沉淀成本与资源型城市转型分析

本文应用一个简单的投资模型，从经济性沉淀成本和社会性沉淀成本角度分析了资源型城市转型的障碍并提出了相关的政策建议。模型分析表明，沉淀成本与信息不完全的结合会在很大程度上扭曲资源配置，导致产业结构刚性，降低经济效率和福利水平。因而资源型城市转型的基本政策处方，是补偿经济性沉淀成本和社会性沉淀成本，促进各类生产要素的充分流动，以利于资源型城市投资主体的自由退出和发展接续产业。     

规模报酬递增的第二种机制:为什么重复建设与规模效率的提高可以并存

本文探讨了政府竞争格局下行业规模报酬递增的机制。我们发现,经典的规模报酬递增机制会导致垄断竞争条件下的厂商均衡数目减少,因而规模效率的提高与重复建设不可能同时出现。但是地方政府降低厂商固定成本的竞争却可以在重复建设的同时带来规模效率的提高,这就是本文所发现的政府竞争格局下行业规模报酬递增的第二种机制。我们通过DEA-VRS模型和DEA-Malmquist指数法初步证实了此过程。实证研究发现,在控制了干中学和货币外部性之后,地区行政垄断指数与规模效率的动态变动呈现显著的倒U形关系。     

企业成本管理面临的问题与对策

随着我国经济的发展,国有企业若想在激烈的市场竞争中求得生存与发展,就必须不断的创新,不断寻求降低成本的途径,以适应市场经济发展及变化需求,取得长期竞争优势,提高企业竞争力。武钢矿业公司乌龙泉矿是国有企业,近几年在成本管理过程中针对存在的问题采取相应的对策,加大降成本力度,不仅甩掉了沉重的历史包袱,而且逐步形成了规模经济,实现了“管理出效率、管理出效益、管理出人才”的目标。     

规模经济的一般理论：中国范例

规模经济（Economyofscale）是工业化时代“大量生产”的产物。其具体含义为,在投入增加的过程中,产出增加的比例超过投入增加的比例,产品的平均成本随着产量的增加而降低。其具体机制是,在投入增加的过程中,固定成本不变,总产量的提高可以降低单位产出的平均固定成本,这在一般情况下也就导致平均成本的降低。人们一般所说的规模经济是就企业而言的。熊贤良（1997）指出,应当区分规模经济的不同层次,进而采取相应的对策。他论述了企业规模经济,企业外部、行业内部的规模经济,有时又称作“地区集中化经济”（Localizationeconomy…     

研发与市场结构:基于成本视角的分析

本文从成本入手，探讨了研发与市场结构的关系。通过对平均成本、固定成本及知识特性的综合分析，认为由于技术复杂度的不断提高及研发带来的规模经济，在多数产业研发会导致市场集中度逐渐提高。通过对研发沉没成本的分析表明，在专利保护与许可证制度下，当研发导致的沉没成本比较小时，厂商数量较多的竞争性市场的福利好于寡占或垄断市场，因为其研发速度更快；反之，寡占或垄断市场的福利更好，因为研发的沉没成本得到了节约。在理论分析的基础上，本文就如何通过优化市场结构，提升我国企业研发能力，应对经济全球化的挑战，提出了三点对策。     

核电站要注重竞争优势的培育

随着电力市场改革的深入,面对竞价上网的压力,核电站如何提高自身的竞争力,培育并保持竞争优势,在产业整体的价值链中保证稳定的利润空间,获得持续的赢利能力,就成了必须面对的战略课题。总体上讲,核电目前在竞争中还处于弱势地位,还是一个需要国家大力扶持的新兴产业。由于电力产品的单一性、同质性,决定了降低经营成本是电力企业普遍的竞争策略。在这种大环境下,核电站应该从两个方面来降低经营成本。 1.发挥规模优势核电站具有规模经济性的显著特征。规模经济要求发电企业的产出规模必需足够大,以分摊巨额固定资产投资所形成的固定成本,降低单位产出的固定成本,进而降低单位产出的平均成本,使价格具备竞争力。对特定机组而言,就是要争取多发电;对不同机组而言,就是要追     

跨国研发下国有企业的最优技术选择策略

随着技术保护主义与“逆全球化”趋势不断增强，国有企业的技术选择将对本国产业链供应链的稳定性产生重大影响。本文构建了国际混合寡头竞争模型，考察同时存在国内国外技术交易渠道下国有企业的最优技术选择策略。研究发现，国有企业最优技术国产化比重随专利价值的提升而增加。当专利价值较低时，国有企业应当同时使用本国与国外的技术以平衡研发效率与专利使用成本，即“国际分散选择”；当专利价值足够大时，为避免国外企业拒绝授权带来的供应链产业链冲击，国有企业应实现产品技术的完全国产化，即“本土集中选择”。偏离最优技术选择策略，国有企业采用先进技术可能降低整体社会效益，特别是国有企业完全依赖国外技术的选择会降低本国产业链供应链的创新效率与利润水平，损害社会福利。进一步，本文通过比较静态分析发现，在专利价值足够高时，为推动国有企业加快实现选择技术的完全国产化，应在产品市场上鼓励跨国研发企业间竞争以提高整体创新动力，同时在技术交易渠道上鼓励跨国研发企业深度合作以提高整体创新效率。本文揭示了技术市场中国有企业的策略性技术选择的影响机制，为提高产业链供应链韧性提供了新的分析视角与政策启示。     

中国经济过度竞争的原因及治理

国有企业的产权特性、产品的非差异化、行政垄断、不完善的市场体系、企业行为的短期化和高交易费用是造成过度竞争的主要原因。过度竞争会降低社会资源配置效率和福利水平，并不利于民族工业的发展。要从根本上解决我国经济中的过度竞争现象，应进行产权制度和金融制度的创新、放松行政垄断行业的进入管制。除此之外，还应制定一定的以市场化为导向的产业调整援助政策，改善地方政府和官员的政绩考核标准。     

沉淀成本、交易成本与政府管制方式——兼论我国自然垄断行业改革的新方向

通过审视新古典经济学完全竞争和完全可竞争市场理想化模型可知,在市场完全条件下,没有沉淀成本和交易成本,至少可以实现帕累托次优。一旦引入规模经济(自然垄断)、沉淀成本和交易成本概念,并且这些经济变量相互作用,市场很容易失灵,不仅为私人缔约奠定了理论基础,而且还为政府管制提供了正当理由。尤其当政府管制本身遭受交易成本困扰时,就会出现"管制刃锋"问题,所以需要理性地权衡市场竞争、政府对私营企业管制和国有企业"三位一体"格局,正确处理竞争与垄断市场结构、私有与国有治理结构,以及确立政府管制结构的基本原则,对于深化我国自然垄断行业改革具有重大的理论与现实意义。     

对企业资产重组的再认识

企业资产重组在我国经济结构调整中具有重要作用。由于资产重组是一个企业不同资产的分离和组合过程，需要支付相当的成本代价，只有当资产重组的收益大于成本时，重组才是有绩效的。以优势企业为主体的资产重组，能够降低重组的成本和风险，并有利于调整我国的企业规模结构和地区产业结构。     

个人理性与沉没成本悖论

文章放松了新古典经济学条件下沉没成本决策无关性假设前提,进而从真实世界角度阐述沉没成本悖论存在的理性逻辑,从而表明人们很难忽略过去发生的沉没成本,它本身并不能被视为一种悖论或错误行为,甚至是非理性行为,同样也是在约束条件下一种广义理性行为。因此,需要承认沉没成本悖论存在的普遍性,而且还需要采取恰当的非正式和正式制度设计克服沉没成本悖论所带来的负面影响,并不是简单地警告我们不要考虑过去发生的沉没成本,＂让过去的事情过去吧＂的规范结论。因此,不仅需要提高决策者的认识能力,更多需要采取加强沉没成本与风险管理,创造一个良好的市场环境是最为根本的。     

Sunk Costs,Extensive R&D Subsidies and Permanent Inducement Effects

Using firm‐level data on Spanish manufacturing firms we estimate a model of the firm's optimal R&D decisions (whether to perform R&D and how much to invest). We quantify the fixed (proper fixed costs plus firms' outside option) and sunk costs of R&D and find the former to be substantially higher than the latter. While sunk costs act as a barrier to entry into R&D for some firms, fixed costs are the binding obstacle for many more firms. Simulation based on the estimated model reveals that one‐shot trigger subsidies cause a substantial increase in both the share of R&D firms and average R&D expenditures. This effect shows persistence over time, but totally fades away after seven years as firms are gradually hit by negative R&D profitability shocks.     

Firm and destination-specific export costs: The case of the Swedish food sector

This paper focuses on sunk export costs in the Swedish food and beverage sector. Its purpose is threefold. First, it investigates whether the estimation of the importance of sunk costs is sensitive to persistence bilateral (firm-destination) effects such as specific market knowledge compared to firm-specific effects such as managerial skills or product quality. Second, it analyses the effects of firm and market characteristics on firms’ export decisions. Third, it tests whether the importance of sunk costs varies with destination as well as firm characteristics. The main results are: (1) that firm-destination effects are more important than general, unobserved firm characteristics, (2) that more productive and larger firms are more likely to export and that firms’ expectations from exporting increase with market size and exchange rate stability, and (3) that the importance of sunk export costs varies with firm and market characteristics.     

THE ROLE OF SUNK COSTS IN THE DECISION TO INVEST IN R&D*

We present a dynamic empirical model of a firm's R&D decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk R&D costs, taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms, and among different technological regimes. We estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm‐level data of Spanish manufacturing for 1990–2000. Conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors, we find that R&D history matters. This true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk R&D costs associated with performing R&D. Sunk R&D costs are found to be higher for large, high‐tech firms.     

Sunk Costs,Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry

Although economists usually support the unrestricted entry of firms into an industry, entry may lower social welfare if there are setup costs or if entrants have a cost disadvantage. We consider the welfare effects of entry within a standard Cournot model where some of an incumbent firm’s costs are sunk. We find that the range of parameter values over which entry can harm welfare declines monotonically in the fraction of cost that are sunk. Furthermore, the presence of even a small fraction of sunk costs often reverses an assessment that entry harms welfare.     

Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.     

Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs

We show that a menu of two-part tariffs can solve the opportunism problem identified by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) [McAfee, R.P., Schwartz, M., 1994. Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity. American Economic Review, 84 210–230] in vertical games with sequential contracting, provided the sunk costs incurred by the first firm to invest are not too large. If the seller were to engage in opportunism with a second firm in an attempt to shift rents from the first firm, the first firm could mitigate the dissipation of its rents by choosing from its menu of contract options the tariff with the higher marginal price and lower fixed fee. The prospect of the first firm's choosing the ‘wrong’ two-part tariff in the event of opportunism is, in some environments, sufficient to make opportunism unprofitable for the seller.     

Firm entry and firm growth

This paper reports on the importance of firm entry and growth flows in Portuguese manufacturing during the period 1982–86, and investigates their determinants. We find that both movements are induced by past profitability and deterred by economies of scale, product differentiation and sunk costs. The analysis does not reject the hypothesis that the determinants of firm entry and growth are quantitatively the same, thereby giving some support to the hypothesis that entry and expansion are close substitutes in absorbing industry excess profits, and that the choice between them does not depend on the height of the entry/mobility barriers.     

Sunk Costs,Market Contestability,and the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper we offer a new economic explanation for the observed inter-industry differences in the size distribution of firms. Our empirical estimates based on three temporal (1982, 1987, and 1992) cross-sections of the four-digit US manufacturing industries indicate that increased market contestability, as signified by low sunk costs, tends to reduce the dispersion of firm sizes. These findings provide support for one of the key predictions of the theory of contestable markets: that market forces under contestability would tend to render any inefficient organization of the industry unsustainable and, consequently, tighten the distribution of firms around the optimum.