同行业间避税与企业的战略反应——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文运用2007-2016年中国A股上市公司数据,引入同行业竞争者的股票异常回报作为工具变量,研究同行业竞争者避税行为对企业战略反应的影响。研究发现,相比国有企业,民营企业的同行业竞争者避税行为与企业避税存在战略互补效应,即同行业竞争者的避税行为越激进,企业会选择更加激进的避税策略。探究可能影响这种战略互补效应的机制,结果显示民营企业很可能会模仿同行业领导者等被认为避税行为更有效合理的竞争对手制定避税策略。进一步发现地理距离衰减有利于降低同行业信息收集成本,导致同行业间战略互补反应更显著,即同行业避税政策模仿具有“本土偏好”。本文提供了同行业竞争对企业避税影响的因果关系证据,揭示了同行业竞争者避税行为是企业避税行为的重要影响因素。     

工薪所得税筹划与企业创新

本文结合我国工薪所得税税负较重及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景,探讨工薪所得税筹划是否以及如何对企业创新产生影响。研究发现:(1)工薪所得税筹划程度与企业创新显著正相关;(2)员工应税压力越大,二者正相关关系越显著,且2011年个人所得税税制改革会抑制二者之间的正向关系,表明纳税筹划主要通过降低工薪税负的不利影响,强化薪酬的激励效应,进而促进企业创新;(3)当公司为国有企业或公司处在税收征管强度较大的地区时,二者的正向关系更强;(4)当企业人均薪酬波动较大时,二者的正向关系削弱;(5)当创新员工更有可能是避税行为的受益者时,二者的正相关关系更强。本研究对于降低工薪阶层税负,以及如何提高企业创新意愿,实现创新驱动发展战略,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

税费替代:增值税减税、非税收入征管与企业投资

通过减税促进企业投资和提振宏观经济是近年来中国税收制度改革的重要目标,但减税政策的实际效果却存在争议。本文利用2009年增值税转型改革,研究了减税对地方政府税费收入和企业非税负担的影响,从税费替代的角度揭示非税负担变动如何影响企业固定资产投资。研究发现:(1)增值税转型在减税的同时提高了地方政府非税收入并加重了企业非税负担,地方财政收入受增值税转型冲击越大,企业非税负担上升越明显。(2)上述应主要体现在小型、微型和民营企业上,大中型、非民营企业的非税负担未发生明显变化。(3)非税负担上升会显著抑制小型、微型和民营企业的固定资产投资,促使小型微型和民营企业通过持有更多现金和减少流动性负债来应对税费负担不确定性。本文有助于理解减税政策对小型微型和民营企业非税负担的溢出效应及其影响,为通过减税降费促进投资和提振经济提供经验支撑。     

International Corporate Tax Avoidance Practices: Evidence from Australian Firms

This paper examines the international corporate tax avoidance practices of publicly listed Australian firms. Based on a hand-collected sample of 203 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006–2009 period (812 firm-years), our regression results indicate that there are several practices Australian firms use to aggressively reduce their tax liabilities. Specifically, we find that thin capitalization, transfer pricing, income shifting, multinationality, and tax haven utilization are significantly associated with tax avoidance. In fact, based on the magnitude and significance levels of the regression coefficients in our study, thin capitalization and transfer pricing represent the primary drivers of tax avoidance, whereas income shifting and tax haven utilization are less important. Finally, our additional regression results show that tax havens are likely to be used together with thin capitalization and transfer pricing to maximize international tax avoidance opportunities via the increased complexity of transactions carried out through tax havens.     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting: Empirical evidence from Australia

This study extends prior research on the willingness of firms to significantly decrease their corporate taxes. It specifically examines the associations between corporate tax avoidance and the reported significant uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise and tax affiliations of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel. Based on a dataset of 200 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006–2010 period (1000 firm years), we find that the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel are significantly positively associated with tax avoidance. Conversely, firms with board members who have at least one tax-related affiliation are significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance.     

Chief financial officer co-option and tax avoidance in European listed firms

This paper investigates the impact of chief financial officer (CFO) co-option on corporate tax avoidance. Using hand-collected data from a sample of nonfinancial listed firms included in the S&P350-Europe from 2013 to 2019, we find that firms with co-opted CFOs exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance. We also find that the board membership of co-opted CFOs moderates their propensity to engage in tax avoidance. These results introduce novel evidence about the role of CFOs in influencing firms’ levels of tax avoidance. They also shed light on the monitoring activity of the board of directors in the presence of board members who are also key decision-makers in tax strategies.     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

Adjustment costs of institutional tax changes from the audit pricing perspective: Empirical evidence from the VAT reform

Institutional changes inevitably impose adjustment costs on firms while also generating benefits. However, empirical evidence regarding the adjustment costs of institutional changes is limited, with much of the focus centered on benefits. Using data on China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 and the nation’s staggered adoption of the “business tax to value-added tax reform” (hereafter, “VAT reform”) as a natural experiment, we examine the impact of this reform on a particular corporate cost: audit fees. We find audit fees to be 8.11% higher for VAT reform firms than for non-VAT reform firms. This difference does not exist before or after the reform year. That is, it is only observed in the year of VAT reform implementation. This indicates the existence of an adjustment cost specifically related to the VAT reform. Furthermore, we observe larger fee increases among firms audited by Big 4 international audit firms, firms that require more audit work, firms that are more complex, and firms with weak internal controls. From the audit pricing perspective, we provide evidence of the economic consequences of tax reform. The corporate adjustment costs that arise from institutional changes deserve more attention from decision-makers.     

Government ownership,corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China

This study investigates how government ownership and corporate governance influence a firm's tax aggressiveness. Using Chinese listed companies during 2003–2009, we find that compared with government‐controlled firms, non‐government‐controlled firms pursue a more aggressive tax strategy. In particular, non‐government‐controlled firms with a higher percentage of the board shareholdings and with a CEO who also serves as the board chairman are more aggressive. For government‐controlled firms, we find that board shareholding has an impact on tax aggressiveness and it does not differ between local and central government‐controlled firms. However, local government‐controlled firms in less developed regions where the implementation of corporate governance measures is generally less effective are more tax aggressive than those in other regions.     

A review of tax avoidance in China

This paper synthesizes the major empirical findings of the burgeoning tax avoidance research in China from the accounting, finance, and economics literature over the last 13 years. It surveys the evidence in four main areas: (1) the mechanisms through which Chinese firms avoid income taxes; (2) the effects of government ownership and agency problem on tax avoidance; (3) tax avoidance and political connections; and (4) the roles of book-tax conformity, tax enforcement, and corporate governance. It also discusses the appropriateness of tax avoidance measures in the Chinese setting. Finally, it proposes important directions for future research.     

Information system and corporate income tax enforcement: Evidence from China

This paper adds the literature by investigating the effect of information system on corporate income tax (CIT) enforcement. We exploit the regional variations generated by the implementation in 2013 of the third stage of the China Tax Administration Information System (CTAIS-3) pilot. The CTAIS-3 is a nationally unified information system that significantly reduces information asymmetry between different tax authorities across regions. We find that the CTAIS-3 pilot significantly reduced firms’ conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance. The enhanced tax enforcement is particularly prominent if a firm is of a smaller size, or is administrated by the State Administration of Taxation, or is a non-state-owned enterprises, or locates in cities with a higher level of local fiscal pressure. Furthermore, we show that the CTAIS-3 improved the CIT enforcement by deterring firms from underreporting accounts receivable, as well as over-reporting accounts payable, inventory and the number of employees. In general, it would be more difficult for firms to hide profits from tax authorities under the CTAIS-3.     

上市公司限售股转让税收政策研究

自2010年1月1日实施对个人转让限售股征收20％的个人所得税以来，通过法人转股给自然人进行避税的方式不再有效，但是各种新的避税方式仍层出不穷。对当前限售股转让的避税方式及其制度根源进行深入探讨，可以进一步完善当前税收政策的对策，使其充分发挥税收调节收入分配的职能。     

Information processing costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from the SEC’s XBRL mandate

The IRS uses information contained in financial statements as well as tax returns to detect tax avoidance behavior. We examine the impact on corporate tax avoidance behavior of reductions in the IRS’s information processing costs resulting from the mandatory adoption of XBRL for financial reporting. Motivated by the recent debate in the U.S. Congress over the cost-benefit of mandatory XBRL reporting for small firms, we pay particular attention to small firms, which inherently have relatively high information frictions. We find that the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting results in a significant decrease in tax avoidance. We further find that the negative relation between XBRL reporting and tax avoidance is less prominent for firms subject to more intense IRS monitoring in the pre-XBRL-reporting period. Overall, our results suggest that XBRL reporting reduces the cost of IRS monitoring in terms of information processing, which dampens managerial incentives to engage in tax avoidance behavior.     

Product market threats and tax avoidance

In this paper, we find that product market threats increase firms’ tax avoidance. This association is especially observed for firms that pursue tax avoidance more than their optimal target level (i.e., actively tax-avoiding firms). In addition, among these firms with active tax avoidance practices, firms with weaker corporate governance structure, lower financial flexibility, and greater predation risk are more likely to experience the positive relationship between product market threats and tax avoidance. Further evidence suggests that higher levels of tax avoidance driven by product market threats do not come with higher levels of tax uncertainty and rather positively affect firms’ profitability. This result highlights the decoupling relationship between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty.     

Corporate and personal income tax declarations

Decisions by firms and individuals on the extent of their tax payments have generally been treated as separate choices. Empirically, a positive relationship between corporate and personal income tax evasion can be observed. The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that a manager's decision on the firm's behaviour will be independent of his personal preferences if the gain from reducing corporate tax payments is certain, as in the case of tax avoidance. If, however, the firm evades taxes so that the manager's income depends on whether the firm's activities are detected or not, corporate and personal income tax evasion choices cannot be separated. Jel Code H 24 · H 25 · H 26     

Executive cash compensation and tax aggressiveness of Chinese firms

We examine the influence of corporate compensation policies on firms’ tax aggressiveness in an emerging market where executive compensation is primarily in cash form. Based on a hand-collected dataset of 958 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms for the 2006–2012 period, we find that firms paying higher executive cash compensation are associated with lower tax aggressiveness. This relationship also holds for the excess cash compensation measures which control for executive shareholding, firm profitability, size, growth opportunity, and board independence. We further document that mutual funds ownership pressure firms paying higher compensation to reduce their tax aggressiveness, suggesting adverse selection by mutual funds on firms exhibiting risky tax avoidance activities. High leverage offsets the negative link between cash compensation and tax aggressiveness, indicating a complementary effect between debt and tax avoidance, and, hence, suggesting that creditor monitoring is weak. These results are robust to the system-GMM estimation, which simultaneously account for the endogeneity of executive compensation, tax aggressiveness, ownership and control, leverage, and corporate governance. Our findings on Chinese firms have important policy implications for developing countries around the world with concentrated ownership structure, weak institutional environment, widespread corruption, ineffective rule of law, and ongoing significant social and political transformation.     

Political costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from sin firms

The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.     

Tax avoidance in family firms: Evidence from large private firms

Ownership structure plays an important role in firms’ decisions on tax avoidance. Recently, the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance has become an issue of increasing interest among scholars from both the fields of family business research and tax research; however, empirical findings have so far remained ambiguous. Based on a unique sample of 678 large private firms from Germany, we show that for unlisted large firms (i) family firms avoid more tax than non-family firms, (ii) tax avoidance increases with the percentage of family ownership, and (iii) tax avoidance is a function of the number of shareholders. We interpret our results as evidence that benefits from avoiding taxes outweigh the non-tax costs in the case of large private family firms in Germany. Furthermore, as the number of family shareholders increases, family firms satisfy increasing demand for dividends by avoiding taxes.     

机械制造业税务风险的实证分析

以2008～2010年的机械制造业上市公司的480组数据为样本,考察我国机械制造业税务负担现状和税务风险影响因素,结果发现:机械制造业总体税负居中,但呈逐年递增趋势;机械制造业的税务风险与增值税负担、所得税负担、资产收益、固定资产变动和企业规模显著正相关,与企业总资产周转率显著负相关。