规制政策不确定性对电网投资影响的实物期权分析

根据电网规制政策变动的特点.利用实物期权方法分析了规制政策的不确定性对电网投资的影响.模型及算例结果表明,在政策确定的情形下,规制机构的成本补偿政策能够促进电网企业投资,而补偿政策变动的不确定性则会提高投资的临界值.并且,随着补偿政策变动概率与价格(或者企业利润)的相关系数的提高,投资临界值也将提高.     

规制分权化、组织合谋与制度效率--基于中国电力行业的实证研究

产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派，研究结果均表明，规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率．降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题，并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验．结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应，即规制低效率。因此，规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率．而解决问题的关键是机制设计。     

保障性住房价格成本信息披露的博弈分析

信息不对称严重影响了政府对企业关于保障性住房价格的规制。纠正双方的信息不对称是政府确定合理的保障性住房价格的前提。基于委托代理理论,分析了政府与企业就成本信息披露的完全信息静态博弈,得出了混合策略下的纳什均衡。针对企业披露信息的真实程度,采用演化博弈分析的方法,分析了政府和企业的群体演化过程,在此基础上提出了政府监督企业信息披露的政策建议。     

环境规制与雾霾脱钩效应——基于企业投资偏好的视角

本文从企业投资偏好视角,分析了环境规制对工业发展与雾霾污染脱钩的作用机制,在验证不同环境规制能否通过影响企业投资偏好实现雾霾脱钩的基础上,通过门槛回归模型,分析当各种环境规制强度提高时,异质企业投资偏好与雾霾脱钩效应关系的变化情况。结果表明:环境行政管制仅通过企业技术投资偏好的路径实现雾霾脱钩,而环境污染监管和环境经济规制则通过企业技术投资偏好和类金融投资偏好两条路径实现雾霾脱钩。不同环境规制工具对企业投资偏好的雾霾脱钩效应影响不同,其中环境行政管制和环境污染监管强度的提高可增强企业投资偏好的雾霾脱钩效应,但环境经济规制强度的提高反而减弱企业投资偏好的雾霾脱钩效应。相比于总体样本,环境行政管制下大规模企业和地方国有企业技术投资偏好的雾霾脱钩效应较弱,这两类企业发生雾霾脱钩效应的环境污染监管门槛较高,而且在更高门槛下,类金融投资偏好不存在雾霾脱钩效应,表明大规模企业在更高环境经济规制下可能存在脱离实体经济的现象。     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

放松规制后电力企业技术创新与制度激励研究

分析了在放松规制的环境下,电力企业进行技术创新所面临的市场及制度环境,并剖析了造成企业技术创新困境的制度原因。为了激励电力企业进行技术创新,实现企业绩效与社会福利的双赢,本文从促进市场化及加强规制者可信性承诺两方面提出了政策建议。     

数字规制政策、外部性治理与技术创新——基于数字投入与契约不完全的双重视角

数字经济的迅猛发展对企业技术创新带来了变革性影响，然而数字规制政策作为解决数字要素外部性问题的政策工具，是否能够成为创新驱动发展的制度保障，值得探究。本文构建理论模型，分析了数字规制政策的外部性治理与数字转移成本效能，从数字要素投入与中间品契约不完全的双重视角出发，分析其影响企业创新决策的创新效率效应与中间品效应双重驱动机制，提出数字投入与契约依赖的理论假说；然后采用1989—2017年41个国家的跨国跨行业数据，通过构建广义双重差分模型对理论假说进行检验与分析。研究发现：从整体层面看，数字规制政策能够有效推动数字要素的外部性治理，其对技术创新带来的驱动效应有效弥补了数字转移成本所带来的技术创新抑制效应，最终显著促进了各国技术创新水平的提升。从跨国与跨行业双重差异看，数字规制政策能够通过“数字投入”与“契约依赖”的双重机制，破除企业数字要素投入障碍与合同中数据条款的非完全性问题，有效解决数字投入依赖度更高、契约依赖度更高行业的市场不完全问题，从增进创新效率和降低交易成本两个层面提升了技术创新的边际收益，成为驱动这些行业中企业技术创新的关键渠道。本文结论为数字规制政策驱动企业技术创新提供...     

非对称信息条件下静态Cournot模型均衡分析

本文针对目前对Coumot模型讨论和分析的不足，通过引入两个不同企业成本类型的预测概率建立了静态Coumot模型，并分析了其在信息对称和信息不对称条件下的关系以及企业生产成本对均衡产量和均衡利润的影响，从而得出了一些具有现实指导意义的结论。     

油气勘探开发项目投资决策的博弈分析

现行体制下我国油气勘探开发项目的执行者为各个石油公司的子（分）公司。由于项目的执行者具有各自独立的经济利益，因而存在虚报项目评价信息以获取集团公司投资的现象。在项目投资决策高度集中的体制下，在信息不对称的条件下，决策者和执行者之间的关系表现为一种博弈关系。集团公司的决策者和基层企业围绕投资决策形成的均衡一种混合策略的“纳什均衡”，支付矩阵的求解为集团公司政策的制定提供了理论基础。     

构建电网工程资产折旧率优化模型

<正>在考虑输配电价监管期的情况下，年准许收入的核算以及年输配电价的确定对电网公司资产回报率以及盈利能力影响较大。为合理确定新形势下电网企业准许收入水平以及输配电价，需要分析电网工程资产折旧率的影响因素，建立年折旧率动态调整机制，保证监管期年准许收入和输配电价的合理性、可行性和最优化。     

Locational Determinants of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in China

This study examines 2,933 cases of Japanese investment in 27 provinces and regions in China to identify the role that policy determinants had in influencing the sub-national location decision of Japanese firms in China. The empirical results show that the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Opening Coastal Cities (OCCs) were a successful policy instrument initially, as SEZs and OCCs had a strong influence on Japanese foreign investment during the early years of China's liberalized foreign investment environment. Since the mid-1990s SEZs and OCCs have attracted proportionally less foreign investment as competition from other special investment zones has intensified in China. From these observations, we discuss the periodic influence of SEZs and OCCs and introduce and review the influence of newly emerging investment zones. We also draw inferences to the location choice literature in terms of understanding the variable influence of policy factors and traditional locational indicators as driven by temporal changes in investor motivations and preferences in a country.     

Expropriation and control rights: A dynamic model of foreign direct investment

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country. We analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of “creeping expropriation” once his investment is sunk. It is shown that this hold-up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak, and overinvestment if it is too strong. We also analyze the impact of spillover effects, we give a rationale for “tax holidays” and we examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country.     

Heterogeneous Investor Sentiment and Institutional Real Estate Investments

Commercial real estate investors differ in their sentiment due to factors such as market expertise, investment strategies and expectations about future market conditions. Focusing on the office market, we investigate whether investors with a multiasset investment focus such as pension funds or insurance companies rely on the sentiment of specialized real estate investors such as public REITs or private developers/owners as source of information in their investment decision‐making. Using disaggregated sentiment measures and vector autoregression (VAR) we find evidence that changes in REIT and private real estate investor sentiment lead to changes in institutional investor sentiment in the suburban office and office REIT market. Our findings suggest that institutional investors rely on the sentiment of specialized real estate investors to make real estate investment decisions. Our study contributes to the existing literature on sentiment in commercial real estate markets by emphasizing the heterogeneity of investor sentiment and introducing a disaggregated sentiment measure. We also contribute to the institutional herding literature.     

Capital Structure Decisions in Real Estate Investment

This study examines the financing decisions of real estate investors and the choice of capital structure when acquiring income-producing properties. Drawing from the literature in finance and real estate, we develop a capital structure model for real estate investment and derive six hypotheses regarding the relationship of the overall loan-to-value ratio chosen by an investor to selected characteristics of the investment. The hypotheses are then tested using financing data from a sample of apartment and commercial transactions over a fifteen-year period in a specific real estate market. The empirical findings strongly support the importance of depreciation deductions, financial distress costs, capital constraints, tax rates, and interest rates as determinants of the capital structure of real estate investors.     

Comovement After Joining an Index: Spillovers of Nonfundamental Effects

This study considers the case of two overlapping categories in the context of recent category models. Specifically, we examine whether investor sentiment and market frictions specific to one category can affect the returns on assets belonging to the other category. With recent additions of several real estate investment trusts (REITs) into general stock market indices as a natural experiment, we find support for spillovers of such nonfundamental effects, as evidenced by the increased return correlation between REITs that remain outside the index and the index stocks. Further analysis reveals that market frictions play a greater role than investor sentiment.     

Integrating Illiquid Assets into the Portfolio Decision Process

We consider the issues associated with modeling the decision to invest in an illiquid asset, such as real estate, over an extended period of time. Markets for illiquid assets tend to display certain characteristics: for example, significant time‐till‐sale and correlation in the rates of return over time. More importantly, as the liquidity of a market cannot be an issue if an investor never needs to liquidate an asset, we focus on how the liquidity of a market interacts with an individual's uncertain need to liquidate. We show that the optimal strategy is state contingent, if possible. We also show that the penalty associated with an illiquid investment depends on the characteristics of other assets being held in the portfolio, on the characteristics of liquidity shocks and on the interaction between time and behavior. We show that borrowing to pay for a liquidity shock cannot overcome all of the costs of owning an illiquid asset. In contrast, borrowing at t = 0 benefits from the complementarity in the assets. In a simpler model, we show that the portfolio perspective makes illiquid assets more valuable to an investor with a longer time horizon.     

Crypto-assets portfolio optimization under the omega measure

Abstract

Crypto-currencies, or crypto-assets, represent a new class of investment assets. The traditional portfolio analysis approach of Markowitz is not appropriate for use with portfolios containing crypto-assets, as the model requires that the investor have a quadratic utility function or that the returns be normally distributed, which isn’t the case for crypto-assets. We develop a portfolio optimization model based on the Omega measure which is more comprehensive than the Markowitz model, and apply this to four crypto-asset investment portfolios by means of a numerical application. The results indicate that these portfolios should favor traditional market assets over crypto-assets. In the case of portfolios formed only by crypto-assets, there is no clear preference in favor of any crypto-asset in particular.     

我国公用事业运营和监管改革研究

我国公用事业正处于规模扩张和制度变革并举的新阶段。这个阶段公用事业改革核心是处理好非网络环节、网络环节和监管环节之间的关系。在开放竞争、健全监管的基础上推进民营改革。非网络环节引导和推动各类资本进入。加强市场结构评估和监管，着力营造多元投资主体、多家企业相互竞争的格局；网络环节注重发挥政府投资的拉动和引导功能．健全和推行特许经营制度，加强市场行为评估和监管。建立开放条件平等、接入价格合理、设施使用充分的制度；监管环节着力实现政企分离、政监分离，健全中央和地方两级监管机构．科学配置监管权。确保终端用户能够以合理价格取得充分、可靠、满意的公用事业产品和服务。     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

ICT governance: South Africa

Formal ICT governance structures exist although the efficacy of both the regulator and parliamentary oversight committee remain contentious. On the other hand, the Minister of Communications exercises a strong policy oversight that is viewed as not leading to the envisaged growth in competition and investment in the sector. Consumer protection is also weak.