Innovation and diffusion of environmental technology: Industrial NOx abatement in Sweden under refunded emission payments

We study the actual process of technical change in the case of NOx abatement from large stationary sources that have been regulated by very forceful policies in Sweden. Considerable progress has been made in lowering aggregate emissions and this paper seeks to disaggregate average industry improvements to study how much of it is due to innovations by first movers, and how much is achieved by adoption and diffusion of technology. We find both factors very important. Innovation has been rapid: the best firms have cut emissions on the order of 70%. In spite of this, reductions have actually been even more rapid for the majority of firms so that the median firms have caught up with best practice. We analyze various characteristics of the technological change observed.     

Price Volatility and Risk Exposure: On the Interaction of Quota and Product Markets

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is??whether it is ??clean?? or ??dirty????and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, a grandfathering regime??where clean firms are allocated no quotas and dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions??minimizes the impact on firm behavior relative to a risk-neutral benchmark.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour. Allowing for abatement does not change the qualitative nature of our results.     

Local air pollution and global climate change: A combined cost-benefit analysis

This article presents the findings of a combined cost-benefit analysis of local air pollution and global climate change, two subjects that are usually studied separately. Yet these distinct environmental problems are closely related, since they are both driven by the nature of present energy production and consumption patterns. Our study demonstrates the mutual relevance of, and interaction between, policies designed to address these two environmental challenges individually. Given the many dimensions air pollution control and climate change management have in common, it is surprising that they have only little been analyzed in combination so far. We attempt to cover at least part of the existing gap in the literature by assessing how costs and benefits of technologies and strategies that jointly tackle these two environmental problems can best be balanced. By using specific technological options that cut down local air pollution, e.g. related to particulate emissions, one may concurrently reduce CO₂ emissions and thus contribute to diminishing global climate change. Inversely, some of the long-term climate change strategies simultaneously improve the quality of air in the short run. We have extended the well-established MERGE model by including emissions of particulate matter, and show that integrated environmental policies generate net global welfare benefits. We also demonstrate that the discounted benefits of local air pollution reduction significantly outweigh those of global climate change mitigation, at least by a factor of 2, but in most cases of our sensitivity analysis much more. Still, we do not argue to only restrict energy policy today to what should be our first priority, local air pollution control, and wait with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, we propose to design policies that simultaneously address these issues, as their combination creates an additional climate change bonus. As such, climate change mitigation proves an ancillary benefit of air pollution reduction, rather than the other way around.     

The semiconductor silicon industry roadmap: Epochs driven by the dynamics between disruptive technologies and core competencies

The resource-based perspective has done much to identify idiosyncratic firm attributes that may be a principal source of competitive advantages. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic industry evidence to support the strategic importance of core competence, nor has there been much work on the temporal or cumulative nature of core capabilities within an industrial setting. Further, little or no research has been performed demonstrating how the advent of technological discontinuities or disruptive technologies plays a part in creating epochs in technology competency development and the roadmap of an industry. In this study, we analyze the evolutionary and cumulative nature of core capabilities and their interactions with technological discontinuities from a market-driven perspective. We have studied the evolution of 167 firms through the 50-year history of the semiconductor silicon industry. Over time, there were several structural shifts in the necessary competencies through the advent of disruptive technologies. In the last 30 years, however, the change in the required competencies has been more cumulative in nature. We summarize this in a roadmap detailing the epochs in the semiconductor silicon industry.     

Adverse Selection and Pigou Taxes

It id assumed that firms have different technologies, and that an environment protection agency knows which technologies exist, but not which is used by which firms. Neither the emissions of individual firms nor their total emissions are observable. The output of each individual firm, however, can be monitored without cost. Based on this information tax schemes are constructed which induce firms to produce the socially efficient output quantities. Conditions about cost functions are derived which ensure the existence of tax schemes which yield first best solutions.     

The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment

We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment in which industrial firms produce environmentally harmful emissions. A government controls the emissions by assigning emission quotas to firms, and permits could be issued and freely traded as financial instruments across firms on the basis of the quotas. We show that an environmental policy that decreases an aggregate number of emission quotas could degenerate economic growth and lower environmental quality in the long run. We also show the implications of this result for environmental policy.     

Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic competition in supply schedules

This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and development [R&D] subsidy) in a dynamic setting when two firms, producing differentiated products, compete in the output market over time. Firms compete in a differential game setting over supply schedules, which encompasses a continuum of imperfect competition equilibria from Bertrand to Cournot. Although production generates environmentally damaging emissions, firms can undertake R&D that has the sole purpose of reducing emissions. In addition to characterizing the optimal policy, we examine how the optimal tax and subsidy, and the optimal level of abatement, change as competition intensifies, as the dynamic parameters change, and as the investment in abatement technology changes. In this setting, competition increases welfare through its impact on the final goods price. However, lower prices result in larger quantities and more pollution. Our key contribution is to show how the impact of increased competition on welfare depends on the extent of the market and the nature of preferences and technology.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition

By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and therefore the emissions decisions, of all firms in the market. This paper examines how the welfare implications of strategic behavior depend on how pollution is regulated. Under an emissions tax, aggregate emissions do not affect the marginal cost of polluting. In contrast, the price of tradable permits is endogenous. I show when this feedback effect increases strategic firms’ output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased emissions locally, thereby substantially reducing the regional tradable permit price. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been even greater.     

Entering an era of ferment – radical vs incrementalist strategies in automotive power train development

Incremental improvement of a deeply embedded technology system has been a hallmark of the automotive industry for a very long time. Efforts to develop alternatives have repeatedly failed. This paper analyses how Toyota started to challenge this pattern in the late 1990s, by the architectural innovation embodied in Prius, the first mass-produced hybrid-electric car. This is followed by an account of how key competitors reacted by accelerating their incremental innovation efforts, in an era when concerns over fuel prices and greenhouse gas emissions increased demand for environmentally sound vehicles. The paper builds on records of patenting and performance of actually marketed models to analyse the unfolding technology competition. It also considers the most probable technologies on the market in a 10–12 year timeframe, and further explains how different technology strategies put competing firms in different positions in an era of ferment.     

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.     

Diffusion and adoption of advanced emission abatement technology induced by permit trading

This paper analyzes firm incentives to diffuse and adopt advanced abatement technology for three different regimes of tradeable emission permits (auctioning, benchmarking, and grandfathering). We particularly consider technical change that decreases marginal abatement costs (MACs) only at high emission levels, whereas it increases them at low firm emissions. We establish that the desirability of the different regimes of allocating permits to firms is critically influenced by how MACs are changed by technological improvements.     

Trade and the Environment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity

In this paper, we derive a new effect of trade liberalization on the quality of the environment. We show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms, the aggregate volume of emissions is influenced by a reallocation effect resulting from an increase in the relative size of more productive firms. The relative importance of this reallocation effect and the scale effect well‐known from the literature is affected by the emission intensity at the firm level. Domestic emissions decrease as a result of a unilateral tariff reduction if and only if firm‐specific emission intensity decreases strongly with increasing firm productivity. As a result of the induced change in foreign emissions, domestic pollution can increase even if domestic emissions decrease.     

R&D activities in start-up firms: What can we learn from founding resources?

Research and development is critical in promoting innovation and firm development. While many studies have been discussing how firms’ R&D behaviour is affected by the internal factors and external factors, little has been done to link it to firms’ founding conditions. Using resource-based view theory, this study suggests the firms’ R&D activities in their later stages are partly determined by firms’ starting resource bundle. We propose that the financing structure, entrepreneurs’ education background and intellectual property of the new firms will affect their R&D behaviour. The study examines the performance of a random sample of firms established in 2004 using data from the Kauffman Firm Survey. The result shows a mixing impact of firms’ starting resources. The founders’ education and the ownership of intellectual property have a positive and long-lasting impact, while firms’ financial capital matters mostly in the short term. The study also finds subsequent resource development is highly reliant on the initial resource bundle.     

Permit markets,carbon prices and the creation of innovation clusters

Innovation clusters combining public and private effort to develop breakthrough technologies promise greater technological advances to slow down climate change. We use a multi-country model with an emission trading system to examine whether and how international climate policy can incentivize countries to create such innovation clusters. We find that a minimal carbon price is needed to attract applied research firms, but countries may nevertheless fail to invest in complementary research infrastructure. We construct a mechanism that leads to innovation clusters when emissions targets are set before uncertainty surrounding technological developments is resolved. It is a combination of low permit endowments for the country with the lowest costs to build the needed infrastructure, compensation for this country by profits from permit trade, and maximal possible permit endowments for the remaining countries. We outline how the EU-ETS can be further refined according to this mechanism.     

The value contribution of strategic foresight: Insights from an empirical study of large European companies

This paper focuses on exploring the potential and empirically observable value creation of strategic foresight activities in firms. We first review the literature on strategic foresight, innovation management and strategic management in order to identify the potential value contributions. We use survey data from 77 large multinational firms to assess how much value is generated from formalized strategic foresight practices in these firms. We show that it is possible to capture value through (1) an enhanced capacity to perceive change, (2) an enhanced capacity to interpret and respond to change, (3) influencing other actors, (4) and through an enhanced capacity for organizational learning.     

Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information

We compare emissions taxes and quotas when a (strategic) regulator and (non-strategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov perfect decision rules. Firms make investment decisions that affect their future abatement costs. For general functional forms, firms’ investment policy is information-constrained efficient when the regulator uses a quota, but not when the regulator uses an emissions tax. This advantage of quotas over emissions taxes has not previously been recognized. For a special functional form (linear–quadratic) both policies are constrained efficient. Using numerical methods, we find that a tax has some advantages in this case.     

Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

In a differential game between two symmetric firms, provided with a clean and a dirty production activity, it is analyzed how investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. If both firms face the same environmental policy, a stricter policy reduces long-run investment in the dirty activity, while the impact on the clean activity is ambiguous. Both long-run emissions of each firm and total emissions decrease. This result does not necessarily hold if both firms face different policy instruments: Each firm's investment levels increase with a stricter environmental policy towards its rival, which causes more emissions by this firm.     

Welfare, Growth and Environment: A Sceptical Review of the Skeptical Environmentalist by B. Lomborg

Lomborg's best‐selling attempt to demolish environmental concerns has been praised by the Economist and the Financial Times, in stark contrast to the reactions of environmental scientists. We show in detail here how Lomborg selects statistics to support his optimistic views, and systematically neglects relevant but unfavourable evidence. He also ignores much of modern environmental economics, such as the use of genuine investment that captures environmental degradation, ‘double dividends’ from green taxation in the presence of unemployment, and local health benefits from abatement of emissions.     

Large‐Scale Risks and Technological Change: What About Limited Liability?

We consider a firm under strict liability that must choose between two risky technologies, one being safer but costlier than the other one. The total potential level of damage increases with the level of activity. We show that, under limited liability, technological change is welfare‐improving and leads to full risk internalization when the firms are sufficiently capitalized. Nevertheless, the percentage of firms adopting the safer technology and full risk internalization is higher under unlimited liability than under limited liability. We show how an adequate tax policy increases this percentage. We also determine the characteristics of a second‐best tax policy.