基于旅行社价格竞争的博弈分析及策略

本文通过运用博弈论方法对旅行社面临的竞争进行分析,阐述了在非完全信息条件下,旅行社不可能形成“默契合谋”,从而导致价格竞争的不可避免。因此,本文进一步提出了旅行社面对价格竞争时应具备的观念及相关策略。     

券商佣金价格联盟——一个博弈分析框架

国内各城市的券商组成具有寡头市场结构特征,经营中各寡头经过博弈的结果是形成佣金价格联盟。通过对利益相关者的博弈分析,这种联盟的稳定性非常脆弱。从更深层次的原因分析,这种联盟的形成与我国的券商退出机制没有健全有密切联系,当务之急是尽快建立市场化的券商退出机制。     

博弈均衡和区域移动通信价格竞争:来自移动通信业的经验分析

在现有的管理体系下,区域移动通信运营商在大众市场的价格竞争并不是基于收入最大化的决策,而是基于代理人效用最大化的价格决策,代理人的效用主要体现在收入任务的完成及竞争大势的把控.本文通过构建基于价格竞争策略的区域代理人博弈模型,对区域移动运营商之间的价格决策进行了实证分析,指出了可能导致恶性价格竞争的因素,并在此基础上提出了促进区域移动市场良性发展的建议.     

关于内容分析方法对中国旅行社网站营销效果的研究——以国内44家旅行社网站为例

学者们从多个角度、不同方法对网站评价进行了研究,而且建立了很多网站评价指标.我们认为对于电子商务网站仅仅考虑可用性等指标是不全面的,应该融合网站营销效果的因素.基于此,本研究采用内容分析法,运用成熟的编码表对国内旅行社网站的营销效果进行了研究,分析了不同网站利用网站沟通的能力和差异.     

基于信息不对称房价博弈模型的优化均衡研究

目前我国住宅市场存在严重的信息不对称,如何进行规制引起多方关注。首先利用房价博弈模型研究我国住宅市场信息不对称下的非理性均衡和精炼优化的序贯均衡,进而探求政府对市场房价经济优化规制后的理性序贯均衡,以此提出政府对住宅产业的规制方式和对策建议。     

Market Segmentation: The Role of Opaque Travel Agencies

This paper investigates the role of discount travel agencies such as Priceline and Hotwire in the market segmentation of the hotel and airline industries. These agencies conceal important characteristics of the offered services, such as hotel locations or flight schedules. We explicitly model this opaque feature and show that it enables service providers to price discriminate between those customers who are sensitive to service characteristics and those who are not. Service providers can profit from such discrimination despite the fact that the opaque feature virtually erases product differentiation and thus intensifies competition. The reason is that the intensified competition for less sensitive customers enables service providers to commit to a higher price for more sensitive customers, which leads to higher profits overall. This explains why airlines or hotels are willing to lose the advantage of product differentiation and offer services through discount travel agencies.     

论组合优化出让规制下的地价博弈均衡与对策

作为中国住宅商品重要投入要素的土地,其价格对房价的影响不可小觑,而转型期地方政府有形之手及土地自身固有特性导致的土地市场失灵和地价失效,必须通过政府之手实行价格经济规制再造,以达到市场的理性回归.本文从利益各方地价博弈视角切入,构建中央与地方、地方政府与开发企业间的地价博弈模型,由于利益各方博弈行动相互牵制,纳什均衡结果表明中央政府为了稳定房地产价格须采取组合优化供给地价规制,实现土地市场的平稳发展,而地方政府则退而求其次,采取组合优化出让土地,迎合中央地价规制政策,实现自身目标效用的次优化.在地方政府与企业的土地出让博弈中,唯有采用组合优化土地供给规制方式,加大土地招标出让方式的比重,才能达到规制地价的效果.     

旅行社产品开发的问题及对策

旅游产品是指旅行社为满足旅游者在旅游过程中的需要而向旅游者销售的所有服务和产品。旅游产品是由多种因素组合起来的特殊产品,由交通、住宿、饮食、游览、购物、娱乐六大要素构成,并贯穿于整个旅游活动中。旅游产品是旅行社竞争的核心,旅游产品开发设计对于旅行社来说是至关重要的。     

物流联盟知识转移的博弈分析

首先分析了物流联盟的特点及其知识转移的内容,然后根据知识转移的过程建立博弈模型,分析得出物流联盟中知识的顺利转移与贴现率、对方知识存量、对方参与转移知识的比例、自身对知识的吸收能力、自身创造新知识的能力成正比;与转移知识的风险成反比。     

物流联盟知识转移的博弈分析

首先分析了物流联盟的特点及其知识转移的内容,然后根据知识转移的过程建立博弈模型,分析得出物流联盟中知识的顺利转移与贴现率、对方知识存量、对方参与转移知识的比例、自身对知识的吸收能力、自身创造新知识的能力成正比;与转移知识的风险成反比.     

From General Equilibrium to Schumpeter

A simple model of cost innovation in a monetary economy is presented that illustrates the essentially dynamic model of Schumpeter involving breaking the circular flow of capital is logically consistent with the General Equilibrium (GE) model of an exchange and production economy. The GE model as presented by Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie is a non-process model; and the original theory deals with the non-constructive proofs of existence of competitive equilibria (CEs). To associate this theory with GE it is necessary to recast the basic model as a process model. The GE model is enlarged and specified as a playable game by adding rules to describe the mechanisms that carry process.Although we believe that GE was a great intellectual achievement, it strangled dynamics and the type of low dimensional equilibrium dynamics of the rational expectations school is profoundly misleading. It turns out that, by remodeling GE as a process model even with only one or two strategic moves, Pandora׳s Box of mechanisms appears and the functions of markets, money and default conditions all emerge as logical necessities.It is shown that the opportunity for process innovation can be described minimally and formally modeled by considering the availability of a new process as a function of a controlled stochastic variable where success depends on chance modified by the level of investment. The Schumpeterian concept of “breaking the circular flow of capital” appears naturally as a disequilibrium phenomenon where the extra resources are captured by a strategic disequilibrating allocation of money.     

企业知识联盟的博弈分析

企业知识联盟的脆弱及非持续性一直是企业建设知识联盟实践时常遇到的问题。本文采用博弈论方法对企业知识联盟中的竞争合作互动关系进行了分析,并就参与方如何建设持续、长久的合作型企业知识联盟提出了策略和建议。