Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy‐sell trade sequences around good‐news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good‐news earnings announcements and being ‘short‐term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad‐news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad‐news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.     

Managerial Disclosures and Shareholder Litigation

This paper explores the link between shareholder lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and managerial disclosures of prospective information. When the manager's information is such that there is no affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, previous research has shown that the manager will withhold his information if it is sufficiently unfavorable and will disclose it otherwise. When the manager's information is such that there exists an affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, it is shown here that the manager will release either good news or news that is sufficiently bad. Further, the good news disclosures are expected to be more precise than those that reflect unfavorable information. It is also demonstrated that the probability of a disclosure will increase with both the precision of the manager's information and the variability of his firm's earnings.     

Can “Big Bath” and Earnings Smoothing Co‐exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?

We study a model of financial reporting where investors infer the precision of reported earnings. Reporting a larger earnings surprise reduces the inferred earnings precision, dampening the impact on firm value of reporting higher earnings, and providing a natural demand for smoother earnings. We show that for sufficiently "bad" news, the manager under-reports earnings by the maximum, preferring to take a "big bath" in the current period in order to report higher future earnings. If the news is "good," the manager smoothes earnings, with the amount of smoothing depending on the level of cashflows observed. He either over-reports or partially under-reports for slightly good news, and gradually increases his under-reporting as the news gets better, until he is under-reporting the maximum amount for sufficiently good news. This result holds both when investors are "naïve" and ignore management's ability to manipulate earnings, or "sophisticated" and correctly infer management's disclosure strategy.     

投资者异质后验信念对股票价格影响的实证研究

过度自信程度不同的投资者因消息确认精度差异引起意见分歧,产生异质后验信念,导致投资者对股价高估或者低估。在此基础上,以盈余公告信息作为利好或利空消息,研究不同环境下异质后验信念对我国股票价格的影响。实证结果表明:不管在牛市还是在熊市环境下,异质后验信念均会对股价产生影响,当盈余公告为利好消息时,异质后验信念程度越高,当期股价被高估的程度越显著;当盈余公告为利空消息时,异质后验信念程度越高,当期股价被低估的程度越显著。此外,在盈余公告前投资者就对盈余消息作出了反映,但对好消息与坏消息的反映程度不同。     

Informed Trading in Corporate Bonds Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper examines the information content of corporate bond trading prior to earnings announcements using data from both NAIC and TRACE. We find that the direction of pre‐announcement bond trading is closely related to earnings surprises. This link is most evident prior to negative news and in high‐yield bonds. Further, abnormal bond trading during the pre‐announcement period can help predict both earnings surprises and post‐announcement bond returns. Such predictive ability of bond trading largely originates from institutional‐sized trades and is concentrated in the issuer's most actively traded bond. Finally, even after accounting for transactions costs, informed bond trading can generate significant net profits, especially prior to the release of bad news.     

Voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the directional effects of management earnings forecasts on the cost of equity capital. We find that forecasters of bad news experience a significant increase in the cost of equity capital in the month after their disclosure. Conversely, the cost of equity capital for good news forecasters does not change significantly in the same period. We also indicate that the magnitude of changes in the cost of capital for good news forecasters is significantly lower than that for bad news forecasters and non-forecasters, which suggests that investors may view good news forecasts less credible. Finally, we show that the effect of the subsequent earnings announcement on the cost of equity capital is preempted by the management forecasts for bad news firms, and that the combined effects of the management earnings forecasts and the earnings announcement are not significant for both good news and bad news forecasters. Our paper contributes to the literature by adding evidence on directional effects of voluntary disclosures and on long-term economic consequences of management earnings forecasts.     

The timing of information arrival and overnight returns

This paper examines the information assimilation of overnight returns after positive or negative news arriving during RHT (regular-hours-trading) or AHT (after-hour-trading). We first show that overnight returns are informative of earnings news arriving either during RHT or AHT, and the effects are strongest on the first day after the announcement. Our results then suggest that positive (negative) overnight returns after good (bad) earnings news arrival increase (decrease) CARs, with more pronounced effects for news released AHT. We further show that the market takes the timing of news release into account and reacts negatively to those released during AHT, causing significant under-performance in the subsequent CAR. Lastly, our finding of market underreaction to good news and overreaction to bad news when it is released during AHT suggest that it may be more appropriate for managers to release all news during RHT when market participants are at their trading desks.     

Audit opinion improvement and the timing of disclosure

Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This paper investigates the potential impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good news.” We take both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change into consideration, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). We find that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and that these effects were related to the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there is an asymmetric response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the effect on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion news. Overall, our results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. Finally, we also find that overall earnings timeliness has improved in China since the enactment of new reporting regulations in 2006.     

How do the content,format, and tone of Twitter-based corporate disclosure vary depending on earnings performance?

Using 86,891 tweets, from the official corporate Twitter accounts of 715 unique firms, this study examines whether and how managers strategically attract and distract investors’ attention from corporate news through Twitter. We find that firms with good earnings news use Twitter to post more earnings-related information directly, whereas firms with bad earnings news post more non-earnings-related information on Twitter. We further find that depending on earnings performance firms strategically choose the format of tweets (qualitative or quantitative) and the tone of earnings tweets (positive or negative) to attract investors’ attention to good news or distract investors’ attention from bad news. Our results are robust to difference-in-differences (DID), alternative sample periods, and different variable specifications. Our findings provide empirical evidence for investors and regulators regarding current practices in corporate information on Twitter.     

Religious holidays,investor distraction,and earnings announcement effects

We examine price reactions to U.S. firms’ earnings announcements during Easter week in order to analyze whether and how the religious holiday calendar impacts investors’ information processing. We find that there is an asymmetric pattern of immediate and delayed responses to earnings surprises experienced during Easter, entailing similar immediate reactions to both good and bad news and a stronger delayed response to bad news. Moreover, local religious characteristics affect investor’s response to firm news. The results are consistent with a religion-induced distraction effect on investors’ information processing ability. We also show that this effect can form the basis for a profitable trading strategy. The findings highlight the importance of religion for firms’ information environment and for the local component of stock prices.     

Accounting earnings response coefficient: An extension to banking shares in Asia Pacific countries

This paper reports new finding on earnings response coefficients for banking firms on how disclosures on total earnings and disaggregated fee earnings are used by investors to change share prices prior to earnings disclosures. The information relating to total earnings influences share prices significantly in all four banking sectors studied, all of which have sufficiently liberalized capital markets. Australian investors appear to use information on disaggregated non-interest fee income to revise share prices significantly: not so in other markets. The investors in Malaysia and South Korea appear to consider changes in fee income as bad news with negative price impact, anomalous to theory. The Australian investors appear to regard both total and fee incomes as equally important whereas investors in other markets either ignore or consider changes in fee income as bad news for share valuation. This study extends the literature on this topic from non-bank to banking firms.     

A Wealth-Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism

This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.     

Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd preannounce quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

A comparison of the skewness of stock return distributions at earnings and non-earnings announcement dates

This paper presents evidence that stock return prediction errors are less positively skewed in the time period surrounding accounting earnings report announcements than in a subsequent non- announcement period. Assuming that information available about firms in non-announcement periods depends on discretionary disclosure practices of firms and discretionary search for information by investors, the results suggest that earnings reports cause more extreme ‘bad news’ to be reflected in stock prices relative to discretionary sources of information.     

The options market response to accounting earnings announcements

We examine the reaction of the equity options market to accounting earnings announcements over the period 1996–2008 using changes in implied volatility to measure the options market response to earnings news. We find that positive earnings surprises and positive profit announcements produce a larger uncertainty resolution than negative earnings surprises and loss announcements. We demonstrate an inverse relation between the change in implied volatility and earnings news in a three-day window immediately after an earnings announcement. We refer to the magnitude of this relation as the ‘options market earnings response coefficient’. This ‘options market earnings response coefficient’ is stronger for both bad news announcements and positive profit announcements. We do not find any significant relation between changes in implied volatility and earnings news in the pre- or post-announcement periods. We conclude that the options market efficiently absorbs earnings information.     

Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Forecasts?

We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.     

The impact of litigation risk on the strategic timing of management earnings forecasts

This paper examines whether managers strategically time their earnings forecasts (MEFs) as litigation risk increases. We find as litigation risk increases, the propensity to release a delayed forecast until after the market is closed (AMC) or a Friday decreases but not proportionally more for bad news than for good news. How costly this behaviour is to investors is questionable as share price returns do not reveal any under‐reaction to strategically timed bad news MEF released AMC. We also find evidence consistent with managers timing their MEFs during a natural no‐trading period to better disseminate information.     

When Good News Is Not So Good: Economy‐wide Uncertainty and Stock Returns

This paper shows that variation in economy‐wide uncertainty causes asymmetric stock price responses to firm earnings surprises. The uncertainty that attends bad earnings news that arrives during expansions with greater economy‐wide uncertainty occasions larger price declines. This is because news inconsistent with investors’ prior beliefs about the state of the economy increases uncertainty, which amplifies the negative cash flow effects contained in bad earnings news. Asymmetrically, the positive cash flow effect of good earnings news that arrives during recessions is offset by increased investor uncertainty, which results in relatively smaller price reactions to the good news. This is consistent with Veronesi's rational expectations equilibrium model, which shows that investors demand higher expected returns in the face of greater uncertainty.