外商直接投资与安徽经济增长关系的实证分析

通过运用协整检验和格兰杰因果检验对外商直接投资与安徽经济增长之间的关系进行实证分析,结果表明:外商直接投资流入对促进安徽经济增长有促进作用,但安徽经济增长对吸引外商直接投资的作用是不显著的.安徽应积极采取相应措施,改善投资环境,吸引更多的外商直接投资.     

集聚经济对我国吸引FDI的影响

在经济全球化不断深化的过程中,集聚经济已逐步成为外商直接投资区位选择的重要影响因素.本文运用Panel Data模型进行对比分析,最终发现,提升一个地区吸引外商直接投资的能力很大程度上取决于该地区的集聚经济环境.我国需要全面致力于集聚经济的发展,积累集聚经济优势,在维持东部地区的引资优势的同时,更要发展西部的引资优势,使其成为我国吸引外资的一个新的增长点.     

Foreign Direct Investment and the Unionization Rate

Technological innovations improve the welfare of a country facing fixed terms of trade, but may lead to immiserization when the terms of terms of trade are adversely affected. This paper establishes that transport innovation can be immiserizing for a small country when the transport sector exhibits variable returns to scale. The release of resources from the transport sector triggers Rybczynski-like effects, and the resulting expansion (contraction) in the volume of trade and in the demand for transport services raises unit costs of these services, and may reduce welfare in the presence of decreasing (increasing) returns to scale. [411]     

外商直接投资对新疆区域经济的影响及对策

进入十一五时期,我国吸引外商直接投资的规模继续扩大,利用外资的质量不断提高,引资政策也有了明显的转变。国家大力引导外资投向新兴产业及西部欠发达地区。在新形势下,新疆必须结合自身特点,建立有别于其他地区的具有新疆特色的引资发展战略。本文对过去新疆利用外商直接投资(FDI)的相关数据进行对比分析,总结了新疆利用外商直接投资的发展趋势及存在的主要问题,根据新疆经济发展的特点,提出了具有新疆特色的引资发展战略。     

外商直接投资对我国区域经济失衡的影响

随着我国改革开放带来的经济高速发展,吸引了愈来愈多的外商对华直接投资,但在投资的地区分布上呈现出明显的不均衡状况,很大程度上导致了我国区域经济失衡。针对外商直接投资在华分布不均问题展开讨论,详细分析了由于外商直接投资造成的我国区域经济失衡的原因、现状,并提出了相应的改善措施与途径。     

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the growing interest in capital and technology issues, certain issues still remain to be explored regarding the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation and the corporation's consequent choice of investment location. This paper addresses some of these concerns by analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation, both theoretically and empirically. For this purpose, the paper integrates a number of traditional and nontraditional variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm. The theoretical model implies that both traditional as well as nontraditional factors matter in determining the flows of foreign direct investment in a country. The generalized investment theory on US foreign direct investment then is tested empirically utilizing panel data for 44 countries from 1983 to 1990. The estimation results provide considerable support for the importance of both traditional and nontraditional factors in determining flows of foreign direct investment in a country. Furthermore, the country-specific dummies show high level of significance, reflecting the importance of the country-specific characteristics in explaining flows of foreign direct investment.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer Under Uncertainty in a Liberalizing Host Economy

This paper tackles the issue of investment and optimal ‘choice’ of market structure for a foreign multinational enterprise (MNE) in a newly liberalized economy under uncertainty and in the presence of sunk costs. A minimalist duopolistic model is developed whereby a foreign investor's subjective belief about the probability distribution of policy uncertainty is endogenized as a function of the aggregate output in the tradable goods sector. The main propositions derived from the model are consistent with some unconventional empirical findings in the literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), technology transfer to and crowding out of domestic firms in LDEs.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

外商直接投资与金融创新

改革开放20多年以为，中国与世界经济一体化迅速加快，而外商直接投资已经成为中国经济快速增长的关键因素之一。外商直接投资促进了所有制结构多元化的变迁，对中国经济制度的市场化变革提供了持续的推动力。虽然我国金融市场化改革取得了很大成就，但是金融结构和金融制度安排并没有发生实质性的变化。随着中国加入WTO，外商直接投资的深度与广度将得到很大发展，这将推动我国金融结构的金融制度安排和创新。     

外商直接投资与国家自主创新

本文将FDI(外商直接投资)和LICENSIING(技术许可)作为其潜在的渠道,建立了技术引进的模型.此模型的一个重要特征是模型中的主要假设,模型的结论以及模型的政策意义都与实际经验的观察相一致.对于包括中国在内的发展中国家(LDC)而言,技术许可比外商直接投资所带来的技术外溢更有效,在考虑制定何种政策以达到社会福利的最优化时,人力资本的水平起到了决定性的作用.     

Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital's control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all.     

Labor Training and Foreign Direct Investment

Evidence shows that most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developed to developed countries (North–North) in skilled labor‐intensive industries. This paper builds a model that incorporates labor training into the proximity–concentration tradeoffs to analyze the entry mode of multinationals to a foreign country. Production requires both skilled labor and unskilled labor.. A multinational pursuing FDI needs to provide training to some workers in the host country to equip them with skills that are specific to the production of the firm. Labor training and skill specificity lead to contract friction. It is shown that in skilled labor‐intensive industries, FDI increases along with the economic development level of the host country, whereas in unskilled labor‐intensive industries, the reverse is true. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings on the prevalence of North–North FDI in skilled labor‐industries and North–South FDI in unskilled labor‐intensive industries.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

外商直接投资对我国区域经济非均衡增长影响研究

改革开放以来,我国区域经济在发展过程中呈现出不均衡发展特征。这种不均衡发展格局与外商直接投资(FDI)分布的不平衡密切相关。文章利用相关数据,对外商直接投资对我国区域经济增长的影响进行分析。结果表明,由多种因素造成我国不均衡分布的外商直接投资是造成我国东西部地区经济发展不平衡的重要原因。     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment

During the last decade the extent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US has increased dramatically. An important aspect of industries where most FDI takes place is their high level of concentration. This paper investigates how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, it focuses on the foreign firms' choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in the host country when facing competition from a domestic oligopoly. The empirical investigation reveals that the relationship between FDI and tariffs is not as simple as previously thought. In highly concentrated industries, where strategic behavior may play an important role, high tariffs rather than low tariffs may lead to less FDI and more imports.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.