Effects of interest rate swaps

In this paper we examine the effect of interest rate swaps on the firm, and identify characteristics of firms that use interest rate swaps, reporting findings consistent with interest rate swaps being used as a risk-reducing instrument. Relative to nonswappers, firms using swaps are more likely to experience decreased cash flow variance in the five-year period subsequent to swap initiation. In addition, firms that engage in swaps are found to be larger and more highly levered than a control sample of nonswappers. Dividing our sample based upon type of swap, we find different characteristics explain different types of swap. In particular we find evidence consistent with swaps from variable to fixed interest rates being engaged in for risk reduction, i.e., hedging purposes.     

The components of interest rate swap spreads: Theory and international evidence

This article contains both a theoretical and an empirical analysis of the components of interest rate swap spreads defined as the difference between the fixed swap rate and the risk‐free rate of equal maturity. The components are determined by expected LIBOR spreads, default risk, and market structure. A model of the swap market incorporating debt market imperfections and corporate financing choices is used to explain participation by both swap buyers and sellers. The model also motivates an empirical relationship between swap spreads and the slope of the risk‐free term structure. The article then provides empirical evidence on the cross‐sectional and time‐series variation of swap spreads in seven international markets. The evidence is consistent with the suggested components across both markets and swap maturities as well as over time. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:347–387, 2003     

How and Why Do Firms Adjust Their Cash Holdings toward Targets? Evidence from China

We examine the dynamic adjustment of cash holdings of publicly traded Chinese firms during 1998–2006. The empirical evidence is supportive of the dynamic trade-off theory of cash holdings. In particular, there is strong evidence of asymmetric adjustments, i.e., adjustments from above the target are significantly faster than those from below. Moreover, the speeds of adjustment (SOA) are heterogeneous for firms facing differential adjustment costs. More specifically, the adjustment speed is higher in firms with bank lines of credit, positively related to the deviation from the target, but it is negatively related to firm size. Furthermore, in terms of adjustment method, firms make adjustments to their targets primarily through debt and equity financing when they are in cash shortage, On the other hand, the dividend payments play a minimal role in it. Lastly, in terms of motives for adjustment, we find that the precautionary motive arising from financial constraints well explains the cash holdings adjustment behaviors of Chinese listed firms.     

CREDIT SPREADS, OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND IMPLIED VOLATILITY WITH ENDOGENOUS DEFAULT AND JUMP RISK

We propose a two-sided jump model for credit risk by extending the Leland–Toft endogenous default model based on the geometric Brownian motion. The model shows that jump risk and endogenous default can have significant impacts on credit spreads, optimal capital structure, and implied volatility of equity options: (1) Jumps and endogenous default can produce a variety of non-zero credit spreads, including upward, humped, and downward shapes; interesting enough, the model can even produce, consistent with empirical findings, upward credit spreads for speculative grade bonds. (2) The jump risk leads to much lower optimal debt/equity ratio; in fact, with jump risk, highly risky firms tend to have very little debt. (3) The two-sided jumps lead to a variety of shapes for the implied volatility of equity options, even for long maturity options; although in general credit spreads and implied volatility tend to move in the same direction under exogenous default models, this may not be true in presence of endogenous default and jumps. Pricing formulae of credit default swaps and equity default swaps are also given. In terms of mathematical contribution, we give a proof of a version of the "smooth fitting" principle under the jump model, justifying a conjecture first suggested by Leland and Toft under the Brownian model.     

Pricing models of equity swaps

This article provides a generalized formula for pricing equity swaps with constant notional principal when the underlying equity markets and settlement currency can be set arbitrarily. To derive swap values using the risk‐neutral valuation method, the swap payment is replicated at each settlement date by constructing a self‐financing portfolio. To obtain the foreign equity index return denominated in the domestic or in a third currency, equity‐linked foreign exchange options are used to hedge the exchange rate risk. It is found that if the swap involves international equity markets, then the swap value contains an extra term which reflects the currency hedging costs. This methodology can easily be applied to price various types of equity swaps simply by modifying the specifications of the model presented here as required. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:751–772, 2003     

Credit granting to small firms: A Brazilian case

Transaction costs limit the supply of credit to small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). From a sample of 65,535 SME credit proposals submitted to a large Brazilian bank between January 2004 and September 2006, this research analyzes credit granting decisions. Results suggest that small firms face credit rationing and that low risk credit contracts with liquid collateral are their primary source of credit. Also, the bank captures private information through its lending relationships with borrowers, which affects its credit granting decisions. The findings reveal that the bank under study faces difficulties in expanding the supply of credit to small firms mainly because of cost, collateral-dependency and constraints due to asymmetric information.     

Small businesses and liquidity constraints in financing business investment: Evidence from shanghai's manufacturing sector

When firms experience financial hierarchy, external finance, if at all available, is substantially more expensive than internal finance. Factors such as transaction costs, agency problem, and asymmetric information have created such a hierarchy. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that asymmetric information between firms and potential suppliers of external finance creates adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit market in developed market economies. This problem of a higher cost of external finance is commonly thought to be more serious for small firms because they are more disadvantaged than their larger counterparts in accessing external finance due to several factors: (1) Public information on small firms is generally not available and leads to the even greater problem of asymmetric information, i.e., more severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems. These information problems have excluded small firms from bond and share markets. (2) Due to the lack of available means of external finance, small firms rely more heavily on bank loans than their larger counterparts. In addition, as small firms are more interested in cultivating stable relationships with a few banks in order to secure a stable supply of credit, these banks become virtual monopolies by lending to small businesses and exercise their market power in lending to small firms.Most of existing research considers only small firms in market economies; little research has been done to understand the relationship between firm size and investment financing in any economy in transition. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by studying the relationship between firm size and liquidity constraints by using a firm level data of manufacturing enterprises in Shanghai during the period of 1989–1992. We consider whether small manufacturing firms in Shanghai are constrained by the availability of liquidity compared with their larger counterparts when they are financing their fixed investment. In a transforming economy such as China (or other similar transition economies), external finance relies heavily on loans from banks that are fully owned by the state. Due to historical reasons, allocations of credit are always biased in favor of state-owned enterprises. Such a `lending bias' imposes an extra cost on small Chinese enterprises in financing investment as the majority of them are not state-owned.In such an environment, our empirical results show that small manufacturing firms in Shanghai are actually less liquidity-constrained than their larger counterparts in financing their fixed investment. This surprising result is rather different from what people normally predict based on the experience in market economies. We suggest three possible explanations for this peculiar finding: (1) The composition of various firm size classes plays an important role in explaining the result: Non-state enterprises which are fast growing and efficient dominate the small firm classes. Their successes in the markets helps them to generate enough internal funds to smooth their investment over time. (2) The presence of heavy indebtedness of large state-owned enterprises may deprive them of sufficient cash available for investment decision. Given that state-owned enterprises have been making heavy losses, the central and regional governments have a liquidity problem in satisfying their huge liquidity demands. (3) Small enterprises in non-state sectors can rely on the informal credit market to obtain funds for investment although they are excluded from the state banking system.However, the further trade liberalization in terms of eliminating tariffs and quotas caused by China's bid of joining the WTO will erode the profits of these small enterprises as imported goods will be supplied at lower prices. In addition, further reforms in financial sectors may also affect the supply of external finance to small enterprises in nonstate sectors. The consequence may lead to a tight liquidity constraint for small enterprises in China.     

Trade Credit in Small and Medium Size Firms: An Application of the System Estimator With Panel Data

Financing through suppliers is a subject that has been little studied in the economic literature in general and in corporate finance in particular. Although several hypotheses have been put forward to explain the different reasons behind this phenomenon, trade credit is not based on a general theory. This study provides empirical evidence about factors determining the use of trade credit for a sample of small and medium size firms, which are potentially the firms that would follow this financing route, since they are more rationed in credit markets. Using a panel of Canary-Island firms from 1990 to 1996, and by means of specifications with the system estimator, results reveal that trade credit leads to a reduction in asymmetric information between firms and their financial backers, as well as in transaction costs. Furthermore, we confirm the theory that companies with easier access to institutional finance act as a credit channel for those with greater difficulties to obtain external funds.     

The Financial Structure of Private Held Belgian Firms

We examine the determinants of the debt-equity choice and the debt maturity choice for a sample of small, privately held firms in a creditor oriented environment. Our results, which are based on 4,706 firm-year observations for 1132 Belgian firms in the period 1996–2000, generally confirm the role of asymmetric information and agency costs of debt as major determinants of the financial structure of privately held firms. High growth firms and firms with less tangible assets have a lower debt ratio. We also find that more profitable firms have less debt. Firms tend to match the maturity of debt with the maturity of their assets. Growth options do not seem to influence debt maturity, which would suggest that the underinvestment problem is resolved by lowering leverage and by bank monitoring, not by reducing debt maturity. Credit risk is also an important determinant of debt maturity: firms with higher credit risk borrow more on the short term. Finally, in contrast to most studies on the financial structure of companies, we find that larger firms tend to have a higher debt ratio and a shorter debt maturity.      

Firm-Level Determinants of the Financing Decisions of Small and Medium Enterprises: Evidence from Argentina

This article studies the determinants of the financing decisions of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which we characterize through three cases: trade-off behavior, pecking order, and extreme aversion to debt. We test our hypotheses using a dataset of firms from Bahía Blanca (Argentina) for two years: 2006 and 2010. We find that firm characteristics related to information asymmetries, such as firm age, size, and legal form; and personal factors, such as owner’s age and education; and perception of emotional bankruptcy costs, are relevant variables in SME financing behavior. The recognition of extreme aversion to debt motivates reconsideration of the underleverage problem of SMEs.     

Islamic financing and bank risks: The case of Malaysia

We examine whether Islamic financing can explain three important bank risks in a country with a dual banking system: credit risk, interest‐rate risk, and liquidity risk. Using Malaysian data, we find that commercial banks with Islamic financing have significantly lower credit and liquidity risks but significantly higher interest‐rate risk than banks without Islamic financing. There is also evidence that bank size is significantly related to credit risk; the proportion of loan sales to total liabilities and bank size are significant determinants of interest‐rate risk; and off‐balance‐sheet financing, the extent of securitization, loan volatility, bank capital, and bank size are statistically significantly related to liquidity risk. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Small firms finance in France

The data concerning interest rates paid by small and medium sized firms on credit and financial markets as well as the available balance-sheets confirm the idea that firms have difficulties to get financial resources. This paper tries to put in light the financial disparities among firms when a discrimination resting on size characterises the functioning of credit market. The first section presents the main financial characteristics of French SMEs: the low level of equities, the heaviness of short term debts and the over use of payment delays. Section 2 shows how French and European authorities reacted in order to improve the financial situation of SME's and to reduce their liquidity constraint, changing tax policy and promoting the creation of new means of financing.     

Funding Gaps? Access To Bank Loans By High-Tech Start-Ups

This paper aims to shed new light on start-up financing of new technology-based firms (NTBFs) and the existence of credit constraints that may negatively affect their activity. For this purpose, we analyze the different sources of start-up financing used by NTBFs and investigate several characteristics that may influence the extent of recourse to bank loans. In the empirical section, we consider a sample composed of 386 Italian NTBFs that operate both in manufacturing and services. We estimate double-censored tobit and bivariate tobit models so as to highlight the determinants of (i) the financial leverage, measured by the ratio of bank debt to total capital, and (ii) the amounts of personal capital and bank loans of firms at start-up, respectively. Our findings support the view that the credit market is imperfect and there exists a financing hierarchy. In fact, only a minority of firms resorts to outside financing, and especially to bank debt. In addition, the level of financial leverage is not random; it increases with an increase of the predicted amount of firms’ total initial capital, while it decreases with variables such as the number of owners and the work experience of founders that are indicative of greater personal wealth available to finance firms’ start-up. Lastly, the size of the bank loans obtained by firms generally is small and it is quite insensitive to demand-side factors that instead determine the amount of personal and total capital, with the notable exception of scale economies in the industry of the start-up. In other words, in accordance with the argument that credit to NTBFs is rationed, the loan supply curve is highly inelastic, even though not perfectly so.     

Empirical evidence on the dependence of credit default swaps and equity prices

We investigate the common practice of estimating the dependence structure between credit default swap prices on multi‐name credit instruments from the dependence structure of the equity returns of the underlying firms. We find convincing evidence that the practice is inappropriate for high‐yield instruments and that it may even be flawed for instruments containing only firms within a sector. To do this, we model individual credit ratings by univariate continuous time Markov chains, and their joint dynamics by copulas. The use of copulas allows us to incorporate our knowledge of the modeling of univariate processes, into a multivariate framework. However, our test and results are robust to the choice of copula. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:695–712, 2009     

On Lending to Small Firms

Lending to small firms is difficult because of the problems of information asymmetry. Innovative ways to address these problems have the potential to increase credit availability to these firms. The papers in this section provide a discussion of two different innovations in small business financing: increased usage of credit scoring technology and the introduction of microfinance lending institutions. Though these two approaches make use of different technologies, they provide a valuable picture of how lending to small firms is evolving over time.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Financing Decisions: Evidence from Stock Market Liberalization

We analyze the impact of firm‐specific stock market liberalization events on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms from emerging market economies. We differentiate between firms based on their ownership structures at the time of liberalization and analyze their post‐liberalization behavior regarding corporate financing decisions. Our empirical results show that single–class‐share firms (typically with stronger corporate governance and better information environments) respond differently to their dual–class‐share counterparts. Liberalization results in lower debt reliance for the former group while the latter lengthen the maturity of their debt portfolios. Jel Classification: F30; G15; G32.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RETENTION RATIO IN A KALECKIAN MODEL WITH DEBT ACCUMULATION

By using a Kaleckian model with debt accumulation, Hein (2007; Metroeconomica, 56 (2), pp. 310–39) found that the long‐run equilibrium value of the debt–capital ratio is positive and stable only if interest rates are extremely high and if the short‐run equilibrium exhibits the ‘debt‐led’ growth regime. However, this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption that the retention ratio of firms is equal to unity. By relaxing this assumption, we show that there exists a positive and stable long‐run equilibrium even under the ‘debt‐burdened’ regime without any constraint on the nominal interest rate.     

Multiple Ratings Model of Defaultable Term Structure

A new approach to modeling credit risk, to valuation of defaultable debt and to pricing of credit derivatives is developed. Our approach, based on the Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) methodology, uses the available information about the credit spreads combined with the available information about the recovery rates to model the intensities of credit migrations between various credit ratings classes. This results in a conditionally Markovian model of credit risk. We then combine our model of credit risk with a model of interest rate risk in order to derive an arbitrage‐free model of defaultable bonds. As expected, the market price processes of interest rate risk and credit risk provide a natural connection between the actual and the martingale probabilities.     

Corporate environmental performance and financing decisions

We investigate the financing strategies of environmentally responsible firms to understand how they set target capital structures and make incremental financing decisions. Literature shows that firms with better environmental performance have lower risk and better access to financing. However, it is not obvious how these firms choose to finance their investments. Using an extensive data set of U.S. firms, we find that firms with superior environmental performance have significantly lower debt ratios and use mostly short‐term debt for temporary financing needs. In doing so, environmentally responsible firms are able to achieve more tax savings and experience lower costs of financial distress. Our results provide new empirical facts about environmental performance and financing decisions, and they help explain the observed relationship between environmental performance and economic performance.     

Succession financing in family firms

Business succession is one of the primary management challenges for family firms. However, many family firms fail at this task because of financial issues. Although a vast number of studies have investigated the succession process, research thus far has failed to determine how and why family firms select particular forms of financing for succession-related expenditures. Accordingly, this study conceptually and empirically investigates succession financing. We introduce a conceptual framework that investigates the reasons behind an owner-manager’s intent to use debt for succession financing. Specifically, our model accounts for general and succession-related personal factors. However, we also include a set of firm-specific financing behavioral controls in our research. The empirical results are derived from a sample of 187 German family firms, and the results highlight financial knowledge, attitudes, succession experience, and succession planning as significant determinants of the owner-managers’ debt usage intentions. The implications and avenues for future research are discussed.