Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test

Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure, but not with simpler (unmotivated) statements of expected choices of opponents. Scoring rule belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and prior beliefs implied by such models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. We also find that “inferred beliefs” (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can predict observed actions better than the “stated beliefs” from scoring rule belief elicitation.     

Public choice versus constitutional economics: A methodological interpretation of the Buchanan research program

Through conceptual redirections, the Buchanan research program attempts to react to the fact that economic policy advice is often ignored. In terms of positive analyses, the research perspective is focused on institutions, i.e., the rules of economic as well as political games. In terms of normative analyses, the democratic criterion of unanimous consent is substituted for the normative efficiency criterion employed by welfare economics. The underlying idea is to direct positive analyses toward developing informative explanations on which normative analyses can build in order to provide intellectual orientation and thereby to contribute to democratic self-enlightenment. However, large parts of the existing public choice literature can be regarded as empirically oriented welfare-economic analyses of the political sector. Consequently, they run the danger of duplicating the failure of economic policy advice. This is why, during the 80s James Buchanan has changed the name of his research program from public choice to constitutional economics.     

Shang inquiry as an alternative to Delphi: Some experimental findings

A new group judgment method known as Shang is presented as an alternative to Delphi. Shang is structured to avoid Delphi problems associated with convergence pressures and response commitment while incorporating Delphi advantages. The new method is evaluated through an experiment comparing it with a control method and two Delphi techniques, one using point estimates and one using distributional estimates. Findings indicate that Shang is generally superior to Delphi in producing accurate numerical estimates from the judgments of a group of experts.     

Stated preferences over job characteristics: A panel study

When making choices over jobs with different characteristics, what trade-offs are decision-makers willing to make? Such a question is difficult to address using typical household surveys that provide a limited amount of information on the attributes of the jobs. To address this question, a small but growing number of studies have turned to the use of stated preference experiments; but the extent to which stated choices by respondents reflect systematic trade-offs across job characteristics remains an open question. We use two popular types of experiments (profile case best–worst scaling and multi-profile case best–worst scaling) to elicit job preferences of nursing students and junior nurses in Australia. Each person participated in both types of experiments twice, within a span of about 15 months. Using a novel joint likelihood approach that links a decision-maker's preferences across the two types of experiments and over time, we find that the decision-makers make similar trade-offs across job characteristics in both types of experiments and in both time periods, except for the trade-off between salary and other attributes. The valuation of salary falls significantly over time relative to other job attributes for both types of experiments. Also, within each period, salary is less valued in the profile case compared to the more traditional multi-profile case.     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72     

Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Holmström’s [Holmström, B., 1982/1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. Originally published in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki] career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: (i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; (ii) decision errors take time to decrease; (iii) while subjects’ average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner’s curse arises on the labor demand side.     

Decision theories and probabilistic insurance: an experimental test

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which probabilistic insurance, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is compared both with full insurance and no insurance. The experimental results conform to the intuitive prediction that risk-averse agents who are indifferent between full insurance and no insurance, will prefer full insurance to probabilistic insurance and probabilistic insurance to no insurance. The first conclusion is incompatible with the predictions of expected utility theory, and the second with Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory. We also show that Loomes and Sudgen's regret theory can easily accommodate these intuitive results. JEL Classification: C91, D81. We are most grateful to Graham Loomes and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, under project BEC2001-0535, and from the Generalitat Valenciana under project GRUPOS03/086, is gratefully acknowledeged.     

Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed, then sincere voting in accordance with a voter's private information is always rational while participation may become strategic. We find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data. Moreover, voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible. The latter finding may serve to rationalize the co-existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature.     

New Austrian macro theory: A call for inquiry

This essay sketches some contours of what we think can reasonably be called New Austrian macro theory. By New Austrian, macro we mean a style of theorizing that incorporates the core of traditional or Old Austrian macro and pushes that core in new directions by using new analytical tools and methods. We would note that New Austrian is not some invention or construction de novo, but is a product of blending some traditional Austrian insights and formulations with new analytical formulations that were never part of the Austrian tradition but which can multiply the analytical oomph of that tradition. In this essay, we explain that the traditional Austrian macro theory suffers not from analytical wrong-headedness but from an underdevelopment of those complementary pieces of intellectual capital that would render Austrian macro once again a significant player in the efforts of economists to theorize about the properties of economic systems in their entirety.     

Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test

We study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments. Where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base, one can observe two types of externalities: a horizontal externality, working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum; and a vertical externality, working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates. Building on the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis [Keen, Michael J., Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2002. Does federalism lead to excessively high taxes? American Economic Review 92 (1) 363–370], we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables. This test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of Swiss municipalities that feature direct-democratic fiscal decision making, so as to maximize the correspondence with the “benevolent” governments of the theory. We find that vertical externalities dominate – they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition.     

Learning,non-equilibrium beliefs,and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game

Summary. We present a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possibly out-of-equilibrium beliefs about other players' preferences that also incorporates random utility (noise). We estimate the model using the data from the four-country ultimatum game experiments of Roth et al. (1991). We find evidence that in the US and in Israel, the estimated beliefs of proposers are stationary and out-of-equilibrium, that in Slovenia, they are in equilibrium, and that in Japan, they are out-of-equilibrium, change from period to period and move away from equilibrium over time. In Japan and in the US, the estimated proposers' beliefs are further away from the uniform prior than the estimated equilibrium beliefs. The results seem to provide support for a non-pecuniary payoff explanation in all countries. Received: May 16, 2000; revised version: December 15, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alvin Roth for providing us with the data sets of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991). We are very grateful to Vincent Crawford, Joel Sobel, and an anonymous referee for all their comments and feedback. We are also grateful to J?rg Borrmann, Bruno Broseta, Jimmy Chan, Liran Einav, Bernd Engelmann, Drew Fudenberg, Oscar Jorda, Muriel Niederle, Pedro Pereira, Georg Weizs?cker, and audiences at the California Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and at the European Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Lausanne for their comments. Costa-Gomes was affiliated with the Harvard Business School during part of his work on this project. The usual disclaimer applies. Correspondence to:M.A. Costa-Gomes and K.G. Zauner     

Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study

While both simultaneous and sequential contests are mechanisms used in practice such as crowdsourcing, job interviews and sports contests, few studies have directly compared their performance. By modeling contests as incomplete information all-pay auctions with linear costs, we analytically and experimentally show that the expected maximum effort is higher in simultaneous contests, in which contestants choose their effort levels independently and simultaneously, than in sequential contests, in which late entrants make their effort choices after observing all prior participants’ choices. Our experimental results also show that efficiency is higher in simultaneous contests than in sequential ones. Sequential contests’ efficiency drops significantly as the number of contestants increases. We also discover that when participants’ ability follows a power distribution, high ability players facing multiple opponents in simultaneous contests tend to under-exert effort, compared to theoretical predictions. We explain this observation using a simple model of overconfidence.     

Literacy and labour market outcomes: self-assessment versus test score measures

This paper looks at the determinants of literacy and the relation between literacy and labour market outcomes while focusing on comparisons of self-assessment versus test score measures of literacy. The test score measure performs considerably better than the self-assessments when literacy is treated as an outcome variable in terms of the overall fit of the model and the specific coefficient estimates, with the self-assessments sometimes actually generating wrongly signed parameters. The test score measure also performs much better as an explanatory variable in the employment models, with the self-assessment variable generating significant underestimates of the effects of literacy on the probability of being employed. Finally, the test score is also superior in the income models, although the self-assessment measure is at least a reasonably good performer in this regard, suggesting that the main results reported in much of the existing literature (based on such measures) should perhaps be taken as good representations of the true underlying relationships.     

Estimation in sequential decisionmaking models: A methodological note

The purpose of this note is to develop an appropriate model of behavior and a statistical technique for estimating it for individuals who make sequential decisions under uncertainty. The distinctive aspect of this model is that differences among individuals are reflected in their behavior rather than being swept into the error term.     

Export instability,expansion and market concentration: A methodological interpretation

An analysis of the interrelationships among export instability, expansion and market concentration exhibited by fourteen Western Pacific countries yields three important and meaningful results. There exists a positive and significant association firstly, between export instability and export growth, secondly between the latter and geographical concentration, and hence thirdly between export fluctuations and market concentration but not in any direct causal manner as has been postulated by the general ‘concensus’. There is also evidence that the United States and Japan tend to provide the best growth potential, as demand sources for exports from Western Pacific area, at least in the near future.     

Methodological ignorance: A comment on field experiments and methodological intolerance

Glenn Harrison [Journal of Economic Methodology, 2013, 20, 103–117] discusses four related forms of methodological intolerance with respect to field experiments: field experiments should rely on some form of randomization, should be disconnected from theory, the concept of causality should only be defined in terms of observables, and the role of laboratory experiments is dismissed. As is often the case, the cause of intolerance is ignorance, as it is here. To acquire knowledge about potential influences, which we need for both the evaluation of internal and external validity of experimental results, we cannot do without theory. A purely empiricist (inductive) methodology will be unable to give us sufficient understanding of the validity of these results. An account of causality only based on directly observed things, is an account based on factual influences only. This account will be too restricted, because it will not deal with the unobserved potential influences, which we need – again – for the evaluation of the internal and external validity of the experimental results. Every investigation in a laboratory that is feasible regarding a specific potential influence may lead to deep knowledge. It is simply scientifically irrational to dismiss this kind of knowledge.     

Understanding Hurricane Evacuation Decisions Under Contingent Scenarios: A Stated Preference Approach

We conduct a stated preference analysis to understand the factors that individual households take into consideration to evacuate during hurricanes. In designing the contingent scenarios for evacuation, we randomly assign varying levels of hurricane characteristics (wind speed, lead time for landfall and the height of storm surge) combined with different types of emergency management options (voluntary versus mandatory evacuation order and a voucher with varying amounts to cover evacuation expenses). Findings indicate that individual households respond, in a non-linear fashion, to the intensity of hurricanes when making evacuation decisions. Respondents are also more likely to evacuate when the storm surge reaches a certain threshold. In terms of policy interventions, mandatory evacuation orders are more effective to increase the likelihood of evacuation. The potential intervention in the form of providing evacuation vouchers to assist households to cover their expenses (e.g. for food, water, transportation and lodging) also seems effective. We discuss policy implications of our findings.     

Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques: A Framework for a Discussion of Coping Strategies

This paper introduces a symposium on the issue of how stated preference (SP) research can best cope with ‘anomalies’ (i.e. systematic deviations from the predictions of standard economic theory) in survey responses. It proposes a framework for constructive debate, recognising (i) the legitimate aspirations of SP research, (ii) the relevance of evidence from sources other than best-practice SP, and (iii) the precautionary value of investigating strategies for coping with suspected anomalies, even if questions about the robustness of anomalies have not been finally resolved. Five alternative coping strategies, discussed in more detail in the symposium, are briefly introduced. JEL classifications: D61, D63, Q51     

Efficiency versus collusion: a reformulation of the Weiss test

The weiss test has been used to discriminate between the efficiency and collusion hypotheses. Using a conventional oligopoly model, we show that the test is valid for the former hypothesis but not the latter. Contrary to recent emperical studies, we find that a negative coefficient on concentration in profitability equations does not refute the collusion hypothesis. In fact, this finding supports the hypothesis if the sample is dominated by small firms.     

Floating exchange rates versus a monetary union under rational beliefs: the role of endogenous uncertainty

Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated. Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged.