Growth in fragile states in Africa: Conflict and post‐conflict capital accumulation

This article analyses the pattern of capital accumulation in Africa and its interaction with political fragility. Political fragility, defined as armed conflict or civil war, retards or reverses gains with respect to capital accumulation, slowing long‐term economic growth. Many countries experience negative rates of capital accumulation, particularly during periods of acute political instability. In post‐war periods, countries generally continue to experience capital destruction, lending support to the “war ruin hypothesis.” This has implications for long‐term economic growth in view of the strong association between capital accumulation and economic performance. The main policy implication of the analysis is that African countries and their international partners should pay more attention to capital accumulation, including capital reconstruction after periods of political instability, to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth.     

Institutions,human capital,and growth: The institutional mechanism

This paper contributes to the debate on the relationship between human capital, institutions, and economic growth. The paper first develops a micro-foundation model linking institutions to human capital. The advantage of our modeling strategy is that the human capital accumulation function is derived from an endogenous process. The theoretical model shows that improvements in the quality of institutions foster human capital accumulation, decrease income inequality and change the historical development path. The paper uses cross-country panel data from 1965 to 2005 to test some of the model's propositions and finds that deep structures or structural institutions – which are very persistent and rooted on the historical development path of an economy – affect long-term economic performance, while political institutions are uncorrelated with productivity and long-term economic growth. The empirical estimates also show that growth of physical and human capital – instead of levels – determines long-run economic growth.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

The first Great Divergence and the evolution of cross-country income inequality during the last millennium: the role of institutions and culture

Using a millennium of data for 12 countries in the East and in the West, this article tests the extent to which contracting institutions, property right institutions and culture can explain economic development and the Great Divergence. It is tested whether these theories influence growth through science and technology or through human capital or channels that are independent of these two channels. It is found that culture, contracting institutions and property right institutions have all been relevant for growth and development.     

A new approach to capital flows: Theory and evidence

This paper examines how an open economy determines its financial openness and deals with volatile capital flows when deciding to utilize them for output growth. We find that higher economic instability is an inevitable price paid for faster growth if a country permits wider openness without reversing its financial vulnerability. We prove that the country can leave its capital market wider open to achieve higher growth and lower instability if its financial system has been strengthened substantially. We show why some financially advanced countries request reluctant developing countries to liberalize their immature markets and how the conflict of interest between the two parties is formulated. The paper also presents a large sample of cross-country experiences with tradeoffs between growth and instability, with the observed evidence supporting our theoretical predictions.     

OPTIMAL FOREIGN BORROWING REVISITED

Foreign capital has become increasingly important in financing investment and growth in developing countries. Foreign capital flows, however, can be volatile as is evident from the recent financial crises. It has also recently been noted by researchers that there is little systematic empirical evidence that foreign capital contributes to the economic growth of developing countries. In this context, this paper attempts to theoretically reevaluate the borrowing behaviour of a developing economy that relies on foreign borrowing for its capital formation. In particular, this paper investigates the implications of different lending policies of international financial institutions. It is found that no matter whether the borrowing interest rate increases with the level of foreign debt per capita or with the foreign‐capital/total‐capital ratio, the economy always moves toward the stationary state. The result holds even when the representative agent regards the interest rate given as constant. This implies that foreign borrowing does help economic growth, irrespective of lending policies of international financial institutions.     

Technological retard in small least developed countries — small is beautiful but fragile?

This paper argued the technological retard and its influence to stagnant economic growth in small least developed countries. First we measured the technological development by UNIDO's TCI, and found that the level of technical complexities in island or inland countries was lower than the normal level by 27 and 57 per cent. We also found that the development of technical complexity is very important to industrialization in developing countries. Thus the stagnant technological improvement is one of the reasons for low growth of LDCs handicapped by smallness or isolation. Secondly we analyzed the relation between stagnant technological improvement and the low growth of small LDCs by a simple growth model, which combines the Romer-type non-linear production function and human capital growth equation. The brain drain was explicitly considered a main hindrance of human capital formation in these LDCs.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

The long term impact of economic development in developed countries on developing countries since 1820

The linkages between the economic development of developed and developing countries are analyzed historically. The analysis is divided into epochs, distinguished by global trade regimes and by common characteristics of long term economic growth. The break throughs in long distance transport technology which occured during the industrial revolution created a global economy in which the rythm of economic activity in developing economies became linked to that of developed economies. The major transmission mechanisms were international trade, international migration and international capital flows. Exports were the main engine of growth in developing countries. But the effects of export expansion varied across countries. The speed of transmission of the industrial revolution to developing countries depended on their institutional readiness; countries with most developed capitalist institutions in factor markets were the first to develop. The extent of diffusion of the benefits of growth from export expansion within developing countries also depended on the nature of their institutions, both economic and political. Finally, policies with respect to international trade, investment and agriculture were also critical to the speed and diffusion of economic development.The research underlying this paper is the result of a twentyfive year collaboration with Professor Cynthia Taft Morris. She is indebted to the World Bank for financing the research in this paper as part of the background studies for the World Development Report 1991. She is also indebted to Sherman Robinson for his comments.     

Institutional framework and economic development: international evidence

This paper examines the effect of ‘quality’ of the institutional framework on economic development. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that ‘good’ institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth. The positive effect of institutional ‘quality’ is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom. Our results also indicate that ‘good’ institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence. We infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation, but also freedom to choose and institutional support.     

The impact of foreign direct investment on productivity: New evidence for developing countries

We provide new empirical evidence on the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and total factor productivity (TFP) growth using cross-country data for 51 developing countries over the period 1984–2010. Our results suggest a weak direct effect of FDI on TFP growth but, after accounting for the roles of human capital and institutions as contingencies in the FDI-TFP growth relationship, we find a robust FDI-induced productivity growth response dependent on these ‘absorptive capacities’. However, the relevance of the human capital contingency effect diminishes when the effect of institutions is also considered, which suggests that improving institutions is relatively more important than human capital development for developing countries to realise productivity gains from FDI.     

Political instability,political freedom and inflation

Using a dynamic panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the political and institutional factors on inflation. Estimation results show that a lower degree of political instability generates lower inflation only for developed and low-inflation countries. However, when political freedom is taken into account, political instability appears to be influential on inflation also for developing countries and turns out to be significant only for high-inflation countries. Such findings emphasize the inflation-reducing effects of political stability depending on democratic political structure.     

International Reserves and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.     

The Politics of Capital Flight in the Global Economic Crisis

This paper studies the effects of economic governance and political institutions on portfolio investment during the Global Economic Crisis of 2008–2009. Leveraging a unique cross‐national dataset on portfolio flows immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it shows that countries with “better institutions” – those with more (or less) democratic, more (or less) constrained or more accountable political systems – were no less vulnerable to portfolio outflows than countries with “worse institutions.” However, countries with better governance prior to the crisis – those with better regulatory apparatuses, rule of law, property rights, and those considered less politically risky – experienced lower net portfolio capital outflows after Lehman. Governance is in fact the strongest predictor of portfolio capital flows during the global flight to liquidity, while political institutions perform poorly. The findings shed light onto the political factors that mediated how the collapse of Lehman affected national financial markets the world over, and have implications for literatures on the political economy of foreign investment, as well as for broader topics of institutions, governance, and economic performance.     

追赶战略、人力资本及地区经济增长趋同——基于教育效率的水平创新模型的实证分析

文章基于一个教育效率的水平创新模型分析了落后地区对发达地区的人力资本与经济发展战略问题,指出人力资本是影响技术吸收与创新能力的主要因素。通常所言的静态比较优势战略无法改变落后地区在人力资本上的比较劣势,因而落后地区也就无法发挥所谓的后发优势进而实现与发达地区间的经济收敛。而只有基于教育质量与人力资本积累效率的提高,实行人力资本的动态比较优势战略或追赶战略才能让落后地区提高学习效率,真正发挥后发优势实现经济赶超。最后文章以中国为例验证了这一结论并简要提出了促进落后地区经济快速增长的政策建议。     

Effects of financial liberalization on financial market development and economic performance of the SSA region: An empirical assessment

This study investigates the role of financial liberalization in promoting financial deepening and economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA). We apply the more efficient system GMM estimator in dynamic panel data that combines first difference and original level specification to deal with the problems of weak instruments. Our dataset covers 21 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period of 1981–2009.Additionally, the paper sought to examine both the direct and indirect impacts of financial liberalization policies on economic growth and financial deepening using a much more comprehensive and recent financial liberalization dataset. The econometric results suggest that, on average, financial liberalization is negatively associated with income growth in SSA region. Our findings provide support for the skeptical empirical view of financial liberalization in emerging markets, which show that liberalization, by itself, might be associated with lower economic growth through leading to destabilization, stimulating domestic capital flight and increasing the risk of financial fragility. However, the research finds that financial liberalization does indeed impact positively on financial deepening and resource mobilization in SSA region, after controlling for key macroeconomic factors such as institutional quality, fiscal imbalances and inflation. In fact the study reports a stronger reforms effect for countries that have stronger legal institutions, protection of property rights and higher human capital. Policy-wise, the study finds that institutional and human capital factors are important in explaining growth and financial development; therefore, it is necessary for SSA governments to promote a stronger and more transparent institutional development as we move forward.     

Granger causality tests among openness to international trade,human capital accumulation and economic growth in China: 1952–1999

Abstract

This study examines Granger causality among openness to international trade, human capital accumulation and economic growth in China using time series data over the period from 1952 to 1999 and a sub-period, i.e. a period from 1978 to 1999. For the 1952–1999 period, economic growth is found to Granger cause human capital accumulation and not vice versa. For the 1978–1999 period, economic growth and openness to international trade, economic growth and human capital accumulation, and human capital accumulation and openness to international trade are found to have bidirectional Granger causality, respectively. Thus, there is a dynamic relationship among openness to international trade, human capital accumulation and economic growth. The experience of economic reform in China could be an example to other developing countries.     

THE MECHANICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS*

This study develops a model wherein capital is used in final goods production and research and development (R&D) activities. This arrangement generates changes of the equilibrium capital allocation corresponding to capital endowment, which engenders a regime change from capital based growth with decreasing returns to R&D based perpetual growth. These two growth phases account for the polarization of economies. The model also engenders multiple equilibria on capital allocation—which emerge during the middle stages of capital accumulation—accounting for leapfrogging and the instability of the economic growth of developing countries with medium capital accumulation.     

Political institutions and telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and discuss venues for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.