Beyond products: services-based strategy

Services technologies are changing the way companies in every industry--manufacturers and service providers alike--compete. Vertical integration, physical facilities, even a seemingly superior product can no longer assure a competitive edge. Instead, sustainable advantage is more and more likely to come from developing superior capabilities in a few core service skills--and out-sourcing as much of the rest as possible. Within companies, technology is increasing the leverage of service activities: today, more value added comes from design innovations, product image, or other attributes that services create than from the production process. New technologies also let independent enterprises provide world-class services at lower costs than customers could achieve if they performed the activities themselves. These changes have far-reaching implications for how managers structure their organizations and define strategic focus. Companies like Apple, Honda, and Merck show that a less integrated but more focused organization is key to competitive success. They build their strategies around a few highly developed capabilities. And they outsource as many of the other activities in their value chain as possible. To help managers develop an activity-focused strategy, the authors offer a new way to approach competitive analyses, guidelines for determining which activities to outsource and which to retain, and an overview of the risks and rewards of strategic outsourcing. Throughout, they draw on the findings of their three-year study of the major impacts technology has had in the service sector.     

Supporting virtual organizations through constraint fusion

The formation and operation of dynamic and open virtual organizations is a central concern in business‐to‐business e‐commerce. Virtual organizations enable partner companies to develop and manufacture customized products with low costs and rapid delivery. Agent‐based architectures are an effective platform for such virtual organizations because they provide mechanisms to allow organizations to advertise their capabilities, exchange rich information, and synchronize workflows at a high level of abstraction. In this paper, we examine the KRAFT architecture and its features for supporting virtual organizations. In particular, we focus upon KRAFT's agent‐based architecture, and its use of constraints as a knowledge‐exchange medium. We show how constraint fusion supports the design of customized products. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

Selling the brand inside

When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.     

Strategic sourcing: from periphery to the core

As globalization changes the basis of competition, sourcing is moving from the periphery of corporate functions to the core. Always important in terms of costs, sourcing is becoming a strategic opportunity. But few companies are ready for this shift. Outsourcing has grown so sophisticated that even critical functions like engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can-and often should-be moved outside. And that, in turn, is changing the way companies think about their organizations, their value chains, and their competitive positions. Already, a handful of vanguard companies are transforming what used to be purely internal corporate functions into entirely new industries. Companies like UPS, Solectron, and Hewitt have created new business models by concentrating scale and skill within a single function. As these and other function-based companies grow, so does the potential value of outsourcing to all companies. Migrating from a vertically integrated company to a specialized provider of a single function is not a winning strategy for everyone. But all companies need to rigorously reassess each of their functions as possible outsourcing candidates. Presented in this article is a simple three-step process to identify which functions your company needs to own and protect, which can be best performed by what kinds of partners, and which could be turned into new business opportunities. The result of such an analysis will be a comprehensive capabilities-sourcing strategy. As a detailed examination of 7-Eleven's experience shows, the success of the strategy often hinges on the creativity with which partnerships are organized and managed. But only by first taking a broad, strategic view of capabilities sourcing can your company gain the greatest benefit from all of its sourcing choices.     

The uncompromising leader

Managing the tension between performance and people is at the heart of the CEO's job. But CEOs under fierce pressure from capital markets often focus solely on the shareholder, which can lead to employee disenchantment. Others put so much stock in their firms' heritage that they don't notice as their organizations slide into complacency. Some leaders, though, manage to avoid those traps and create high-commitment, high-performance (HCHP) companies. The authors' in-depth research of HCHP CEOs reveals several shared traits: These CEOs earn the trust of their organizations through their openness to the unvarnished truth. They are deeply engaged with their people, and their exchanges are direct and personal. They mobilize employees around a focused agenda, concentrating on only one or two initiatives. And they work to build collective leadership capabilities. These leaders also forge an emotionally resonant shared purpose across their companies. That consists of a three-part promise: The company will help employees build a better world and deliver performance they can be proud of, and will provide an environment in which they can grow. HCHP CEOs approach finding a firm's moral and strategic center in a competitive market as a calling, not an engineering problem. They drive their firms to be strongly market focused while at the same time reinforcing their firms' core values. They are committed to short-term performance while also investing in long-term leadership and organizational capabilities. By refusing to compromise on any of these terms, they build great companies.     

Entering China: an unconventional approach

Conventional wisdom has it that the best way to do business in China is through an equity joint venture (EJV) with a well-connected Chinese partner. But pioneering companies are starting a trend toward a new way to enter that market: as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, or WFOE. Increasingly, says the author, joint ventures do not offer foreign companies what they need to succeed in China. For example, many companies want to do business nationally, but the prospects for finding a Chinese partner with national scope are poor. Moreover, there are often conflicting perceptions between partners about how to operate an EJV: Chinese companies, for example, typically have a more immediate interest in profits than foreign investors do. By contrast, the author asserts, WFOEs are faster to set up and easier to manage; and they allow managers to expand operations more rapidly. That makes them the perfect solution, right? The answer is a qualified yes. First, foreign companies will still need sources of guanxi, or social and political connections. Second, managers must take steps to avoid trampling on China's cultural or economic sovereignty. Third and perhaps most important, foreign companies must be prepared to bring something of value to China-usually in the form of jobs or new technology that can help the country develop. Companies willing to make the effort, says the author, can reap the rewards of China's burgeoning marketplace.     

Aligning incentives in supply chains

Most companies don't worry about the behavior of their supply chain partners. Instead, they expect the supply chain to work efficiently without interference, as if guided by Adam Smith's famed invisible hand. In their study of more than 50 supply networks, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman found that companies often looked out for their own interests and ignored those of their network partners. Consequently, supply chains performed poorly. Those results aren't shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each with its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction for a chain to deliver goods and services to consumers quickly and cost-effectively. According to the authors, a supply chain works well only if the risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. In fact, misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts, inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service. The fates of all supply chain partners are interlinked: If the firms work together to serve consumers, they will all win. However, they can do that only if incentives are aligned. Companies must acknowledge that the problem of incentive misalignment exists and then determine its root cause and align or redesign incentives. They can improve alignment by, for instance, adopting revenue-sharing contracts, using technology to track previously hidden information, or working with intermediaries to build trust among network partners. It's also important to periodically reassess incentives, because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business conditions alter the alignment of incentives.     

When are outside directors effective?

This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases when outsiders are added to the board, and when the cost of information is high, performance worsens when outsiders are added to the board. The estimates provide some of the cleanest estimates to date that board independence matters, and the finding that board effectiveness depends on information cost supports a nascent theoretical literature emphasizing information asymmetry. We also find that firms compose their boards as if they understand that outsider effectiveness varies with information costs.     

Strategic renewal for business units

Over the past decade, business units have increasingly taken the role of strategy formulation away from corporate headquarters. The change makes sense: business units are closer to customers, competitors, and costs. Nevertheless, business units can fail, just as headquarters once did, by losing their focus on the organization's priorities and capabilities. John Whitney--turnaround expert and professor of management at Columbia University--offers a method for refocusing companies that he calls the strategic-renewal process. The principles behind the process are straightforward, but its execution demands extensive data, rigorous analysis, and the judgment of key decision makers. However, when applied with diligence, it can produce a strategy that yields both growth and profit. To carry out the process, managers must analyze, one by one or in logical groupings, the company's customers, the products it sells, and the services it offers in light of three criteria: strategic importance, significance, and profitability. Does a given customer, product, or service mesh with the organization's goals? Is it significant in terms of current and future revenues? And is it truly profitable when all costs are care fully considered? Customers, products, and services that do not measure up, says the author, must be weeded out relentlessly. Although the process is a painstaking one, the article offers clear thinking on why-and how-to go about it. A series of exhibits takes managers through the questions they need to raise, and two matrices offer Whitney's concentrated wisdom on when to cultivate--and when to prune.     

Getting offshoring right

The prospect of offshoring and outsourcing business processes has captured the imagination of CEOs everywhere. In the past five years, a rising number of companies in North America and Europe have experimented with this strategy, hoping to reduce costs and gain strategic advantage. But many businesses have had mixed results. According to several studies, half the organizations that have shifted processes offshore have failed to generate the expected financial benefits. What's more, many of them have faced employee resistance and consumer dissatisfaction. Clearly, companies have to rethink how they formulate their offshoring strategies. A three-part methodology can help. First, companies need to prioritize their processes, ranking each based on two criteria: the value it creates for customers and the degree to which the company can capture some of that value. Companies will want to keep their core (highest-priority) processes in-house and consider outsourcing their commodity (low-priority) processes; critical (moderate-priority) processes are up for debate and must be considered carefully. Second, businesses should analyze all the risks that accompany offshoring and look systematically at their critical and commodity processes in terms of operational risk (the risk that processes won't operate smoothly after being offshored) and structural risk (the risk that relationships with service providers may not work as expected). Finally, companies should determine possible locations for their offshore efforts, as well as the organizational forms--such as captive centers and joint ventures--that those efforts might take. They can do so by examining each process's operational and structural risks side by side. This article outlines the tools that will help companies choose the right processes to offshore. It also describes a new organizational structure called the extended organization, in which companies specify the quality of services they want and work alongside providers to get that quality.     

Is American business working for the poor?

At first glance, poverty seems to have little to do with business. When most people--managers included--think about poverty, they assume that people are poor because they are isolated from the mainstream economy, not productive participants in it. But according to Harvard University professors Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood, this is a misleading image of the true face of poverty in the United States today. Most poor adults--and a full 90% of poor children--live in families where work is the norm, not the exception. Poor people often work or want to work. But at the low-wage end of the American economy, having a job is no guarantee of avoiding poverty. Poverty is a business issue, then, because the American poor are part of the American work force. And this poses a problem for managers. In a more competitive and fast-changing economic environment, the performance of companies increasingly depends on the capabilities of their employees. In response to this human-resource challenge, more and more managers are embracing the language of "empowerment". And yet how can low-wage employees believe empowerment when their experience of work is, quite literally, impoverishment? It is unlikely that American companies can create the work force of the future with the poverty policies of the past. Fortunately, there are some simple policy mechanisms that can assist the working poor without putting an undue burden on business. Enacting them, however, requires managers to see poverty policy as one part of a national human-resource strategy that links the strategic concerns of companies to a broad social agenda.     

The hard side of change management

Everyone agrees that managing change is tough, but few can agree on how to do it. Most experts are obsessed with "soft" issues, such as culture and motivation, but, say the authors, focusing on these issues alone won't bring about change. Companies also need to consider the hard factors-like the time it takes to complete a change initiative, the number of people required to execute it, and so forth. When the authors studied change initiatives at 225 companies, they found a consistent correlation between the outcomes of change programs (success versus failure) and four hard factors, which they called DICE: project duration, particularly the time between project reviews; integrity of performance, or the capabilities of project teams; the level of commitment of senior executives and staff; and the additional effort required of employees directly affected by the change. The DICE framework is a simple formula for calculating how well a company is implementing, or will be able to implement, its change initiatives. The framework comprises a set of simple questions that help executives score their projects on each of the four factors; the lower the score, the more likely the project will succeed. Companies can use DICE assessments to force conversations a bout projects, to gauge whether projects are on track or in trouble, and to manage project portfolios. The authors have used these four factors to predict the outcomes and guide the execution of more than 1,000 change management programs worldwide. Not only has the correlation held, but no other factors (or combination of factors) have predicted outcomes as successfully.     

Getting the most out of all your customers

Companies spend billions of dollars on direct marketing, targeting individual customers with ever more accuracy. Yet despite the power of the myriad data-collecting and analytical tools at their disposal, they're still having trouble optimizing their direct-marketing investments. Many marketers try to minimize costs by pursuing only those customers who are cheap to find and cheap to keep. Others try to get the most customers they possibly can and keep all of them for as long as they can. But a customer need not be loyal to be highly profitable, and many loyal customers turn out to be highly unprofitable. Companies can get more out of direct marketing if they see it as a single system for generating profits than if they try to maximize performance measures at each stage of the process. This article describes a tool for doing just that. Called ARPRO (Allocating Resources for Profits), the tool is essentially a complex regression analysis that can estimate the impact of a company's direct-marketing investments on the profitability of its customer pool. With data that companies already gather, the tool can show managers how much to spend on acquisition versus retention and even what percentage of their funds they should allocate to the different direct-marketing channels. Using the model, companies can easily see that even small deviations from the optimal levels of customer profitability are expensive. Applying it to one catalog retailer showed, for instance, that a 10% reduction in marketing costs would lead to a 1.8 million dollar drop in long-term customer profits. Conversely, spending 69% less on marketing would actually increase average customer profitability at one B2B service provider by 42%. What's more, the tool can show that finding the optimal balance between investments in acquisition and retention can be more important than finding the optimum amount to invest overall.     

When to ally & when to acquire

Acquisitions and alliances are two pillars of growth strategy. But most businesses don't treat the two as alternative mechanisms for attaining goals. Consequently, companies take over firms they should have collaborated with, and vice versa, and make a mess of both acquisitions and alliances. It's easy to see why companies don't weigh the relative merits and demerits of acquisitions and alliances before choosing horses for courses. The two strategies differ in many ways: Acquisition deals are competitive, based on market prices, and risky; alliances are cooperative, negotiated, and not so risky. Companies habitually deploy acquisitions to increase scale or cut costs and use partnerships to enter new markets, customer segments, and regions. Moreover, a company's initial experiences often turn into blinders. If the firm pulls off an alliance or two, it tends to enter into alliances even when circumstances demand acquisitions. Organizational barriers also stand in the way. In many companies, an M&A group, which reports to the finance head, handles acquisitions, while a separate business development unit looks after alliances. The two teams work out of different locations, jealously guard turf, and, in effect, prevent companies from comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the strategies. But companies could improve their results, the authors argue, if they compared the two strategies to determine which is best suited to the situation at hand. Firms such as Cisco that use acquisitions and alliances appropriately grow faster than rivals do. The authors provide a framework to help organizations systematically decide between acquisition and alliance by analyzing three sets of factors: the resources and synergies they desire, the marketplace they compete in, and their competencies at collaborating.     

Building collaborative enterprise

Can large companies be both innovative and efficient? Yes, argue Adler, of the University of Southern California; Heckscher, of Rutgers; and Prusak, an independent consultant. But they must develop new organizational capabilities that will create the atmosphere of trust that knowledge work requires--and the coordinating mechanisms to make it scalable. Specifically, such organizations must learn to: Define a shared purpose that guides what people at all levels of the organization are trying to achieve together; Cultivate an ethic of contribution in which the highest value is accorded to people who look beyond their specific roles and advance the common purpose; Develop scalable procedures for coordinating people's efforts so that process-management activities become truly interdependent; and Create an infrastructure in which individuals' spheres of influence overlap and collaboration is both valued and rewarded. These four goals may sound idealized, but the imperative to achieve them is practical, say the authors. Only the truly collaborative enterprises that can tap into everyone's ideas---in an organized way--will compete imaginatively, quickly, and cost-effectively enough to become the household names of this century.     

A new game plan for C players

It's a big driver of business success, but one that executives are loath to talk about: upgrading the talent pool by weeding out "C" players from management. These aren't the incompetent or unethical managers whom organizations dismiss without a backward glance; C performers deliver results that are acceptable--barely--but they fail to innovate or to inspire the people they lead. The authors of The War for Talent have studied what it takes to upgrade an organization's talent pool. In this article, they explore the hidden costs of tolerating under-performance and acknowledge the reasons why executives may shy away from dealing decisively with C players. They recommend that organizations take an "iron hand in a velvet glove" approach to managing subpar performers. That is, companies should establish rigorous, disciplined processes for assessing and dealing with low-performing managers but still treat them with respect. The authors outline three ironhanded steps. First, executives must identify C players by evaluating their talents and distributing employee performances along an assessment curve. Second, executives must agree on explicit action plans that articulate the improvements or changes that C performers must achieve within six to 12 months. And third, executives should hold managers accountable for carrying out the action plans. Without such discipline, procrastination, rationalization, and inaction will prevail. The authors also emphasize the need for the "velvet glove." Executives must ensure that low performers are treated with dignity, so they should offer candid feedback, instructive coaching, and generous severance packages and outplacement support. The authors' approach isn't about being tough on people; it's about being relentlessly focused on performance.     

Changing the way we change

More and more companies struggle with growing competition by introducing improvements into every aspect of performance. But the treadmill keeps moving faster, the companies keep working harder, and results improve slowly or not at all. The problem here is not the improvement programs. The problem is that the whole burden of change typically rests on so few people. Companies achieve real agility only when every function and process--when every person--is able and eager to rise to every challenge. This type and degree of fundamental change, commonly called revitalization or transformation, is what many companies seek but rarely achieve because they have never before identified the factors that produce sustained transformational change. The authors identify three interventions that will restore companies to vital agility and then keep them in good health: incorporating employees fully into the principal business challenges facing the company, leading the organization in a different way in order to sharpen and maintain incorporation and constructive stress, and instilling mental disciplines that will make people behave differently and then help them sustain their new behavior. The authors discovered these basic sources of revitalization by tracking the change efforts of Sears, Roebuck & Company, Royal Dutch Shell, and the United States Army. The organizations used these interventions to alter the way their people experienced their own power and identity, as well as the way they dealt with conflict and learning. As at Sears, Shell, and the U.S. Army, any major shift in those four elements will create a landmark shift in any organization's operating state or culture.     

Human due diligence

Most companies do a thorough job of financial due diligence when they acquire other companies. But all too often, deal makers simply ignore or underestimate the significance of people issues in mergers and acquisitions. The consequences are severe. Most obviously, there's a high degree of talent loss after a deal's announcement. To make matters worse, differences in decision-making styles lead to infighting; integration stalls; and productivity declines. The good news is that human due diligence can help companies avoid these problems. Done early enough, it helps acquirers decide whether to embrace or kill a deal and determine the price they are willing to pay. It also lays the groundwork for smooth integration. When acquirers have done their homework, they can uncover capability gaps, points of friction, and differences in decision making. Even more important, they can make the critical "people" decisions-who stays, who goes, who runs the combined business, what to do with the rank and file-at the time the deal is announced or shortly thereafter. Making such decisions within the first 30 days is critical to the success of a deal. Hostile situations clearly make things more difficult, but companies can and must still do a certain amount of human due diligence to reduce the inevitable fallout from the acquisition process and smooth the integration. This article details the steps involved in conducting human due diligence. The approach is structured around answering five basic questions: Who is the cultural acquirer? What kind of organization do you want? Will the two cultures mesh? Who are the people you most want to retain? And how will rank-and-file employees react to the deal? Unless an acquiring company has answered these questions to its satisfaction, the acquisition it is making will be very likely to end badly.     

Six dangerous myths about pay

Every day, executives make decisions about pay, and they do so in a landscape that's shifting. As more and more companies base less of their compensation on straight salary and look to other financial options, managers are bombarded with advice about the best approaches to take. Unfortunately, much of that advice is wrong. Indeed, much of the conventional wisdom and public discussion about pay today is misleading, incorrect, or both. The result is that business people are adopting wrongheaded notions about how to pay people and why. In particular, they are subscribing to six dangerous myths about pay. Myth #1: labor rates are the same as labor costs. Myth #2: cutting labor rates will lower labor costs. Myth #3: labor costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs. Myth #4: keeping labor costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge. Myth #5: individual incentive pay improves performance. Myth #6: people work primarily for the money. The author explains why these myths are so pervasive, shows where they go wrong, and suggests how leaders might think more productively about compensation. With increasing frequency, the author says, he sees managers harming their organizations by buying into--and acting on--these myths. Those that do, he warns, are probably doomed to endless tinkering with pay that at the end of the day will accomplish little but cost a lot.