Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Duration of bankruptcy proceedings and monetary policy effectiveness

A common assumption in well-known costly-state-verification frameworks is that when a borrower defaults, creditors receive a payoff immediately (after incurring bankruptcy costs). While this assumption enhances tractability, it is unrealistic given the considerable delays in the actual practice of bankruptcy. In this paper, I identify the duration of bankruptcy proceedings as an additional source of friction in financial markets and investigate the relationship between this friction and the effectiveness of monetary policy by using U.S. state-level data. Consistent with the commonly-observed positive relationship between the degree of standard financial frictions and the amplitude of macroeconomic responses, I find that U.S. monetary policy is most effective in states with longer bankruptcy proceedings.     

Labor immobility and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a monetary union

It is believed that a common monetary policy in a monetary union will have identical effects on different countries as long as these countries have identical fundamentals. We show that, when there is specialization in production, the terms of trade react to the shock. The transmission mechanism of a monetary shock has in this case an additional channel, the terms of trade. This is the case even if state contingent assets can be traded across countries. For a reasonable parametrization, the differential on the transmission across countries is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect on the union's aggregates. Monetary shocks create cycles with higher volatility in “poor” countries than in “richer” ones.     

Financial frictions and stabilization policies

After the financial crisis of 2007, in many economies, public and private debt have moved in opposite directions, as opposed to pre-2007 evidence. Private deleverage and public debt build-up may affect the recovery path of countries after a recession. In a new Keynesian model with financial frictions, we show that when the economy is hit by a credit risk shock, the negative correlation arising between public and private debt amplifies the response of GDP. In our setup, the traditional monetary-fiscal policy mix is not enough to offset this private-public debt mechanism and therefore bring back economic stability. When macroprudential policy is part of the policy mix, the private-public debt channel can be broken. Interestingly, depending on the macroprudential instrument, a trade-off may arise between private debt and output stabilization.     

Cross-border spill-overs from fiscal stimulus in a monetary union

We analyse domestic and cross-border effects of fiscal policy in a two-region business cycle model of a monetary union. Without relying on debt consolidation via spending reversals along the lines of Corsetti, Meier and Mueller (2010) and Corsetti and Mueller (2014) we show that a fiscal expansion by the core economies of the euro area is associated with crowding in of both core and periphery consumption. Interestingly, cross-border spill-over effects are larger the larger the share of credit constrained households in the periphery.     

Socially optimal monetary policy institutions

Research on the interaction between wage setters and central banks has shown that the classical dichotomy of monetary policy models in the tradition of Barro and Gordon [Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983) 589] does not hold if an inflation motive of wage setters is introduced. In this paper, the conditions for this result are re-examined under different assumptions concerning the exact timing of the strategic game, and the consequences for the socially optimal delegation rules and incentive contracts for central bankers are derived. It is shown that the relationship between central bank conservativeness and macroeconomic performance—and hence the design of optimal monetary policy institutions—is sensitive to the modelling choice. In particular, the case for an ultra-populist central banker is valid only under assumptions that appear to be quite unrealistic.     

Gains from commitment in monetary policy: Implications of the cost channel

Many empirical studies find robust evidence that marginal cost of production directly depends on the nominal rate of interest. This relationship induces a cost channel for monetary policy transmission. Although the empirical literature provides ample evidence for a cost channel, studies that evaluate the welfare gains from monetary policy commitment have so far entirely ignored its presence. This study shows that, overlooking the cost channel, one significantly underestimates the welfare gains from monetary policy commitment. I find that there is a robust positive relationship between the size of the cost channel and welfare gains from monetary policy commitment. Using a version of the new Keynesian model calibrated to the US economy, I find that failure to take into account the presence of a cost channel leads to an understatement of the gains from monetary policy commitment by an amount equivalent to a 0.48 percentage points permanent cut in quarterly inflation.     

On the benefits of fiscal policy coordination in a currency union: a note

It is quite often claimed by politicians that a common currency makes it beneficial to be also endowed with a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy can reasonably be considered to be a source of shocks, national fiscal policies which are steered independently from each other are generally preferable because they allow the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks. Abstracting from automatic stabilizers, this view is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest rates.

货币政策与财政政策的区域产业结构调整效应比较

本文运用1978—2007年东、中、西部的面板数据分析。货币政策和财政政策是否具有区域产业结构调整效应结果显示:第一,财政政策具有产业结构调整效应,而货币政策的产业结构调整效应并不明显。第二,货币政策在对第一和第三产业的效应方面强于财政政策,而财政政策则在对第二产业的效应方面具有优势。第三,货币政策和财政政策对三次产业的效应都存在比较明显的区域效应。第四,在东部地区货币政策和财政政策对第一产业和第二产业的效应相差非常悬殊,而对第三产业的效应则集中在高位;在中部地区货币政策和财政政策对第二产业的效应集中在高位;在西部地区货币政策对第一产业的效应集中在高位,而财政政策对第一产业的效应则集中在低位。     

The identification of fiscal and monetary policy in a structural VAR

Good economic management depends on understanding shocks from monetary policy, fiscal policy and other sources affecting the economy and their subsequent interactions. This paper presents a new methodology to disentangle such shocks in a structural VAR framework. The method combines identification via sign restrictions, cointegration and traditional exclusion restrictions within a system which explicitly models stationary and non-stationary variables and accounts for both permanent and temporary shocks. The usefulness of the approach is demonstrated on a small open economy where policy makers are actively considering the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies.     

Real wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a small open economy

The main objective of the study is to provide a theoretical analysis of optimal monetary policy in a small open economy where households set real wage in a staggered fashion. The introduction of real wage rigidities plays a important role to resolve main shortcomings of the standard new Keynesian small open economy model. The main findings regarding the issue of monetary policy design can be summarized as three fold. First, the optimal policy is to seek to minimize variance of domestic price inflation, real wage inflation, and the output gap if both domestic price and real wage are sticky. Second, controlling CPI inflation directly or indirectly induces relatively large volatility in output gap and other inflations. Therefore, both CPI inflation-based Taylor rule and nominal wage-inflation based Taylor rule are suboptimal. Last, a policy that responds to a real wage inflation is most desirable.     

Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with endogenous growth

We study optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian (NK) model with endogenous growth and knowledge spillovers external to each firm. We find that, in contrast with the standard NK model, the Ramsey dynamics implies deviation from full inflation targeting in response to technology and government spending shocks, while the optimal operational rule is backward looking and responds to inflation and output deviations from their long-run levels.     

Financial frictions and the ratio in UK manufacturing

This note concerns an asymptotic distribution result from the literature on nonlinear estimation with integrated variables. It points out a way of strengthening local asymptotic distribution results towards results that hold for the global minimizer of the criterion function.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

Financial distress and fiscal inflation

Is inflation ‘always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ or is it fundamentally a fiscal phenomenon? The answer hinges crucially on the underlying monetary–fiscal policy regime. Scant attention has been directed to the role of credit market frictions in discerning the policy regime, despite its growing importance in empirical macroeconomics. We augment a standard monetary model to incorporate fiscal details and credit market imperfections. These ingredients allow for both interpretations of the inflation process in a financially constrained environment. We find that introducing financial frictions to the model and adding financial variables to the dataset generate important identifying restrictions on the observed pattern between inflation and measures of financial and fiscal stress, to the extent that it overturns existing findings about which monetary–fiscal policy regime produced the U.S. data. To confront policy regime uncertainty, we propose the use of dynamic prediction pools and find strong cyclical patterns in the estimated historical regime weights.     

The cost of capital,asset prices,and the effects of monetary policy

The primary objective of this paper is to study the interaction between monetary policy, asset prices, and the cost of capital. In particular, we explore this issue in a setting where individuals face idiosyncratic risk. Incomplete information also provides a transactions role for money so that monetary policy can be studied. In contrast to standard monetary growth models which focus on the transmission of monetary policy to the demand for capital goods, we incorporate a separate capital goods sector so that the supply response to monetary policy is taken into account. Consequently, in contrast to the standard monetary growth model, monetary policy plays an important role in investment activity through the relative price of capital goods. Moreover, different sources of productivity can affect the degree of risk sharing. Although the optimal money growth rate falls in response to an increase in productivity in either sector of the economy, monetary policy should react more aggressively to the level of productivity in the capital sector.     

Evaluating monetary policy with financial stability objective: rules vs. discretion

This article explores whether adding the goal of financial stability to the more traditional goals of output and price stability could improve optimality of monetary policy. A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model that endogenously incorporates financial frictions is used to derive optimality conditions across rule-based and discretionary monetary policy environments. The results indicate that it is optimal for the Central Bank to keep output below the potential level in the short term so as to dampen the inflationary effects arising from supply and financial shocks. When the economy is exposed to a financial shock, both leverage and credit spread rise significantly, thereby tipping the economy into a financial crisis and raising the probability of macroeconomic risk.     

Even more on monetary policy in a small open economy

It is well known that in a small open economy with full capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy is ineffective in influencing real output (e.g. the works of Fleming [Int. Monetary Fund Staff Pap. 9 (1962) 369.] and Mundell [Can. J. Econ. Polit. Sci. 29 (1963) 475.]). However, Wu [Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 8 (1999) 223.] finds that when the credit channel is added to this model, monetary policy can have real effects under a fixed exchange rate system. This conclusion hinges on the assumption that open market operations have no effect on foreign exchange reserves of the central bank when evaluating how a change in monetary policy affects the loan market. This assumption is incorrect because under a fixed exchange rate regime, the quantity of foreign reserves becomes endogenous in the model. It is shown that when this assumption is relaxed, monetary policy is still ineffective in influencing output under a fixed exchange regime, even with an operative credit channel.     

Optimal simple rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy

Stabilization policy involves joint monetary and fiscal rules. We develop a model enabling us to characterize systematic simple monetary and fiscal policy over the business cycle. We principally focus on the following question. What are the key properties of the joint simple rule governing the conduct of systematic stabilization policy? We find that conducting stabilization policy incorporates not only a set of monetary policy choices governed by the so-called ‘Taylor principle’ but also fiscal policy that gives considerable force to automatic stabilizers. Recent US and UK monetary and fiscal choices seem broadly consistent with this model. This result is found to be robust to a number of alternate modeling strategies.     

Uncertainty shocks,precautionary pricing,and optimal monetary policy

Existing studies show that, in standard New Keynesian models, uncertainty shocks manifest as cost-push shocks due to the precautionary pricing channel. We study optimal monetary policy in response to uncertainty shocks when the precautionary pricing channel is operative. We show that, in the absence of real imperfections, the optimal monetary policy fully stabilizes the output gap and inflation, implying no policy trade-offs. Our result suggests that precautionary pricing matters only insofar as expected inflation is volatile. Thus, a simple Taylor rule that places high weight on inflation leads to a stabilized output gap, thereby attaining the “divine coincidence”.