Ambiguity and Public Good Provision in Large Societies

In this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty, there may be less free‐riding in large societies.     

The role of risk aversion in public goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: an experimental analysis

The purpose of this study is to extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in public goods dilemmas. The present paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of risk aversion on public goods provision. A von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is used to investigate the impact of risk attitudes within a threshold public goods environment. The outcome of the threshold public goods experiment shows that subjects are indifferent to the changes in environmental conditions. Additionally, the analysis indicates that risk aversion is a significant determinant of voluntary public goods contribution level.     

省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响——基于河北省136县(市)面板数据的实证分析

基于河北省136个县(市)2003～2007年的相关社会经济数据,文章建立面板数据实证分析了省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响。研究发现,省直管县改革在显著提高县域生产性公共物品供给水平的同时,显著降低了县域服务性公共物品的供给水平;而且除人口规模外,省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响关系并不会受到县域环境因素的影响。     

Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods

Public provision of a private goods is justified on efficiency grounds in a model with no redistributive preferences. A government’s involvement in the provision of a private good generates information about preferences that facilitates more efficient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. Public provision of the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. The efficiency gains require that consumers cannot arbitrage the publicly provided private good, so our analysis applies to private goods where it is easy to keep track of the ultimate user, such as schooling and health care, but not to easily tradable consumer goods.     

Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis

One important determinant of voluntary contributions to public goods is the value of the public good relative to that of the forgone private good. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) formalized this relation in the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) and demonstrated its influence on the provision of linear public goods. This paper develops a parallel concept, in the context of a threshold public good, the Step Return (SR). After providing a meta-analysis of the effect of SR in previous experiments, we compare contributions in threshold public goods games with low, medium and high SRs. Results show that subjects respond to the SR in this setting just as they respond to the MPCR in the linear public goods setting: higher SRs lead to more contributions.     

Non‐Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two‐Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how nongovernmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a nongovernmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system increases contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium of utility‐maximizing individuals. This result is in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good which—without altruism or related motives—is eroded by free‐riding. Reliance on altruistic behavior is not required in supplying the second‐order public good “norm enforcement” in large societies.     

Five proposals for a European model of the countryside

The inability of European institutions to reform the common agricultural policy is a landmark case of political failure. The CAP has led to several policy failures. It helps mainly the well-off farmers in a very wasteful way; it provides excessive incentives for non-competitive primary commodities, specialization and intensification, with adverse impacts on rural natural resources. Economic principles support long-term programmes aimed only at market failures: the respect of environmental norms and the provision of rural public goods in line with society's demands. While not interfering with market mechanisms, the instruments we propose acknowledge the diverse economic potential of European rural areas and the variety of goods and services provided by the rural space. Political feasibility and social concerns may require a transitory period of direct income support for current farmers. We argue, however, against any direct payments for new farmers in order to prevent future dependence on public support.
Large established farmers are those who stand to lose the most from our proposals. However, they and those who represent them have to face the inefficiencies of the current policy and society's demands. Farmers deserve rewards from public funds for the rural public goods they provide, but these rewards should be decoupled and targeted. A profound reform is required if we are to preserve a 'European model of the countryside'.     

Exchange Rules and the Incentive Compatibility of Choice Experiments

The incentive properties of stated-preference surveys continue to be a central debate in the valuation of public goods. The majority of empirical studies have focused on incentive properties of contingent valuation questions in relation to situations where answers have monetary consequences. This research explores the incentive properties of repeated, attribute-based choice questions when subjects are provided with an explicit connection between choices and outcomes. Two market/provision-rules are investigated: a posted-price market and a plurality-rule vote. These two provision rules are contrasted to treatments in which no provision rule is discussed—subjects are simply asked to choose their preferred alternative. These three hypothetical choice treatments are compared with a binding choice treatment. While none of the public good treatments are theoretically incentive compatible, we include a comparison of hypothetical and binding choices for a private-good that is incentive compatible. The private good experiments indicate that marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates from the hypothetical treatment are larger, but not statistically different than corresponding estimates in the binding choice treatment. Results for the public good experiments indicate that marginal WTP estimates from the hypothetical treatments are much larger, and statistically different than corresponding estimates in the binding choice treatment. The bias is largest when no provision rule is discussed. The bias is reduced with the inclusion of a provision rule, but surprisingly, there was no difference across provision rule treatments. Overall, our results indicate that choice experiments involving a public good should include a provision rule to reduce bias, but the resulting marginal WTP estimates may still be more biased, on average, than those arising from contingent valuation survey formats.     

Participation constraints of matching mechanisms

Matching mechanisms have been proposed to improve public good provision in voluntary contributions. However, such decentralized subsidizing mechanisms may not be Pareto‐improving and may suffer from incomplete information and incredible commitment. This paper examines participation constraints of matching mechanisms with small matching rates in two cases of equilibria. At interior equilibria, there always exist small Pareto‐improving matching schemes regardless of preferences. This universal existence is useful for cooperation among heterogeneous players in the context without global information of preferences or at the international level without central governments. At corner equilibria, matching schemes work in different ways and have distinct welfare effects in certain cases, and the existence of Pareto‐improving matching schemes is not universal but is possible under certain conditions. The paper further characterizes Pareto‐improving matching schemes, and shows that it is easier to reach Pareto‐improving matching outcomes if players value more on public goods and have stronger substitution between private and public goods.     

效应溢出与地方公共产品供给的权限

基于地方公共产品理论,探讨了具有溢出效应的地区间地方公共产品最优供给效率,尝试性地测度了地方性公共产品不同的供给形态对帕累托效率的偏离,并在此基础上指出经济权限和政治权限的耦和是实现地方公共产品最优供给的重要途径,最后借助外部性内在化的理论分析框架探讨了实现经济权限和政治权限耦合的相应制度安排。     

公共产品提供的逻辑

从市场失效推导出来的公共产品理论不能有效地区分公共与私人产品,也不能解释公共提供的事实。本文试图从另一个角度讨论什么是决定产品公共提供的根本原因,并以外部性—效用相互依存性—公共提供这样的顺序来推导公共产品提供的逻辑。     

Hypothetical Bias Reconsidered: Payment and Provision Uncertainties in a Threshold Provision Mechanism

We extend research on the consequentiality of stated preference choices to a threshold provision mechanism for public goods. We develop a simple theoretical model of option price to analyze how option price varies with payment and provision uncertainty. We explore whether threshold provision contributions are similarly influenced by payment and provision uncertainty using an induced value contribution experiment. Results suggest that: (1) the probability of payment has a negative effect on contributions; (2) the probability of provision has a positive effect on contributions. We offer subjective beliefs regarding payment and provision as a plausible systematic explanation for hypothetical bias.     

Consumer welfare from publicly supplemented private goods: age and income effects on demand for health care

In spite of major advances in the theoretical, positive and normative, literature analysing the welfare implications of public provision of private goods, empirical investigation is often limited to contingent valuation studies, for example, of health care programmes. In this article we argue that when a market for a (subsidised or free of charge) publicly provided good exists, a consumer demand approach can be used to construct a money metric of welfare corresponding to the consumption of public provision. We illustrate this approach in investigating age and income effects on household demand for health care in Cyprus, where free public provision is not universal and those entitled to it often resort to private supplementation. Our findings suggest that the money metric of welfare, which consumers attach to free access to publicly provided health care, varies with age and to a lesser extent with household income.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

公共品供给机制:作用边界变迁及影响因素

公共品供给机制是从供给主体和运行机理的角度抽象出的公共品供给模式,包括政府供给、市场供给和自愿供给.某一公共品的供给方式不是一成不变的,其供给机制的作用边界处于变迁之中,主要表现为政府供给与私人供给的相互转化.在公共品供给机制的变迁中,公共品的性质特征、技术进步、政府职能理念、公平效率准则、政府政策倾向、需求状况以及私人资本规模都产生了一定的影响作用.     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

Mixed public goods,consumption externality,and economic growth

Conclusion From the viewpoint of pure theory the basic contribution of this paper is in identifying both the consumption inducing and consumption displacing tendencies when mixed public goods are financed by income taxes. We have come to recognize that the provision of mixed public goods is conducive to economic growth if they are consumption displacing in nature.     

Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.     

PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS

I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective‐value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods.     

Measuring the Unmeasured: Cultural Heritage Studies in Honor of Prof. Francesco Forte

This paper presents the contributions of Francesco Forte to the measurement of art and cultural goods and services, as I worked with him as his co-author. These contributions range from the valuation of art goods by the art matrix we conceived, to the valuation of the cultural welfare of nations, regions and local communities. Our work also assessed the provision of cultural welfare at the national, regional and local level for the public and non-profit sectors and measured the efficiency and effectiveness of museum bureaucracies. We also studied the profitability of investments in the arts by considering product life cycles, artistic movements and economies. More recently, with Michele Caputo, we focused on the long-run life cycle and success of the movie industry for select countries competing with foreign movie industries and TV entertainment by adopting Caputo’s fractional derivatives theory, which captures the role of past history. Professor Forte and I also developed the Differential Touristic Development Index to measure the effects of art and cultural enterprises as tourist attractions. The most innovative contributions of Francesco Forte to the measurement of the economic value of cultural goods and services demonstrate that it is possible to “measure the unmeasured,” and therein improve public collection of statistical data with the goal of increasing the preservation and valuation of cultural goods and services and highlighting their potential as economic multipliers.