从股权结构到股东关系

近80年来,国内外学者围绕股权结构问题开展了广泛且颇具影响力的研究。其中,对股权结构定性或定量的测度是所有研究开展的基础。本文系统总结了股权结构相关研究的内容、技术路线及对股权结构的刻画方式。分析表明,仅从产权维度和垂直方向认识股权结构及代理问题存在明显的局限和偏差。为此,本文从横向网络以及股东之间多种形式的契约出发,考察股东关系对公司产权分布体系的影响。在股东关系的框架下,我们重构了公司股东的产权、利益和势力结构,并用一套较详细且操作性较强的指标体系对股东关系进行了刻画。本文提出的"关系基础"的股权结构将为深化与拓展股权结构、公司治理和投资者保护等研究提供有益的帮助。     

Information,Ownership Structure,and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals

This paper examines how information and ownership structure affect voting outcomes on shareholder-sponsored proposals to change corporate governance structure. We find that the outcomes of votes vary systematically with the governance and performance records of target firms, the identity of proposal sponsors, and the type of proposal. We also find that outcomes vary significantly as a function of ownership by insiders, institutions, outside blockholders, ESOPs, and outside directors who are blockholders. These results suggest that both public information and ownership structure have a significant influence on voting outcomes.     

Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

中国上市公司股权结构的悖论及其产权关系的特征

国有资产的"产权界定"是基本清晰的,而"一股独大"和"所有者缺位"的描述是不准确的,三者均不能成为我国产权关系的基本特征,也不能成为解释我国国有控股公司内外部治理失效的根本原因。我国国有产权关系的两大重要特征是国有产权泛化和异股同权,国有资产产权的虚拟性是导致这两大特征的深层次原因,并且引发出一系列的产权问题和公司治理问题。     

Shareholder Protection,Ownership, and Dividends: Russian Evidence

This article investigates the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in Russian firms. Using a sample of Russian listed firms over the period 1998–2003, we estimate models for dividend pay probability and payout size. We find that there has been a significant increase in dividend payout levels which coincide with improvements in legal shareholder protection. State controlled firms are more frequent dividend payers as compared to other majority owned firms. We also find that dual share firms, in which corporate charters protect minority interests, have a higher dividend pay probability; while firms reporting according to US GAAP, which may be less likely to manipulate earnings, have a lower dividend payout.     

机构投资者持股、高管激励与大股东掏空抑制

激励和监督是公司治理最基本的重要手段,从这两方面入手探讨机构投资者持股、高管激励对大股东掏空抑制的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股不仅可以抑制大股东掏空行为,还可以增强高管激励的力度;此外,利用中介效应检验模型,还发现机构投资者抑制大股东掏空的路径,即机构投资者主要通过高管激励中介影响大股东掏空行为。研究结论可以丰富公司治理的研究问题,为解决现实中存在的大股东掏空行为提供借鉴。     

投资者法律保护、股权集中度与大股东行为

在不同的法系和国家中,对投资者的法律保护存在很大的差异。作为对投资者法律保护的替代,在投资者法律保护薄弱的国家,股权结构相对集中。为了保护投资者的利益,我国应该完善对投资者的法律保护,提高执法质量和会计质量,促进股权的适度集中,限制控制股东的掠夺行为。     

“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据

本文以我国A股上市公司 2 0 0 0— 2 0 0 3年的关联交易数据为基础 ,对所有权结构与控股股东的掏空 (Tun neling)行为之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明 ,控股股东占用的上市公司资金与第一大股东持股比例之间存在先上升后下降的非线性关系 ,但与其他股东的持股比例则表现出严格的负相关关系。另外 ,控股股东的控制方式以及产权性质也对其资金占用行为具有重要影响。其中 ,通过控股公司控制上市公司的控股股东占用的资金低于通过企业集团控制的上市公司 ,国有企业控制的公司的控股股东占用的资金高于非国有企业控制的上市公司。     

Dual Domestic Listing, Market Structure and Shareholder Wealth

This paper examines the impact of dual domestic listing of common stocks on shareholder wealth. The sample contains 137 AMEX- and NYSE-listed companies that dually listed their common stocks on the Pacific and Midwest Stock Exchanges between 1984 and 1988. Because the sample stocks do not have unlisted trading privileges, dual listing changes the market structure in which the stocks traded. Changes in market structure may affect stock returns through the liquidity services provided by the competing markets and through the possible nonhomogeneous clientele across markets. Using standard event methodology to examine stock market behavior around dual listing shows that the net effect of dual listing on returns is negative. Such negative returns suggest that corporate managers have reasons for dual domestic listing other than increasing shareholder wealth.     

Agency Costs,Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.     

股权结构、股权再融资行为与绩效

我国上市公司一方面在再融资方式的选择上存在着强烈的股权再融资偏好,另一方面却是股权再融资的绩效低下。本文认为我国上市公司特有的股权结构是上市公司过度的股权再融资行为和再融资绩效低下的根本原因,并据此提出了相应的政策建议。     

Capital Structure Swaps and Shareholder Wealth

We show how capital structure swaps can increase the wealth of a firm's long‐term shareholders when a firm's debt or equity is misvalued. We review the conventional rule that a firm should issue equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt (an equity‐for‐debt swap) when equity is overvalued, or repurchase equity with proceeds of new debt (a debt‐for‐equity swap) when equity is undervalued. We also analyse the more complex case where a firm's debt and equity are both undervalued, showing the optimal swap may be to issue undervalued equity, contrary to the conventional rule.     

后股权分置时期大股东行为研究

为了解决我国证券市场股权分置的沉疴,一场结构性改革于2005年春天启动.随着改革的进行,股权分置这一长期困扰我国股市的问题,将得到一次真正意义上的解决.伴随股权分置改革的完成,我国证券市场将进入后股权分置时期,这一崭新时期的到来,无论对非流通股东还是流通股股东都具有划时期的意义.后股权分置时期是一个全流通的时期,股价同样成为大股东所关心的指标,因而股权分置改革使得上市公司大股东的获利方式发生改变,其效用函数也随之改变,从而影响其最大化自身利益的行为模式.     

Ownership Structure,Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It is hypothesized that stockholder controlled banks have incentives to take higher risk than managerially controlled banks and that these differences in risk become more pronounced in periods of deregulation. In support of this hypothesis, we show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks during the 1979–1982 period of relative deregulation.     

Valuation,Capital Structure,and Shareholder Unanimity for Depository Financial Intermediaries

The theory of corporate finance is not directly applicable to financial intermediary decision-making. The lack of applicability stems largely from the particular conditions that distinguish intermediary operations from those of the nonfinancial firm. First, when intermediaries accept deposit financing, they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at considerable expense for real resources. Second, the introduction of intermediation is likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not in general valid. In this paper, a model with incomplete markets is developed and a shareholder approved rule for intermediary capital structure decisions is derived.     

公司特征、股权结构与股票流动性

股票流动性是金融市场微观结构的核心议题,其影响因素问题受到了人们的广泛关注。然而,以往的研究存在两个方面的重要缺陷:一是多数研究仅关注了股权结构对股票流动性的影响,而忽略了公司特征因素的作用;二是以往股权结构视角的研究由于存在研究设计上的问题,使得实证结论的可靠性不高。本文使用2003-2009年沪深两市仅发行了A股的上市公司为样本,采用高频交易数据构造买卖价差以衡量股票流动性,考察了公司特征、股权结构与股票流动性之间的关系,以及股权分置改革对这一关系的影响,得到了与以往研究不同的实证结论。针对这些结论,本文给出了符合我国制度背景的理论阐释。     

董事会结构、股权结构与中小企业绩效

以中小企业板2004～2009年数据为基础,分析了中小上市企业董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明,中小上市企业的董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的内生性特征不显著。董事会规模对Tobin’Q具有负向影响,对总资产收益率无显著影响。CEO双重性对Tobin’Q和总资产收益率分别具有负向影响和正向影响。董事会独立性对总资产收益率具有负向影响,对Tobin’Q无显著影响,表明独立董事在中小上市企业中并未起到有效的监督作用。Tobin’Q和股权集中度之间呈现显著的倒W形关系,但总资产收益率和股权集中度之间无显著相关性。Tobin’Q和总资产收益率与管理层持股之间均呈现显著的N形关系。     

股权结构、行业竞争性与企业价值

股权结构根本反应了公司治理结构,在很大程度上影响着企业价值的实现.以市净率作为被解释变量,以股权结构为解释变量,利用平行数据模型解释他们之间的相关关系,并对竞争性相异的不同行业进行对比分析,从而说明行业竞争性在此发挥的重要作用.最后得到的结论是,不同性质的股权对于企业价值的作用方向存在明显差别,少数大股东相互制衡的股权结构对企业价值的提升更为有利.     

公司特征、股权结构与现金持有量

在中国特定的制度和治理背景下探讨企业特征与股权结构对企业现金持有量的影响,并从静态和动态两个角度进行实证研究的结果表明,虽然静态实证结果显示权衡理论、代理理论和融资优序理论都能一定程度上解释中国企业的现金持有行为,但动态实证结果显示中国上市公司的现金持有量具有动态的均值复归趋势。这符合权衡理论和代理理论的预期,但不符合融资优序理论预期。