Inflation convergence in the EMS: Some additional evidence. A comment

Conclusions As in Caporale and Pittis, this paper finds significant evidence supporting the hypothesis of long-run equilibrium relationships between inflation rates in countries which participate in the ERM. However, the results differ in several important respects. First, the evidence rejects a dynamic specification in terms of inflation differentials against Germany and in at least one important case, Table 5, it is clear that imposing this restriction may lead to invalid inferences on the role of the ERM as a mechanism to achieve inflation convergence. Second, on the issue of German leadership the results given in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the German inflation rate cannot be considered weakly exogenous. Rather it shares a long-run relationship with inflation in both ERM and non-ERM economies and responds to deviations from these equilibria. Finally, as these results also hold for a sample period twice the length of that used by Caporale and Pittis they cast considerable doubt on their assertion that cointegrating relationships are unlikely to be detected when “the dynamic process of convergence is still going on”.     

Adoption of the euro: Why is the Czech approach cautious?

When published, the Czech Euro-area Accession Strategy signalled a rather cautious approach to adopting the euro in comparison to the intentions of other EU acceding countries. The euro adoption was scheduled around 2010 and the ERM II was viewed only as a waiting room. The Czech strategy was attuned to specific features of the Czech economy. Although inflation and nominal interest rates converged to the EMU levels before EU entry, large fiscal deficits and the need for significant fiscal reform did not make it possible to meet the Maastrich criteria soon. Moreover, real convergence was viewed as a priority for the forthcoming years and, consequently, the strategy was aimed at maintaining nominal flexibility in order to cushion consequences of price and wage rigidities during the peak period of the catch-up process.     

Central Bank Autonomy,the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992

This paper analyzes the determinants of inflation in Italy over the period 1970–1992. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of central bank independence in influencing monetary growth, and on the role of monetary growth and of the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in affecting inflation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Bank of Italy lacked independence and the ERM was still not credible, monetary growth was highly unstable and was the main determinant of Italian inflation, although oil price and tax shocks also played a role. After the March 1983 general exchange rate realignment and the French U-turn, the ERM became more credible and monetary growth stopped being a significant determinant of inflation; instead, the German inflation became the main variable influencing Italian inflation.     

The ERM II issues: An interpretation of the Slovenian approach

This paper overviews the joint strategy of the Bank of Slovenia and of the Government of Slovenian for the policy management in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) and the eventual adoption of the euro. The current prospects of the Slovenian economy are favorable for early entry into ERM II so that the currency union can be acceded as soon as possible. The ERM II-connected risks, in particular an asymmetric credit financed demand boom, require a new policy mix to be set in place. While the monetary policy will focus on the tight management of the nominal exchange rate, the role of inflation restraint and shock absorption will rely on fiscal and income policies. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily correspond to those of the Board of the Bank of Slovenia. This paper was prepared for the panel “Monetary Policy and EMU Enlargement: The Adoption of the Euro” at the International Atlantic Economic Conference held in Lisbon in March 2004.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Did the underlying behaviour of inflation change in the 1980s? A study of 17 countries

Did the Underlying Behaviour of Inflation Change in the 1980s? A Study of 17 Countries. - Have the ERM member countries experienced a regime change to a lower degree of persistence for inflation in the 1980s compared to the 1970s? Some results give the impression that deflationary policies associated with ERM membership may have reduced the mean level of inflation, but did not reduce the persistence parameter over the last decade. However, other results show that the persistence parameter does decline for a majority of ERM members. Surprisingly, the results also show stronger evidence of a fall in inflation persistence for some non-ERM countries who adopted a strong anti-inflationary stance over the same period.     

Designing and Choosing Macroeconomic Frameworks: The Position of the UK after Four Years of the Euro

Fiscal and monetary policy frameworks have become increasinglypopular as disenchantment with active stabilization policy hasincreased. Frameworks need to be designed to achieve targetsefficiently and stabilize the volatility of the economy. Thecurrent fiscal and monetary frameworks in the UK and the euroarea can be improved. The UK economy went through major regimechanges in the 1990s and as a result it has experienced morestable outcomes in the last few years. Whether the UK remainsoutside EMU or becomes a member, inflation, real interest rates,and the level of government borrowing would be similar. However,further gains to stability and hence to potential productivityare available if the UK becomes a member of EMU. The UK andthe euro-area countries currently have economic cycles thatare coherent, experiencing very similar cyclical positions.Although interest rates differ, it is clear that these smalldifferences in rates have little impact on the cyclical positionof these economies. In addition we find no evidence that outputin the UK is excessively sensitive to changes in interest rates,at least when compared to the other large European countries.     

The linkage of interest rates within the EMS

The Linkage of Interest Rates within the EMS. — The paper explores the linkage between interest rates in Germany and the United States with those on other currencies within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System. Monthly data on money market interest rates and rolling window cointegration techniques are used. The principal findings are that during the early part of the sample period (1979–1995), there is widespread cointegration between both US and German interest rates and those on other currencies in the ERM; but during the later part of the sample, this “worldwide” linkage disintegrates, cointegration between German and other ERM interest rates strengthening whilst that with the US disappears.     

Was ECB's monetary policy optimal?

Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactorily in the first phase of EMU. Nevertheless, this paper asks whether monetary policy could not have been improved. In the last three years, Euroland was confronted with the first external shock. Oil prices increased considerably, leading to an increase of headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000–01. With a specific Taylor rule one can very well understand, how the ECB sets interest rates, but it turns out that monetary policy based on the estimated Taylor reaction function was rather backward than forward looking. While it reacted with a lag to the actions of the U.S. Fed, it was overly cautious by targeting total HICP inflation. Here it is strongly argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy oriented towards core inflation would have resulted in a much better economic performance. The business cycle downturn could have been mitigated with no additional inflation risks.     

Convergence of EMU Equity Portfolios

This paper demonstrates that, after integration, equity portfolios of countries that joined the European Monetary Union have converged at faster rate than those of NON EMU countries. This outcome can be interpreted as a combination of the convergence of inflation rates and the convergence of investment barriers. On the one hand, the common monetary policy might have driven a stronger comovement in inflation rates, leading to increasingly similar hedging strategies among member countries. On the other hand, exposure to the common currency might have homogenized bilateral investment barriers, thus inducing increasingly similar portfolio allocations among member countries. We find that the comovement of inflation rates has not significantly increased after EMU inception, pointing toward an exclusive role for convergence in investment barriers.     

Convergence of inflation: A necessary prerequisite for EMU?

This article assesses the rationale for inflation convergence as a major criterion for the passage to the final stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). A simple two-country model is developed to examine the effects of the change in regime under different hypotheses concerning agents' expectations. The results suggest that, in the absence of convergence, the move to EMU is likely to produce spillover effects from the high-inflation to the low-inflation country. The latter, therefore, has a strong incentive to request strict convergence criteria for inflation before moving to EMU.     

Monetary policy and EMU enlargement: Issues regarding ERM II and adoption of the euro in Estonia

The aim of the paper is to give an overview of the issues related to Estonia's entry into ERM II. For that purpose the article describes the official position of the Estonian authorities regarding entry into ERM II and the adoption of the euro, explains the rationale for early entry into ERM II, and presents the reasons for maintaining the currency board arrangement until full membership in EMU. Also, the challenges of the adoption of the euro are discussed. The article concludes that early entry into ERM II is appropriate as the perceived costs—short-term costs of fiscal consolidation and the cost of giving up independent monetary policy and flexible exchange rates as stabilization tools—are practically non-existent in Estonia. The paper argues that the high level of exchange rate stability and nominal convergence, relatively high flexibility of the economy, and integration with the euro area support the rationale for maintaining the currency board arrangement and adopting the euro early.     

Inflation Expectations and Inflation Uncertainty in the Eurozone: Evidence from Survey Data

This paper uses the European Commission’s Consumer Survey to assess whether inflation expectations have converged and whether inflation uncertainty has diminished following the introduction of the euro in Europe. Consumers’ responses to the survey suggest that inflation expectations depend more on past national inflation rates than on the ECB’s anchor for price stability. Inflation expectations do not converge significantly faster than actual inflation rates. Regarding inflation uncertainty, the data indicate a relationship with country size following the introduction of the euro. This suggests that within EMU, inflation uncertainty may increase in countries that have a smaller influence on ECB policy. JEL no.  D84, E31, E58     

Has there been any structural convergence in the transmission of European monetary policies?

This paper makes three contributions. First we present a technique by which the monetary transmission mechanism of Germany, France, the UK and the Eurozone can be decomposed into its component cycles, compared across economies and across time. As a result, we found that the individual data generating processes have varied over time. Second we show that Germany has now converged on the rest of Europe and not vice versa, although Germany had dominated monetary policy making in Europe for many years. Third, we show that the UK as an outsider has behaved like a peripheral EMU country, even when EMU was not in place. In other words, the transmission mechanisms of Germany and the UK were fundamentally different. Hence, when that German monetary policy dominated Europe in a way that was not in line with the rest of Europe, never mind the UK, it is no surprise that the UK eventually left the ERM (1992). The current financial crisis may enforce the trend of convergence of the transmission mechanism. But there have been signs of a divergence between core and periphery, to some extent involving the UK, so this general convergence, as opposed to tighter convergence in the core, may not last.

The political economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism

The apparent tendency of ERM countries other than Germany to experience high real exchange rates and to subsidize manufacturing is explained by a rational expectations model in which there is optimally asymmetric policy reaction to good and bad times—devaluation in bad, no revaluation in good. The resulting expected depreciation (at all times) causes inflation in normal and good times to be less than expected inflation, raising real wages and the real exchange rate, and creating pressures for subsidy of the traded sector.     

Foreign Capital Flows,Uncertainties of Exchange Rates and Central Bank Independence: Implications for Emerging Economies

Utilizing time series data for a panel of 22 emerging countries and applying Granger causality tests, this paper extends the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and uncertainties of inflation by including the phenomena of exchange rates and foreign capital flows. There are two specific objectives of this investigation. The first objective is to see whether uncertainty of inflation induces volatility of exchange rates, and vice versa, under differing degrees of CBI. The second objective is to explore whether the dynamics of the former relationship influence foreign capital flows in turn and, if so, whether the extent of CBI plays any role in shaping that influence. The period of study spans the years 1968 through 2013. Conditional variances for inflation and exchange rates define proxies for uncertainties of inflation and exchange rates in the empirical analysis. Additionally, annual inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) provide measures for foreign capital flows in the analysis. Results of causality tests for high and low CBI country subgroups show interesting differences. For the high CBI countries, uncertainty of inflation and uncertainty of exchange rates do not share any causal relationship whatsoever between them. However, a weak link runs from FDI to uncertainties of inflation in the long run. This may be indicative of the disciplined monetary policy and tamed inflation in these countries. Contrastingly, for the low CBI countries, there is strong evidence of causal links running from uncertainties of inflation to uncertainties of exchange rates on the one hand and to FDI flows on the other. In addition, there is indication of a bi-directional causal link between FDI flows and exchange rates for these countries.     

One Money and Sixteen Needs: Has the ECB’s Monetary Policy Become More Balanced Towards the Needs of the Member States?

In this paper we analyze whether the ECB’s monetary policy has become more balanced towards the needs of the individual member states with the passage of time. We assume that the ECB’s monetary policy stance is in line with a Taylor rule and based on the overall situation in the Euro area, more specifically on the Euro area inflation rate and the overall business cycle position in the area. The question therefore boils down to investigating whether inflation and business cycles have converged since the start of the monetary union. We show that the ECB, if in existence in the 1990s, would have had an impossible task. This is because inflation and business cycles still strongly differed in that time, although convergence substantially increased in the run up to the monetary union. In this respect, the decade under EMU drastically differs from the preceding one. This being said, the evidence for a further improvement in the course of the first decade of the new millennium is mixed. This is because although inflation has further converged, business cycles have shown a tendency for increased divergence. If, however, we are willing to put weights on inflation and output gap divergence (as implied by the Taylor rule), we conclude that also in the course of the period under EMU in general the ECB’s monetary policy has become more in line with the needs of the individual members. Looking at individual countries, we show that during the first decade of its existence the ECB’s interest rate was most fitted to the needs of France and Italy, and least to the needs of Ireland and Greece (both too low) and Germany (too high). To a lesser extent there were also mismatches for Spain and Portugal (both too low). In the more recent period since 2005, the mismatch between the desired domestic interest rate and the desired ECB rate has come down for most countries (most noticeable Germany). For Belgium (for which a higher interest rate was more appropriate), on the other hand, the mismatch increased. These overall positive findings, however, offer no guarantee that the task of the ECB will become easier in the future.     

Purchasing Power Parity Between the UK and Germany: The Euro Era

We use the Johansen cointegration approach to assess the empirical validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) between the UK and Germany since the introduction of the euro. We conduct the empirical analysis in the context of the global financial crisis that began in 2007 and find that it directly affects the cointegration space. We fail to validate the Johansen and Juselius (1992) original hypothesis that nonstationarity of PPP associates with the nonstationarity of interest rate differentials to produce a stationary relation. On the other hand, we do not reject PPP. We find that PPP cointegrates with inflation differentials. We also find, contrary to conventional wisdom, that (i) equilibrium adjustment occurs between the German and UK inflation rates, while weak exogeneity exists for the German and UK interest rates and the PPP condition, and (ii) three common trends associated with the German interest rate the UK interest rate, and the PPP condition “push” the system with the German interest rate and the PPP condition playing dominant roles in affecting inflation in both Germany and the UK. These results cast serious doubt on the presumed independence of the UK monetary policy.     

Inflation and total factor productivity in Germany

Conclusions This paper has found a significant and substantial negative relationship between inflation and economic growth in Germany. Thus, inflation substantially reduced the rate of productivity growth and output growth in Germany. German policymakers, especially the Bundesbank, have emphasized the importance of low inflation rates, and inflation in Germany has been less than in most OECD countries. As a result, Germany has benefitted from relatively high rates of economic growth. But had the Bundesbank succeeded in achieving zero inflation, the underlying rate of productivity growth would have been almost a third higher and output growth about a sixth higher.     

Does the dispersion of unit labor cost dynamics in the EMU imply long-run divergence?

Using unit labor cost (ULC) data from Euro area countries as well as US States and German Länder we investigate inflation convergence using different approaches, namely panel unit root tests, cointegration tests and error-correction models. All in all we cannot reject convergence of ULC growth in EMU. However, country-specific deviations from the rest of the currency union are much more pronounced and much more persistent in Europe than in the US or Germany. This holds before and after the introduction of the common currency. Hence, asymmetric shocks in the future might take a long time to dissipate.