Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters

In his seminal work on tariff retaliation, Johnson ( Review of Economic Studies , 21 , 1953–1954) showed that a country will "win" a bilateral "tariff war" if its relative monopoly/monopsony power in world trade is sufficiently large. However, it is unclear from Johnson's analysis and from subsequent research on the subject how this power is determined in general economic environments. An important goal of this paper is to address this issue. With the help of a neoclassical trade model in which country size is at centre stage, it is shown that a sufficient condition for a country to prefer a non-cooperative Nash tariff equilibrium (retaliation) over free trade is that its relative size be sufficiently large. The paper also refines the structure of the general trade model and generates additional characterization results on the importance of country size for best-response tariff functions, retaliatory tariffs, and welfare.     

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general‐equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most‐favored‐nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free‐ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN‐based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non‐ cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN‐based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side‐payments if they bargain bilaterally.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

The 2020 US Presidential election and Trump’s wars on trade and health insurance

The trade war initiated by the Trump administration is the largest since the US imposed the Smoot-Hawley tariffs in the 1930s and was still raging when he left office. We analyze how the trade war impacted the 2020 US Presidential election. Our results highlight the political salience of the trade war: US trade war tariffs boosted Trump’s support but foreign retaliation hurt Trump. In particular, the pro-Trump effects of US trade war tariffs were crucial for Trump crossing the recount thresholds in Georgia and Wisconsin. Even more important politically, voters abandoned Trump in counties with large expansions of health insurance coverage since the Affordable Care Act, presumably fearing the roll-back of such expansion. Absent this anti-Trump effect, Trump would have been on the precipice of re-election by winning Georgia, Arizona, Nevada, and only losing Wisconsin by a few thousand votes. These effects of the trade war and health insurance coverage expansion cross political and racial lines, suggesting the mechanism operates through the impact on local economies rather than political polarization.     

Trade imbalance and the endogenous optimal tariff

Endogenous tariff literatures reveal empirically that trade imbalance is negatively related with import tariff, this article gives a theoretical evidence and explanation to support this finding with the methodology of multi-country numerical general equilibrium modelling and simulation. We explore how optimal tariff changes after trade imbalance is introduced, and find that optimal tariffs decrease substantially, either for surplus or deficit countries, when imbalance is considered. Specifically, when the imbalance is modelled in endogenous monetary and inside-money structures, the optimal tariffs decrease by 26% globally on average. Our results suggest that the deepening trade imbalance is beneficial to the global trade liberalization due to its driving tariffs down.     

Gains and losses from potential bilateral US–China trade retaliation

Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World, and calibrated to a global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary non-neutrals and including China's trade surplus as an endogenous variable.Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis world is much debated. In a US–China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading partners' practices would determine costs for China.Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare improving for the US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with non-retaliatory regions, while China and non-retaliatory regions may be adversely affected. Results in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification, however, suggest that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of imports are high. Costs are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade and adjustment costs at home.     

The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi, T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92–97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism.     

Energy prices and the expansion of world trade

The share of merchandise output that is internationally traded has significantly increased while tariffs have fallen. However, standard trade models have surprising difficulty linking these two facts. Trade growth slowed in the 1970s as tariffs fell relatively sharply while after the late 1980s trade grew quickly as tariffs fell slowly. This pattern implies that the price-import elasticity has changed over time. Also, tariffs have not fallen enough to generate such a large increase in trade given estimates of this elasticity. Changes in transport costs can resolve both puzzles. I present a vertical specialization trade model with an energy-using transportation sector. In the simulated model, trade growth slows from 1974 to 1985. The oil shocks raised transport costs, offsetting falling tariffs, so the price-import elasticity no longer needs to change. It also generates the observed volume of trade growth since transport costs have fallen over the long run.     

Measuring China’s trade liberalization: A generalized measure of trade restrictiveness index

Neither simple average nor import-weighted average tariff indexes are ideal measures of tariff barriers. In this paper, we propose a generalized trade restrictiveness index (GTRI) that extends Feenstra’s (1995) tariff restrictiveness index (TRI) by relaxing the crucial assumption of a small open economy. We show that the GTRI can be measured using import tariffs, import shares, and the corresponding import and foreign export elasticities. We then apply the GTRI to examine how trade restrictiveness has evolved in China from 1997 to 2008, the period in which China entered the WTO. The GTRI indicates a higher level of protection than simple and import-weighted averages, but lower than the TRI. We further show a negative correlation between tariffs and product export supply elasticity, indicating that strategic trade policy was being pursued prior to China’s WTO accession. Finally, we calculate the welfare loss and terms-of-trade gain due to tariff protection. The overall tariff pass-through increases from around 28% to almost 47% because of the WTO.     

Export taxes versus buffer stocks as optimal export policies under uncertainty

Optimal state-dependent export taxes and costly-to-store buffer stocks are compared in their welfare implications for an exporter possessing monopoly power in the international trade of a volatile commodity. Optimal stochastic control is used to derive the optimal buffer stock rules. It is shown that, if the internal and external fluctuations facing the exporter are large, if the storage costs are low, and if the price elasticity of export supply is small relative to that of export demand, the exporter would gain more from a buffer stock than from a optimal export tax. World welfare is always increased by buffer stocks, as opposed to tariffs; and, under some conditions, the foreign country might also benefit and, hence, not retaliate.     

Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?

Many nations have undergone significant trade liberalization even as they have increased their use of contingent protection measures. This raises the question of whether some of the trade liberalization efforts, at times accomplished through painful reforms, have been undone through a substitution from tariffs to non‐tariff barriers. Among the new forms of protection, antidumping is the most relevant. This paper examines whether the use of antidumping is systematically influenced by the reduction of applied sectoral tariffs in a sample of 29 developing and six developed countries from 1991 through 2002. Evidence is found of a substitution effect only for a small set of heavy users of antidumping among developing countries. There is no similar statistically significant result for other developing countries or developed countries. Robust evidence is also found of retaliation and deflection effects as determinant of antidumping filings across all subsamples.     

Armington elasticities in intermediate inputs trade: a problem in using multilateral trade data

Abstract.  In this paper we find that the estimates of Armington elasticities (the elasticity of substitution between groups of products identified by country of origin) obtained from multilateral trade data can differ from those obtained from bilateral trade data. In particular, the former tends to be higher than the latter when trade consists largely of intermediate inputs. Given that the variety of intermediate inputs traded across borders is increasing rapidly and that the effect of this increase is not adequately captured in multilateral trade data, the evidence shows that the employment of multilateral trade data to estimate Armington elasticities needs caution. JEL classification: F14, C51     

Learning How To Export

In this paper, we present a standard quality ladders endogenous growth model with one significant new assumption: it takes time for firms to learn how to export. It is known that the welfare gains from trade liberalization implied by a large class of models like the Armington gravity model, the Krugman model, and the Melitz model are small. Our quality ladders model is consistent with a number of firm‐level stylized facts from the heterogeneous firms trade literature and is, in addition, capable of generating very large welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Shifting Armington trade preferences: A re-examination of the Mercosur–EU negotiations

This paper examines the ‘small share’ problem inherent within the constant elasticity of substitution Armington specification. As a de facto research tool in the quantitative trade literature, this structural bias plagues the results of numerous multi-region CGE studies. Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006) proposed a fusion of gravity and CGE specifications to remedy said bias, which the current paper further develops. With a pervasiveness of ‘small-share’ examples on Mercosur–European Union trade owing to the latter's restrictive tariff regime, the results reveal that significant additional trade led gains to Mercosur under a potential preferential trade agreement when compared with the standard Armington treatment.     

The Ramaswami Argument in a Multi-commodity Setting

This paper considers the optimum taxes and tariffs in a multi-commodity setting. Using the argument in Ramawami (1968), I show that when all goods and factors are tradable, the home country should buy out all the foreign factors. Conditions for the optimal terms of trade are also analyzed. In a single consumption good model, the foreign factors should be bought out at the foreign autarky prices. This result is only partially true in the more general setting. While factor mobility should be prohibited before the buy-out, non-prohibitive tariffs have to be imposed on trade in goods to attain the optimum terms of trade.     

Economic integration and tax policy with endogenous foreign firm ownership

This paper analyses the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model where corporate taxation is motivated by the desire to tax profits accruing to foreigners and the number of foreign owned firms is endogenous. Increasing economic integration is modeled as a decline in trade costs or tariffs. It turns out that declining trade costs lead to increasing profit taxes if the government may use import tariffs. If tariffs are not available, declining trade costs induce profit taxes to decline as well. A mandatory reduction in tariffs also triggers profit tax reductions. We conclude that the existence of foreign firm ownership may fail to prevent profit taxes from declining as economic integration proceeds.     

Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model

This paper considers uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium of a tariff retaliation model. The approach to the problem is geometrical and reminiscent of the analysis for the free trade competitive equilibrium. If the countries have constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, some simple conditions can be used to prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the tariff retaliation game. The welfare effects of endowment changes are analyzed in terms of the standard terms of trade and volume of trade effects. If the elasticity of substitution of one of the countries is sufficiently high, immiserizing growth will not occur.      

Comparison of deep integration in the Melitz,Krugman and Armington models: The case of The Philippines in RCEP

We estimate the welfare effects of a modern mega-preferential trade agreement--the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership--with three versions of market structure: (i) perfect competition, Armington style; (ii) monopolistic competition based on Krugman (1980); and (iii) monopolistic competition in the style of Melitz (2003). We develop a new numerical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) with heterogeneous firms and extension of the Krugman model that allows small countries to impact the number of varieties. We hold both the trade and FDI responses constant across the three market structures. We find that in all three market structures, there are substantial gains from deep integration, but virtually no gains from preferential tariff reduction. Both our Krugman and Melitz style models produce significantly larger welfare gains than the Armington structure, especially if third countries benefit at least partially from the deep integration reforms via either spillovers or wider liberalization.     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18