Impact of formalisation of property rights in informal settlements: Evidence from Dar es Salaam city

This paper aims to study the responsiveness of the informal property market and management systems towards the introduction of land registration for informal settlements in Tanzania. City governments are increasingly recognising the need to strengthen legal rights for the urban poor as a means to bring them more effectively into the urban economy and ensure better provision of water, sanitation and other primary services. The research focuses on Tanzania and in particular two case studies within Dar es Salaam. The findings of the work suggest that the introduction of residential licenses whilst potentially assisting in creating legal certainty has not resulted in the financial sector accepting them as full security against loans. Accessing credit by the poor however has not yet been fully realised resulting in some further hurdles for the financial sector to overcome. Finally, and of some significance is the registration of property in the informal settlements has provided the opportunity of formal property transactions within these settlements.     

Whose scarcity? Whose property? The case of water in western India

Water scarcity is usually portrayed in absolute or volumetric terms. But do most analyses of scarcity focus on how the ‘problem’ of scarcity is constructed, the need to disaggregate users and their entitlements and the imperative to look at the politics of distribution and technology choice within a frame of political economy? By taking the case of water scarcity in Kutch, western India which is supposed to benefit from the controversial Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project (SSP), the paper demonstrates how scarcity has emerged as a ‘meta-narrative’ that justifies controversial schemes such as large dams, allows for simplistic portrayals of property rights and resource conflicts and also ignores the cultural and symbolic dimensions of resources such as water. Moreover, water scarcity tends to be naturalised and its anthropogenic dimensions are whitewashed. It is thus necessary to distinguish between the biophysical aspects of scarcity that are lived and experienced differently by different people and its ‘constructed’ aspects. The paper draws on a wide range of conceptual approaches such as political ecology, common property resource theory and post-institutional approaches to highlight that scarcity is not a natural condition. Instead, it is usually socially mediated and the result of socio-political and institutional processes. It also argues that while institutional perspectives have played in a key role in moving away from alarmist portrayals of scarcity and property rights by demonstrating how local people can manage and live with scarcity, they need to be complemented by analyses that locate property rights within wider historical, cultural and socio-political processes that combine both discursive and materialist analyses.     

Intermediate levels of property rights and the emerging housing market in Ho Chi Minh City,Vietnam

Vietnam introduced a Policy of Renovation (‘Doi Moi’ Policy) to restructure the economy in 1986. Under this policy, the Land Use Right Certificate was introduced as a form of tenure for agricultural land and urban land, according to the Land Laws of 1987 and 1993, respectively. However, by 2001, most properties and/or land in Vietnam still did not have a legal title. Although Vietnam's land reforms in the 1990s provided some of the weakest private rights among the transition countries, big cities like Ho Chi Minh City are presently homes to thriving housing markets. Transactions of ‘property without a physical entity and legal title’ in the real estate market show how property ownership can be formed in order to operate within different institutional contexts. This paper highlights that ‘intermediate levels of property rights’ are the driving forces behind the thriving housing market in Ho Chi Minh City.     

The dilemma of property rights and indigenous institutional arrangements for common resources governance in China

Traditionally, property rights have been seen as an efficient means of optimizing the allocation of common resources. The arrangement of property rights, however, has historically led to a number of social, economic and ecological issues. Herders living in China are currently exploring collective grazing partnerships as they seek to maintain balance between ecological protection and livelihood development in the process of grassland governance. For the purposes of this study, we conducted an in-depth analysis of the property rights dilemma, offering possible solutions for indigenous institutional arrangements as exemplified in six typical cases. We assert that (1) stakeholders should respect local culture by ensuring the participation of herders in policymaking, (2) the use of fences for the demarcation of property rights is ineffective and often serves as a catalyst for the destruction and degradation of grassland ecosystems, and (3) herders’ use of collective action techniques should be reinvented with the support of state policy.     

Assessing Market Efficiency

Abstract

Government regulations through import licensing and “seasonal calendars” entail large transaction costs for traders operating in the fruit and vegetable wholesale market in Oman. Monitoring and enforcing these market regulations increase search costs and reduce market efficiency. The objective of this study is to develop a methodology to categorize and measure transactions costs by analyzing traders perceptions and attitude toward regulatory measures, and other market activities. Results show that importers operating at Al-Mawaleh market face the highest level of transaction costs. The changing nature of import calendar as well as the import license procedure represents significant elements of uncertainty that rise the importers' search and monitoring costs. It is suggested that the conversion of these non-tariff barriers into tariffs along WTO rules would reduce market uncertainty and increase market efficiency.     

Situating community forestry enterprises within New Institutional Economic theory: What are the implications for their organization?

Community forestry enterprises (CFEs) have gained considerable traction with rural development and forestry practitioners as models for community development, poverty alleviation, and conservation. This paper uses New Institutional Economic theory to identify the key organizational features and potential inherent weaknesses of CFEs. NIE theory focuses on arguments of economic efficiency, specifically transaction cost reductions that serve as incentives for collective action by groups of owners. Examples are given to show how the organization of CFEs reduced transaction costs stemming from interactions with industrial loggers and service providers. However, the creation of these community enterprises goes beyond simple transaction cost reductions and economic justifications. Additional unquantifiable benefits, such as self-determination, control over resources that communities have historically used, application of acquired skills, political representation, and application of acquired skills to name a few, are also secured through community ownership. These benefits however do not come without a cost. As enterprises where ownership rights are incomplete or ill-defined and which do not operate with the incentives of investor-owned firms, CFEs have little to no initial capital pool and experience considerable investment limitations due to limited wealth, horizon problems, and unsolved issues with moral hazard vis-à-vis banks. CFEs also face important management and collective decision-making challenges. In spite of their institutional weaknesses, it is apparent that many societies have decided that the benefits of community ownership far outweigh their ownership costs. State intervention and policy have played an important role in building the necessary supportive framework for the development of these enterprises. NIE as a dominant model for understanding alternative entrepreneurial forms was useful for identifying some important aspects of CFEs that, in a profit-driven economy, can constitute weaknesses that place them at a disadvantage with investor-owned firms. This analysis informs where policy should be targeted if CFEs are to be supported and fostered.     

Securing land and property rights in sub-Saharan Africa: The role of local institutions

Central governments have neither the capacity nor the local knowledge to implement a just, large-scale national land registration system. Support to local institutions to undertake intermediate forms of land registration has been shown to be far more effective in many places—although these need careful checks on abuses by powerful local (and external) interests, measures to limit disputes (too many of which can overwhelm any institution) and measures to ensure that the needs of those with the least power – typically women, migrants, tenants and pastoralists – are given due weight. These locally grounded systems can also provide the foundation for more formal registration systems, as needs and government capacities develop. Even if there are the funds and the institutional capacity to provide formal land title registration to everyone in ways that are fair and that recognize local diversity and complexity, and could manage disputes, this may often not be needed. For the vast majority of people, cheaper, simpler, locally grounded systems of rights registration can better meet their needs for secure tenure.     

Courts and contract enforcement in transition agriculture: theory and evidence from Poland

The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% respondents reported to believe that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who believed the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the boundary between contracts to be regarded as 'enforceable' and 'not-enforceable' and, simultaneously, the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers' responses can be explained by cost-benefit calculations regarding the use of courts, (2) the legal 'enforceability' of contracts depends not only on the efficiency of the legal system but also on the attributes of the transaction, the contracts and the relationship between buyer and seller and (3) the threshold of taking legal action is significantly influenced by indirect costs of court enforcement, such as the disruption of a valuable business relationship, and by the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms.     

Resource regimes and cooperation

The choice of resource regimes is a choice over the cost of transacting and the ability and willingness to cooperate. This paper argues that people may be willing to forgo individual gains for the sake of the common good. This depends, however, on the institutional context. Hence, it is argued that an important role of resource regimes is their capacity to define whether the issue is one of individual gain or cooperation. The paper builds its arguments on material from experiments in psychology and economics. They show that cooperative action dominates under certain institutional structures while individual gain is fostered in others. Moreover, studies of behavior in real-life institutional settings—e.g., of markets, common property regimes and public provisioning—support these findings. The lessons learned are finally used to introduce a discussion over the direction of institutional design being able to solve the growing problems of global environmental degradation.