factors have taken on an increasingly important role. One of the more notable of these factors is a country's level of excise taxes. Since these taxes are applied to both imports and domestic production, it is obvious that a given percentage change in excise taxes will have a smaller influence on trade than an equal percentage change in tariffs. Nevertheless, excise takes can be used to some extend as a substitution for tariffs. Hence, it would seem desirable to determine the degree to which such substitution will affect the volume of imports.

The role of taxes and tariffs in trade models has been considered in a number of theoretical discussions. ^{1 1} The effects of commodity taxes on the terms of trade and on domestic welfare have been analysed by MUNDELL, (1960), and by FRIEDLAENDER and VANDENDORPE (1968). However, virtually no effort has been made to examine the relationships among excise taxes, tariffs and imports in order to determine the extent to which countries can use excise taxes as a device to counterbalance the movement toward freer trade through the aegis of G.A.T.T. This study will attempt to rectify this omission.     

Foreign trade and its impact on employment: The Mexican case

This paper discusses the relationship between foreign trade and employment in a small open economy, and carries out some empirical work using Mexican data. It is argued that employment multipliers are not stable if intermediate inputs are imported. Actual employment multipliers will be given by the relationship between effective demand and installed capacity in each sector, and will depend strongly on whether quotas or tariffs are in operation. It is also found that Mexican exports are capital intensive relative to its imports.     

Leniency policies and illegal transactions

We study the consequences of leniency—reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers—on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager–auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that—when not properly designed—leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.     

Growth,expectations and tariffs

We present a growth model of international trade in which expectations about profitability and growth influence innovation and investment. Adaptive learning dynamics determine transition paths for countries with differing structural parameters. Countries limiting trade by tariffs on imports of capital goods can experience gains in growth and perceived utility for a finite time, whereas the rest of the world is adversely affected. Asymmetric gains persist longer when structural advantages of the country applying tariffs are larger. Substantial differences in levels of innovation, output and utility can appear within our asymmetric country setting.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF THAILAND

After the Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand's trade policy has been driven by the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs). We use firm‐level data to estimate the effects of reductions in tariffs applied to Thai imports on Thai firms. Reductions in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) tariffs were associated with increasing firm employment and exports, lower ASEAN‐China import tariffs were associated with increasing firm employment, while lower tariffs from the Japan‐Thailand FTA were associated with reductions in firm employment and increasing likelihood of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certifications. FTAs were associated with a decrease in firm R&D spending. (JEL F1, F2, F6)     

政府规模和法治水平有助于提升服务贸易发展水平吗——来自G20国家面板数据分析

本文构建政府规模和法治水平影响服务贸易发展的一般性分析框架，结合G20国家的面板数据，实证检验了政府规模、法治水平与服务贸易发展之间的关系，并对实证结果进行稳健性检验。研究发现：政府规模在促进服务贸易发展上存在明显双路径传递效应，即政府规模通过两种不同渠道影响服务贸易发展；法治水平显著抑制服务贸易发展，其可能原因是法治水平作为经济发展的制度要素，也存在边际收益递减规律；部分G20国家臃肿的法治体系与其服务贸易创新发展的需求不相适应。针对时间影响的稳健性结果和针对收入影响的稳健性结果表明，随着政府规模或法治水平等制度安排日渐稳固，经济因素则成为推动服务贸易发展的主要动力。