Corruption,governance, and public pension funds

We examine the effects of state corruption as well as political and governance factors on U.S. public pension funds. We find that pension funds in states with more corruption have lower performance; a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a decrease in annual returns of at least 14 basis points, and this relationship is robust to state-level and pension-level fixed effects. Pensions located in more corrupt jurisdictions also invest a larger fraction of their assets in equities. We find that having a new treasurer decreases the negative effects of corruption, suggesting that more frequent changes in administrations are beneficial in corrupt jurisdictions. Governance-related variables and political affiliation variables are by themselves not significantly related to pension returns, although these variables are associated with differences in asset allocation.     

PAYG pension systems with capital mobility

This paper studies the design of an optimal pension scheme in an OLG and open economy model. The pension scheme provides a flat rate benefit and is based on the PAYG principle. It thus combines inter- and intra-generational redistribution. In this setting a number of symmetric economies are connected by an open and perfect capital market. When this number is very large, we have the small open economy case; when it is reduced to one, we have the case of autarky or perfect coordination. As the number of countries increases, there is more intragenerational redistribution, but less capital accumulation. JEL Code H55 · H87     

Government pension policy and the cost of labor and capital

This article examines how the pension insurance provided by the PBGC and the tax treatment of pension plans affect the cost of labor and capital. Two important aspects of the insurance program are (1) the premium schedule and (2) an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits (the deductible). These two aspects interact to increase the cost of capital relative to labor, especially for firms with underfunded plans.     

Public pension fund ownership and firm performance

Equity ownership by public pension funds (PPFs) is widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Cremers and Nair 2005; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007) as a measure of the strength of shareholder monitoring/governance. This paper raises caution on such practices by illustrating an inverted-U shape relationship between PPF ownership and firms’ future performance, measured by stock returns and operating performance: during 1985–2005, future performance first increases, then declines in aggregate equity ownership by PPFs. Our results suggest that PPFs’ presence is consistent with shareholder value maximization when they have moderate influence on firm management, whereas excessive PPF ownership may facilitate PPF managers’ pursuits of political interests and destroy shareholder value. Therefore, it is important to impose an upper bound to PPF ownership when measuring the strength of shareholder monitoring/governance.     

Ageing and public capital accumulation

We have examined the effects of ageing on the balanced-growth-maximizing public investment policy in an overlapping generations model with growth engines of public capital accumulation. Extended life expectancy tends to increase individual savings, while the increased old-age dependency requires more resources to be allocated to consumption in the economy. Declining working population makes for a severe trade-off between private and public capital accumulation. It is shown that as ageing proceeds, not only the income tax rate must be raised to accelerate public capital formation but the expenditure share of maintenance should be increased in order to maximize the balanced-growth rate.      

Public market staging: The timing of capital infusions in newly public firms

We examine financing activities of newly public firms for evidence on capital staging in the public equity market. Staging (sequential financing) can increase issuance costs but can limit costs associated with overinvestment. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that staging is employed to help control the overinvestment problem in public firms. Initial public offering (IPO) proceeds, relative to external financing requirements, are smaller for firms with more intangible assets and more research and development (R&D)-intensive firms. Asset intangibility and R&D intensity are also both negatively related to the length of time from a firm's IPO to its first post-IPO capital infusion.     

The efficiency of Greek public pension fund portfolios

Greek public pension funds can invest up to 23% into risky assets and are not allowed to invest outside Greece. This paper seeks to investigate the costs of investment constraints on pension fund portfolios. In particular we try to quantify the losses that portfolios suffer due to under-diversification and sub-optimal asset allocation. We find that the high concentration of Greek equity portfolios imposes a substantial return and utility loss which is further increased when the lack of international diversification is taken into account. Restricting the weight of equities to 23% of the total portfolio, leads to sub-optimal asset allocation that costs as much as 2% (3%) per annum compared to a balanced domestic (global) benchmark.     

Debt financing,venture capital,and the performance of initial public offerings

We examine the roles of two financial intermediaries, lenders and venture capitalists, in a sample of more than 6000 IPO firms during 1980–2012. Venture capitalists and lenders generally fund different types of firms and, on average, are substitutes; however, in some instances we observe interactions and complementary roles between the two funding sources. Firms with high debt have lower valuation uncertainty, and lower initial day returns than those backed by venture capital. However, firms with high debt levels underperform in the long-run, especially those without venture capital. We provide some evidence that firms backed by reputable venture capitalists perform better.     

Public policy,entrepreneurship, and venture capital in the United States

This paper empirically examines business starts, deaths, venture capital and patents in relation to U.S. public policy. The most consistent evidence in the data shows that lower levels of labor frictions and higher levels of SBIR awards are associated with more business starts and higher levels of venture capital per population. Counter to expectations, the data indicate a positive impact from the homestead exemption only among the bottom quartile homestead exemption states, and otherwise a negative impact. We analyze a variety of other policy instruments and compare the effects of policy in regular times with the financial crisis of 2008–2010.     

Shareholder activism of public pension funds: The political facet

This paper studies the political incentive of public pension funds in shareholder activism. Using a sample of shareholder proposals from 1993 to 2013 and a hand-collected data set of the political variables of public pension funds, we document evidence consistent with the “political attention hypothesis.” We find that the number of politicians on public pension fund boards is significantly positively related to the frequency with which portfolio firms are targeted. Moreover, the frequency of social-responsibility proposals by public pension funds increases significantly, as the funds have a greater number of board members running for election to public office. However the frequency of corporate governance proposals is not related to the number of board members running for elections to public office. Furthermore, we document that political connection between a portfolio firm and a public pension fund mitigates the firm’s likelihood of being targeted by the fund with social-responsibility proposals. This result supports the “political contribution hypothesis.” The paper provides direct evidence that public pension-fund board members employ shareholder proposals to enhance their political capital.     

Venture capital funds and the public equity market

This paper considers the relationship between the public equity market and the returns to venture investing using a dataset which is derived from the records of two large limited partners who have been investing in venture capital for almost 30 years. Evidence is found to suggest that market conditions over the investment cycle, and exit conditions at the time of exit in particular, are an important determinant. This paper also investigates whether any other aspects of the venture investment process respond to events in the broader market. While general trends are evident in the venture investment cycle, only the intensity of the investment process is found to respond to events in the public equity market.     

Public entrants,public equity finance and creative destruction

We explore the importance of new public firms and public equity finance for R&D and creative destruction in the US high-tech sector. Over 1900 new public firms enter high-tech manufacturing between 1970 and 2004; they are increasingly R&D intensive and rely extensively on public equity finance in the 1980s and 1990s. We estimate dynamic R&D models and find a strong link between public equity finance and R&D for new entrants, but not established entrants or incumbents. Further, recent cohorts of public entrants have a substantial economic impact: by 2000, recent public entrants account for almost half of high-tech sales and more than half of R&D. Variation in the availability of public equity finance has a marked impact on entrant R&D and the rate at which entrants take market share from incumbents. Our findings identify a key channel through which public equity markets facilitate the process of creative destruction.     

Information disclosure,firm growth,and the cost of capital

We study how information disclosure affects the cost of equity capital and investor welfare in a dynamic setting. We show that a firm’s cost of capital decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) a certain threshold. The threshold growth rate is higher when the firm’s cash flows are more persistent, or when other firms in the economy are growing at low rates. While current shareholders always prefer maximum public disclosure, future shareholders’ welfare decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) the threshold.     

An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the determinants of public pension fund investment risk and reports several new important findings. Unlike private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that CalPERS equity allocation or beta is mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, our results suggest that government accounting standards strongly affect pension fund risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and portfolio beta.     

公共养老储备基金资产配置比较研究与启示——基于挪威、法国、爱尔兰、新西兰四国公共养老储备基金比较分析

公共养老储备基金的资产配置策略是以储备基金的营运目标为导向制定的。设定基准投资组合、分散化的全球资产配置、重视新兴市场与社会责任投资、再平衡策略与动态资产配置策略并重等成为近年来各国共公告养老储备基金资产配置的主要特征。基于全国社会保障基金的投资实践,文章提出了制定差异化的资产配置策略以实现不同阶段目标,投资监管模式和资产配置策略同步创新以实现投资监管与投资实践良性互动,加快资产配置策略的全球布局以实现区域经济套利和人口红利套利,注重储备基金的责任投资导向、凸显养老金绿色投资功能的改革建议。     

Relationship marketing,relational capital and the future of marketing in public service organizations

This article proposes an innovative model of marketing practice for public services. This is rooted in the paradigm of relationship marketing and emphasizes the need to build relational capital between and within organizations operating in the public services arena. It is argued that this is essential for the effective management of contemporary public services in the fragmented state.     

Terminal valuations, growth rates and the implied cost of capital

We develop a model based on the notion that prices lead earnings, allowing for a simultaneous estimation of the implied growth rate and the cost of equity capital for US industrial sectors. The major difference between our approach and that in prior literature is that ours avoids the necessity to make assumptions about terminal values and consequently about future growth rates. In fact, growth rates are an endogenous variable, which is estimated simultaneously with the implied cost of equity capital. Since we require only 1-year-ahead forecasts of earnings and no assumptions about dividend payouts, our methodology allows us to estimate ex ante aggregate growth and risk premia over a larger sample of firms than has previously been possible. Our estimate of the risk premium being between 3.1 and 3.9 % is at the lower end of recent estimates, reflecting the inclusion of these short-lived companies. Our estimate of the long run growth is from 4.2 to 4.7 %.