The surprising economics of a "people business"

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs-that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business-or a company that includes one or more of them how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous people-oriented metrics-for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. Once you have assessed the business's true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).     

A new mandate for human resources

Should we do away with HR? In recent years, a number of people who study and write about business--along with many who run businesses--have been debating that question. The debate arises out of serious and widespread doubts about HR's contribution to organizational performance. Dave Ulrich acknowledges that HR, as it is configured today in many companies, is indeed ineffective, incompetent, and costly. But he contends that it has never been more necessary. The solution, he believes, is to create an entirely new role for the field that focuses it not on traditional HR activities, such as staffing and compensation, but on business results that enrich the company's value to customers, investors, and employees. Ulrich elaborates on four broad tasks for HR that would allow it to help deliver organizational excellence. First, HR should become a partner in strategy execution. Second, it should become an expert in the way work is organized and executed. Third, it should become a champion for employees. And fourth, it should become an agent of continual change. Fulfilling this agenda would mean that every one of HR's activities would in some concrete way help a company better serve its customers or otherwise increase shareholder value. Can HR transform itself on its own? Certainly not--in fact, the primary responsibility for transforming the role of HR, Ulrich says, belongs to the CEO and to every line manager who works with the HR staff. Competitive success is a function of organizational excellence, and senior managers must hold HR accountable for delivering it.     

Employee motivation: a powerful new model

Motivating employees begins with recognizing that to do their best work, people must be in an environment that meets their basic emotional drives to acquire, bond, comprehend, and defend. So say Nohria and Groysberg, of Harvard Business School, and Lee, of the Center for Research on Corporate Performance. Using the results of surveys they conducted with employees at a wide range of Fortune 500 and other companies, they developed a model for how to increase workplace motivation dramatically. The authors identify the organizational levers that companies and frontline managers have at their disposal as they try to meet workers' deep needs. Reward systems that truly value good performance fulfill the drive to acquire. The drive to bond is best met by a culture that promotes collaboration and openness. Jobs that are designed to be meaningful and challenging meet the need to comprehend. Processes for performance management and resource allocation that are fair, trustworthy, and transparent address the drive to defend. Equipped with real-world company examples, the authors articulate how to apply these levers in productive ways. That application should not be selective, they argue, because a holistic approach gets you more than a piecemeal one. By using all four levers simultaneously, and thereby tackling all four drives, organizations can improve motivation levels by leaps and bounds. For example, a company that falls in the 50th percentile on employee motivation improves only to the 56th by boosting performance on one drive, but way up to the 88th percentile by doing better on all four drives. That's a powerful gain in competitive advantage that any business would relish.     

Are leaders portable?

Does management talent transfer from one company to another? The market certainly seems to think so. Stock prices spike when companies announce new CEOs from a talent generator like General Electric. But how do these executives perform over the long term? The authors studied the careers of 20 former GE executives who went on to lead other major organizations, with strikingly uneven results. Even the best management talent, the authors found, is transferable only if it maps to the challenges of the new environment. More specifically, the authors identified five types of skills that may or may not transfer to a new job: general management human capital, or the skills to gather, cultivate, and deploy financial, technical, and human resources; strategic human capital, or individuals' expertise in cost cutting, growth, or cyclical markets; industry human capital, meaning the technical and regulatory knowledge unique to an industry; relationship human capital, or the extent to which a manager's effectiveness can be attributed to his or her experience working with colleagues or as part of a team; and company-specific human capital, or the knowledge about routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal structures, and systems and processes that are unique to a company. The GE executives' performance as CEOs depended on whether their new organizations were able to leverage each type of skill. The authors'findings challenge the conventional wisdom on human capital, which holds that there are two types of skill: general management, which is readily transferable, and company specific, which is not. In fact, they argue, other types of management capabilities can make a significant contribution to performance, and company-specific skills can be an asset in a new job.     

Interrelación de la cultura,flexibilidad laboral,alineación estratégica,innovación y rendimiento empresarial

The objectives of this research are to understand the relationships between the organizational practices related to alignment strategies (AE), organizational culture (CO), innovation initiatives (INN), and flexible labor practices (PFL), with the perceived firm's performance from the worker's perspective. To achieve these goals, we use a quantitative analysis with a sample of 98 people working on a firm with more than 500 employees. We define firm's performance using five alternative definitions: Creativity and initiatives (IC), goals achieved (OA), workers’ satisfaction (ST), fast workers’ advance (EO), and resources’ efficient use (AR). Preliminary results indicate that CO and AE positively affect firm's performance under the five alternative definitions used. However, INN and PFL have asymmetric effects in firm's performance, which are sensitive to the firm's performance definition used. Particularly, firms face a tradeoff between performance objectives selection and the organizational flexible processes they pursue. In summary, innovation processes and flexible labor practices work in opposite directions in pursuing the firm's goals achievement, and consequently do not lead to the development of a unidirectional development of a sustainable competitive advantage.     

The Empirical Average Cost of Capital: A New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Corporate Funds

The authors develop a new way to measure the cost of capital, called the empirical average cost of capital (or “EACC”), which is consistent with existing methods of calculating the weighted average cost of capital, but uses information from the firm's financial statements and requires fewer and less subjective inputs. The authors’ model relies on the concept of economic profit while using data from the period 1990‐2012 on net operating profits and total capital to estimate the EACC at both the individual company and industry‐wide levels. Estimates of the EACC and rolling quarterly forecasts of future net operating profits for a single company, McDonald's, for its related industry, and for 57 other U.S. industries are compared to five conventional “textbook” estimates of the weighted average cost of capital published by Ibbotson Associates. The authors find that the EACC yields forecasts of future net operating profit after taxes that compare favorably to those of the five published measures of the weighted average cost of capital, as well as the average and median of these measures.     

How to Create Value Without Earnings: The Case of Amazon

Investors and commentators often equate GAAP accounting metrics, especially earnings per share, with financial success. The reality, however, is that there is no simple, linear relationship between GAAP earnings and intrinsic value, which is defined as the present value of expected future cash flows. And adjustments of GAAP metrics, though admittedly subjective, are often required to understand the economic reality of a business. http://Amazon.com Inc. provides a case study that throws into sharp relief the need to look beyond GAAP in order to analyze underlying fundamentals and value. In this paper, the authors argue that Amazon has done a superb job of building shareholder wealth, all the while reporting low and declining operating and net income margins. The article provides a framework for thinking about Amazon's underlying profitability that is based on the concept of return on capital in relation to the cost of capital, and shows how that profitability has been masked by GAAP accounting. The authors demonstrate that the company is now investing very large amounts of capital with the expectation of earning rates of return well above its cost of capital. And their analysis suggests that if such investment can continue over the long term, Amazon's current market value of $140 billion can be readily justified.     

Factors influencing the role of management accounting in the development of performance measures within organizational change programs

Many companies are undergoing organizational changes encompassing innovative approaches to organizing production processes, restructuring work practices and developing new planning and control mechanisms. This paper explores the role that management accounting played in the development of performance measurement systems within five organizations implementing change programs. The major case study is of a large manufacturing firm undertaking changes which included the development of team structures, the adoption of a customer-focused strategy and the implementation of new performance measurement systems. In this company, a lack of integration of operational performance measures with strategic priorities contributed to poor integration of team activities with overall strategy. The paper proposes five interrelated factors that may help explain the extent to which management accountants contribute to the development of integrated performance measures and change programs. Case evidence drawn from a further four firms is presented to provide some validation of conclusions drawn from the primary case study.     

Four Things No One Will Tell You About ESG Data

As the ESG finance field and the use of ESG data in investment decision‐making continue to grow, the authors seek to shed light on several important aspects of ESG measurement and data. This article is intended to provide a useful guide for the rapidly rising number of people entering the field. The authors focus on the following:

1. The sheer variety, and inconsistency, of the data and measures, and of how companies report them. Listing more than 20 different ways companies report their employee health and safety data, the authors show how such inconsistencies lead to significantly different results when looking at the same group of companies.
2. ‘Benchmarking,’ or how data providers define companies' peer groups, can be crucial in determining the performance ranking of a company. The lack of transparency among data providers about peer group components and observed ranges for ESG metrics creates market‐wide inconsistencies and undermines their reliability.
3. The differences in the imputation methods used by ESG researchers and analysts to deal with vast ‘data gaps’ that span ranges of companies and time periods for different ESG metrics can cause large ‘disagreements’ among the providers, with different gap‐filling approaches leading to big discrepancies.
4. The disagreements among ESG data providers are not only large, but actually increase with the quantity of publicly available information. Citing a recent study showing that companies that provide more ESG disclosure tend to have more variation in their ESG ratings, the authors interpret this finding as clear evidence of the need for ‘a clearer understanding of what different ESG metrics might tell us and how they might best be institutionalized for assessing corporate performance.’

What can be done to address these problems with ESG data? Companies should ‘take control of the ESG data narrative’ by proactively shaping disclosure instead of being overwhelmed by survey requests. To that end, companies should ‘customize’ their metrics to some extent, while at the same time seeking to self‐regulate by reaching agreement with industry peers on a ‘reasonable baseline’ of standardized ESG metrics designed to achieve comparability. Investors are urged to push for more meaningful ESG disclosure by narrowing the demand for ESG data into somewhat more standardized, but still manageable metrics. Stock exchanges should consider issuing—and perhaps even mandating—guidelines for ESG disclosures designed in collaboration with companies, investors, and regulators. And data providers should come to agreement on best practices and become as transparent as possible about their methodologies and the reliability of their data.     

How I learned to let my workers lead

In 1980, Ralph Stayer owned a successful, growing sausage company that had him badly worried. Commitment was poor, motivation was lousy, the gap between performance and potential was enormous. Over the next five years, Stayer turned the company upside down, but only by turning himself upside down first. For years he had insisted on his own control, made all decisions, delegated nothing. But when he tried to picture what the company would have to look like to sell the most expensive sausage and still enjoy the biggest market share, he saw an organization whose employees took responsibility for their own work. After several false starts, he finally began in earnest by making himself give up much of his own authority. Stayer turned quality control over to the workers on the production line. Workers also began answering letters of complaint from customers. Rejects went from 5% to 0.5%. Employees thrived on their new responsibility and asked for more. Gradually, people on the shop floor took over personnel functions as well, followed by scheduling, budgeting, and capital improvements. Managers came to function more as coaches than as bosses. Stayer--a little to his own dismay--began to find himself superfluous. In mid-1985, the company faced a watershed decision--whether or not to accept a massive new order that would make huge demands on every employee and strain the company's capacities. Stayer asked the employees to make the decision. They accepted the challenge, and productivity, profits, and quality all rose dramatically. By the late 1980s, Stayer had reached his goal of working himself out of a job.     

Virtuous capital: what foundations can learn from venture capitalists

U.S. foundations and nonprofits work diligently on behalf of society's most needy and yet report that progress is slow and social problems persist. How can they learn to be more effective with their limited resources? Foundations should consider expanding their mission from investing only in program innovation to investing in the organizational needs of nonprofit organizations as well. Their overemphasis on program design has meant deteriorating organizational capacity at many nonprofits. If foundations are to help nonprofits be assured of making payroll, paying the rent, or buying a much-needed computer, they must develop hands-on partnering skills. Venture capital firms offer a helpful benchmark. In addition to putting up capital, they closely monitor the companies in which they have invested, provide management support and stay involved long enough to see the company become strong. If foundation officers familiarize themselves with such practices, they can begin to build organizational capacity in the nonprofit sector. Foundations can hire organizational experts to assist grantees; they can lengthen grant terms to allow nonprofits to build up organization strengths; and they can create new classes of grants that allow for organizational effectiveness. Nonprofits in turn should articulate their organizational needs when applying for grants; they should apply to foundations known for longer-term grants; and they should create plans that justify long-term support from foundations.     

How to invest in social capital.

Business runs better when people within a company have close ties and trust one another. But the relationships that make organizations work effectively are under assault for several reasons. Building such "social capital" is difficult in volatile times. Disruptive technologies spawn new markets daily, and organizations respond with constantly changing structures. The problem is worsened by the virtuality of many of today's workplaces, with employees working off-site or on their own. What's more, few managers know how to invest in such social capital. The authors describe how managers can help their organizations thrive by making effective investments in social capital. For instance, companies that value social capital demonstrate a commitment to retention as a way of limiting workplace volatility. The authors cite SAS's extensive efforts to signal to employees that it sees them as human beings, not just workers. Managers can build trust by showing trust themselves, as well as by rewarding trust and sending clear signals to employees. They can foster cooperation by giving employees a common sense of purpose through good strategic communication and inspirational leadership. Johnson & Johnson's well-known credo, which says the company's first responsibility is to the people who use its products, has helped the company in time of adversity, as in 1982 when cyanide in Tylenol capsules killed seven people. Other methods of fostering cooperation include rewarding the behavior with cash and establishing rules that get people into the habit of cooperating. Social capital, once a given in organizations, is now rare and endangered. By investing in it, companies will be better positioned to seize the opportunities in today's volatile, virtual business environment.     

Organizational Capital and Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity: The Effect of Management Quality Practices

This paper examines the influence of organizational capital, as evident in management quality practices, on the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We provide novel and strong evidence that investment sensitivity to internal cash flows decreases in the presence of superior management practices. We also find that superior management practices reduce the firm's financing frictions, evident in lower capital constraints. Our results are robust to numerous tests. Overall, our findings suggest that intangible organizational capital is important for investment decisions and that superior management practices contribute to value‐maximizing behavior.     

The Growing Blessing of Unicorns: The Changing Nature of the Market for Privately Funded Companies

The past 15 years have seen the emergence of large infusions of private capital at levels previously accessible only in public markets. One direct effect of these non‐public fundraisings is the spawning of private entities with market valuations reaching $1 billion, thereby achieving the status of unicorns. As the authors reported in an earlier study, by the end of 2015, there were 142 unicorns with an aggregate value exceeding $500 billion. The conviction of many investors and managers at that time was that these companies could best create value by staying private, often by adopting governance structures focused on creating superior operating performance. It was also widely believed that unicorns would remain outside the public markets longer and succeed in attracting even more private capital, thereby enabling their investors to capture a greater share of the increase in company value. In this study, the authors examine how the characteristics and dynamics of “the blessing” have changed in the past five years. Despite the widespread view that the valuations and private financing trend fueling this market were not sustainable, the authors report that by March 2020, the “net” number of unicorns had grown from 142 to 464, a number that doesn't reflect the transformation of over half of the 2015 sample through acquisition or public offering and their replacement by new unicorns. Further, the cumulative market valuation of unicorns more than doubled from $500 billion to $1.37 trillion, representing growth far greater than that in the public equity markets (some 26% per annum, as compared to 9% for the S&P 500) over the same period—and the blessing has become more diversified, both in terms of industry and geographical location. The authors also consider what happens when unicorns “graduate” to a different organizational form by means of an IPO, private buyout, or business failure. Analyzing the 107 firms that departed the sample between 2015 and 2020, the authors report that the average lifespan of a unicorn from its founding date to its exit date has been 9.5 years, indicating that such firms indeed remain privately owned for a longer time than in the past. Additionally, the study finds that the founders and initial investors in unicorns have fared quite well, cashing out their initial investment at almost six times invested capital, on average. These private investment performance metrics have been significantly higher than the returns to public shareholders in the same firms during the post‐IPO period, signifying that unicorn investors have captured much more of the value created in the company's growth phase than public stockholders.     

Capital Market Development,Competition, Property Rights,and the Value of Insurer Product‐Line Diversification: A Cross‐Country Analysis

In this article, we show that the effect of product diversification on performance is not homogeneous across countries. Diversified insurance companies perform significantly worse than their focused competitors in countries with well‐developed capital markets, high levels of property rights protection, and high levels of competition. In addition, we find that the diversification–performance relationship for insurance companies depends on company size. For large insurers operating in countries with less developed capital markets, diversification significantly increases performance. Our results suggest that the optimal organizational structure may be different for insurers operating in emerging economies than for insurers operating in developed countries.     

论保险公司组织绩效评价指标体系及评价方法

本文从保险公司组织绩效评价的理论出发,阐述保险公司组织绩效评价的内涵及其意义,构建了分析保险公司组织绩效评价的理论框架。在此基础上,总结了评价指标与保险公司组织绩效的相互关系,并提出构建评价保险公司组织绩效的方法,目的在于为科学评价保险公司组织绩效提供有效的分析方法。     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

The hard side of change management

Everyone agrees that managing change is tough, but few can agree on how to do it. Most experts are obsessed with "soft" issues, such as culture and motivation, but, say the authors, focusing on these issues alone won't bring about change. Companies also need to consider the hard factors-like the time it takes to complete a change initiative, the number of people required to execute it, and so forth. When the authors studied change initiatives at 225 companies, they found a consistent correlation between the outcomes of change programs (success versus failure) and four hard factors, which they called DICE: project duration, particularly the time between project reviews; integrity of performance, or the capabilities of project teams; the level of commitment of senior executives and staff; and the additional effort required of employees directly affected by the change. The DICE framework is a simple formula for calculating how well a company is implementing, or will be able to implement, its change initiatives. The framework comprises a set of simple questions that help executives score their projects on each of the four factors; the lower the score, the more likely the project will succeed. Companies can use DICE assessments to force conversations a bout projects, to gauge whether projects are on track or in trouble, and to manage project portfolios. The authors have used these four factors to predict the outcomes and guide the execution of more than 1,000 change management programs worldwide. Not only has the correlation held, but no other factors (or combination of factors) have predicted outcomes as successfully.     

Integrated Reporting,Stakeholder Engagement,and Balanced Investing at American Electric Power

The policies and practices of American Electric Power (AEP) encompass a number of paradoxes in the domain of sustainability. AEP is a large electric power provider with a predominantly coal‐fired power generation portfolio, which puts the company squarely in the center of national debates about global climate change and national air quality. At the same time, AEP is also a leader on several social and environmental fronts: integrated reporting, stakeholder engagement, technology innovation, and policy solutions for climate change. In this article, the authors describe AEP's rationale for providing leadership in these areas and then explore how the company tries to balance stakeholder interests and financial, environmental, and social concerns in its capital investment decisions. Using these examples, the authors expand on and discuss the limitations of Michael Jensen's theory of “enlightened value maximization.”