Interlock Concentration and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Value Implications of Interlock

From the perspective of information commonalities among firms with director interlock relationships, this study mainly investigates the outcomes of earnings forecasts by analysts who choose to concentrate on interlocked firms (analysts following both a firm and its interlocked partner firm in their research portfolio). Using interlocked A‐share firms listed in the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2013 as samples, we empirically find that analysts who concentrate on interlocked firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts who do not. In additional analysis, we also find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide superior earnings forecast quality for other non‐interlocked firms in their research portfolios. Finally, through examining the market reaction to interlocked firms, we find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide new information and improve information efficiency for the capital market.     

EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS,QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF INFORMATION,AND STOCK PRICE CHANGES

We analyze the informational effect of earnings announcements on stock price changes. Although prior studies postulate that the direction and magnitude of earnings surprises contribute to abnormal stock price changes, we attribute earnings surprises and subsequent stock price changes to the quality and quantity of available information. If a stock is followed by many financial analysts, the amount of information available to investors contributes to higher quality information, which in turn is reflected by a small earnings surprise. Furthermore, we demonstrate that as the quality and quantity of information increase, stock prices adjust more quickly, which sheds additional light on the post-earnings-announcement drift issue. Finally, cross-sectional analysis reveals that the flow of information, as measured by the rate of trading volume changes, and the stock of information, as measured by the number of financial analysts, contributes significantly to the variations in excess returns and return volatility. Traditional variables, such as earnings surprises, earnings reporting lag, and firm size, do not perform well.     

Ethnic Minority Analysts’ Participation in Public Earnings Conference Calls

We investigate ethnic minority and nonminority sell-side analysts’ participation in public earnings conference calls. We find that minority analysts are underrepresented in conference call Q&A sessions, and minority analysts who do participate on the calls experience lower levels of prioritization than do nonminority analysts. Minority analysts’ lower participation rates are partially but not fully mediated by characteristics such as experience, work environment, and stock rating favorability. Additionally, firm and conference call fixed effects mediate approximately half the magnitude of lower minority participation rates. Extroverted minority analysts participate at higher rates, but the negative association between minority status and conference call participation is exacerbated when calls are more time constrained, when executive teams are less diverse, and when analysts are from less prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, we document the underrepresentation of minority analysts on earnings conference calls and provide evidence suggesting both analysts’ and managers’ choices influence minority analysts’ participation rates.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.     

Stock Recommendations for Politically Connected Firms

Social network connections of corporations can significantly affect operating performance and firm valuation. Political connections are one form of social networking which often manifests into improved firm profitability as a result of political favors granted by politicians. However, analysts often have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of politically connected firms than those of non‐connected firms. This is because politicians often grant political favors to firms in an unpredictable manner making it difficult for market participants to time precisely when political benefits will translate into higher firm profitability. I examine how political connections affect analysts’ stock recommendations using a unique dataset of political contributions in the US over the period 1993–2012. I show that analysts’ recommendations are less profitable for firms with high connectedness than for firms with low (or no) connectedness. I also find that analysts are less effective in translating earnings forecasts into profitable recommendations for highly connected firms. Overall, the findings suggest that analysts do not impound all of the information concerning corporate political connections efficiently into their primary research outputs.     

How does earnings management influence investor’s perceptions of firm value? Survey evidence from financial analysts

Survey evidence shows CFOs to believe that earnings management can enhance investor valuation of their firms. This evidence raises the question of correspondence between the beliefs of CFOs and investors. Surveying financial analysts to gain insight into how earnings management influences investor perception of firm value, we find analysts’ and CFOs’ beliefs to be generally consistent. We find that analysts perceive meeting earnings benchmarks and smoothing earnings to enhance investor perception of firm value and all earnings management actions to reach a benchmark, save share repurchases, to be value destroying. CFOs, however, are reluctant to repurchase shares, preferring to use techniques viewed by analysts as value destroying (e.g., reductions in discretionary spending). Analysts’ inability to unravel such techniques perhaps explains CFOs’ preferences.     

Analyst information precision and small earnings surprises

This study proposes and tests an alternative to the extant earnings management explanation for zero and small positive earnings surprises (i.e., analyst forecast errors). We argue that analysts’ ability to strategically induce slight pessimism in earnings forecasts varies with the precision of their information. Accordingly, we predict that the probability that a firm reports a small positive instead of a small negative earnings surprise is negatively related to earnings forecast uncertainty, and we present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our findings have important implications for the earnings management interpretation of the asymmetry around zero in the frequency distribution of earnings surprises. We demonstrate how empirically controlling for earnings forecast uncertainty can materially change inferences in studies that employ the incidence of zero and small positive earnings surprises to categorize firms as suspected of managing earnings.     

Underreaction to Industry‐Wide Earnings and the Post‐Forecast Revision Drift

We test whether the post‐forecast revision drift is mainly attributable to investors’ underreaction to industry‐wide earnings news conveyed by analysts’ forecast revisions. We find a large drift associated with industry‐wide earnings news but no drift associated with firm‐specific earnings news. Consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, we provide evidence that the post‐forecast revision drift is driven by investors’ underreaction to the higher persistence of industry‐wide earnings. Although prior research has focused on differential persistence of earnings components stemming from managerial reporting discretion, we provide evidence suggesting that investors do not fully understand the differential earnings persistence attributable to industry fundamentals.     

The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival

This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.     

Additional Evidence on Analysts’ Decision to Issue Disaggregated Earnings Forecasts: Strategic Biasing

This study examines why analysts issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S. Some recent studies suggest that analysts with superior forecasting ability issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to build reputation in the marketplace and stop forecast disaggregation once their reputation has been established. Based on an analysis of I/B/E/S forecast data for U.S. firms from 1998 to 2008, we find that, in a given year, about 20%–34% of analysts disaggregate for some, but not for all the firms that they follow. This evidence of selective disaggregation by analysts suggests that reputation building alone does not fully explain the decision to disaggregate forecasts. We hypothesize that the decision to disaggregate earnings forecasts is at the firm‐level as well and is systematically related to the analysts’ bias in the issued forecasts. Our findings are that (a) analysts’ overall optimistic bias and forecast errors decrease monotonically with the level of forecast disaggregation, and (b) analysts that selectively disaggregate their forecasts for some firms or who do not persistently disaggregate a given firm's forecasts exhibit more positive bias and larger forecast errors. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the analysts who issue biased forecasts, for example, to curry favour with the management, are less likely to provide disaggregated information as part of the forecast.     

Learn from peers? The impact of peer firms' analyst earnings forecasts on a focal firm's corporate investment efficiency

We explore whether a firm can learn from information on peers produced by analysts. Based on a sample of Chinese firms, we document that analyst earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion or optimism) of peer firms is positively (negatively) associated with the focal firm's investment efficiency. The effect is more salient when the focal firm operates in a competitive industry, when analysts are predicting positive earnings, when peers produce low-quality annual reports, or when the focal firm has high information asymmetry. Overall, our findings provide new insights on learning from peer information produced by a third party and show that analyst earnings forecasts have spillover effects in the product market.     

The Effect of Multinationality on Security Analyst Underreaction

Previous research presented evidence of bias and positive serial correlation in forecast errors suggesting that analysts do not properly recognize the time–series properties of earnings when setting expectations of future earnings. A reason for the security analyst underreaction is the level of multinationality of the firm's activities. This study shows that analysts underreact to prior information more as the level of multinationality of the firm examined increases.     

Analysts’ and Investors’ Reactions to Consistent Earnings Signals

We investigate (1) whether the trajectory of the current‐quarter earnings expectation path (defined by the signs of the forecast revision and the earnings surprise) provides information about future firm performance, and (2) the extent to which analysts and investors react to that information. Our results indicate that analysts underreact more to earnings information revealed by consistent‐signal earnings expectation paths than to earnings information communicated by inconsistent‐signal expectation paths. We also find that the current earnings expectation path provides incremental explanatory power for future abnormal returns, even after controlling for the sign and magnitude of the earnings surprise. Overall, our evidence is consistent with underreaction stemming from analysts’ and investors’ bias in processing the information in consistent‐signal earnings expectation paths.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and analysts’ reliance on earnings announcements

Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibits corporations from selectively disclosing material information to groups of favored analysts and institutional investors. If information previously provided is excluded by the new regulation from analysts’ information set, it is plausible that the relative importance of the other information, such as earnings announcements, which remains could increase (Arya et al., 2005). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether analysts become more reliant on firm earnings announcements in revising their forecasts after implementation of the regulation. Our empirical results show that, after the regulation, more analysts issue forecasts immediately after earnings announcements. In addition, analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to converge more after observing earnings announcements in the post-regulation period. These results, in conjunction with the finding of higher overall level of forecast errors and dispersion, indicate that earnings announcements become more important information sources in the post regulation period. These findings suggest that analysts are more reliant on earnings announcements and there is an increase in analyst herding as a result of Regulation Fair Disclosure.     

Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R

This study examines how key market participants??managers and analysts??responded to SFAS 123R??s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expense. Despite mandated recognition of the expense, some firms?? managers exclude it from pro forma earnings and some firms?? analysts exclude it from Street earnings. We find evidence consistent with managers opportunistically excluding the expense to increase earnings, smooth earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks but no evidence that these exclusions result in an earnings measure that better predicts future firm performance. In contrast, we find that analysts exclude the expense from earnings forecasts when exclusion increases earnings?? predictive ability for future performance and that opportunism generally does not explain exclusion by analysts incremental to exclusion by managers. Thus our findings indicate that opportunism is the primary explanation for exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings and predictive ability is the primary explanation for exclusion from Street earnings. Our findings suggest the controversy surrounding the recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of market participants.     

Evidence that Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper presents evidence that prices of firms followed by sell-side analysts and favored by institutional investors incorporate future earnings earlier than prices of other firms. We conduct two sets of empirical tests: the first examines coefficients from regressions of returns on lead, contemporaneous, and lag earnings changes; the second compares the timing of monthly abnormal returns from earnings-based zero-investment portfolios. In both sets of tests, the results for analysts and institutions are incremental to each other. In addition, neither the analyst price lead nor the institutional price lead is due to price leads increasing with firm size.     

The association between quarter length,forecast errors,and firms’ voluntary disclosures

Approximately 60 percent of adjacent fiscal quarters contain a different number of calendar days. In preliminary analyses, we find the change in quarter length is significantly associated with the changes in sales and earnings and that analysts condition on the prior quarter's results when making their forecasts. These results indicate that it is important for analysts to adjust for changes in quarter length when making forecasts. However, we find the quarterly change in days is positively associated with analysts’ sales and earnings forecasts errors, where forecast error equals the actual earnings minus the forecasted earnings. These results indicate that analysts systematically underestimate (overestimate) performance when quarter length increases (decreases). We find evidence indicating investors make similar errors as returns around earnings announcements are positively associated with the change in quarter length, but only when changes in firm performance is more sensitive to changes in quarter length. Corroborating these findings, managers are more (less) likely to discuss quarter length during conference calls when quarter length decreases (increases). These results are consistent with managers’ strategic disclosure incentives. In summary, our evidence suggests analysts and investors fail to fully take account of the quasi-mechanical effect that quarter length has on firm performance and managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosures to take advantage of these failures.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

Lease transaction structuring,earnings management,and management credibility

Despite recent regulatory concerns regarding off-balance sheet financing, and concerns about lease accounting in particular, relatively little is known about how financial statement users view lease transaction structuring compared to other forms of earnings management. We examine sell-side financial statement analysts’ views on lease transaction structuring and its impact on their assessments of management credibility. Although operating leases often act as the prototypical example of transaction structuring, survey responses suggest that lease structuring and related voluntary reconciliations do not raise the same concerns for analysts as do other earnings management activities (which lower analysts’ perceptions of management credibility). Our findings are consistent with prior research demonstrating that, with precise accounting standards, managers are more likely to attempt earnings management by structuring transactions, but auditors are also less likely to adjust such attempts, and suggest that financial statement users may also be less concerned with transaction structuring than with other forms of earnings management.     

Product market power and management’s action to avoid earnings disappointment

We investigate the empirical relationship between a firm’s product market power and its management’s action to use real-activity-based earnings management techniques to avoid earnings disappointment by meeting or beating earnings targets such as analysts’ earnings forecasts, positive earnings, or higher earnings relative to previous years. While there is a general consensus that product market competition in an industry affects management’s operating and financial decisions, and thus is an important intervening factor in a firm’s strategies for many economic situations (Nickell in J Political Econ 104:724–746, 1996; Porter in The competitive advantage of nations. Macmillan, London, 1990), the linkage between product market power, managerial incentives, and financial reporting quality has so far received little academic attention. Our analyses show that while the firms manage both accruals and real activities in varying degrees, the firms having greater product market power with the ability to differentiate their products to earn additional revenue, if necessary, are less inclined to engage in real-activity-based earnings management in certain suspect economic situations compared to the firms with less market power. We, however, do not find any significant relationship between product market power and accrual-based earnings management.