Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

What determines households inflation expectations? Theory and evidence from a household survey

The purpose of the present paper is to study how households form inflation expectations using a novel survey dataset of Italian households. We extend the existing ‘inattentiveness’ literature by incorporating explicitly inflation targets and distinguishing between aggregate and disaggregate dynamics based on demographic groups. We also consider both the short- and long-run dynamics as households update their inflation expectations. While we find clear distinctions between the various demographic groups behavior, households tend to absorb professionals forecast. The short-run dynamics also indicate they not only overreact when updating their expectations but also adjust asymmetrically to any perceived momentum change of future inflation.     

Nexus between economic sanctions and inflation: a case study in Iran

Conventional studies have applied dummy variables to analyse the relationship between economic sanctions and inflation while we construct an index which is called Trade-Financial Sanctions (TF index). TF Index is a liner combination of indices which includes trade openness and foreign investment by applying the principal component model. Through the TF index and market exchange rate the impact of economic sanctions on inflation is analysed in the three phases of sanctions; free sanctions, heavy sanctions, and light sanctions. The results illustrate that the TF index decreases inflation when the Iran’s economy experiences free sanctions or light sanctions relative to when the economy is in heavy sanctions. Heavy sanctions create instability in the market exchange rates and widening the gap between the market and the official exchange rates. Furthermore, economic sanctions increase expected inflation among the people and drive higher inflation. Therefore, these results suggest that the government should work more seriously to solve the main obstacles of trade and investment inflows imposed by the economic sanctions.     

Identifying fiscal inflation

Fiscal theorists warn about the risk of future inflation as a consequence of fiscal imbalances in the US. Because actual inflation remains historically low and data on inflation expectations do not corroborate such risks, warnings for fiscal inflation are often ignored in policy and academic circles. This paper shows that a canonical NK-DSGE model enables identifying an anticipated component of inflation expectations that is closely related to fiscal policy. Estimation results suggest that fiscal inflation concerns have induced a 1.6%-points increase in long-run inflation since 2001. The model also rationalizes why data on inflation expectations do not reveal such concerns outright.     

INFLATION INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Different spending patterns across households and differences in price increases across goods and services lead to unequal levels of inflation faced by different households. In this paper we measure the degree of inequality in inflation across U.S. households for the period 1987–2000. The broad picture that emerges from our results is that over our whole sample period there are substantial differences in the inflation experiences across U.S. households. We find that the cost of living increases were generally higher for the elderly, in large part because of their health care expenditures, and that the cost of living of poor households is most sensitive to the, historically large, fluctuations in gasoline prices. Still, when looking at the whole population, we find that individual households that are confronted with high inflation in one year do not generally face high inflation in the subsequent year as well.     

Inflation surprises and inflation expectations in the Euro area

In the second half of 2012, euro area inflation started declining and reached historical lows at the end of 2014. Market-based measures of inflation expectations also declined to unprecedented levels. During this disinflationary period, inflation releases have often surprised analysts on the downside. We provide evidence that inflation ‘surprises’ have significant effects on inflation expectations. The sensitivity of inflation expectations to the surprises, which has varied over time, disappeared after the introduction of the Asset Purchase Programme by the European Central Bank.     

公众预期、需求冲击与通货膨胀——兼论通胀持久性的地区差异

本文基于具有微观基础的混合式新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线模型,利用1985-2009年的省际面板数据,分析了预期因素、需求冲击及产出缺口与通货膨胀之间的动态过程及其地区差异。研究发现：总体上,无论是适应性预期还是理性预期对当期通货膨胀都有较强的推动作用;作为需求冲击的居民消费支出、固定资本形成以及产出缺口对通货膨胀都具有正向拉动作用。从通货膨胀持久性的地区差异上看,西部地区的通胀持续性最长,中部最短。     

Expected inflation, expected stock returns, and money illusion: What can we learn from survey expectations?

We show empirically that survey-based measures of expected inflation are significant and strong predictors of future aggregate stock returns in several industrialized countries both in-sample and out-of-sample. Empirically discriminating between competing sources of this return predictability by virtue of a comprehensive set of expectations data, we find that money illusion seems to be the driving force behind our results. Another popular hypothesis – inflation as a proxy for aggregate risk aversion – is not supported by thedata.     

How anchored are inflation expectations in EMU countries?

Anchored inflation expectations help stabilize inflation. Previous results indicate that monetary policy has been effective in breaking the link between actual and expected inflation at the euro area level. In this paper we examine whether this is also true at the national level. We define the ‘disconnect’ between inflation and inflation expectations and then proceed to examine the extent to which this disconnect exists for a number of euro area countries. Our findings suggest that for some countries, their own inflation experiences still affect national inflation expectations, and certainly more by comparison to how they affect the aggregate euro area level.     

A political economy perspective on persistent inequality,inflation, and redistribution

In this paper we examine the dynamics of the link between inequality and inflation from a political economy perspective. We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, and inequality is persistent. Inflation in our model is a mechanism of redistribution, and we find that the link between inequality and inflation within any period or over time depends on institutional and preference related parameters. Furthermore, we find that differences in the initial distributions of wealth can yield a diverse set of patterns for the evolution of the inflation and inequality link. Relative to existing literature, our model leads to more precise predictions about the inflation–inequality correlation. To that end, results in the extant empirical literature on the inflation and inequality link need to be interpreted with caution.     

The expected inflation channel of government spending in the postwar U.S.

There exist sticky price models in which the output response to a government spending change can be large if the central bank is nonresponsive to inflation. According to this “expected inflation channel,” government spending drives up expected inflation, which in turn, reduces the real interest rate and leads to an increase in private consumption. This paper examines whether the channel was important in the post-WWII U.S., with particular attention to the 2009 Recovery Act period. First, we show that a model calibrated to have a large output multiplier requires a large response of expected inflation to a government spending shock. Next, we show that this large response is inconsistent with structural vector autoregression evidence from the Federal Reserve׳s passive policy period (1959–1979). Then, we study expected inflation measures during the Recovery Act period in conjunction with a panel of professional forecaster surveys, a cross-country comparison of bond yields and fiscal policy news announcements. We show that the expected inflation response was too small to engender a large output multiplier.     

Multi‐asset Deprivation and Pro‐poor Growth in Cameroon

This article analyzes pro‐poor growth of multiple dimensions of household well‐being by sector of activity in Cameroon. It uses (1) a polychoric principal component analysis to construct indicators of household asset endowments, (2) the growth incidence curve to analyze the pro‐poorness of the different assets, and (3) a Shapley value framework decomposition to account for changes in deprivation in terms of within‐sector growth and changes in within‐sector inequality. Data is sourced from the second and third Cameroon household consumption surveys. Results show that: (a) pro‐poor growth is not observed for all assets and households at the bottom of the distribution of the different assets experienced an increase in inequality; (b) for all asset endowments, overall deprivation worsened between 2001 and 2007; (c) whereas the growth component mitigated the worsening incidence, depth and severity of human asset deprivation, both growth and redistribution components accounted for the worsening physical, financial and social asset deprivations; (d) while the tertiary sectors of activity benefited some human asset poverty reduction, all sectors suffered from worsening financial and social asset deprivation. These results have implications for promoting growth and improving the allocation of household assets.     

Assessing the (de-)anchoring of households’ long-term inflation expectations in the US

Well-anchored inflation expectations play an important role in the achievement of price stability. The (de-)anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the US has been under debate since the sub-prime crisis. This paper assesses and explains the evolution of the degree of (de-)anchorage of households’ long-term inflation expectations in the US during the period of 1990 to 2019, in a time-varying framework. We find the long-term inflation expectations to be de-anchored during the entire study period. The de-anchorage was greater in the first half of the 1990s. Subsequently, it has declined but has not yet anchored. An increase in inflation perception reduces the degree of de-anchorage in a (persistently) low-inflation perception period, whereas it causes a rise in the degree of de-anchorage when inflation perception is around its long-term average or is persistently high. Further, a rise in economic policy uncertainty also increases the de-anchorage of households’ long-term inflation expectations. This suggests that the Federal Reserve System (Fed) may find it beneficial to pay more attention to households’ inflation perception.     

Inflation and the fiscal limit

We use a rational expectations framework to assess the implications of rising debt in an environment with a “fiscal limit”. The fiscal limit is defined as the point where the government no longer has the ability to finance higher debt levels by increasing taxes, so either an adjustment to fiscal spending or monetary policy must occur to stabilize debt. We give households a joint probability distribution over the various policy adjustments that may occur, as well as over the timing of when the fiscal limit is hit. One policy option that stabilizes debt is a passive monetary policy, which generates a burst of inflation that devalues the existing nominal debt stock. The probability of this outcome places upward pressure on inflation expectations and poses a substantial challenge to a central bank pursuing an inflation target. The distribution of outcomes for the path of future inflation has a fat right tail, revealing that only a small set of outcomes imply dire inflationary scenarios. Avoiding these scenarios, however, requires the fiscal authority to renege on some share of future promised transfers.     

Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.     

Inflation and inflation volatility in Thailand

Quarterly data for Thailand are used in this article for the period 1965q3–2013q4 to investigate both the relationship between inflation and inflation volatility, and the impact of inflation volatility on economic growth. Inflation volatility is estimated by deploying the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) technique. A Granger causality test is then conducted to examine the causality between inflation and inflation volatility. The empirical results obtained are consistent with a number of theoretical propositions. First, the results are consistent with the Friedman–Ball proposition, which states that a rise in inflation raises inflation volatility. Second, there is evidence supporting the Holland proposition that inflation volatility lowers the rate of inflation. This is consistent with the view that central banks attempt to stabilize inflation with the rise in inflation volatility. Third, empirical results obtained by asymmetric GARCH models suggest that inflation shocks have an asymmetric impact on inflation volatility (i.e. a positive inflation shock has a larger impact on inflation volatility – as measured by the logarithm of the conditional variance of inflation – than a negative inflation shock). Fourth, inflation volatility has an adverse impact on economic growth. Finally, given the fixed/pegged or managed float exchange rate system, US inflation has been found to have a positive impact on inflation and its volatility in Thailand. This article discusses the implications of empirical findings on the design and enactment of monetary policy for price stability in Thailand.     

Product market regulation,trend inflation and inflation dynamics in the new Keynesian Phillips curve

In this empirical paper, we take a close look at the impact of the observed decline in the product market regulation, and hence in the barriers to entry and in impediments to competition, on inflation dynamics since the early 1980s.We use an enlarged new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) allowing for entry of firms and increasing competitive pressures with the number of firms and non zero trend inflation.Using OECD indicators on product market regulations, characterized by persistent fluctuations, and taking into account the non stationary properties of the inflation process, we investigate the empirical relevance of this NKPC for inflation dynamics in the US and France, assuming VAR expectations. The results point out that product market regulation is a good candidate as an exogenous structural source of the observed persistence in inflation for the past thirty years in both the US and France.     

Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data

This article analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that in the post-crisis period longer-term inflation expectations have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term ones and to actual HICP inflation. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term expectations of professional forecasters and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.     

Revisiting the inflation perception conundrum

Households' inflation perceptions and expectations play a key role in many dynamic macroeconomic and monetary models and are important for the ability of central banks to reach their objective of price stability. This paper revisits the issue of overestimation bias in inflation perceptions and expectations based on new and unique microdata from the Danish part of the EU-Harmonised Consumer Expectations Survey linked to rich household-level data from administrative registers. The analysis shows that accounting for even several of the household characteristics and social gradients usually addressed in the literature is far from sufficient to explain the inflation perception bias. Furthermore, we find that respondents participating in the survey more than once tend to be persistent in their degree of perception bias and that overpessimistic households have larger perception bias than other households. This indicates that inflation perception bias is related to fundamental personality traits. Finally, households' expectations of the future inflation level tend to be mean reverting and associated with the same types of bias as inflation perceptions.