On the architecture of complex organizations

We use results from information theory to show that the screening effectiveness of organizations which consist of many fallible agents can be arbitrarily improved, but only if organizational architecture is non-hierarchical. We also examine how any desired outcome may be implemented as a symmetric equilibrium, when agents are selfish.     

信贷审批权配置效率的实证分析

运用Bankscope全球银行与金融机构分析数据库,实证分析了银行信贷审批权的配置对银行经营绩效的影响。研究发现,银行信贷审批权限对其经营绩效没有显著影响。这意味着信贷审批权的上收并不一定会改进银行经营绩效。银行把信贷审批权上收,虽然可以在一定程度上减少代理人的道德风险,降低代理成本,但是银行信息成本可能会增加。因此,银行在进行贷款审批权的配置时需要综合考虑代理成本和信息成本．不应该搞“一刀切”,一味地把信贷审批权上收。     

Selectivity and Transparency in Social Banking: Evidence from Europe

How do social banks signal their social commitment to motivated funders? We hypothesize that two main channels are used: selectivity and transparency. We test these predictions using a rich dataset comprising balancesheet information on 5,000 European banks over the period from 1998 to 2013. The results suggest that social screening leads social banks to higher project selectivity compared to mainstream banks. Social banks also tend to be more transparent than other banks. However, combining selectivity and transparency can result in excess liquidity. Overall, the empirical findings not only confirm our theoretical hypotheses, but also raise challenging issues regarding the management of social banks.     

基于财务数据的信息甄别——以通信产业为例

在证券市场上 ,始终存在着信息不足和信息过载的情况。低效率的信息处理方法无法令投资者做出正确的投资判断。本文以通信类上市公司为例 ,对上市公司公开可获得的财务数据的甄别做些理论探讨。具体地讲是为当前通信类上市公司转型阶段的确定提供一种与定性的基本面分析相结合的转型阶段判别模型分析方法 ,使投资者能够拨开“概念和题材”的迷雾 ,对通信类上市公司的转型有一个科学、客观的判断。本文模型的判别结果与基本面的分析具有高度的一致性     

IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan.     

Efficiency of Screening and Labor Income Inequality

We analyze the importance of information about individual skills for understanding human capital accumulation and income inequality. The paper uses the framework of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Agents in each generation differ by random individual ability, or talent, which affects the screening process. The human capital of an agent depends on both his talent and his investment in education. The investment decision is based on a public signal (test outcome), which screens all agents for their talents. We analyze how a better information system, which allows more efficient screening, affects investment in education and, hence, income inequality in equilibrium. As a main result, we find that, typically, less inequality in the distribution of actual incomes can only be achieved at the expense of more inequality in the distribution of income opportunities.     

Screening, cross-border banking, and the allocation of credit

The author analyses competition among banks when banks can use creditworthiness tests that generate (imperfect) information about borrowers. When banks can strategically adjust the test characteristics by investing resources in the screening technology, he shows that credit markets are not easily contestable. An increase in the intensity of competition may have few effects on incumbents» conduct and overall market shares. Moreover, conditions are provided under which screening efforts are reduced by competition. In such situations the quality of the overall loan portfolio declines and the economy incurs higher aggregate risk due to the lower quality of banks» information production. The welfare gains from integrating fragmented loan markets can actually be negative.     

Using stated preference discrete choice modelling to inform health care decision-making: A pilot study of breast screening participation

This study was an important start to explore the feasibility of applying stated preference discrete choice modelling (SPDCM) for use in developing breast screening participation enhancement strategies. It needs to be followed by further research to establish model validity and authoritative results. In the meantime a random effects binary probit choice model was estimated using a main effects with selected 2-way interaction design and a convenience sample of Australian breast cancer screening participants. A response rate of 48% was obtained. Clear preferences for different service configurations were revealed and used to demonstrate how potential strategies to enhance future participation rates of women placed on routine recall could be identified. As anticipated accuracy of screening was the most important attribute of the service to influence the probability of uptake but others were screening time, travel time, information about screening benefits and the desire for privacy lending support to the view that benefit assessment goes beyond health factors. In summary, the SPDCM approach can be regarded as a judicious approach for helping decision-makers improve screening participation.     

The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure

Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used. Received April 17, 2001; revised version received January 24, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002     

Partial ownership and cross-border mergers

Partial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information. As partial ownership is confined to sharing future merger profits, it cannot achieve complete separation in all cases but improves expected merger gains also in an equilibrium which is not fully separating. Without partial ownership, the foreign firm potentially discriminates against high productivities. In a pooling equilibrium with partial ownership, however, it will potentially discriminate against intermediate productivities.     

Ecological footprint accounting in the life cycle assessment of products

We present and discuss ecological footprint (EF) calculations for a large number of products and services consumed in the western economy. Product-specific EFs were calculated from consistent and quality-controlled life cycle information of 2630 products and services, including energy, materials, transport, waste treatment and infrastructural processes. We formed 19 homogeneous product/process subgroups for further analysis, containing in total 1549 processes. Per group, the average contribution of two types of land occupation (direct and energy related) to the total EF was derived. It was found that the ecological footprint of the majority of products is dominated by the consumption of non-renewable energy. Notable exceptions are the EFs of biomass energy, hydro energy, paper and cardboard, and agricultural products with a relatively high contribution of direct land occupation. We also compared the ecological footprint results with the results of a commonly used life cycle impact assessment method, the Ecoindicator 99 (EI). It was found that the majority of the products have an EF/EI ratio of around 30 m²-eq. yr/ecopoint ± a factor of 5. The typical ratio reduces to 25 m² yr/ecopoints by excluding the arbitrary EF for nuclear energy demand. The relatively small variation of this ratio implies that the use of land and use of fossil fuels are important drivers of overall environmental impact. Ecological footprints may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, our results also show that the usefulness of EF as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited for product life cycles with relative high mineral consumption and process-specific metal and dust emissions. For these products the EF/EI ratio can substantially deviate from the average value. Finally, we suggest that the ecological footprint product data provided in this paper can be used to improve the footprint estimates of production, import and export of products on a national scale and footprint estimates of various lifestyles.     

Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty

Summary A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.We thank Dov Samet for pointing out an error in an earlier version.     

Work Requirements and Long-Term Poverty

We study how work requirements can be used to target transfers to the long‐term poor. Without commitment, time consistency requires all screening measures to be concentrated in the first phase of the program. We show that this increases the effectiveness of workfare; it is optimal to use work requirements for a wider range of prior beliefs about the size of the poor population, and work requirements are used more intensively. We compare these results with the optimal policy under commitment.     

Product quality and competition: evidence from the broadband industry

Access to high-quality broadband internet is important in many different respects such as in communication, education, commerce and information acquisition. We investigate the relationship between the number of broadband providers in an area and the quality of broadband service provided where download speed is used as a proxy for quality. We find that increased competition in an area positively affects the access to fast download speeds. This finding is robust to three different top download speeds tested. Additionally, a theoretical model is provided which shows that competition can decrease the profits associated with offering slow speeds; this gives an incentive for providers to offer higher speeds as a way to increase profits.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

Economic implications of better information in a dynamic framework

Summary. We consider an OLG model with accumulation in human capital and analyze the economic implications of information about individual skills. Agents in each period differ by the random innate ability assigned to each individual. When young, all agents are screened for their abilities and this screening process (signal) constitutes a public information which is used in choosing the level of private investment in education. We demonstrate that in the presence of risk sharing markets better information may be harmful for all in equilibrium, and find conditions under which better information either enhances growth or reduces growth.Received: 8 September 2003, Revised: 3 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D80, J24.Correspondence to: Bernhard EckwertWe are pleased to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of R. Benabou, Z. Eckstein, E. Helpman, B. Ravikumar and D. Tsiddon. Also, special thanks are given to two anonymous referees. This research was supported by a Grant from G.I.F., the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development.     

Explaining foreign bank entrance in emerging markets

This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history.     

On the Fisher information matrix of a vector ARMA process

We derive a neat and compact representation of the asymptotic Fisher information matrix of a vector ARMA process. Its inverse can be used immediately as the asymptotic covariance matrix of the Gaussian maximum likelihood estimator. We also provide the robust sandwich covariance estimator when the process is non-Gaussian.     

Relationship lending and innovation: empirical evidence on a sample of European firms

This paper investigates the impact of relationship lending on innovation (the probability to innovate and the intensity of innovation). Using a unique dataset providing detailed information on bank–firm relationships across European firms, we relate different proxies of relationship lending (soft information, long-lasting relationships, number of banks and share of the main bank) to innovation. We find a very strong and robust positive effect of ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships, a less robust positive effect of long-lasting relationships and a negative effect of credit concentration as measured by the number of banking relationships. We also find that ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships reduce credit rationing for innovative firms, while long-lasting relationships seem to favour innovation via other relational channels. These results raise some concern on the impact of screening processes based on automatic procedures, as those suggested by the Basel rules, on firms' capability to finance innovative activities in Europe.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.