环境保护低效率的博弈探析

本文利用博弈论探析了厂商、居民和政府的保护环境中的实际行为决策过程,各类博弈最后得到的解具有一个共性,不利于环境保护的纳什均衡,即形成非合作博弈。结论指出,必须结合市场机制和政府政策改变各博弈方的收益,使博弈达到新的纳什均衡,提高环境保护效率。     

20世纪90年代以来中国经济的动态效率

本文借助于西方宏观经济学中的索洛经济增长模型和拉姆齐 卡斯 库普曼斯模型 ,讨论了宏观经济中最优消费和储蓄的确定机制 ,并得出判断宏观经济运行动态效率的黄金定律以及修正黄金定律标准。同时 ,借助代际交叠模型从理论上探讨了自由竞争经济出现动态无效的可能性。在此基础上 ,我们利用黄金定律规则对中国实际经济运行的动态效率进行了考察 ,认为 2 0世纪 90年代初起中国经济运行处于一种动态无效状态 ,进而我们深入分析了造成中国经济出现动态无效的原因。根据中国经济处于动态无效的事实 ,并结合原因探索 ,我们最后提出了摆脱动态无效困境的若干政策建议。     

动态效率、生产性公共支出与结构效应

利用1979-2008年三次产业的数据和误差修正模型,本文估算了我国政府生产性公共支出与经济动态无效的长期关系,考察了政府生产性公共支出对三次产业的生产要素积累所产生的影响。研究发现:在结构效应为正的条件下,当期公共支出的增加能够影响资本和劳动在三次产业之间,以及三次产业内部不同行业之间的要素积累方式,起到改善经济结构、优化资源配置的作用;我国经济的投资拉动型增长方式及与之相伴随的公共品供给机制,通过"租金"创造机制诱导特定产业的发展,从而能够提升产业结构,促进资源和生产要素的优化配置,符合赶超型经济的目标要求。     

Modelling the dynamics of Bitcoin and Litecoin: GARCH versus stochastic volatility models

We examine and compare a large number of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) and stochastic volatility (SV) models using series of Bitcoin and Litecoin price returns to assess the model fit for dynamics of these cryptocurrency price returns series. The various models examined include the standard GARCH(1,1) and SV with an AR(1) log-volatility process, as well as more flexible models with jumps, volatility in mean, leverage effects, t-distributed and moving average innovations. We report that the best model for Bitcoin is SV-t while it is GARCH-t for Litecoin. Overall, the t-class of models performs better than other classes for both cryptocurrencies. For Bitcoin, the SV models consistently outperform the GARCH models and the same holds true for Litecoin in most cases. Finally, the comparison of GARCH models with GARCH-GJR models reveals that the leverage effect is not significant for cryptocurrencies, suggesting that these do not behave like stock prices.     

Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking

Economic regulation is characterized as (1) an effort by special interests to influence the allocation of property rights, in (2) a continuous path-dependent spontaneous evolution (as apposed to a static equilibrium), driven by (3) market, political, and bureaucratic entrepreneurship in an ongoing discovery process. The implications of the model are illustrated by an examination of the evolution of regulation in interstate trucking. The model is also used to explain that the Chicago School's political-regulatory efficiency conclusions are incorrect, and that the inefficiencies arising from rent seeking are even greater than the Public Choice approach implies.     

The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies

When pollution is transboundary and there is international trade, a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well‐known inefficiencies at the international level. More precisely, there will be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries. However, there will also be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions. In this Nash equilibrium, welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries.     

Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs

We analyze an overlapping generations model in which pollution arises, in an accumulatively way, from production. Householders do not care directly about the environment, but pollution leads them to incur health costs when they are elderly. We show that the presence of pollution means that the economy more likely to be dynamically inefficient. For these cases we analyze two kinds of tax scheme: one based on production taxes and the other based on capital and wage taxes. We show how to design both schemes to put the economy into the golden rule allocation. We also show that under the production tax scheme young and elderly agents pay less taxes (or receive more transfers) than under the production tax system.     

Banks' Inefficiency and Economic Growth: A Micro‐Macro Approach

This paper offers a methodological contribution to the empirical analysis of the relationship between banking and economic growth by suggesting a new indicator for the state of development of the banking system based on a measure of bank microeconomic efficiency. This choice helps to overcome the problem of causality and to capture the effects of banks' activity on growth. This new approach is then applied to analyse the relationship between the banking system and economic growth in the Italian regions, through a dynamic panel technique. The empirical results show the existence of an independent effect exerted by the efficiency of banks on regional growth.     

资产泡沫能消除经济动态无效吗——基于AMSZ准则扩展与中国数据的检验

在经济运行动态无效的情况下,通过引入资产泡沫可以使得经济趋于动态有效。这就为控制资产泡沫带来一种困扰。本文在“AMSZ准则”扩展的基础上,用中国1985～2007年的数据做出检验,得出自1990年以来中国经济动态无效的结论．并进一步分析引入资产泡沫消除经济动态无效的不可取;在提高劳动收入的基础上扩大消费需求才是正道。     

从事前效率问题到事后效率问题——不完全合同理论的几类经典模型比较

通过对不完全合同经典理论模型的组成要素的梳理和分类,本文首次将不完全合同理论的模型分为四种类型:行动事前不可缔约而事后可缔约的事前效率问题模型,行动事前和事后都不可缔约的事前和事后效率问题模型,事前部分可缔约的事前和事后效率问题模型,收益事后不可证实的事前和事后效率问题模型。这些不同的理论被纳入一个统一的框架中进行表述。传统的产权理论具有一些缺陷,而事后不可缔约的模型更适合研究权威、授权、科层等问题。相对于关于投资激励的事前效率问题,事后效率问题的来源要多得多。对事前与事后缔约性问题的探讨以及对事后效率问题的研究是丰富不完全合同理论发展的动力。     

Analysis on Inefficiency of Transmitting the Monetary Policy of the Capital Market

Looking from the institutional system that the stock market services the state-owned enterprises, the bad corporate governing structure of the state-owned listed companies, the lack of balance between the yield from an investment and the stock, and the polarization of the wealth distribution in the stock market, we make an intensive analysis and exploration on the inefficiency of transmitting monetary policy of Chinese capital market herein.     

Environmental Policy in Developing Countries: A Dynamic Analysis

A dynamic model is constructed of the environmental policy formulation process in a stylized developing country (DC). The paper analyzes the employment and output effects of three pollution control policies. These policies embody different assumptions about the DC government's ability to commit to its announced course of action. The timepath of the government's policy variable is characterized. Optimality calls for an activist policy, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy. However, the effects of this activist policy depend fundamentally on the government's period of commitment.     

Liberalizing NAFTA Rules of Origin: A Dynamic CGE Analysis

Most computable general-equilibrium (CGE) studies assessing the welfare impact of moving from a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to a deeper form of integration, for example a customs union (CU), typically proxy the integration as the adoption of a common external tariff toward the rest of the world. However, a CU is also an arrangement that allows for the elimination of FTAs' preferential rules of origin (ROO), which is typically not captured in CGE studies. This paper addresses the issue using a multicountry, multisector dynamic CGE model. Although the removal of distortionary ROO is likely to lower the unit costs of production within North America, it may also deteriorate North American terms of trade with the rest of the world. Thus, the net effect of the removal of NAFTA ROO on welfare is ambiguous and is an empirical issue.     

Intra-Industry Trade: A Static and Dynamic Panel Data Analysis

This study examines the features and determinants of intra-industry trade (IIT), horizontal IIT (HIIT) and vertical IIT (VIIT) between Portugal and the European Union in the period 1996–2002, using a static and a dynamic panel data analysis. The findings indicate that Portuguese VIIT increased significantly during the period in accordance with the values expected for a developed country. The regression results show that there is evidence supporting the explanation of VIIT by Heckscher–Ohlin’s (HO) theory and that Portugal has comparative advantages in low-quality differentiated products. The findings support the theory that, in general, there is no positive statistical association between HIIT and HO variables. The central theme of this paper is to show that it may be preferable to use the GMM approach in empirical studies of IIT rather than pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects estimators. The results also suggest that the GMM system estimator obtains more reasonable parameter estimates than the first-differenced GMM estimator.

战略节奏——战略分析的动态新框架

引入创新扩散理论,在产业层面将产品市场需求变化按照时间维度展开,以此考察产品市场需求的变化对资源市场和股权市场的影响,并在此基础上构建了一个新的企业战略动态分析框架。在这一框架下,根据主流客户、市场规模、成长速度和需求多样性的不同,将市场发展分成四个阶段,并考察了在不同的市场发展阶段企业在产品市场、资源市场和股权市场上的活动及其对企业竞争优势的影响。按照这一框架,企业战略管理的核心是动态地在产品市场、资源市场和股权市场上实现经营上的协同,即企业通过管理战略节奏获取竞争优势。     

Concentration and Inefficiency in the Defense Sector: Policy Options

This article, which is a part of a larger comprehensive study of the effects of employee ownership and worker participation on productivity in the United States, focuses on and documents the lack of worker participation in employee-owned firms [Rooney 1987]. It is estimated that more than 7,000 U.S. firms covering some 10 million employees have some degree of employee ownership [Rosen, Klein and Young 1986, p. 15]. By employee ownership, we simply mean that most of the employees own some shares of stock in the company in which they work. While most employee-owned firms have less than a majority ownership stake, several hundred U.S. firms are majority emp10yeeowned, and are the target of this study.     

企业边界:基于动态效率的分析

企业边界是企业理论关注的一个焦点,不同的理论分支对之有不一样的见解.本文在批判了新制度经济学中用边际交易成本解释企业边界论的基础上,从企业的知识、能力出发,按照动态效率标准对企业边界提出了自己的看法,即企业依据自身情况制定的发展战略是影响企业边界的重要因素.     

Inefficiency of bilateral bargaining in interbank markets

Many countries have interbank markets that are over the counter (OTC) instead of exchange mediated. In OTC systems, bilateral bargaining takes place over the rate of interest on the (interbank) loan. This article characterizes such bilateral bargaining for loans between banks under asymmetric information and shows that bargaining outcomes maybe inefficient. The article suggests two sources of inefficiency. In a one-period model, bargaining between two banks may fail due to incomplete information even if gains to trade exist. Intertemporal issues examined in this article reveal that repeated interaction could create distorting effects through reciprocal contracts. Both cases are shown to require active liquidity management by the regulatory authority to restore the first best allocation.