简析当代中国人口性别结构的比例失调现象

本文通过对当代中国人口性别结构的比例失衡现象进行描述和分析,结合我国的特色,深入探讨了产生中国性别结构比例失调现象的原因,此现象对社会产生的影响,以及解决中国人口性别结构比例失调现象的对策和方法。旨在通过研究,找到一条能够有效解决当今我国面临的人口性别结构的比例失衡问题的方法,推进我国人口的可持续发展。     

基于非均衡增长模型的经济效应分析

文章立足于我国二元经济结构的现状,利用二元经济非均衡增长模型,对我国二元经济结构的增长效应进行了实证分析,发现我国经济增长的非均衡现象极为显著,最后针对这一现象提出解决我国二元经济均衡发展的政策和建议。     

市场营销失误与民营企业流星现象

民营企业做为我国国民经济中的重要组成部分,民营企业的发展对我国刺激民间投资,拉动国内消费有着重要的作用。然而我国的民营企业大部分都存在生命周期短的现象即流星现象,文章从民营企业市场营销产生的问题方面解释了民营企业的流星现象并提出了解决对策     

知识失业的成因、影响及对策研究

知识失业是指受过高等教育的知识劳动者处于不得其用的状态,近年来我国知识失业现象开始出现并受到广泛关注。本文研究了我国出现知识失业现象的原因和负面影响,提出了减少知识失业的对策建议。     

我国上市公司利润操纵的方式与治理对策

随着我国股票和证券市场的快速发展,我国上市公司利润操纵的会计造假现象屡禁不止。我国上市公司往往利用各种利润操纵的方式来试图实现自身的各项目的,这样不仅损害了国家和社会公众的利益,还严重扰乱了我国股票和证券市场的运营秩序。文章将针对目前我国上市公司利润操纵的方式来探讨有效治理上市公司利润操纵现象的对策建议。     

我国上市公司“债务担保链”的博弈分析

当前,“债务担保链“现象在我国上市公司中已十分普遍,并不同程度地给上市公司造成了一定的危害,从“啤酒花事件“我们便可略见一斑。为何“债务担保链“现象在我国证券市场上愈演愈烈呢?为了探究其存在的原因及改变其现状的对策,本文通过创建博弈模型分析了我国上市公司的“债务担保链“现象。     

从垄断市场到竞争市场:深刻的社会变革

随着我国市场化进程的不断演进 ,反垄断已成为改革的一大焦点。文章从中国经济反垄断的背景、当前我国垄断现象的主要表现形式、行政垄断的特点及成因等 ,对垄断现象进行了剖析 ,并提出了反垄断改革的方向。     

我国中小企业利润操纵及治理的博弈模型分析

近年来,我国中小企业利润操纵的现象日益普遍,致使企业资产不实、利润虚增或虚减、所有者权益不实等现象,既影响了国家的宏观经济决策,也给投资者带来了严重损失。文章以此背景进行了探讨,剖析了我国中小企业利润操纵和利益相关者中显著相关的税务部门进行动态博弈分析,探究规范我国中小企业利润操纵行为的途径,对完善我国中小企业利润操纵的治理提出了最终的建议。     

对义务教育阶段“择校”现象中教育公平的透视

我国义务教育阶段实行免试就近入学政策。但由于目前教育资源分布不均衡,以及人们对优质教育的追求等原因,出现了择校现象。择校现象在我国目前的教育条件下有其客观现实性和不可避免性,并且在一定程度上体现了多元教育公平。     

思想政治教育功能淡化的原因及应对措施

思想政治教育在我国的革命和建设中发挥了重大作用。但目前在我国思想政治教育实践中 ,还存在许多思想政治教育功能淡化的现象 ,文章针对这些现象及其原因进行分析 ,提出解决的应对措施。     

基于产业集群的中小企业政策集群

在产业集群形成和发展的不同的阶段上，产业集群主体——企业通常会提出不同的政策需求，它的政策密度和广博性也有很大的差别。由于体制、制度和文化的原因，我国的政策供给存在明显的不足，表现为政策供给主体缺位、政策协调性差、集群文化薄弱等。因此为了促进产业集群的快速发展必须搭建一整套有利于企业集群发展的环境优化平台、信息服务平台、监控平台。     

基于文献量化分析的中国创业政策差异研究——以北京，上海，重庆为例

政府制定合理的创业政策对于创业活动的开展具有重要意义。对中央政府和北京、上海、重庆三市地方政府1994年-2017年间颁布的创业政策进行整理分析,采用政策计量和内容分析方法,对政策文本内外部特征进行分析,描绘中央政府与地方政府、地方政府之间创业政策的差异,进而总结了政策差异与创业发展实践的关系。研究发现：中国创业政策发文时间的初始颁布年份和密集颁布年份存在差异;政策发文单位的层级和部门存在差异;政策工具使用的目标、重点、思路和时间存在差异;不同地区创业政策导向的差异影响了地区创业活动的开展。     

Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

What can Indonesia learn from China's industrial energy saving programs?

Even though Indonesia's CO₂ emissions are dominated by deforestation while China's are dominated by industry, Indonesia has much to learn from China's industrial energy saving programs. To begin with, it is only a matter of time before Indonesia's emissions from fossil fuels overtake those from deforestation. Given the long technological lock-in effects of energy systems and industries, Indonesia needs to think now about how it will tackle this problem. There are other reasons for believing that Indonesia might learn something from China – the CO₂ intensities of GDP, of industry and of cement production have been rising in Indonesia, while they are falling in China. China's better intensity performance is due to policies that Indonesia would do well to follow – adopting a technological catch-up industrial development strategy; raising energy prices to scarcity values; liberalising domestic markets and opening the economy to trade and investment; and mounting a massive energy saving program.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve

In this paper we apply a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel to a monetary union (see Bofinger et al., J Econ Educ, 37:98–117 (2006), Walsh, J Econ Educ, 33:333–346 (2002)). We show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a high degree of integration in product markets is advantageous for the ECB as it prevents national interest rates from driving a wedge between macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In particular small countries are in need for fiscal policy as an independent stabilization agent with room to breath.

A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy

In a simple three-stage model of an international Cournot duopoly, optimal strategic trade policy is shown to be time inconsistent. If the domestic government first announces a production subsidy, firms then irrevocably commit resources to R&D, and finally play their output game, there is an incentive for the government to revise its ex ante optimal policy once R&D decisions have been made. If private agents anticipate this revision and if the government does not have the power to commit itself to the ex ante optimal policy, a credibility constraint has to be imposed.     

Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU

We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic stabilisation policies and policy games usually neglects this point and reaches overoptimistic conclusions about the desirable effects of accommodating fiscal policies. Central bank preferences also affect the desirability of fiscal coordination in a monetary union. In fact, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), we find that fiscal coordination improves outcomes in the case of a conservative central banker, whereas it leads to worse outcomes with a populist one.

Optimal Taxes and Tariffs with Private Information

The implications of private information regarding a worker’s skills for optimal tax policy in an open economy are explored. Two cases are considered. In one general skills are private information and in the other sector-specific skills are private information. It is shown that for a small open economy tariffs and other equivalent trade distortions are not part of the optimal tax policy in either case. In both cases the optimal policy distorts the labor–leisure choice but only in the case of sector-specific skills as private information are labor allocation decisions distorted. For a large country, distortions that are equivalent to the standard optimal tariff formula characterize the optimal tax policy.

Non-Keynesian Fiscal Adjustments? A Close Look at Expansionary Fiscal Consolidations in the EU

This paper analyses the characteristics of episodes of fiscal consolidation in the EU exhibiting non-Keynesian features, i.e., followed by an improved growth performance. Roughly half of the episodes of fiscal consolidations that have been undertaken in the EU in the last 30 years have been followed by higher growth. Probit regressions indicate that the consolidations that turned out to be expansionary were more likely started in periods with output below potential and based on expenditure cuts rather than on tax increases. These results appear quite robust with respect to the criteria used to identify the consolidation episodes and to classify such episodes as expansionary.

House Prices and the Stance of Monetary Policy: The Case of Korea

Abstract

This paper is an empirical investigation on whether the Bank of Korea should respond to the housing price developments in conducting monetary policy. For that aim, we construct a small scale empirical model of the Korean economy, simulate the estimated model with a set of alternative monetary policy rules, and compare the stabilization performances of those rules. There turns out to be ample room for further stabilization of inflation and output, if the central bank shifts from the historically conducted monetary policy rule to the optimal rule. The stabilization gains under the optimal rule, however, are not attributable to additional policy indicators (such as housing price inflation) the optimal rule involves. Rather, the optimal rule improves upon the historical one because the former takes a quite different reaction scheme toward the historical policy indicators. Moreover, as long as the Bank of Korea maintains appropriate reactions to the historical policy indicators, housing price inflation does not contain much extra information for further stabilization