Collective contests with externalities

This paper examines collective contests associated with externalities. The collective contest is modelled as a two-stage game in which intra-group sharing rules and individual outlays are determined sequentially. Depending upon the restrictions on the intra-group sharing rules and the extent of externalities, we identify three kinds of Nash equilibria, and compare them with the outcome of the contest between individuals. This paper also proposes a real rent-dissipation rate as a measure of social waste when externalities are present. The externalities are shown to have significant effects on the relationship between the number of players and the real rent-dissipation rate.     

Schooling,wages and profits: Negative pecuniary externalities from schooling and their consequences for schooling investments

This paper tests the hypothesis that the schooling of the poor reduces profits for landowners, and that such negative pecuniary externalities in turn adversely affect schooling investments made by local governments. A theoretical model of occupational choice in the presence of credit and labor market constraints, combined with existing political economy models of the delivery of local public goods delivers such a result. This hypothesis is tested using household data from India. The empirical analysis shows that profits are reduced by the schooling of the poor and that this is primarily because of the effect of schooling on wages. It also shows that the negative effect of wages on profits reduces government provided schooling inputs.     

On the interaction between education and social security

This paper uses an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility choices to analyze the quantitative costs and benefits of subsidizing higher education, paying particular attention to the interaction between such policy and the sustainability of the social security system. The paper focuses on the demographic change as the mechanism that link both policies. It is found that an increase in education subsidies changes the educational composition of the population and lowers average fertility. Lower average fertility and higher life expectancy of educated individuals translates into changes in the age structure of the population that requires an increase in the social security tax rate in order to balance the pension budget. Such process reduces the welfare benefits of this educational policy since the rise in social security taxes lowers the after-tax lifetime earnings of almost all individuals born in the period of the policy reform and over.     

A note on some properties of the ESTAR model

Some properties of ESTAR models are derived. We demonstrate that these models can exhibit chaotic dynamics and multiple equilibria. We show that a nonchaotic deterministic model with added noise can produce a time series that (falsely) appears to be chaotic.     

Catholic schooling and further education

Using new estimation methods and data, I find that Catholic schooling substantially increases years of schooling by 0.42 to 0.47. The estimates are robust to various specifications that account for potential selection bias.     

Negative externalities and welfare improving preference changes

When the over-consumption of open access resources and congestible public goods generate negative externalities and social welfare losses, many individuals and environmental advocacy organizations offer as an alternative nongovernmental solution the adoption of new ecology sustaining preferences. This paper shows that exogenously inducing a change in preferences and the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences, which increase an individual's marginal rate of substitution between a private good and a good whose consumption imposes external costs on others, not only reduces the aggregate output of the negative externality but also produces an economic state that is socially superior to the initial state. Because it is based on both the initial and new preferences, the social superiority welfare criterion makes possible meaningful welfare comparisons of economic states generated by preference changes. A computational general equilibrium model is then used to simulate preference changes and to calculate the resulting allocative and welfare effects. The computer simulations reveal that important factors in the attainment of a socially superior state include (i) the particular characteristics of an individual's negative externality reaction function, (ii) the magnitude of the preference change, and (iii) the number of individuals changing preferences.     

Endogenous public policy and multiple equilibria

One of the well known roles of public policy in models with indeterminacy is to reduce the set of equilibria. However, agents' expectations regarding future policy may be self fulfilling when public policy is endogenized. We show that a simple overlapping generations economy with public education may yield multiple equilibria. Under a laissez-faire system, our model has a unique equilibrium. Thus, the presence of public policy may generate, rather than eliminate, multiple equilibria.     

Ethnic externalities in education and second-generation immigrants

I analyse the role of ethnic and native human capital – defined, respectively, as the average years of schooling of ethnic groups and of natives within a specific region – and of ethnic concentrations in the educational attainment of second-generation immigrants in Germany. Compared to natives’ children, parents’ education has a small and insignificant effect on second-generation immigrants’ education. Ethnic concentrations have a negative effect, while ethnic capital is insignificant. The effect of native capital, too, is insignificant but much larger in magnitude than the effect of ethnic capital. For women, mother’s education is relatively more important. For men, ethnic concentrations constitute a stronger impediment to educational attainment than for women.     

Type interaction models and the rule of six

In this paper, I describe and analyze a class of type interaction models. In these models, an infinite population of agents with discrete types interact in groups of fixed size and possibly change their types as a function of those interactions. I then derive conditions for these models to produce multiple equilibria. These conditions demonstrate a trade off between the number of types and the size of the interacting groups. For deterministic interaction rules, I derive the rule of six: the number of agent types plus the group size must be at least six in order to support multiple equilibria given a spanning assumption.Troy Tassier provided help with early versions of this model. Ken Arrow, Bob Axelrod, Larry Blume, Steven Durlauf, David Harris, John Holland, Lu Hong, Mercedes Pascual, Rick Riolo, and Carl Simon provided input on earlier drafts of this research. Financial support from the National Science Foundation, the James S. McDonnell Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

The role of warnings in regulation: keeping control with less punishment

Regulatory agencies frequently present violators with warnings, not pursuing prosecution if the violation ceases upon receipt of the warning. We show how such warnings may help regulators to keep control: Prosecution is costly for the regulator, and insufficient prosecution efforts yield low penalties. Thus, with a limited regulatory budget, threats of harsh sanctions are credible only if the number of violators is low. This produces multiple Nash equilibria. If firms may make mistakes, the economy can accidentally switch from one equilibrium to another. Warnings reduce substantially the probability of such accidental switches from the full-compliance to the no-compliance equilibrium.     

时滞产品生产的经济增长与社会福利分析

时滞产品生产所带来的负外部性 ,使厂商利益与社会利益往往不一致 ,时滞产品的生产导致经济增长率与社会福利的同步下降 ,并可能引致资本向时滞产品生产领域流动从而加剧其影响程度。在生产领域适当的政府调控是保障经济增长目标实现与社会福利提升的必然选择。     

Date of birth and selective schooling: Some lessons from the 1944 education reforms in England and Wales

We compare the probabilities of selective (grammar) school entry in England and Wales before and after the 1944 Education Act. The Act had direct and indirect influences on the costs of grammar education and on entry-exam coverage, design and marking methodology. Post-1944, grammar school entry among children born in the middle of the school year improved considerably. We argue that age-adjusted group standardized testing was an important contributory factor. The youngest pupils remained significantly disadvantaged. We produce evidence that this is consistent with the practice of streaming (tracking) junior school children at age 7 into classes delineated by average ability.     

Multiple equilibria and hysteresis in simple exchange models

This paper presents a simple two-good general equilibrium model of exchange in which demands are linear functions of relative prices. The solution of the model is represented by a cubic equation which can have either a single root which corresponds to a unique equilibrium price or three roots corresponding to multiple equilibria. The major properties of the model are that the relative price can make large discrete jumps in response to small parameter changes, and can display hysteresis. The paper shows how recent developments in non-linear methods can be used to examine the equilibrium properties of the model and establish conditions under which multiple equilibria can arise. The model is compared with that used by Shapley and Shubik.     

Evaluating currency crises: the case of the European monetary system

In this paper we examine the nature of currency crises. We ascertain whether the currency crises of the European Monetary System (EMS) were based either on fundamentals, or on self-fulfilling market expectations driven by extrinsic uncertainty. In particular, we extend previous work of Jeanne and Masson (J Int Econ 50:327–350, 2000) regarding the evaluation of currency crisis. We contribute to the existing literature proposing the use of Markov regime-switching with time-varying transition probability model. Our empirical results suggest that the currency crises of the EMS were not due only to market expectations driven by external uncertainty, or ‘sunspots’, but also to fundamental variables that help to explain the behavior of market expectations. We would like to thank Joseph Byrne, James Mitchell, Martin Weale and two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions.     

Knightian uncertainty and poverty trap in a model of economic growth

This paper explores how Knightian uncertainty affects dynamic properties in an economic growth model. The decision-making theory employed in the analysis is the theory of expected utility under a non-additive probability measure, i.e., the Choquet expected utility model of preference. We apply this decision-making theory to an overlapping generations model where producers face “uncertainty” in their technologies. When the producer is averse to uncertainty, the firm's profit function may not be differentiable. Therefore, the firm's decision to invest and hire labor becomes rigid for a certain measurable range of real interest rates. In dynamic equilibrium, the existence of firm-level rigidity causes discontinuity in the wage function; this makes multiple equilibria the more likely outcomes under the log utility and Cobb–Douglas production functions. In this paper, we show that even if aversion to uncertainty is small, the “poverty trap” can arise for a wide range of parameter values.     

Unique and multiple equilibria in a macroeconomic model with environmental quality: An analysis of local stability

This paper develops and analyzes an economic growth model which incorporates environmental quality into the production and utility functions. We solve our model for the balanced growth path and find that a unique low growth equilibrium is attained when environmental quality is given less weight in the utility function. Multiple equilibria exist if environment quality is given greater weight in the utility function. We also perform local stability analysis of our model. We conclude that an economy in which the environmental quality is given relatively less importance by the agents will be caught in low growth, high consumption poverty traps as is the case for many developing countries while other economies can potentially reach a relatively low consumption, high growth steady state if they place greater weight on environmental quality. Finally we look at how the gap between low and high growth equilibria shrinks when individuals place greater weight on environmental quality and how governmental policies can promote growth when societies give less weight to the environment.     

Public capital, endogenous growth, and endogenous fluctuations

Cazzavillan [Cazzavillan, G., 1996. Public spending, endogenous growth, and endogenous fluctuations. Journal of Economic Theory 71, 394–415] studies a discrete-time, one-sector endogenous growth model with a flow of publicly enjoyable goods and productive services financed through income taxation. He demonstrates how equilibrium paths are indeterminate, for a large range of the consumption externality of public spending. This study extends [Cazzavillan, 1996] by considering an otherwise identical production function, except with public capital stock as an input. The results support the robustness of multiple growth paths even in a one-sector growth model with public capital stock, and modify the set of the consumption externality of public spending, in determining growth dynamics in a similar model with non-accumulated public spending.     

The effect of armed conflict on accumulation of schooling: Results from Tajikistan

This paper uses differences in regional and temporal exposure to the 1992-1998 armed conflict in Tajikistan to study the effect of violent conflict on schooling outcomes. Data on the past damage to a household's residences from the 1999 Tajik Living Standards Survey is used as well as data on the events during the conflict within a conceptual framework that controls for important individual, household and community characteristics. Girls who were of school age during the conflict and lived in affected regions were less likely to complete their mandatory schooling than girls of the same age who lived in the regions relatively unaffected by conflict. The results also indicate that exposure to violent conflict had a large and statistically significant negative effect on the enrollment of girls. No effect of regional and household conflict exposure on education of boys was found. The results are robust to community and household fixed effects, selection into violence and migration.     

Upstream-downstream transactions and watershed externalities: Experimental evidence from Kenya

Where environmental policies or projects seek behavioral change, understanding underlying norms and preferences is essential to securing environmental outcomes. This study models a payment for environmental services intervention in an experimental field laboratory in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Upstream and downstream individuals are paired in a standard investment game, in which the upstream mover's investment represents land use decisions and the downstream mover responds with a choice of compensation payment. The experimental intervention introduces an enforcement treatment on the downstream movers' compensation decisions for a single round. Underlying social preferences and identity appear to shape individual transactions between upstream and downstream individuals. Upstream first movers are sensitive to the removal of the enforcement on their downstream partners in the second round, and make decisions consistent with crowding out of social preferences. The results suggest that environmental interventions may affect resource decisions for individuals who are not themselves direct targets of enforcement.     

The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse

We examine the role that belief, network externality, and information aggregation play in inefficient market collapses. After receiving consecutive negative shocks, some ex-ante identical Bayesian agents will be discouraged about the unknown state of the market they invest; therefore, they will stop investing. This decision will have two effects: first, it will cause agents to aggregate information through social/observational learning; second, it will decrease the network externality effect. We show that there might be an inefficient market collapse if the externality effect diminishes too much, and the cost of re-entry to the market is too high. We also analyze the effects of strategic delay and experimentation on the exit decision of the agents. I especially thank Thomas D. Jeitschko, Matthew Mitchell, B. Ravikumar Ted Temzelides. I also thank anonymous referees, an associate editor, John Conlon, Larry Samuelson, Troy Tassier, Stephen Williamson, and seminar participants of the University of Saskatchewan, Georgia Tech, Concordia University, University of Manitoba, Iowa Alumni Workshop, Midwest Economic Theory Conferences held at Indiana Bloomington, and Notre Dame, and 1st International Conference on Business, Management and Economics organized by Yasar University.