Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

South Africa’s monetary policy independence: evidence from a Global New-Keynesian DSGE model

We study the response of South African monetary policy decisions to foreign monetary policy shocks. We estimate the extent of foreign monetary policy pass through by augmenting standard Taylor rules and comparing the results within the context of a Global New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. The general equilibrium model captures important spill-over effects that would otherwise have been ignored in a single equation set-up. The results show that the relationship between foreign monetary policy shocks and South African interest rates is complicated – South Africa does not import foreign monetary policy directly, but is still affected. Except for the US, an increase in foreign interest rates leads to a decrease in South African interest rates – highlighting the complex channels that the monetary policy authority has to monitor outside of its economy.     

关于“双顺差”背景下实现中国内外均衡的思考

内外均衡目标是指充分就业、物价稳定、经济增长及国际收支均衡。目前，中国正面临通货紧缩的压力和国际收支双顺差的格局，因此需通过扩张性的财政及货币政策进行协调，同时辅以汇率及利率政策。只有内外兼顾统一才能使经济实现稳定发展。     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

改革开放三十年:中国经济波动与宏观调控的回顾与反思

改革开放以来,我国经历了三次大的经济周期波动.伴随经济周期的波动,政府采取了不同的宏观调控政策,都收到了预期的成效且有各自的特点.文章对我国经济运行及宏观调控实践进行了历史回顾,进而对历次调控中存在的问题进行了反思.     

Optimal monetary–fiscal policy in the euro area liquidity crisis

We build an euro-area level DSGE model featuring a liquidity shock in the sovereign bonds market to simulate the strong contraction in economic activity observed during the 2008–2009 crisis. In the model, a sudden deterioration of the liquidity property of sovereign bonds is associated with deep recession and deflation. Against this background we characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy with full commitment. We find that the optimal policy contains three features: (i) the policy rate is lowered until hitting the zero lower bound (ZLB) and then is kept at the ZLB for more periods; (ii) a prolonged central bank’s balance-sheet expansion aimed at restoring the liquidity deteriorated; (iii) a counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus which offsets, to a large extent, the fall in private spending caused by the liquidity shock. Policy regimes involving (i), but not (ii) and (iii), are quite weak in stabilizing output gap and inflation. Monetary policy regimes such as full inflation-targeting or nominal GDP targeting perform remarkably well insofar as they are complemented with an optimally-implemented counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Our results tend to favour the view that, in case of recession, an euro-wide coordinated fiscal policy should supplement the role of the ECB in achieving its primary objective.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.

Fiscal shocks and their consequences

This paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to fiscal policy shocks in the post-World-War II US. We identify these shocks with exogenous changes in military purchases and argue that they lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on capital and labor income, and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines in real wages. The shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate investment and small movements in private consumption. We describe and implement a methodology for assessing whether standard neoclassical models can account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock. Simple versions of the neoclassical model can account for the qualitative effects of a fiscal shock. Once we allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs, the model can also account reasonably well for the quantitative effects of a fiscal shock.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a world liquidity trap

We construct a model of the international transmission of ‘liquidity trap’ shocks, and examine the case for international coordination of fiscal policy to respond to the liquidity trap. Integrated financial markets tend to propagate liquidity traps. In a global environment, fiscal policy may be effective in raising GDP when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, but it does so in a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ fashion; when one economy is in a liquidity trap, the cross country spillover effect of fiscal policy is negative. We examine the welfare optimizing policy response to a liquidity trap when countries coordinate on fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool in responding to a liquidity trap, although it is never optimal to use fiscal expansion sufficiently to fully eliminate a downturn. Moreover, there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion. For the most part, the country worst hit by a liquidity trap shock should use its own policies to respond, without much help from foreign policies.     

后经济危机时期我国经济政策的选择:基于历史经验与现实的思考

本文基于上世纪30年代以来几次经济危机后美国所采取的不同的经济政策,研究了后经济危机时期的政策选择对国家经济结构、经济增长及综合实力的影响.认为在后危机时代美国的政策选择对其综合实力的提升具有重要作用.同时,基于对各国次贷危机时采取的经济政策的现实思考,本文提出中国后经济危机时代应采用的经济政策,主要包括调整升级产业结构和转变经济发展方式、及时退出扩张性的财政和货币政策、提高城乡居民收入与构建福利国家等.     

On the benefits of fiscal policy coordination in a currency union: a note

It is quite often claimed by politicians that a common currency makes it beneficial to be also endowed with a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy can reasonably be considered to be a source of shocks, national fiscal policies which are steered independently from each other are generally preferable because they allow the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks. Abstracting from automatic stabilizers, this view is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest rates.