Assessing Project Risk

Finding the appropriate discount rate, or cost of capital, for evaluating investment projects requires an accurate estimate of project risk. This can be challenging because project risk cannot be estimated directly using the CAPM, but must instead be inferred from a set of traded securities, typically the equity betas of comparable firms in the same industry. These equity betas are then unlevered to undo the effect of comparable companies' financial leverage and obtain estimates of “asset” betas, which are then used to estimate project risk. The authors show that asset betas estimated in this way are likely to overestimate project risk. The equity returns of companies are risky not only because of their existing projects but also because of their growth opportunities. Such growth opportunities often include embedded “real options,” such as the option to delay, expand, or abandon a project. Because such real options are similar to leveraged positions in the underlying project, a company's growth opportunities are typically riskier than its existing projects. Therefore, to properly assess project risk, analysts must also unlever the asset betas derived from comparable company stock returns for the leverage contributed by their growth options. The authors derive a simple method for unlevering asset betas for growth options leverage in order to properly assess project risk. They then show that standard methods for assessing project risk significantly overestimate project costs of capital—by as much as 2–3% in industries such as healthcare, pharmaceuticals, communications, medical equipment, and entertainment. Their method should also be applied to stock return volatility to derive project volatility, an important input for determining the value of a firm's growth opportunities and the appropriate time for investing in these opportunities.     

Are real options a missing piece in the diversification-value puzzle?

This paper examines the impact of corporate diversification on a firm's market value in terms of changes in its mix of value sources between growth options and assets-in-place. We argue that the traditionally assumed replicability of corporate diversification benefits by individual investors might not be as feasible when diversification implies acquiring new growth options as when it only involves assets-in-place investments. We further explain why a different effect of diversification on a firm's mix of value sources can occur, therefore leading to a mediating role of growth options between diversification and market value. Using a panel sample of U.S. firms from 1998 to 2010, we find that a firm's growth options portfolio helps explain the effect of diversification strategy on its market value.     

Agency Cost,Dividend Policy and Growth: The Special Case of REITs

Dividend distribution enhances information transmission, and mitigates agency conflicts by restricting managers’ access to free cash flow, and exposing firms to the scrutiny and monitoring by market participants when raising external capital. The reduction in agency costs and improvement in information dissemination reduce the cost of funds, and investment at more competitive cost of capital enhances firm value. For REITs, because of the mandated high dividend distribution, growth depends on the availability of external capital at competitive rates, such that mitigation of agency costs is critical to sustain growth. We examine the relation between dividends and growth with a sample of U.S. equity REITs. Our data reveal a significantly positive relation between externally financed growth and dividend payments. The relation is stronger among REITs with more growth opportunities, and REITs that issue new equity and debt. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the notion that by reducing agency costs and facilitating capital raising, dividends enhance growth.     

Required Rates of Return for Corporate Investment Appraisal in the Presence of Growth Opportunities

Traditional methods of estimating required rates of return overstate hurdle rates in the presence of growth opportunities. We attempt to quantify this effect by developing a simple model which: (i) identifies those companies that have valuable growth opportunities; (ii) splits the value of shares into ‘assets‐in‐place’ and ‘growth opportunities’; and (iii) splits the equity β into β for ‘assets‐in‐place’ and ‘growth opportunities’. We find growth opportunities for UK companies over the 1990–2004 period to average 33% of equity value. Incorporating the effect of growth opportunities, the average cost of capital for investment purposes falls by 1.1 percentage points.     

Growth Opportunities and Investment Decisions: A New Perspective on the Cost of Capital

This paper shows that it is not always correct to make an upward adjustment to the stock beta in calculating the hurdle rate for capital budgeting even when the project under consideration is riskier than existing assets. The paper also shows that the correct hurdle rate is smaller than the market capitalization rate calculated from the firm's stock beta when the project under consideration has the same risk as existing assets. In addition, it is shown that the market capitalization rate will be an underestimate (overestimate) of the correct hurdle rate when the risk of future assets is greater (smaller) than both the risk of assets in place and that of future capital expenditures. These new results are direct consequences of the insight that the firm's investment opportunities are in fact real call options written on underlying assets.     

Growth opportunities,capital structure and dividend policies in Japan

This paper, using 5308 observations of listed Japanese firms between the years 1988–1992, provides additional evidence on contracting theory arguments for the relation between growth opportunities, capital structure and dividend policies. To avoid the problems of using cross-sectional proxies for time-sequenced variables, this study uses (1) pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis and (2) time-series analysis with a one-year lag for the dependent variables. Results show significant negative relations between growth opportunities and levels of both debt financing and dividend yields after controlling for firm size, profitability, firm keiretsu affiliations and industry regulation. The results are consistent with contracting cost arguments for corporate finance and dividend policies and confirm the importance of growth opportunities in corporate finance theory.     

Bridging the Gap between Interest Rates and Investments

The links between interest rates, cost of capital, hurdle rates, and capital allocation have been remarkably weak during the last few years. For instance, whereas the current yield on the World Government Bond Index is a paltry 1.2%, survey evidence suggests that the median reported investment hurdle rate of S&P 100 companies is as high as 18%. In this report, members of J.P Morgan's corporate finance advisory group explain why the cost of capital for most companies is unlikely to increase materially even if interest rates rise as projected. This suggests that companies have room to lower their hurdle rates. Moreover, as the authors argue, a reduction in hurdle rates is likely to be beneficial since excessively high hurdle rates can have the effect of reducing value by sacrificing profitable growth opportunities and increasing the firm's risk profile. The report concludes with a framework for corporate hurdle rates and capital allocation strategies designed to help companies make better investment decisions.     

The Real Options Component and Market Value of Taiwan Technological Companies

Real options valuation has been applied in real investment extensively. However the empirical researches of real options components’ value are seldom studied. This study uses the panel data model to test whether the stock prices of Taiwan listed companies reflect investor’s expectations regarding the value of real options. This article demonstrates that investors cannot ignore the real options components when evaluating stock market value. The results also confirm that the proportion of a firm’s market value not due to assets-in-place is significantly and positively related to the variables of stock beta, skewness of stock returns, size, capital stock, and research and development. In addition, firms with lower firm life cycle have a higher real options value.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

Stock Liquidity and Investment Opportunities: Evidence from Index Additions

We examine the relation between stock liquidity and investment opportunities in a sample of firms experiencing an exogenous liquidity shock. We find a positive relation between changes in capital expenditures and changes in stock liquidity, indicating that stock liquidity influences corporate investment decisions. This relation is robust to alternative measures of growth opportunities, and is consistent with a liquidity premium in equity returns. That is, an increase in liquidity effectively expands the set of positive NPV projects because it reduces the cost of capital. The results suggest that liquidity-enhancing events benefit shareholders by increasing the pool of viable growth opportunities.     

What's your real cost of capital?

In valuing any investment project or corporate acquisition, executives must decide what discount rate to use in their estimates of future cash flows. The traditional approach is to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has remained fundamentally unchanged for 40 years. But the formula--in particular, its beta element--has long been a source of frustration. In fact, corporate executives and investment bankers routinely fudge their CAPM estimates, say the authors, because experience and intuition tell them the model produces inappropriate discount rates. CAPM has three main problems: First, beta is a measure of both a stock's correlation and its volatility; second, beta is based on historical data; and third, CAPM rates don't take into account the term of the investment. These factors together result in discount rates that defy common sense. As an alternative to CAPM and its beta element, the authors developed a forward-looking approach to calculating a company's cost of capital, the market-derived capital pricing model (MCPM). It does not incorporate any measure of historical stock-to-market correlation, relying instead on estimates of future volatility derived from the options market. This is helpful since investor expectations from the options market are built into a company's current stock price. Using GE as an example, the authors give step-by-step instructions for how to calculate discount rates with MCPM. They also offer evidence from a range of industries to show that MCPM's discount rates are more realistic--especially from the corporate investor's perspective--than are CAPM's.     

Betas, market weights and the cost of capital: The example of Nokia and small cap stocks on the Helsinki Stock Exchange

This paper examines the relationship between the market weight of a single stock and the betas of both that stock and the residual portfolio. Theory suggests that the effect of such a large weight is to significantly reduce the beta of the residual portfolio, and it may also significantly raise the beta of the single stock. Furthermore, substantial changes in a stock's market weight will also affect the market risk premium. These results have important implications for cost of capital estimates in markets where there are one or a few large firms. To illustrate the effect of market weight on beta and the cost of capital, the analysis considers the recent case of Nokia and the Helsinki Stock Exchange during a period when Nokia's market weight ranged from 9% to 72%.     

Optimal capital allocation using RAROC™ and EVA®

Equity capital allocation plays a particularly important role for financial institutions such as banks, who issue equity infrequently but have continuous access to debt capital. In such a context this paper shows that EVA and RAROC based capital budgeting mechanisms have economic foundations. We derive optimal capital allocation under asymmetric information and in the presence of outside managerial opportunities for an institution with a risky and a riskless division. It is shown that the results extend in a consistent manner to the multidivisional case of decentralized investment decisions with a suitable redefinition of economic capital. The decentralization leads to a charge for economic capital based on the division's own realized risk. Outside managerial opportunities increase the usage of capital and lead to overinvestment in risky projects; at the same time more capital is raised but risk limits are binding in more states. An institution with a single risky division should base its hurdle rate for capital allocated on the cost of debt. In contrast, the hurdle rate tends to the cost of equity for a diversified multidivisional firm. The analysis shows that hurdle rates have a common component in contrast to the standard perfect markets result with division-specific hurdle rates.     

Boards,CEO entrenchment,and the cost of capital

Existing research on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover focuses on CEO ability. This paper argues that board ability is also important. Corporate boards are reluctant to replace CEOs, as this makes financing expensive by sending a negative signal about board ability. Entrenchment in this model does not result from CEO power, or from agency problems. Entrenchment is mitigated when there are more assets-in-place relative to investment opportunities. The paper also compares public and private equity. Private ownership eliminates CEO entrenchment, but market signals improve investment decisions. Finally, the model implies that board choice in publicly listed firms will be conservative.     

New estimates of the cost of capital for pharmaceutical firms

Academic researchers, as well as pharmaceutical firms themselves, often use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate a firm's cost of capital. But the CAPM implicitly assumes that cash flows follow a random walk. This assumption is inconsistent with our finding that large U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms' cash flow growth rates display either momentum or mean-reversion. We show that growth rate momentum implies: (1) the systematic risk of a project increases monotonically with time to maturity of the cash flows; and (2) longer duration projects require a higher cost of capital. One of the practical implications of our results is that the traditional CAPM underestimates the cost of capital for some pharmaceutical firms by as much as 2.8%. These findings are quite relevant for the policy debate about the high rates of return earned by pharmaceutical companies, which some claim are pure rents and are not necessary to attract investors. Our theoretical and empirical analysis shows that high returns are often required to compensate for the higher systematic risk of long-duration pharmaceutical cash flows.     

Private Benefits of Control,Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.     

SOME EVIDENCE THAT BANKS USE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS TO LOWER CAPITAL COSTS

To the extent raising external capital is especially costly for banks (as the preceding article suggests), bank managers have incentives to manage their internal cash flow in ways that minimize their need to raise external equity. One way to accomplish this is to establish bank holding companies that set up internal capital markets for the purpose of allocating scarce capital across their various subsidiaries. By “internal capital market” the authors mean a capital budgeting process in which all the lending and investment opportunities of the different subsidiaries are ranked according to their risk-adjusted returns; and all internal capital available for investment is then allocated to the highestranked opportunities until either the capital is exhausted or returns fall below the cost of capital, whichever comes first. As evidence of the operation of internal capital markets in bank holding companies, the authors report the following set of findings from their own recent studies:

• ? For large publicly traded bank holding companies, growth rates in lending are closely tied to the banks' internal cash flow and regulatory capital position.
• ? For the subsidiaries of bank holding companies, what matters most is the capital position and earnings of the holding companies and not of the subsidiaries themselves.
• ? The lending activity of banks affiliated with multiple bank holding companies appears to be less dependent on their own earnings and capital than the lending of unaffiliated banks.

The authors also report that, after being acquired, previously unaffiliated banks increase their lending in local markets. This finding suggests that, contrary to the concerns of critics of bank consolidation, geographic consolidation may make banks more responsive to local lending opportunities.     

Toward Real‐Time Financial Reporting: How to Reduce Investors' Information Gap and the Cost of Capital

Public companies are struggling to provide detailed and accurate guidance in a turbulent world. Many have dropped guidance altogether, or substantially reduced the precision of their guidance. However, they pay a price for the resulting increase in investor uncertainty in the form of a higher cost of capital and reduced equity valuations. This article provides evidence that improving investors' information can help to reduce the cost of capital of public companies. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. The article explores ways for both individual companies and financial regulators to improve investor information and reduce the cost of capital. For individual companies, the proposed solution is more frequent and voluntary provision of information about actual performance in lieu of more extensive financial guidance. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. Quarterly reporting is a matter of tradition while today's information technology could easily provide investors with real‐time, or close to real‐time, financial information. Internal financial controls, the quality of financial reporting, and the cost of capital might all be improved by mandating faster reporting cycles.     

Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital for Property-Liability Insurers

This article presents new evidence on the cost of equity capital by line of insurance for the property‐liability insurance industry. To do so we obtain firm beta estimates and then use the full‐information industry beta (FIB) methodology to decompose the cost of capital by line. We obtain full‐information beta estimates using the standard one‐factor capital asset pricing model and extend the FIB methodology to incorporate the Fama–French three‐factor cost of capital model. The analysis suggests the cost of capital for insurers using the Fama–French model is significantly higher than the estimates based upon the CAPM. In addition, we find evidence of significant differences in the cost of equity capital across lines.