Performative global finance: bridging micro and macro approaches with a stratified perspective

Theories of performativity can enhance the study of global finance. Taking everyday financial practices seriously, they emphasise the potentially structuring effects and disciplinary nature of finance, and foreground the performative role of economics, financial models, and formulas. It has remained largely overlooked to date that the literature on the performativity of finance can be divided into two distinct approaches. ‘Microperformativity’ is the more actor-oriented approach, beginning its analysis with the exploration of agencements and their practices, or the examination of the social history of mathematical formulas in finance. ‘Macroperformativity’, in contrast, takes its point of departure from the social structure of finance itself, often in relation to national, international, or global power structures. Neither approach provides for an intermediary concept that more explicitly links the micro and macro level. Nor does either approach give adequate analytical consideration to social conflicts and power struggles. To fill these gaps, the paper applies poststructural hegemony theory to reconceptualise performativity as an articulatory logic which accounts for the transition of a particularity towards a universality within a framework of stratified hegemony. Framed accordingly, the concept of performativity accounts more strongly for the social and political processes, ruptures, contestations and contradictions in global finance.     

From performativity to political economy: index investing,ETFs and asset manager capitalism

As a discipline, political economy has often been reluctant to engage with the details of market devices and practices. This weakens the microfoundations of its analysis of capitalist macro-dynamics and cedes unnecessarily large stretches of intellectual territory to economics. The performativity approach developed by Michel Callon offers a theoretical way out of this dual dilemma. It allows political economists to study ‘the economy’ directly by investigating the links between the diversity of market devices and the diversity of capitalism. The argument is illustrated by an analysis of the gradual, performative evolution of the investment intermediation market, where the traditional high-cost model of active asset management has been challenged by the emergence of a low-cost alternative in the form of index-tracking investment funds. Highlighting the distributive implications of this development, the current article shows that the financial innovation of exchange-traded funds played a crucial part in the completion of the socio-technical agencement of the ‘passive investor’. In contrast to the recently resurgent notion that the two approaches are incompatible, this article insists that the micro-sociological study of market devices fosters the analytical capacity of political economy by opening up new perspectives on the macro-dynamics of contemporary capitalism. In the case at hand, it brings into sharp relief the contours of the emerging constellation of ‘asset manager capitalism’.     

Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism

Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result—cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary—holds even in the case of ‘strong altruism’, when the benefits of a player’s contribution are reaped by the other participants only.     

Karl Polanyi on economy and society: a critical analysis of core concepts

The Review of Social Economy was founded to highlight the irreducible social aspects of economic activity. Yet, the nature of the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ are both unresolved, and they are much more problematic than often assumed. This article probes Karl Polanyi’s depiction of the relationship between the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ and subsequent discourse on ‘embeddedness’. In his Great Transformation (1944) Polanyi associated the ‘economic’ with motives of material gain, while ‘social’ referred to norms of reciprocity and redistribution: his distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ then focused primarily on different kinds of motivation. But in a 1957 essay he brought in different kinds of institutions that engender different types of motivation. Polanyi (1944) argued that after 1800 Britain was transformed into a market-oriented ‘economic’ system, based on motives of greed and material gain. He also proposed that an effective market system had to be ‘self-adjusting’ and free of political interference, despite his important additional claim that the state was involved in its creation. Some of Polanyi’s core concepts and arguments are contradictory and problematic, and need to be reconsidered, especially if his enduring insights are to be salvaged.     

Foucault on the Marginal Revolution in Economics: Language and the Cartesian Legacy

Scholars have long debated the ‘revolutionary’ character of the ‘Marginal Revolution’ in economics, focusing on theoretical foundations, methodological devices, social context and political aspects. This article offers a new perspective by investigating ontological and epistemological conditions of that intellectual movement. This requires, in turn, a characterization of those conditions, for which purpose we will draw on Foucault's configurations of thought into ‘epistemes’ in The Order of Things. Although not mentioning those conditions, there have been few references in economics to Foucault's approach. They have mainly claimed that he neglected its importance because he did not see it as a ‘revolution’ in The Order of Things. It is argued here that he actually considered it a ‘revolution’ in The Archaeology of Knowledge. A revision of Foucault's account provides some ideas regarding deep philosophical conditions of the emergence of neoclassical theory and defies some usual interpretations of the circumstances that led to the mathematization of economics. The main conclusion is that its revolutionary character did not stem from a change of ontological beliefs, but—just as many historians of economics have defended—it was a methodological revolution. This study suggests a reinterpretation of that event, claiming that it resulted from a new conception of language and a crisis of Descartes's project of a mathematical unifying science. Going beyond that debate, these reflections proffer ideas that deserve an appraisal in economics.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

Marx,Sraffa, and Surplus: Observations Prompted by Garegnani (2018)

ABSTRACT

In a posthumously published article, Pierangelo Garegnani (2018. ‘On the Labour Theory of Value in Marx and in the Marxist Tradition.’) depicts Marx’s project in Capital as that of ‘developing systematically the theory of Ricardo and [the] implications of social conflict’ implied by Ricardo’s ‘surplus approach to value and distribution’. This paper argues to the contrary that Marx’s theory of surplus value and exploitation differs from (neo-)Ricardian surplus theory in fundamental ways, and modifies Garegnani’s simple Sraffian model to illustrate the distinctive implications of Marx’s theory.     

Collectively accepted social norms and performativity: the pursuit of normativity of globalization in economic institutions

ABSTRACT

Although the philosophical literature on social institutions has been insightful for social scientific studies, the application of its core concepts, such as collective intentionality, to real institutional dynamics remains challenging. One factor contributing to this situation is insufficient work that identifies collectively accepted social norms and shows how they constitute social institutions. Relying on the perspectives of John Searle and Raimo Tuomela, this study integrates recent analyses of the concept of performativity with discourse analysis. It presents an analytic framework, drawing on the concept of nominalization, to identify collectively accepted social norms that performatively constitute social institutions. Finally, it illustrates the identification of collectively accepted ‘globalization’ that performatively constitutes and shapes economic institutions engaged in corporate financial reporting. This study contributes to closing the gap between philosophical analyses of social institutions and social scientific studies by highlighting the performance of nominalized collectively accepted social norms.     

Social dilemmas,time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’ resource game may induce several ‘subjective’ games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique ‘subjective’ game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payoffs. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A sufficient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is sufficiently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.     

The sceptic as an economist's philosopher? Humean utility as a positive principle

Whereas in philosophy David Hume was long regarded as a negative thinker to be criticized rather than read, many thinkers interested in social and economic theory from Adam Smith onwards found key concepts, distinctions and problems as developed by Hume useful and inspiring. This applies not only to his seminal contributions to technical problems in economics. It is argued that the way in which Hume employed ‘utility as a positive principle’ (most notably in his ‘experimental’ moral theory) is of pivotal importance in this context. It allows for:

a. distinguishing between internal motifs and external circumstances and constraints; and for

b. making explicit the abstract logic of social interaction structures, mechanisms and processes.

Both are necessary conditions for employing the logic of social situations and mechanisms in the explanation of social institutions and economic processes. It moreover prepares the ground for the use of simplified or cartoon-like models of individual agency in economic and social theory, but also for its critique. On this basis, Hume's influence on various strands of social and economic thought, but also the specific differences with regard to more ‘rationalistic’ approaches (such as Hobbesianism or important versions of neoclassical economics) can be assessed more clearly.     

Social welfare for an economy of angelic agents

This paper analyzes an economy in which all agents are pursuing the common good (or social welfare) but choices are decentralized, i.e., each agent can choose his/her action in the set of the actions that he/she can perform. One wonders if it is enough the common goal of maximizing social welfare to their will be achieved. The paper examines both the cases in which the choice made by each agent does not directly influence those of other agents, as in the competitive equilibrium analysis, and the case in which there is a direct influence, as in the game theory analyses. In the first case, we get that the common goal of maximizing social welfare is not enough to reach it, but it is necessary to coordinate the actions of individual agents by extending information to redistribute initial endowments and by introducing an appropriate social organization. We get the maximum social welfare without further intervention for the cases describable with the theory of games, but only for games of complete information. If the information is incomplete, some further coordination is generally required.     

Economics of Social Capital*

The literature on the idea of ‘social capital’ is now enormous. Offering an alternative to impersonal markets and coercive states, the communitarian institutions built around social capital have looked attractive to scholars in the humanities and social sciences. The literature in consequence has a warm glow to it. In this article, I first study the various contexts in which the promises people make to one another are credible and then suggest that the accumulation of social capital is a possible route to creating such a context. I offer a tight definition of social capital – namely, interpersonal networks – so as not to prejudge its ability to enhance human well-being. The links between the microfoundations of social capital and the macroeconomic performance of economies are then studied. I also show that economic theory not only identifies circumstances in which communitarian institutions can function well, but that it also uncovers a dark side, namely, their capicity to permit one group to exploit another within long-term relationships.     

Value,sign, and social structure: the ‘game’ metaphor and modern social science

This exploratory paper, part of continued work on the history of game theory, seeks to illustrate certain links between von Neumann's theory of games and contemporaneous ideas in other fields. In particular, we claim that the emergence of the analytical metaphor of the ‘game’ in economics can be viewed as part of a general reconceptualization of theory in a range of disciplines. That methodological reconstitution may be described as the emergence of a Structuralist view, an approach to theorizing which treated its object – be that a text, a kinship arrangement, or an economy – as a self-contained system, with its own internal logic, subject to its own ‘laws’. In particular, individual texts, or observed social and economic arrangements, are now viewed as variations on an underlying logical theme, on a structural invariant. The latter is to be uncovered, in the case of linguistics, through the analysis of phonemes; in kinship analysis, through the rules governing the exchange of women because of the incest taboo; in von Neumann and Morgensterns game theory, through the possibilities for equilibrium coalition formation, based on the stable set. There thus emerged a tendency, across the intellectual spectrum, towards seeing things in combinatorialterms. Theoretical coherence was to be found in examining how objects ‘held together’ rather than analysing where they ‘came from’: nineteenth-century concerns with history, evolution and individual psychology give way to a distinctly modern emphasis on synchronic, formal structure, on analogical reasoning. Atomism gave way to holism, and formal elegance superceded immediate empirical content. Recourse to the metaphor of the ‘game’ was constitutive of this shift, which we examine by referring to Saussures General Course in Linguistics, to Formalism in mathematics and literary analysis, to Lévi-Strauss's analysis of kinship and myth, and to von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.     

Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations—The anonymous case

This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector of secrets. However, agents would like to free-ride on others' contribution.A mechanism which elicits players' secrets and performs the desired computation defines a game. A mechanism is ‘appropriate’ if it (weakly) implements the social choice function for all secret vectors. namely, if there exists an equilibrium in which it is able to elicit (sufficiently many) agents' secrets and perform the computation, for all possible secret vectors. We show that ‘appropriate’ mechanisms approach agents sequentially and that they have low communication complexity.     

Stabilizing consumer choice: the role of ‘true dynamic stability’ and related concepts in the history of consumer choice theory

Abstract

It is often argued that the inability of Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium theory to produce an adequate proof of the stability of the Walrasian price adjustment mechanism was one of the program's most significant failures. This paper will not question this standard interpretation of the history of general equilibrium theory, but makes the case that characterizing the ‘stability’ question in terms of market stability– in particular the stability of the equilibrium price vector in the Walrasian general equilibrium model – actually helped to stabilize the standard model of consumer choice in general equilibrium theory and elsewhere within microeconomics. The problem of the stability of ‘consumer's equilibrium’ was much discussed early in the twentieth century, and it has recently re-emerged in a different guise as the ‘endowment effects’ and ‘reference dependencies’ of contemporary behavioral economics, and yet it disappeared from mainstream discussion during the period 1950 to 1980. This paper argues that shifting the discussion from the intra-agent stability of the individual consumer to the inter-agent stability of the competitive market contributed – despite its ultimately negative impact on general equilibrium theory – to the long period of stable normal science consumer choice theory enjoyed during the middle of the twentieth century.     

Neoclassical vs evolutionary theories of financial constraints: Critique and prospectus

Empirical models based on neoclassical theory predict that if investment is sensitive to current financial performance, this is a sign that something is ‘wrong’ and is to be regarded as a problem worthy of a policy intervention. Evolutionary theory, however, refers to the principle of ‘growth of the fitter’ to interpret investment-cash flow sensitivities as the workings of a healthy economy. In particular, I attack the neoclassical assumption of rational profit-maximizing firms. Such an assumption is not a helpful starting point for empirical studies into firm growth. One caricature of neoclassical theory could be “Assume firms are perfectly efficient. Why aren’t they getting enough funding?”, whereas evolutionary theory considers that firms are heterogeneous and that not all firms should grow. This essay highlights how interpretations and policy interventions can be framed by the initial modelling assumptions, even though these latter are often chosen with analytical tractability in mind rather than realism.     

Enrico Barone's ‘Ministry of Production’: Content and Context

Abstract

Enrico Barone's famous article on economic planning, ‘Il Ministro della Produzione nello Stato Collettivista’ (‘The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State’), which showed the theoretical possibility of an economically efficient collectivist planned economy, was published in Giornale degli Economisti in 1908. Barone's article has been widely cited, particularly in the comparative economic systems literature, but it has not been very widely read or analysed in recent years, and there is not much literature that places Barone's ‘Ministry’ model in the context of his other works or in its historical, social, or ideological context. The aims of this article are: (a) to analyse and clarify Barone's model in depth; (b) to place it in the context of Barone's other writings and the literature on the subject; and (c) to examine the apparent contradiction between Barone's hostility to socialism and his attempt to formulate the pure theory of the collectivist economy.