Session III: Securities Law in Twenty‐First Century America: A Conversation with SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson

SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson comments on three major issues the Commission has been investigating: (1) the concentration of ownership among American stock exchanges; (2) the extent of common ownership of, and potential for undue influence over, U.S. corporations by large institutional shareholders; and (3) the role of corporate boards in promoting and protecting stakeholder interests as well as shareholder interests. In the first of the three areas, Jackson argues that the ownership of 12 of the 13 U.S. stock exchanges by just three financial conglomerates suggests a competitiveness problem— one that, despite the significant reductions in trading costs during the last 15 years, should receive further investigation. To the concerns raised by the common and increasingly concentrated ownership of U.S. public companies by institutional shareholders, the Commissioner's main response is to note that whatever culpability corporate America is forced to assume for our large and growing environmental and social problems must be shared with the largest U.S. institutional shareholders, whose collective resources and influence confer a responsibility to help guide companies when responding to such problems. Finally, on the issue of stakeholder theory and ESG, Jackson insists that asking corporate boards to put the interests of all stakeholders on a par with their shareholders’ when making strategic business decisions would be a mistake. Besides creating a major accountability problem, the adoption of stakeholder theory in place of “the clear, single‐minded objective function of increasing long‐run shareholder value” would deprive boards of their principal guide “when making the difficult tradeoffs among stakeholders that effective oversight and management of public companies require.”     

LARGE BANK STOCKHOLDERS IN GERMANY: SAVIORS OR SUBSTITUTES?

This article challenges Mark Roe's suggestion that the prevalence of the widely held public corporation in the U.S. may not have been inevitable because U.S. laws prevented financial institutions from playing the monitoring role assumed by large German banks. The differences between Germany and the U.S. in the importance of trading markets and the role of banks as monitors can be explained in large part by actions of German banks that blocked the development of German capital markets and provided big banks with informational advantages over other traders.
Markets are likely to be more effective monitors than large banks because of the banks' conflicts of interest as creditors as well as underwriters and market-makers for German firms. Moreover, there is more diversity in the ownership structure of U.S. corporations than the current governance debate would suggest. In the U.S. there are many publicly owned companies that are either closely held or have reverted to private ownership through LBOs. This in turn suggests that U.S. capital markets have devised means for bringing about concentrated stock ownership in those cases where large stockholder monitoring is likely to be more efficient.
Thus, to the question what is likely to happen to U.S. corporate ownership structure if remaining legal constraints on stock ownership by U.S. banks are relaxed, the answer this article offers is "not much." Indeed, if one considers increasing U.S. institutional ownership together with recent SEC attempts to liberalize shareholder communications, there appears to be a striking trend toward a new concentration of voting power–one that may ultimately rival that of the German banks.     

国企“混改”与企业金融资产配置

本文利用2010～2017年中国沪深A股非金融类上市公司面板数据,考察了国企“混改”对企业金融资产配置的影响,并重点分析了国企“混改”过程中企业金融资产配置的动机。结果显示,非国有股东参股促进了国有企业的金融资产投资。机制检验发现,非国有股东参股通过治理效应路径和融资约束路径共同影响了国有企业的金融资产配置行为,具体表现为非国有股东参股带来的监督治理效应和融资约束强化效应均增强了国有企业配置金融资产的预防性储蓄动机,进而促使国有企业增加金融资产投资。上述研究结果表明,非国有股东参股推动的国有企业金融资产投资并非出于短期利益追逐,而是为了平滑企业投资进行的预防性储蓄。本文研究对于如何通过深化混合所有制改革引导企业“脱虚向实”有一定的借鉴意义。     

The political economy of corporate governance in developing economies: The case of Bangladesh

The paper investigates the influence of concentrated shareholding, boardroom politics and interest group politics in the quality of corporate governance in listed firms. It finds that the controlling shareholders exert influence in boardroom politics through family-aligned board and executive management. The evidence shows that concentrated ownership, family-aligned board and management, and political connection(s) of the controlling shareholder(s) tend to be inversely associated with the quality of corporate governance in a firm. The findings of the study suggest that the broad-based interest group politics which influence both political preference and corporate control politics contribute significantly to the current state of corporate governance in developing economies.     

Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

Although there has been an intensive debate on the relative merits of different systems of corporate governance, empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and firm performance almost exclusively refers to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system. This paper therefore investigates the more network- or bank-oriented German system. In panel regressions for 361 German corporations over the time period 1991 to1996, we find ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively. However, this effect depends intricately on stock market exposure, the location of control rights, and the time horizon (short-run vs. long-run). We conclude from our results that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, (2) ownership concentration seems to be sub-optimal for many German corporations, and, finally, (3) having financial institutions as largest shareholders oftraded corporations improves corporate performance.     

Liquidity,ownership concentration,corporate governance,and firm value: Evidence from Thailand

We examine the interactions among ownership structure, liquidity, and corporate governance in an important emerging market. The results suggest that firms with more concentrated ownership experience significantly lower stock liquidity. Large shareholders are assumed to possess private information, leading to information asymmetry and thus a higher adverse selection cost. As a result, higher ownership concentration is associated with less liquidity. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that corporate governance plays a significant role in the relationship between ownership and liquidity in Thailand.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.     

The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan

I examine the structure of corporate ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s. Ownership is highly concentrated in Japan, with financial institutions by far the most important large shareholders. Ownership concentration in independent Japanese firms is positively related to the returns from exerting greater control over management. This is not the case in firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu). Ownership concentration and the accounting profit rate in both independent and keiretsu firms are unrelated. The results are consistent with the notion that there exist two distinct corporate governance systems in Japan —one among independent firms and the other among firms that are members of keiretsu.     

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

FMA Roundtable on New Developments in European Corporate Governance

In this discussion that took place in Helsinki last June, three European financial economists and a leading authority on U.S. corporate governance consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of the world's two main corporate financing and governance systems: the Anglo‐American market‐based system, with its dispersed share ownership, lots of takeovers, and an otherwise vigorous market for corporate control; and the relationship‐based, or “main bank,” system associated with Japan, Germany, and continental Europe generally. The distinguishing features of the relationship‐based system are large controlling shareholders, including the main banks themselves, and few takeovers or other signs of a well‐functioning corporate control market. Given the steady increase in the globalization of business and international diversification by large institutional investors, the panelists were asked to address the question: can we expect one of these two systems to prevail over time, or will both systems continue to coexist, while seeking to adopt some of the most valuable aspects of the other? The consensus was that, in Germany as well as continental Europe, corporate financing and governance practices have already begun to look much like those in the U.S. and U.K., with much less reliance on bank loans and greater use of bonds and public equity. And these financing changes have resulted in major changes in ownership structures that have seen local main banks largely supplanted by foreign institutional investors—some of whom have demanded a greater voice in how companies are run. Moreover, Finnish economist Tom Berglund may well have provided a blueprint for the dominant European governance system of the future in describing the “Nordic model” as

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Large shareholders and accounting research

Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms’ corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners (and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private (i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.     

Can online annual general meetings increase shareholders’ participation in corporate governance?

We find that annual shareholder meetings conducted online can significantly increase the participation of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. This finding is more evident when the cost of physically attending the annual meeting is higher and when the firm's ownership is more dispersed. We further document significant positive stock returns when firms initiate annual online meetings. We also find that such online meetings help improve corporate governance. Overall, we provide evidence that online shareholder meetings provide shareholders a cost-effective way to participate in governance issues.     

WHEN SHAREHOLDERS CHOOSE NOT TO MAXIMIZE VALUE: THE UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND'S 1994 PROXY FIGHT

This paper examines the fight over a share reunification plan that pitted Swiss financier Martin Ebner against Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), once the largest Swiss bank and a global leader in asset management. In the U.S. corporate governance debate, large shareholders are often held up as a possible solution to corporate governance problems. But this examination of the UBS proxy fight shows why some large shareholders can themselves be a source of governance problems. The share reunification plan was designed to combine the firm's two classes of stock: registered (voting) shares and bearer (non-voting) shares. As its motive for the plan, the UBS board cited a desire both to increase liquidity and to prevent a control change. The majority of the holders of the company's registered stock—many of whom had other financial ties to the bank—ended up voting for a proposal that caused them to lose 11% of the value of their shares during the three trading days following its announcement, and eventually almost twice as much. Moreover, even the holders of the bearer stock hurt themselves by approving the reunification plan. Although the plan clearly transferred value from the registered to the bearer shares, the redistribution benefits from the plan for the bearer shareholders were not sufficient to offset their losses from the reduced probability of a control change. Although it did not succeed in accomplishing its immediate goal, the UBS proxy fight is today recognized as a watershed event in Swiss corporate governance. Until recently, Switzerland's economy has been dominated by cartels, with closely overlapping boards of directors. Hostile takeovers were essentially unheard of, and criticism of management by shareholders was highly unusual. Ebner's activities have had the effect of stimulating public debate about shareholders' rights and shareholder activism. In so doing, they have made it more acceptable for shareholders to criticize management and established shareholder value as a “politically correct” goal for Swiss corporations.     

Board of director characteristics and earnings quality surrounding implementation of a corporate governance code in Mexico

Mexico recently enacted a corporate governance code. One objective of the code is to improve board of director oversight and to reveal more transparent information to shareholders by including detailed information regarding the structure of the board and its functions. Research in the U.S. has documented improvement in earnings quality associated with board characteristics. Whether or not board characteristics are associated with improved earnings quality in Mexico is questionable given the business environment in which firms operate, characterized by controlling family ownership and weak legal protection of property rights. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether or not board characteristics other than compliance with board independence (board composition disclosure, family concentrated ownership and shared-directors) are associated with the improvement in earnings quality found in previous research. Earnings quality is measured using income smoothing, timely loss recognition and conditional accruals. We find firms that do not have concentrated family ownership or share directors have greater increases in earnings quality than firms that have concentrated family ownership or share directors. We conclude that applying board-level corporate governance reforms, without considering cultural and legal environments, may limit the desired effects of the change.     

THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF CALPERS' FOCUS LIST

Shareholder activism can help to protect shareholder value by promoting sound corporate governance practices. As an active institutional investor, CalPERS takes its role in the corporate governance process very seriously. In addition to many other initiatives, CalPERS publishes each year a list of six to twelve public companies with poor corporate governance principles and poor financial performance—its well-known "Focus List"—in the hope that the managements of these companies will be motivated to improve their performance and increase shareholder value for CalPERS and their other equity owners.
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of CalPERS' governance program, the authors examine the market impact of the Focus List and find that companies on the list experience positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the three months following release of the list. Moreover, this wealth effect is even greater for companies with a large, widely dispersed shareholder base, as might be expected given the relative inability of such shareholders to act collectively.     

THE STATE OF U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT'S WRONG?

Largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other prominent American companies, U.S. corporate governance practices have come under attack. These much publicized failures and the resulting popular outcry have served as catalysts for legislative and regulatory changes that include the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ. But is the U.S. corporate governance system really as bad as critics suggest? And will the recent legislative and regulatory changes lead to a more effective system? The authors begin by noting that the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. governance system. During the past two decades, the U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries, even in the wake of the corporate scandals in 2001. Moreover, the most notable changes in U.S. corporate governance in the 1980s and 1990s‐including the institutionalization of U.S. share‐holders and the dramatic increase in equity‐based pay‐have served mainly (though not always) to strengthen the accountability of U.S. managers to their shareholders. The authors' message, then, is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system gave way under the exceptional strain created by the bull market of the 1990s, the overall system‐which includes corrective market forces as well as oversight by the public and government‐has reacted quickly and decisively to address its weaknesses. The net effect of the recent legislative and regulatory changes has been to make a good governance system an even better one. But, as the authors caution, perhaps the greatest risk now facing the U.S. financial market system (of which corporate governance is a critical part) is that of overregulation.     

The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

This paper investigates whether improvements in the firm's internal corporate governance create value for shareholders. We analyze the market reaction to governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual meetings. This provides a clean causal estimate that deals with the endogeneity of internal governance rules. We find that passing a proposal leads to significant positive abnormal returns. Adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions. In addition, we find that acquisitions and capital expenditures decline and long‐term performance improves.     

Ownership structure and forecast accuracy in Spain

This article examines how analysts respond to specific ownership structure characteristics by studying the accuracy of their forecasts after the release of the first Spanish corporate governance code and before IFRS were adopted. Specifically, we analyse the influence of ownership concentration, bank ownership and insider ownership on analyst forecast errors. Overall the results show a positive and significant influence of bank ownership on analyst forecast accuracy, which suggests that bank ownership leads to closer monitoring of management and a reduction in analyst forecast errors. However, the presence of large shareholders and insiders in the ownership structure of the firm does not significantly affect the accuracy of financial analysts. This research provides investors with a more refined sense of how analyst forecasts might be affected through the composition of the ownership structure in a context of high concentration of ownership, relevant presence of banks in firms as creditors and shareholders, and local GAAP.     

Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?

In this paper, the relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance of companies in Singapore and Vietnam is investigated in a dynamic framework. By focusing on two different types of national governance systems (well-developed vs. under-developed), we observe how the relationship is moderated by the national governance quality. We find that the performance effect of concentrated ownership persists in these markets even after the dynamic nature of the ownership concentration–performance relationship is taken into consideration. Our finding supports the prediction of agency theory about the efficient monitoring effect of large shareholders in markets with highly concentrated ownership. In addition, we find that national governance quality does matter when explaining the ownership concentration–performance relationship. The positive effect of concentrated ownership on performance of firms operating in the under-developed national governance system (Vietnam) tends to be stronger than that in the well-established system (Singapore). This finding is consistent with the argument that ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance mechanism which can substitute for weak national governance quality. Econometrically, our findings still hold even after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, inherent in the corporate governance–performance relationship.     

What Drives CEOs to Take on More Risk? Some Evidence from the Laboratory of REITs

Many have pointed to excessive risk‐taking by the CEOs of financial firms as a contributor to the recent worldwide economic crisis. The same observers often blame questionable corporate governance structures and compensation practices for that risk‐taking. But is this perception correct? And what is the relationship between CEO incentives and risk‐taking outside of the financial industry, where the government guarantees provided by deposit insurance could have distorted incentives? In an attempt to answer these questions, the authors analyze the relationship between CEO incentives and corporate risk‐taking by 101 U.S. REITs during the period 2003 to 2007. Their main finding is that corporate risk‐taking, as measured by the growth rate in corporate debt (the only measure of risk that is completely under the control of the CEO), is inversely related to CEO stock ownership—that is, the larger the CEO's equity ownership stake, the slower the growth in debt financing and financial risk‐taking. At the same time, the authors find that financial risk‐taking is positively related to large cash bonuses for the CEOs and to situations in which the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors. Finally, the authors also report that CEOs who are relatively new to the job grow more slowly and borrow less, suggesting that boards of directors can temporarily contain risky expansion plans by the CEO. These results provide support for those corporate governance reformers who wish to cut cash bonus payments for CEOs in favor of long‐term stock ownership.