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1.
Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kenneth L. Judd 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):673-695
Summary. We examine a multistage model of an R&D race where players have multiple projects. We also develop perturbation methods for
general dynamic games that can be expressed as analytic operators in a Banach space. We apply these perturbation methods to
solve races with a small prize. We compute second-order asymptotically valid solutions for equilibrium and socially optimal
decisions to determine qualitative properties of equilibrium. We find that innovators invest relatively too much on risky
projects. Strategic reactions are ambiguous in general; in particular, a player may increase expenditures as his opponent
moves ahead of him.
Received: January 3, 2002; revised version: June 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This is the final version of Judd (1985). The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of anonymous referees, Paul
Milgrom, seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, the 1984 Summer Meetings of the Econometric
Society, University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and Yale University, and the financial support of the
National Science Foundation (SES-8409786, SES-8606581) 相似文献
2.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
3.
Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Max R. Blouin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):245-262
Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where
two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents),
then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless
of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to
models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson).
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's
University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer
Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments. 相似文献
4.
Roman Inderst 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):419-429
Summary. This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both
a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters
the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands
in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining
theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer.
Received: September 10, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I benefitted from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Holger Müller, and Roland Strausz, and from comments made by an
anonymous referee. 相似文献
5.
Ritxar Arlegi 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):219-225
Summary. Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules for individual decision
making under complete uncertainty. This note shows that, in the case of two of these rules, they do not satisfy one of the
axioms used for their characterization. A counterexample illustrating this fact is provided, as well as an alternative way
to characterize the two rules under consideration, mantaining as far as possible the original axioms proposed by Bossert,
Pattanaik and Xu.
Received: November 3, 2000; revised version: March 1, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am grateful for the encouragement and support of Professor Prasanta Pattanaik. I thank also the suggestions of two
anonymous referees. This work was made during an academic visit to the Department of Economics of the University of California
in Riverside (UCR). The visit was possible thanks to an invitation by the UCR and the financial support of the Public University
of Navarra, the Government of Navarra, and the CICYT (SEC96-0858). 相似文献
6.
Summary. In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner
equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible
implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of noncooperative dynamic formulations. We construct
relevant game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information sets, and explain the rules for calculating
ex ante expected payoffs. The possibility of implementing an allocation is related to whether or not it is incentive compatible.
Implementation through an exogenous third party or an endogenous intermediary is also considered.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: April 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper comes out of a visit by Nicholas Yannelis to City University, London, in December 2000. We are grateful
to Dr A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. We also thank Leon
Koutsougeras and a referee for several, helpful comments.
Correspondence to: N.C. Yannelis 相似文献
7.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):33-44
Summary. The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies
and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered
by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a
complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend
when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.
Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin,
Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise. 相似文献
8.
Beth Allen 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):527-544
Summary. This paper examines the ex ante core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which state-dependent allocations are required to satisfy
incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete
contracts or partial commitment. An example is provided in which the incentive compatible core with nontransferable utility
is empty; the game fails to be balanced because convex combinations of incentive compatible net trades can violate incentive
compatibility. However, randomization of such strategies leads to ex post allocations which satisfy incentive compatibility and are feasible on average. Hence, convexity is preserved in such a model
and the resulting cooperative games are balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU
games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core.
Received: December 26, 2001; revised version: June 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID"*" This work was financed, in part, by contract No 26 of the programme “P?le d'attraction interuniversitaire” of the Belgian
government, and, in part, by research grant SBR93-09854 from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Much of my thinking about
this topic was developed during a wonderful visit to CORE for the 1991–1992 academic year (on sabbatical from the University
of Pennsylvania). This paper was originally circulated in December 1991 as CARESS Working Paper #91-38, Center for Analytic
Research in Economics and the Social Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and in February 1992 as
CORE Discussion Paper 9221, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium.
RID="*"
ID="*" At the very start of my research, Jean-Fran?ois Mertens was almost a co-author. Fran?ois Forges provided detailed comments
at a later stage, during my visit to THEMA, Université Cergy-Pontoise, in Spring 1997. They are entitled to the customary
disclaimer. 相似文献
9.
Summary. Finding solutions to the Bellman equation often relies on restrictive boundedness assumptions. In this paper we develop a
method of proof that allows to dispense with the assumption that returns are bounded from above. In applications our assumptions
only imply that long run average (expected) growth is sufficiently discounted, in sharp contrast with classical assumptions
either absolutely bounding growth or bounding each period (instead of long run) maximum (instead of average) growth. We discuss
our work in relation to the literature and provide several examples.
Received: July 26, 2000; revised version: July 10, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am specially grateful to Cuong Le Van and to anonymous referee for detecting an error in a previous version of this
paper and for suggestions that sensibly improved the paper. Comments and suggestions are also acknowledged to Michele Boldrin,
Raouf Boucekkine, Fabrice Collard, Tim Kehoe, Omar Licandro, and Luis Puch. I am also indebted to participants to the III
Summer School on Economic Theory held at the Universidade de Vigo, the Macroeconomics Workshop at the Universitat Autò}noma
de Barcelona, and the Econometrics Seminar at Tilburg University. Financial support from the Belgian government, under project
PAI P4/01, at the IRES-UCL, from a European Marie Curie fellowship, Grant HPMF-CT-1999-00410, at the CEPREMAP, and from IVIE
and Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, under project BEC2001-0535, at the Universidad de Alicante, is gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
10.
Carsten Krabbe Nielsen 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):293-315
Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and
fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison
is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but
rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a
large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction
to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first
will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible
and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation
is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated.
Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at
Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of
Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous
referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related
issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support
from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
11.
>P>Summary. We provide a set of simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected
Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty.
Received: October 29, 2002; revised version: November 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Matthew Ryan for very useful comments and suggestions on related work and for encouraging us to write this
note.
Correspondence to: S. Grant 相似文献
12.
Stefan Maus 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):613-627
Summary. A condition is given that is equivalent to balancedness of all NTU-games derived from an exchange economy with asymmetric
information when endowments are variable. The condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also
to the more general model of Arrow-Radner type economies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation
of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility
functions is developed in which the result would also hold.
Received: December 12, 2001; revised version: November 1, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"I thank two anonymous referees whose comments led to an improvement of the paper. 相似文献
13.
Summary. One of the main challenges for monetary economics is to explain the use of assets that are dominated in rate-of-return as
media of exchange. We use experimental methods to study how a fiat money might come to be used in transactions when an identically
marketable, dividend-bearing asset, a consol, is also available. Our experimental economies, which have an overlapping generations
structure, have the property that the only stationary rational expectations equilibria (SREE) require exclusive use of the
consol as the medium of exchange. In a baseline treatment, agents use the consol exclusively, as would occur in an SREE. However,
in other treatments, we observe episodes of rate-of-return dominance,with consistent use of fiat money as a medium of exchange.
The results show that two properties of our economies are associated with the rate of return dominance anomaly. The first
is a history of trading with fiat money, prior to the introduction of the consol. The second is the timing of the dividend
payment; when the dividend payment follows the execution of trades between generations, hoarding of the consol occurs on the
part of the old, who earn dividends by hoarding. In our economies, settling transactions with a dividend-bearing asset does
not improve allocations over those resulting from trading with fiat money.
Received: July 11, 2002; revised version: July 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"We thank Anne Villamil, participants in the 2000 Purdue University Conference on Monetary Economics, the Summer 2000
meetings of the Economic Science Association, and a referee, for very helpful comments. We thank the Krannert School of Management
and the Purdue University Center for International Business, Education and Research for financial support and Vivian Lei for
research assistance. We also thank Ron Michener for referring us to the historical account of the early introduction of money
into the American colonies, as reported by Benjamin Franklin.
Correspondence to: G. Camera 相似文献
14.
Summary. This paper describes conditions under which one investment project dominates a second project in terms of net present value,
irrespective of the choice of the discount rate. The resulting partial ordering of projects has certain similarities to stochastic
dominance. However, the structure of the net present value function leads to characterizations that are quite specific to
this context. Our theorems use Bernstein's (1915) innovative results on the representation and approximation of polynomials,
as well as other general results from the theory of equations, to characterize the partial ordering. We also show how the
ranking is altered when the range of discount rates is limited or the rate varies period by period.
Received: January 5, 2002; revised version: October 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Robert Driskill, Andrea Maneschi, Roy Radner, and participants of seminars at NYU, Notre Dame, Purdue, and
Washington University for helpful comments. The present version of the paper has benefited from comments by a referee and
the editor. Foster is grateful for support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation through its network on Inequality
and Poverty in Broader Perspective.
Correspondence to: T. Mitra 相似文献
15.
Gautam Bose 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):457-467
Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating
in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in
a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions
which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders
induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving.
Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at
the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King
pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier
drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California. 相似文献
16.
Summary. We provide a detailed portfolio analysis for a financial market with an atomless continuum of assets. In the context of an
exact arbitrage pricing theory (EAPT), we go beyond the characterization of the existence of important portfolios (normalized
riskless, mean, cost, factor and mean-variance efficient portfolios) to furnish exact portfolio compositions in terms of explicit
portfolio weights. Such an analysis has not been furnished before in the context of the asymptotic arbitrage pricing theory
(APT). We also characterize conditions under which a mean-variance efficient portfolio is a benchmark portfolio used in the
EAPT to proxy essential risk. We illustrate our results with several examples of specific financial markets.
Received: May 30, 2002; revised version: August 15, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"Some of the results reported here constituted part of Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper– No. 1139 circulated under the title “Hyperfinite Asset Pricing Theory”; additional results were obtained when Sun visited
the Department of Economics at Johns Hopkins University during March 2002. This paper was presented at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU on July 6–9, 2002
Correspondence to: M. A. Khan 相似文献
17.
Ross M. Starr 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):455-474
Summary. The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium.
Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction
costs and market segmentation in trading posts (with a separate budget constraint at each transaction). Commodity money arises
endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value
from its acceptability for tax payments. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity)
money in equilibrium.
Received: February 15, 2002; revised version: August 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful remarks at the University of California - Santa Barbara,
University of California - San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for
the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin
- Madison, SITE at Stanford University-2001, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest
Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic
Theory Conference at UC - Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California
- Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San
Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of Henning Bohn, Harold Cole, James Hamilton, Mukul Majumdar, Harry Markowitz, Chris
Phelan, Meenakshi Rajeev, Wendy Shaffer, Bruce Smith, and Max Stinchcombe. 相似文献
18.
Oleksii Birulin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):675-683
Summary. I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated
ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every
auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium.
Received: November 5, 2001; revised version: June 10, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"I am grateful to Vijay Krishna, Sergei Izmalkov and anonymous referee for many important comments. 相似文献
19.
Hideki Mizukami 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):211-217
Summary. We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context,
Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out.
But he requires two kinds of domain-richness conditions. One is either smooth connectedness or the finiteness of the set of
alternatives and the other is monotonical closedness. However, dispensing with the former condition, we alternatively prove
the same result under a weaker condition than monotonical closedness.
Received: April 11, 2000; revised version: February 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper received the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Moriguchi Prize in January 2001.
I am grateful to Prof. Ryoichi Nagahisa, Prof. Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Prof. Ken-ichi Shimomura, Prof. Ken Urai, and especially
two anonymous referees for their useful and helpful comments and suggestions. I am a Research Fellow of the Japan Society
for the Promotion of Science. 相似文献
20.
Tetsuo Ono 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):141-168
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth
cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation
growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the
no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the
tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently
between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of
capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level.
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments,
which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at
Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University,
and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine. 相似文献