我国上市公司股权分置改革中的锚定效应研究

股权分置改革是我国资本市场发展中一个独特的经济问题。本文收集526家实施股改公司的相关资料,运用行为心理学著名的“锚定效应”理论,对股权分置改革中对价的制定和对价的影响因素两大问题进行分析、检验和解释。     

R&D expenditures and firm growth – is small beautiful?

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how efficiently different groups of firms use their R&D expenditures. To this end, it investigates how the empirical relationship between firms' R&D expenditures and their sales growth varies with different values of firm size, firm age, and the number of firms in the respective industry. Using panel data for Switzerland ranging from 1995 to 2012, the paper finds that smaller, more mature firms show a more positive relation between R&D expenditures and sales growth than both relatively larger or younger firms. The paper argues that, on the one hand, these firms can benefit from various small size advantages in the R&D process, such as more motivated researchers, caused by a stronger connection to the firm's fate. On the other hand, these firms can also benefit from a well-established R&D department that allows absorbing the latest technological developments. The paper further finds that industries consisting of many small firms show a more positive relation between R&D expenditures and sales growth than industries consisting of only a few large firms. The intuition behind this result is that industries consisting of many small firms imply more independent innovative trials, which then together result in a higher probability of discovering successful innovations. In sum, the paper finds that groups consisting of a large number of small, more mature firms spend their R&D in the most efficient way.     

家族所有权调节下的CEO薪酬与研发投资

以2013—2018年期间379家中国A股技术密集型公司数据为样本,研究了家族所有权在研发投资和CEO薪酬关系中的调节作用。结果发现:与非家族企业相比,家族企业CEO薪酬与研发投资水平关联性较高;家族所有权比例较高的家族企业对CEO薪酬与研发投资的关系具有更强的正向调节能力;低风险与高风险的家族企业在研发投资上没有显著差异。因此,家族所有权在研发投资和CEO薪酬关系中具有调节的作用是基于信息优势和较长的投资期限,而并非风险规避。进一步研究发现:家族企业的研发投资比非家族企业具有更高的投资效率、并可转化为更高的企业价值和增长率。     

Do Chinese executives reward for luck?

This paper examines the sensitivity of executive compensation to luck based on Chinese listed companies. To identify the causal effect, we rely on companies’ market performances driven by exogenous oil prices. We document a positive relationship between executive compensation and market performance driven by oil prices, which support the story of pay for luck. Moreover, by introducing a natural experiment China in 2015, i.e., the policy of “CEO compensation limit” in state-owned firms, we show that the shock of CEO compensation limit significantly weakens the effect of pay-for-luck. We further show that there is asymmetry in pay for luck. Specifically, when oil prices rise, executive compensation is more sensitive to good luck. In addition, the sensitivity of executives to pay-for-luck is more pronounced in firms with state-owned, higher equity concentration, and related party transaction.     

Barriers to innovation in young and mature firms

This paper examines how firm age can affect a firm’s perception of the obstacles (deterring vs. revealed) that hamper and delay innovation. Using a comprehensive panel of Spanish firms for the period 2004–2011, the empirical analysis conducted shows that distinct types of obstacle are perceived differently by firms of different ages. First, a clear-cut negative relationship is identified between firm age and a firm’s assessment of both the internal and external shortages of financial resources. Second, young firms seem to be less sensitive to the lack of qualified personnel when initiating an innovative project than when they are already engaged in such activities. By contrast, the attempts of mature firms to engage in innovation activity are significantly affected by the lack of qualified personnel. Finally, mature incumbents appear to attach greater importance to obstacles related to market structure and demand than is the case of firms with less experience.     

CEO社会资本对其薪酬水平和薪酬波动性的影响——公司市场价值波动性和股权集中度的调节作用

探讨了CEO的社会资本对自身薪酬水平和薪酬波动性的影响,以及公司市场价值波动性和股权集中度对这种影响关系的调节作用。利用2009—2015年德国DAX30指数企业的数据验证研究假设。结果显示:CEO的社会资本对其薪酬具有显著影响,即丰富的社会资本能够提高其薪酬水平,而且增大了薪酬波动性;上述两个正向影响受到公司市场价值波动性和公司股权集中度的调节作用,即公司市场价值波动性增强了CEO的社会资本对其薪酬波动性的影响,股权集中度则减弱了这种影响。     

Stock vesting conditions,control benefits and managerial replacement

This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock‐based compensation on firms’ decisions to replace managers. I indicate that firms may excessively replace managers with both long‐ and short‐term vested stock‐based compensation, while excessive retention can be caused only by short‐term vested options. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, I also show that short‐term vested stock‐based compensation is the equilibrium contract. The study also has implications for regulations concerning mandatory deferral and clawback of executive pay.     

国有企业管理者激励补偿效应——政府的角色

本文突出制度环境,研究了政府干预对国有企业管理者薪酬激励效应的影响。同时,比较了政府这一制度约束与管理者权力这一契约安排之间的制衡关系。通过实证分析发现,政府干预程度越低,管理者盈余管理的空间越有限,薪酬与企业真实绩效的敏感度越强,但这一现象只存在于管理者权力较小的企业。在管理者权力较大的企业,薪酬自定现象明显,政府干预的减少并未弱化管理者的权力,也没有提高薪酬激励效应。本文的结论进一步验证了制度环境对管理者激励契约的重要影响,并对现有相关文献加以扩展,指出了契约安排内的权力取向会削弱制度环境的影响。     

Should employment authorities worry about mergers and acquisitions?

This paper considers the role of mergers and acquisitions on employment. First, it considers the importance of different aspects of compensation policy and human resource management practices for distinguishing acquired and acquiring firms. Second, it examines which individuals from which firms remain with the newly created entity after the takeover. Using a unique employer–employee linked data set for France, we find that very few observable workforce or compensation characteristics distinguish acquired from acquiring firms ex-ante. Nevertheless, the human resources department seems to be quite active in the post-takeover period, with employees of the acquired firm having a lower probability of continued employment with the new entity in the short term after takeover than those of the acquiring firm and with the differences between the two types of firms disappearing after 3 years. The workers with characteristics that tend to be associated with the fastest subsequent job finding in the displaced worker literature are also those who tend to be overrepresented among the individuals who separate from their employer post-takeover. Finally, as both acquired and acquiring firms differ from firms not involved in takeover activity in a similar manner, employment authorities may be able to anticipate the regions in which takeovers are more likely to occur by looking at the financial accounts of firms with particular characteristics that have local establishments.

Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation

We examine changes in the compensation of CEOs of German firms after the prohibition of insider trading (IT) in 1994 to test whether IT is a relevant compensation device. While we find that the performance elasticity of explicit CEO pay slightly increases subsequent to the IT law adoption for non-financial firms indicating an incentive-substitution effect, the overall change in levels seems modest. We explore the hypothesis that compensation for forgone IT profits in general is small because typically, firms lack at least one of the two necessary conditions for profitable IT: the existence of a liquid stock market imposing low costs of transactions and the presence of a small number of co-insiders, preventing the information rent to be competed away. Based on a difference-in-difference estimation, we indeed find that explicit pay increases more strongly for intensely traded firms and decreases for non-financial firms and insurance companies with a higher number of co-insiders. The combined effect is relatively small except for firms with the most liquid shares.     

股权流通性改善对高管激励机制的影响——来自中国股权分置改革前后高管薪酬的证据

以往对股改前上市公司的研究表明,高管薪酬与公司业绩不相关或相关度不高。通过对比股权分置改革前后高管薪酬的情况,本文实证分析了股权分置改革对高管激励机制的影响。我们发现,与股改前相比,上市公司高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性显著提高;与未股改公司相比,股改公司高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性更高。本文论证了股权流通性改善对于完善高管薪酬激励制度的积极意义,为全面评估股权分置改革与理解高管薪酬的制度约束提供了经验证据。     

Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States

This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO compensation in listed US firms during the 1994–2004 period. The results are consistent with agency costs and recruiting considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the ‘investment horizon’ problem. The findings also suggest that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock option compensation and the adoption of broad-based stock option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives.     

Turnover costs and the wage—fringe mix

This paper examines how firms choose their compensation package to influence employee turnover. A firm will attempt to maintain a steady state of trunover consistent with its training and hiring costs. We develop a model of this relationship when the firm's ability to offer a differentiated compensation package. Both the theoretical and empirical findings of our study emphasize the importance of the link between turnover costs and the compensation mix. That is quits are negatively realted to both the share of pensions in the total compensation package and the level of wages. The influence of pensions in attracting stable workers, however, is diminishing. An important implication is that the policies which attempt to standardize worker compensation will hinder the market determination of turnover, and hence, will generate inefficiencies in the labour market.     

Employee Profit-sharing and Labor Extraction in a Classical Model of Distribution and Growth

This article sets out a classical model of economic growth in which the distribution of income features the possibility of profit-sharing with workers, as firms choose periodically between two labor-extraction compensation strategies. Workers are homogeneous with regard to labor power, and firms choose to compensate them with either only a conventional wage or a share of profits on top of this conventional wage. Empirical evidence shows that labor productivity (i.e. labor extraction) in profit-sharing firms is higher than labor productivity in non-sharing firms. The frequency distribution of labor-extraction employee compensation strategies and labor productivity across firms is time-variant, being driven by satisficing imitation dynamics from which we derive two significant results. First, heterogeneity in labor-extraction compensation strategies across firms, and hence earnings inequality across workers can be a stable long-run equilibrium outcome. Second, although convergence to a long-run equilibrium may occur with either a falling or increasing proportion of profit-sharing firms, the share of net profits in income and the rates of net profit, capital accumulation and economic growth nevertheless all converge to the highest possible long-run equilibrium values.     

Animal spirits and the composition of innovation

This paper shows that the Schumpeterian model with both vertical and horizontal innovative research admits many more equilibria than the unique symmetric balanced growth path (BGP) usually highlighted in the literature. Each of a continuum of BGPs is characterized by a different composition of aggregate R&D (vertical versus horizontal).This appears if firms expect self-fulfilling “waves of enthusiasm” in the newly introduced sectors, as is very common in the real world. Pioneers are challenged by more outsiders and the first monopoly of every new good is likely to last less than in more mature industries: By expecting this horizontal innovation is depressed while vertical innovation is more intense. Such “waves of enthusiasm” have a positive effect on growth rates and a negative effect on consumption levels.     

Founders versus non-founders in large companies: financial incentives and the call for regulation

This paper is intended to question some of the premises in the ever increasing calls to regulate executive pay. We focus on founders, and extend Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461–488) manager-specific investments model by explicitly modeling managerial effort and pay performance sensitivity. Tests of this model on a data set of large companies, controlling for the endogeneity of managerial compensation, indicate that founders tend to be less responsive to performance incentives and generally more entrenched. At the same time, founders’ led firms are more valuable, supporting our predictions. This suggests that for founders, regulation of compensation may not be very effective.      

Young firms and innovation: A microeconometric analysis

This paper discusses the sources of product innovation in young innovative companies (YICs), here defined as firms engaged in product innovation and with less than 8 years of activity. In particular, we look at in-house and external R&D and at the acquisition of external technology in its embodied and disembodied components. These input–output relationships are tested on a sample of 2713 innovative Italian firms. A sample-selection approach is applied to study both the determinants of product innovation and the factors affecting the intensity of innovation.Results show that in-house R&D is linked to the propensity to introduce product innovation both in mature firms and YICs; however, innovation intensity in the YICs is mainly dependent on embodied technical change from external sources, while in-house R&D does not play a significant role.     

Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard

This article investigates managerial compensation and its incentive effects. Our econometric framework is derived from a multiperiod principal-agent model with moral hazard. Longitudinal data on returns to firms and managerial compensation are used to estimate the model. We find that firms would incur large losses from ignoring moral hazard, whereas managers only require moderate additional compensation for accepting a contract that ties their wealth to the value of the firm. Thus the costs of aligning hidden managerial actions to shareholder goals through the compensation schedule are much less than the benefits from the resulting managerial performance.     

我国制造企业“服务增强”的实证研究及政策建议

通过"服务"增强制造企业竞争力、形成服务差异化竞争已成为全球化竞争和知识经济背景下我国制造企业的重要战略选择。本文在界定"制造企业服务增强"微观层面概念和阐述其表现形式的基础上,提出国内制造企业的服务增强具有明显的"质量弥补"特征;随后通过问卷调查获取国内制造业的大样本数据,针对基于要素替代的质量弥补以及服务差异化竞争对绩效的影响展开实证研究;最后,指出国内制造业服务增强存在的不足和问题,提出相应的对策建议。本文对企业管理实践者和政策制定者都有较强的启发意义。